lets rethink Jointness
Its time to rethink the benefits of Jointness. Yes there are many benefits associated with the Jointness concept but there are also many negatives. Good interservice competition like we saw in the Cold War and before would increase efficiency and innovation and decrease waste. Anybody disagree/agree?
Disagree with conclusion
Ed, I agreed with your first sentence, and your first sentence only. Yes, we sometimes try too hard to be joint, when joint isn't appropriate just to be joint, which is a form of military political correctness. On rare occassions that has led to less than desirable results for some missions, such as Operation Eagle Claw.
On the other hand, our military has "evolved" to be more joint because we learned through the school of hard knocks that it is absolutely essential to our operational success. I'm not sure why you would want to turn back the clock?
Since the services have different core missions (even the Marines and Army while similiar have different focuses), so what exactly is the field of competition? Should the Army compete with the Navy in submarine warfare? Should the Marines challenge the Air Force in their ability to conduct deep strike operations? Not sure how that would result in cost savings or more innovation.Good interservice competition like we saw in the Cold War and before would increase efficiency and innovation and decrease waste. Anybody disagree/agree?
The services already compete for resources, but there is more cooperation than between the services at the upper levels than you might think, because no responsible leader wants to defang any of our services, since they all need to be capable to support the joint fight.
I think you will see more innovation and more efficiency with increased jointness, but jointness for a purpose, not just pretending to be joint when it isn't appropriate because it sounds good during a brief.
The darker side of human nature will always be there. You'll always have your idiots who think the Air Force can bomb our way to victory, and the Marines and Army have their share of bone heads who can be service and branch centric to the point of mission failure. However, those who get to the top positions, while still dedicated to their service, fully understand and support the importance of jointness.
A standing joke is that joint is spelled "A-R-M-Y" due to all of the staff procedures used to run joint staffs being derived from army staffing processess. I'm coming up on 5 consecutive years in Joint headquarters, and it has it's pros and cons. At its best, it is excellent. SOCPAC, as a subunifed command of PACOM, and a deployable operational HQ as well as a highlevel staff was (and is) a great mix of SF, SEALs, and AF and Marine SOF operators at its core, with a great supporting team from all walks. You can gain a special synergy from such a mix, as each sees similar situations in unique ways. Walk out the door and down the hall to PACOM, and there joint is spelled "N-A-V-Y." Totally different world and culture.
Real downside is the PC effect described above. Commander is Army, so Deputy must be Navy and the COS will be AF and the 3 will be a Marine, etc. Sometimes worrying about keeping the mix right hinders getting the right guy for the job. Just as bad are the joint pubs, where definitions are too often a crazy mix of service definitions, with anything that could not be agreed to either simply left out, or worse, with both conflicting positions included. It's getting better, but we've a long way to go.
But as to service competition, have no fear, the Service Chiefs and their staffs at the Pentagon don't worry about joint and are all slamming away at ensuring their service equities get fully (if not justifed in the big scheme of jointness) funded. JFCOM manages the force provided by the services and allocates it out to the GCCs to employ, but JFCOM knows it must wear kid gloves in dealing with the Services, which remain the true power brokers in DoD.
Personally, I think there needs to be more "joint" not less. One of the biggest problems I see is not enough joint training, particularly between the Army and Air Force. I also wouldn't mind seeing most weapons development and procurement managed at the joint instead of service level.
I think that the Army and Air Force cultures are almost polar opposites, to the extent that joint training will not work for Army units.
For example, the Air Force is a time driven organization, and the Army is a mission driven organization. The ATO cycle drives the Air Force, to the extent that, except for planned flexibility, they can't or won't flex it, in my experience.
Another example is training CAS requests. The Air Force wants to program training CAS a year out. That means that if I drop a request the day I return from deployment, I might get supported the last 30 days before I deploy again (when I have essentially stopped training to ship my stuff and gives guys a break with their families). I can't lock in training resources until 8 weeks or so, so I train with Navy or USMC CAS.
I will second 82nd redleg's experience
At JMRC, Air Force reps usually showed up at the daily meeting, bitch about CAS not being used, and then announce how we should script our training so that we would be using CAS missions that were already scheduled by Air Force the next day.
They then threaten the chain of command with being negligent if even one soldier is "killed" in a mission where CAS is available and not used. (Right, JDAMS that wedding party; it's the American Way)
Nevermind that JMRC is largely "free-play" and we're trying to teach non-lethal or less than lethal for that rotation.
One of our many agreements while disagreeing...
I'll echo others remarks about the USAF and Joint training -- the AF position has always seemed to me to be our way or we won't play and they are totally lacking in flexibility. I've never had real problems coordinating training among Army posts or units, with the Navy or Marines. Compromises were made and things got done. However, doing that with the USAF has always been tedious and irritating-- and frequently unsuccessful, compromise is a word that the AF doesn't seem to know. I understand airplanes are expensive. So is a Rifle Company of 150 plus bodies...Originally Posted by Entropy
That said, I agree that there needs to be more and not less. The question is how do we get there?
I strongly disagree with joint weapons development and procurement; DoD's current single manager approach to the procurement of most things is undoubtedly efficient and has saved the taxpayers some money -- but it also buys stuff that is frequently not fit for purpose. Competition and multiple sources produce multiple weapon types that make system defeat less likely. The American penchant for one size fits all solutions is militarily a very bad approach; the Army is bad enough with their reluctance to buy special purpose equipment for special units (That's a big part of the reason there is now a SOCOM). They're slowly growing out of that but not nearly rapidly enough -- the M4 Carbine debacle is a good example. Crass stupidity.
Given joint development and procurement there would be no F-22, only the F-35...
Ken,
I think, as usual, we agree more than we disagree.
On the training issue, I don't dispute the AF is a bad apple (probabably the worst) a lot of the time which is why I think there needs to be more "adult" intervention at the joint level to ensure the services play nice with each other. We want to minimize "on the job" training as much as possible. And to be sure, the AF perception of the Army is not that different from what's been said about the AF in this thread so far. This division speaks, in my view, to a fundamental lack of communication, understanding and to too much bad blood caused by years of distrust. I'm frankly tired of it and strongly think that someone above the service level needs to tackle this institutional grudge-match head on and force some cooperation and change from all parties.
I also agree in principle with your concerns about joint weapons development, but in my mind the unfortunate reality is that the services (all of them) have proven incompetent at it. They need, at best, mentoring, and at worst, a very very short leash until they can demonstrate some competence as well as to control things like requirements creep. This isn't to suggest that the Army should set requirements for air superiority weapons or that the Air Force should have input on the next destroyer.
120mm,
I understand what you're saying, but the Air Force has training requirements too that need to be met. I have to say I find it kind of amusing that the perception has changed from the AF hating and ignoring CAS to being overly focused on CAS. Some accommodation and artificiality must be introduced for everyone to meet their training requirements. I understand (and fully support) the goal of more non-lethal options in theater, but that should not mean that CAS training should be reduced. After all, when you really do need CAS, do want a pilot supporting you in theater who spent most of his/her time at JMRC burning circles in the sky?
Most of my large training exercise experience is from my Navy time, and accomodations were always made to ensure everyone met their training requirements and got to actually practice their wartime skills. This inevitably means that some players will have to do things they wouldn't actually do in wartime. For example, submarines in exercises will let ASW assets get an initial detection so that ASW assets can practice tracking, engagement, etc. - something a sub would never do in a real war.
Last edited by Entropy; 12-03-2008 at 05:41 PM.
I think the definition and degree of "Joint", needs to be clarified, but I have a sneaking suspicion that "Joint" is something like "love" - it has to be good, and to speak against it, is to worry the herd of sacred Bovine that wander the halls.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
But Wilf, for "love" to be "good", there has to be a strong "pain" component. Doesn't it??? At least it has in my experience. So what if you can get the mission done without the pain?
(I typed this tongue-in-cheek but the more I reread it, the more I like it.)
"Jointery" raises some funny questions
Last month I spoke at our Command and Staff College ( a joint school) about the need for National policy for the conduct of small wars and insurgency. The presentation seemed to go well and the questions were quite benign (it was the lecture before morning tea...) until...
One of the Naval O4 students posed a question that was actually a statement. He queried why when I spoke about the issue of counterinsurgency that I took an "land centric' approach.
After reassuring the audience that there were valuable tasks for all of the joint team in the fight, ultimately I had to point out that most populations live on land.... I did conclude by reassuring the white suiters that when populations started to live underwater we would be guaranteed to start talking a whole lot more about the naval roles in COIN.
You have no idea how many times I had this conversation with my brothers from PACFLEET and PACOM. Tremendous energy and money were committed to complex programs to control the waters of South East Asia. Radar systems, etc. And this was all sold as COIN. My standard line to them was very similar to yours. "Insurgency doesn't happen at sea."
This points to a larger issue though, that the Army guys get just as wrong as the Navy - the issue of border control to solve insurgency. Be it the PAK-AF border, the many "borders" of sub Saharan Africa, or the waters between MY-RP-ID. The fact is that these populaces have been "globalized" for thousands of years, and their culture and commerce rely on what is now considered illegal trade across these modern borders. To close borders has a tremendous negative impact on the very populaces that are already supporting insurgency against their respective governments, all in the name of stopping trans-national crime/terrorism. This, even though everyone also knows that criminals and terrorists have no particular recognition or concern for these borders either, and that networked operations can much more effectively be short-circuited by identifying and taking down the critical nodes on either side of the border where these actions either originate, terminate, or transit through.
So, yes, the Navy looks at the problem in a very Navy way. control the seas. The Army looks at it in a very army way. Defeat the enemy, control the borders.
I take a populist approach. Understand the populace, and the failures of governance that is causing their unrest. Also understand the legitimate cultures and activities of the populace as well. Then design and implement a program to help the governance address its failures and better care for the populace, while at the same time implementing a tailored security program and operations against the insurgent. Never forgetting that the insurgent also a member of the populace.
As to those outside actors, that come into a country waging UW to leverage these insurgencies (AQ all over, the JI in the Philippines, Iranians in Iraq, etc) Apply CT to these, and also seek to understand and then disable their network.
I guess the key thing to remember is that we are all slanted by our training and experience, and will try to fit any given problem into that paradigm. I never met a Marine who didn't think any military problem could not be resolved by an amphibious assault, nor an Air Force pilot who was not convinced that air power, or "global strike" was not the key to victory.
Know your enemy and know yourself...Joint doesn't fix us, but we are getting to know ourselves a lot better, and that is a start.
*Cough* Somali Pirates *Cough*
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
That's not counter insurgency, that's counter piracy
and it's been a naval role for centuries. So not COIN but COPI.
How are they doing on that nowadays, by the way...
cough?
Yep, the pirates are winning over the cargo ship population by first coercing them to act in accordance within pirate expectations, and then as the world's cargo fleets realize that the world's navies can't protect them they'll recognize the pirates as the new government of the sea and willingly start supporting them. This must be an insurgency, and it is obviously the Navy's problem.*Cough* Somali Pirates *Cough*In all seriousness, pirates like other organized criminal groups do present a challenge to the State. I still think our definitions for COIN, FID, UW, etc. are inadequate to address the security challenges we face today. Words have meaning, and many times those meanings can lmit our understanding of reality.
As for joint operations, our joint doctrine has some flaws, for example the aspects of it that are ATO centric (time table driven operations that nests well with the way the Air Force manages operations, but not necessarily with the other services), which is one example of a process that should be largely service doctrine, yet in many ways the ATO drives our joint targeting process.
I think the reality is that most of the problems with joint operations (I don't want to touch procurement and similiar issues) is not the doctrine, but rather how the doctrine is put into practice (if it is put into practice). In this case the shortfalls are due to the personalties involved, not the doctrine. All people, even our best commanders, are not without fault. It is a human trait we cannot overcome (even with EBO); it is simply part of the uncertainty of war. So when I read comments on one joint command being Army centric, and another Navy centric, that isn't a reflection of our joint doctrine, it is a recognition of the failure of people to transition from service centric methodology to joint methodology. Still I believe we are getting better at joint operations each year. I personally wouldn't want to fight an OIF-1 like fight without the synergized capabilities of our joint force empowered by our joint doctrine. Call me bias, but like many of you I have seen the power that this joint force can bring to bare on a situation.
Admittedly our joint doctrine is largely focused on warfighting, NEO, etc., so it doesn't sufficiently address the role of the services in an irregular warfare scenario (we'll get there). The reality is IW is largely ground pounder focused, with air and sea power providing critical enablers. All the services play critical roles, but part of our service culture, based perhaps on our captialist social norms and our Congressional funding process, motivates many officers to attempt to undermine the other services and overly boost the value of their service (or branch). This iis what causes jointness to fail.
Look at the bright side, we know we have our faults, but generally our enemies are much worse. They're stuck with the imperfection of being human too.
...and only half in jest. There is an old Jewish saying that the perfect woman must be the devil.
Seriously, "Joint" is like "comprehensive," "holistic" or "System". It's a word loaded with supposedly benign effectiveness and utility. Of course everyone wants to work towards a common cause, all in agreement and all being more than the mere sum of the parts - nice if you can get it.
"Armoured Infantry" are neither good armour or good infantry, not because the logic is bad, but because the human understanding is poor. Someone skilled in "Joint Planning" is not as skilled as someone in "Land Operations" planning, at planning land warfare operations.
Personally to me, Joint means saving money and reducing effectiveness.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf,
I think "joint" is more than that and is an overall boost to effectiveness. Let's look at the official definition: "...activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate." That pretty much describes almost every military operation.
Also, to me its about making the services cooperate and reducing service parochialism. Standardization through joint doctrine and procedures have been very beneficial in many areas. Minimal joint procurement standards are also necessary - in the bad old days the services literally couldn't communicate with each other because of radio incompatibility, or one service's piece of equipment would disrupt that of another service.
120mm,
Agree with your comments on training.
Ken,
Don't get me started on uniforms. The AF has screwed that up as well. The only two positive things I can say about the ABU is that it is wash-and-wear and it has sizes that fit females much better than any of the older uniforms.
And like the ACU, I'm dubious the color scheme provides much camouflage except in cases such as this:
Unfortunately, the same thing is true of many who tout jointness...
At least the first part is; they mean well but fail to realize that increased efficiency does not equate to increased effectiveness -- and that, frequently it can actually decrease effectiveness.
There are some benefits of increasing joint efforts and most who wish to do so are well intentioned but the big drivers have been just as you say -- an effort to save money which has, even if often inadvertently, adversely affected effectiveness in many areas.
There's nothing wrong with the concept, it's fine -- it's the implementation that counts and to let the Program and Budget folks drive ANY train is an invitation to disaster.
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