Quote Originally Posted by Mark O'Neill View Post
Last month I spoke at our Command and Staff College ( a joint school) about the need for National policy for the conduct of small wars and insurgency. The presentation seemed to go well and the questions were quite benign (it was the lecture before morning tea...) until...

One of the Naval O4 students posed a question that was actually a statement. He queried why when I spoke about the issue of counterinsurgency that I took an "land centric' approach.

After reassuring the audience that there were valuable tasks for all of the joint team in the fight, ultimately I had to point out that most populations live on land.... I did conclude by reassuring the white suiters that when populations started to live underwater we would be guaranteed to start talking a whole lot more about the naval roles in COIN.
You have no idea how many times I had this conversation with my brothers from PACFLEET and PACOM. Tremendous energy and money were committed to complex programs to control the waters of South East Asia. Radar systems, etc. And this was all sold as COIN. My standard line to them was very similar to yours. "Insurgency doesn't happen at sea."

This points to a larger issue though, that the Army guys get just as wrong as the Navy - the issue of border control to solve insurgency. Be it the PAK-AF border, the many "borders" of sub Saharan Africa, or the waters between MY-RP-ID. The fact is that these populaces have been "globalized" for thousands of years, and their culture and commerce rely on what is now considered illegal trade across these modern borders. To close borders has a tremendous negative impact on the very populaces that are already supporting insurgency against their respective governments, all in the name of stopping trans-national crime/terrorism. This, even though everyone also knows that criminals and terrorists have no particular recognition or concern for these borders either, and that networked operations can much more effectively be short-circuited by identifying and taking down the critical nodes on either side of the border where these actions either originate, terminate, or transit through.

So, yes, the Navy looks at the problem in a very Navy way. control the seas. The Army looks at it in a very army way. Defeat the enemy, control the borders.

I take a populist approach. Understand the populace, and the failures of governance that is causing their unrest. Also understand the legitimate cultures and activities of the populace as well. Then design and implement a program to help the governance address its failures and better care for the populace, while at the same time implementing a tailored security program and operations against the insurgent. Never forgetting that the insurgent also a member of the populace.

As to those outside actors, that come into a country waging UW to leverage these insurgencies (AQ all over, the JI in the Philippines, Iranians in Iraq, etc) Apply CT to these, and also seek to understand and then disable their network.

I guess the key thing to remember is that we are all slanted by our training and experience, and will try to fit any given problem into that paradigm. I never met a Marine who didn't think any military problem could not be resolved by an amphibious assault, nor an Air Force pilot who was not convinced that air power, or "global strike" was not the key to victory.

Know your enemy and know yourself...Joint doesn't fix us, but we are getting to know ourselves a lot better, and that is a start.