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Thread: lets rethink Jointness

  1. #21
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default That's not counter insurgency, that's counter piracy

    Quote Originally Posted by selil View Post
    *Cough* Somali Pirates *Cough*
    and it's been a naval role for centuries. So not COIN but COPI.

    How are they doing on that nowadays, by the way...

  2. #22
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    Default cough?

    *Cough* Somali Pirates *Cough*
    Yep, the pirates are winning over the cargo ship population by first coercing them to act in accordance within pirate expectations, and then as the world's cargo fleets realize that the world's navies can't protect them they'll recognize the pirates as the new government of the sea and willingly start supporting them. This must be an insurgency, and it is obviously the Navy's problem. In all seriousness, pirates like other organized criminal groups do present a challenge to the State. I still think our definitions for COIN, FID, UW, etc. are inadequate to address the security challenges we face today. Words have meaning, and many times those meanings can lmit our understanding of reality.

    As for joint operations, our joint doctrine has some flaws, for example the aspects of it that are ATO centric (time table driven operations that nests well with the way the Air Force manages operations, but not necessarily with the other services), which is one example of a process that should be largely service doctrine, yet in many ways the ATO drives our joint targeting process.

    I think the reality is that most of the problems with joint operations (I don't want to touch procurement and similiar issues) is not the doctrine, but rather how the doctrine is put into practice (if it is put into practice). In this case the shortfalls are due to the personalties involved, not the doctrine. All people, even our best commanders, are not without fault. It is a human trait we cannot overcome (even with EBO); it is simply part of the uncertainty of war. So when I read comments on one joint command being Army centric, and another Navy centric, that isn't a reflection of our joint doctrine, it is a recognition of the failure of people to transition from service centric methodology to joint methodology. Still I believe we are getting better at joint operations each year. I personally wouldn't want to fight an OIF-1 like fight without the synergized capabilities of our joint force empowered by our joint doctrine. Call me bias, but like many of you I have seen the power that this joint force can bring to bare on a situation.

    Admittedly our joint doctrine is largely focused on warfighting, NEO, etc., so it doesn't sufficiently address the role of the services in an irregular warfare scenario (we'll get there). The reality is IW is largely ground pounder focused, with air and sea power providing critical enablers. All the services play critical roles, but part of our service culture, based perhaps on our captialist social norms and our Congressional funding process, motivates many officers to attempt to undermine the other services and overly boost the value of their service (or branch). This iis what causes jointness to fail.

    Look at the bright side, we know we have our faults, but generally our enemies are much worse. They're stuck with the imperfection of being human too.

  3. #23
    Council Member Mark O'Neill's Avatar
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    Default What he said

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    and it's been a naval role for centuries. So not COIN but COPI.

    How are they doing on that nowadays, by the way...
    Selil,

    Mate, surely after all this time on SWJ and the countless posts, you don't mistake the criminal act of piracy for insurgency? where have we failed?



    Mark

  4. #24
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    Default

    Selil and Bill Moore raise some very interesting issues, and I for one am not ready to dismiss the issue of whether or not piracy is insurgency.

    Nor am I convinced that piracy is a Navy problem; God help us if it is.

    The topic deserves more and deeper analysis.

  5. #25
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
    Selil and Bill Moore raise some very interesting issues, and I for one am not ready to dismiss the issue of whether or not piracy is insurgency.

    Nor am I convinced that piracy is a Navy problem; God help us if it is.

    The topic deserves more and deeper analysis.
    I have used the Barbary Pirates as an example of Small Wars and Irregular War--with a dash of COIN thrown in as in the pirates against the world's maritime-based economy of the day. Interesting that recent statements by the Somali pirates point to their "country"'s disastrous state and say they turned to piracy against the world. Recent connections between the Muslim extremists and the Somali pirates reinforce that connection. All of that may be streched a bit too far but I feel very comfortable in seeing the phenomenon as an element of irregular warfare. Our Navy runs hot and cold on the issue of brown water operations; sometimes they are for the concept, sometimes they are not. At least some of them are looking at it.


    This relates well to the DoD Directive on IW under discussion on the blog. That directive gives JFCOM the mission to push the training for IW rather than SOCOM. I see that as a good thing not because SOCOM cannot handle IW--they can and do so quite handily. Too many folks however across the services would have seen that as a reason to once again forget about IW, COIN, or any related matter.

    Tom

  6. #26
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Counter Piracy was certainly the reason we created a Navy, and shaped their engagement from 1803 to Stephen Decatur in 1815(or so). But the decisive actions in those campaigns happend on land and were executed by Marines.

    The at Sea portion of countering piracy is important today as well, but the ocean is a big area. There those who say that we then need to implement a blockade. Well as I recall the coast of Somalia alone is as long as the coast of California. Navy ships are big, pirate "ships" are more like 11M RHIBs. That too is too costly and too much area. Once again we will need to follow the vipers to their nest and kill them there.

    Young men are becoming pirates in growing numbers because they escape the norm and gain rockstar-like status and money. Governments turn a blind eye because they are not held accountable for doing so, and also gain money to their weak economies in general, and to their own pockets in particular.

    Simple cost/benefit analysis by all. We need an engagement plan where the benefit exceeds the cost; and we (we being the global maritime economy) need to make the cost of being a pirate exceed the benefit. It will always exist, but clearly the current balance is tipped the wrong way.

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    ISTM piracy can be symptom of an insurgency, but if one is looking for true "naval" insurgents, there is always the LTTE, which has the most advanced naval capability of any insurgency that I'm aware of.
    Last edited by Entropy; 12-05-2008 at 02:10 PM.

  8. #28
    i pwnd ur ooda loop selil's Avatar
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    I've thought that the definitions for insurgency have been to strict. A couple days ago in some prescient Odom channeling moment I was discussing the Barbary Pirates and the Somali Pirates and I expressed that these would definitely fall into small wars territory and likely insurgent activities. This was how the Marine Corps got into the business in some respects.
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  9. #29
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    To understand and define an organiztion, focus on their purpose for action over the nature of their actions themself.

    Too many are labeled "terrorists" that are actually insurgents using terrorism as a tactic. Similarly, while most pirates are criminals (profit motive vs political motive), some are in fact an arm of an insurgent movement, and some are a loosely affiliated fund-raising arm of an insurgency. Same goes for the use of drug cartels by insurgencies, or by non-state organizations waging UW like AQ is.

    The key is to not automatically group or defines organizations with differing purposes by overly focusing on affiliations or similar actions. A piracy organization that is part of an insurgency requires a COIN based solution set. One that is purely profit based can be engaged quite well with more of a CT/law enforecement approach. For those that are a mix, understand the mix, and proceed cautiously. Complex business that is too often over simplified and reduced to simply attacking the symptom directly without regard for what the actual underlying cause is.

  10. #30
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Utility uniform was a DoD wide prescribed unigram. Worked. Was around from the late 50s until the late 70s. Cost about $20.00 a set. Then the Jungle uniform came in and the Army got approval from someone to go to the BDU and it all went downhill from there. Current uniforms run about $70-90, contract dependent. Camouflage band for the Helmet used to cost Nine cents, the new one with two useless luminous tabs sewn on costs over a buck...

    Camouflage uniforms really don't work universally. They look sexy in garrison but in the field the OG 107 -- or better, a dark sage -- single color is harder to detect in most environments; all the 'flage patterns suffer from environmental specificity. Not to mention that the multi color dying adversely affects fabric durability.
    My Dad was on active duty back when the BDU was coming into service (and was involved in it, and getting it standard throughout DOD via DLA), and always said that there was nothing wrong with the pickle suit (except maybe the cap), and that camouflage uniforms should be organizational issue for combat units, for when they go to war or the field and need to be camouflaged.
    He cloaked himself in a veil of impenetrable terminology.

  11. #31
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Wink We rarely differ but this is one of the differs...

    Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
    Selil and Bill Moore raise some very interesting issues, and I for one am not ready to dismiss the issue of whether or not piracy is insurgency.
    Seems to me that piracy is piracy and insurgency is insurgency. The DoD dictionary agrees:

    Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

    Piracy: An illegal act of violence, depredation (e.g., plundering, robbing, or pillaging), or detention in or over international waters committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft.

    That does not mean that insurgents may not use piracy to further their goals nor, I suppose, does it mean that Pirates cannot be insurgents but the two still remain distinct acts.
    Nor am I convinced that piracy is a Navy problem; God help us if it is.
    Oh, I dunno, they've been landing the Marines to take care of land based pirates around the world since 1801 in Tom's Barbary effort; dozens of landings from the Caribbean to Sumatra and even to Korea. Generally successfully. There've even been a few Naval and Marine officers court martialed for 'exceeding their authority.'
    The topic deserves more and deeper analysis.
    Perhaps. Probably deserves action at some point...

  12. #32
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Is the definition too strict

    Quote Originally Posted by selil View Post
    I've thought that the definitions for insurgency have been to strict. A couple days ago in some prescient Odom channeling moment I was discussing the Barbary Pirates and the Somali Pirates and I expressed that these would definitely fall into small wars territory and likely insurgent activities. This was how the Marine Corps got into the business in some respects.
    or do people want to expand definitions to include their pet rocks?

    Been my observation that straightforward definitions focus thinking and amorphous terms encourage fog and groping. Contrary to popular opinion, all cats are not gray in the dark...

  13. #33
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Default well

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    or do people want to expand definitions to include their pet rocks?

    Been my observation that straightforward definitions focus thinking and amorphous terms encourage fog and groping. Contrary to popular opinion, all cats are not gray in the dark...
    Most rocks are gray, and almost all cats prrrrrrrrr; thats gotta count for something.

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  14. #34
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    Perhaps. Probably deserves action at some point...
    Ken, that simple sentence probably best sums up my overall concern with my pet rock. We have increasing piracy off Somalia, we street gangs that are getting more and more powerful (not just in the U.S.), we have narcotrafficers who have well trained and equipped militias that are more than a match for most law enforcement agencies around the world.

    In Mexico I think an argument could be made that the drug cartels are in fact waging a quasi-insurgency, because they are vying for power (control) with the State over certain geographical areas to facilitate their business, but they don't want to overthrow the entire government. Their concern is not taking over Mexico, but creating the conditions to facilitate business. However, if that involves killing off good cops and judges, and buying off bad ones, then that is a form of subversion intending to effect control of at least part of the government.

    Your argument is still correct, by the legacy definition you posted, that is still not an insurgency, but then again this isn't your grandfather's mafia either. The nature of the threat has changed, and in the end the one point we can probably agree on is that these elements present an increasing threat to our national interests and the safety of our citizens in some cases.

    Back to the definitions and my concern with them. Words not only have meaning, they are associated with authorities and perceptions. If we fall back on defining the problem in N. Mexico as a criminal threat (it is, so you wouldn't be wrong), then it is a law enforcement problem, even if it is beyond their capacity to suppress. The military can provide limited support. On the other hand if the threat is defined as an insurgency (only in cases where appropriate), then that implies that other authorities could be implemented if our nation wanted to take more decisive measures to suppress the problem.

    A perfect definition would be nice, but we're all used to working in gray areas. I don't want to spend too much time tripping over definitions, they are what they are, so I'll close with your point, this threat requires more action than we're applying to it now.

  15. #35
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default We can agree on this:

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    ...who have well trained and equipped militias that are more than a match for most law enforcement agencies around the world.

    In Mexico ... Their concern is not taking over Mexico, but creating the conditions to facilitate business. However, if that involves killing off good cops and judges, and buying off bad ones, then that is a form of subversion intending to effect control of at least part of the government.

    ... but then again this isn't your grandfather's mafia either. The nature of the threat has changed, and in the end the one point we can probably agree on is that these elements present an increasing threat to our national interests and the safety of our citizens in some cases.

    ...then it is a law enforcement problem, even if it is beyond their capacity to suppress. The military can provide limited support.

    A perfect definition would be nice, but we're all used to working in gray areas. I don't want to spend too much time tripping over definitions, they are what they are, so I'll close with your point, this threat requires more action than we're applying to it now.
    While disagreeing on this:
    On the other hand if the threat is defined as an insurgency (only in cases where appropriate), then that implies that other authorities could be implemented if our nation wanted to take more decisive measures to suppress the problem. (emphasis added /kw)
    Not our job -- unless we're asked to help. Even then, I'm concerned that out help would be overboard and out of control as it has been in too many cases where we have 'helped.' That's why a lot of people -- sensibly -- do not want our help and do not trust us.

    Words are important. Spinning things to get ones own twist is as old as mankind and it's not going away. Insisting on relative precision in terms helps keep the system honest; shading the terms help politicians and the unlawful do stupid stuff. There is no such thing as absolute precision and that's particularly true in the use of words but trying to be reasonably accurate doesn't hurt and may help.

    On your pet rock, I share your concern but I think that each nation should approach the problem in its own way and other nations should support that. There are nations like Mexico where Armed Forces involvement is desirable or necessary. For the US, my personal belief is that a military solution or reaction to gangs and trans-national criminality would be totally wrong.

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    My one assignment (so far) to a Joint Staff led me to believe that Joint works very well in a garrison and/or CONUS based organization, but there are many challenges when people are deployed into a Joint Command/Staff that has been operating in a combat theater.

    I had two USAF and two USN personnel work for me, and to be frank, they were untrained for the job at hand (mainly because Astan is a largely Army fight). So in addition to actually having to work and lead, I also had to spend time training them on the most simple aspects of the Army.

    When I say simple, I mean the difference between infantry units and capabilites, then the differences in organization from company through BCT level, etc...

    I would like to see more true Jointness occur at the BN and lower level for both NCO's and Officers. Create a strong base of knowledge and expertise, and then allow these individuals to move up through the Joint world as they become more experienced and wiser. Would make a lot more sense than sending an 03 to a Combined/Joint Staff for the first time and asking "what's the difference between light and mechanized infantry?"
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    Default You bring up some great points

    Quote Originally Posted by Ski View Post
    My one assignment (so far) to a Joint Staff led me to believe that Joint works very well in a garrison and/or CONUS based organization, but there are many challenges when people are deployed into a Joint Command/Staff that has been operating in a combat theater.
    The problem, at least in my experience, is the people who are in the joint staff during wartime were not the ones who are on it back in conus for training or whatever. This leads to the very real problem you identify:

    I had two USAF and two USN personnel work for me, and to be frank, they were untrained for the job at hand (mainly because Astan is a largely Army fight). So in addition to actually having to work and lead, I also had to spend time training them on the most simple aspects of the Army.

    When I say simple, I mean the difference between infantry units and capabilites, then the differences in organization from company through BCT level, etc...
    When I was in the Navy, I was one of those guys who didn't know squat about ground stuff to include the basics you cited (I eventually learned them when I got to the AF). It simply wasn't a part of my training. I also was woefully ignorant of the Air Force despite the fact I was in naval aviation, which you'd think would directly translate. The problem you identify is huge, but I think the answer is more "joint" and not less.

    The main problem I've seen (again, very limited anecdotal experience) is that many people on joint staffs (at least in the beginning) are so ignorant of how the other components/services operate that collaboration is very cumbersome in the beginning. Once the team finally figures things out the campaign is over or new people rotate in and the process begins anew. Not very effective, IMO.

    It's important for me to note that I came to this perspective due to my experience spending a significant amount of time in two different services (Navy and AF). It's hard to overemphasize how valuable my Navy experience turned out to be when I got into the AF. Not only could I educate my AF brothers and sisters about the way the Navy does business; Naval capabilities, culture, mindset, etc., but it paid real dividends whenever my units did anything with the Navy. Being in two services really made me understand how ignorant most people are about the other services. That ignorance is not an individual service member's fault - after all, one can't expect them to know without training and exposure - but its a problem that hinders the combined arms team IMO. As part of the Air Force team, for example, I can't provide good support if I'm completely ignorant of the Army, even if I'm a genius on the Air Force. Such ignorance makes it very difficult for me to translate those Army needs into effective Air Force solutions. And the reverse is also true - an Army guy who's ignorant of the Air Force may not ask for support because he/she is unaware that it exists or believes it's not useful. When the individual members of a joint team understand what the others bring to the table and have a basic understanding of their mindset, lingo, capabilities, etc., then that team will probably be effective from the start.

    As an aside, a big reason I originally came to this forum and why I still spend a lot of time here (more than anywhere else, practically) is because I want to learn about the Army and how you Army guys (and gals) think and do business (in addition to learning about small wars, of course). I've already learned a lot here and continue to learn more everyday, which is great for me personally and will hopefully pay more dividends when/if I go downrange again.

    I would like to see more true Jointness occur at the BN and lower level for both NCO's and Officers. Create a strong base of knowledge and expertise, and then allow these individuals to move up through the Joint world as they become more experienced and wiser. Would make a lot more sense than sending an 03 to a Combined/Joint Staff for the first time and asking "what's the difference between light and mechanized infantry?"
    I agree, and the solution, IMO, is to educate officers and NCO's to succeed on joint staffs from the beginning. I would recommend a joint school where people can get "Army/Navy/Air Force/Marines for dummies" so they at least go in knowing the fundamentals. Additionally, it would be nice to have exchange tours, but that might not be practical and the service personnel systems would probably punish officers and NCO's for taking them.

  18. #38
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    Default Ski please explain further?

    I had two USAF and two USN personnel work for me, and to be frank, they were untrained for the job at hand (mainly because Astan is a largely Army fight). So in addition to actually having to work and lead, I also had to spend time training them on the most simple aspects of the Army.
    Ski, this is not a failure of joint operations by any stretch, but it may be a failure of task organizing incorrectly. I really don't think Jet jocks, submarine skippers and surface fleet officer/NCOs need to be an expert on Army Infantry operations to be a valued joint partner. I sure as heck am not an expert on subsurface warfare, fleet operations, strartegic bombing operations, etc., but I can still function effectively in a joint HQs. Your example sounds like another example of trying to make something joint that doesn't need to be under the excuse of giving these officers "joint" experience, which is increasingly important for promotion.

    In a major joint combat operation, one way to keep the chaos manageable is to make one component the main effort, thus the supported component, and other other components support as appropriate, the component that is the main effort can shift by phase or sub phase of an operation. To execute this you need the overall joint force commander and some of his key staff members to have a good grasp of joint capabilities across the force (so they can envision an overall concept, and also sniff out BS if one service is trying to sell the JTF some snake oil). However, the others need to be experts in their specific field/service, that expertise is what they're bringing to the table.

    Joint planning and operations can get rather heated sometimes, that is simple human nature, especially for type A personalities that really want to see things done right. The process is generally one of give and take dialouge to get to an acceptable course of action, all the services educate one another on their capabilities and how they should be employed to best support one another and accomplish the mission. No one said it was smooth process.

    Getting back to your example, why are Navy and Air Force officers planning infantry operations?

  19. #39
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Ski, this is not a failure of joint operations by any stretch, but it may be a failure of task organizing incorrectly. I really don't think Jet jocks, submarine skippers and surface fleet officer/NCOs need to be an expert on Army Infantry operations to be a valued joint partner. I sure as heck am not an expert on subsurface warfare, fleet operations, strartegic bombing operations, etc., but I can still function effectively in a joint HQs. Your example sounds like another example of trying to make something joint that doesn't need to be under the excuse of giving these officers "joint" experience, which is increasingly important for promotion.
    That's just the thing, though. In most cases it's just a ticket punch, so often any Joint billet will do, and an officer needing a Joint assignment gets slotted sometimes into whatever becomes available. But other times, the span of the billet could mean that the incumbent will encounter situations where he will shine (where the situation plays to his professional experience), and others where he may be completely adrift. For example, the O6 in charge of my group until recently at JFCOM J7 was a submariner, but yet was tasked with technical training development for Irregular Warfare. Of course, he has staff that has experience in IW (however you define it), plenty of Army and Marine infantry types, but it's tough to be the talking head when your experience is so different from the subject matter at hand.

    A propos of Ski's comment on levels of preparedness for taking a Joint billet varying with service, we have quite a few simulation planners - officers who plan out simulations/ synthetic training environments for various Joint exercises. Well, the Army has a functional area devoted precisely to that subject matter: FA 57. Every officer from the Army we got that was put in as a sim planner was well prepared, and all were FA 57 course graduates at least, with most having already an FA 57 tour under their belts. The other services don't have anything like that, and quite a few officers from the Nvy and Air Force we received had zero experience in the field, or even really knew that this kind of job existed prior to be assigned there. That's not to say that we haven't had some really good guys quickly climb the learning curve and do well - one of the best I've known was a Navy S-3 pilot - but most take 18 months to learn their job, then they're gone in another 6. It's not like this is a "Joint is spelled A-R-M-Y" thing; all the services use simulations heavily now in training, it's just that only one really prepares officers professionally for it (though I think the Marines must have some level of participation, as all their guys coming into those jobs seem to know their business fairly well).

    Not sure if there is some deeper point to be made there, but there it is.
    He cloaked himself in a veil of impenetrable terminology.

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    Bill

    Check your PM's, I'll explain more.
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