Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory?

[Ken White]

Ken, splain that agin real slow?

If I wanted to type and quote just your words without the rest of that, I'd type:

Ken, splain that agin real slow?

Then I'd highlight that by moving my cursor over it until what I wanted to quote was highlighted in green (in my browser) and then click on the 'quote' Icon up above the white message window; last on on the right in line, put your cursor on it and it pops up: Wrap [QUOTE] tags around selected text

OR

I could type this:

[quote]Ken, splain that agin real slow?[/quote ]

WITHOUT THE SPACE between the last 'e' and the bracket, like this: /quote] and that will produce this:

Ken, splain that agin real slow?

In your post at 12:32 AM if you'd put a [/quote ] without the space between the 'e' and the bracket behind the words "Here's how to selectively quote" you'd have gotten this:

Originally Posted by Ken White >
I'd first say that in any operation like Afghanistan or any COIN operation (the two are not the same thing) -- or any politically limited war -- there is no defeat or victory. All one can obtain is a satisfactory outcome. What comprises that outcome is likely to vary over time and each side will have different goals.

Here's how to selectively quote:

(quote)Very true, but I can't link to all of your posts (/quote)

[Ken White]

Just talking crazy here, but I propose, in general, an effective strategy in regards to narcotics in Afghanistan would be to usurp, rather than destroy, control over the trade. The devil's in the details, of course, and it's probably "unethical", but if the trade could be directed towards an unspecified Afghan neighbor which poses a major risk to US security IOT destablize the regime and the subsequent funds invested in Afghan infrastructure, I'd be willing to consider removing the taboos on the drug trade.

but I can't think of any neighbors that we'd like to see less stable than they are. Quite the contrary, in fact -- and I'm applying that in all directions...

As for usurping the drug trade, apparently you aren't aware of the various loud screams and wails about the mere allegation of drug involvement by the CIA and / or others in South East Asia or Central America during either of those two dust-ups. I can hear the media and Congress now. Much less NATO...

Not to mention the fact that if you were in the drug trade, would you easily let someone interrupt your efforts...

Narcotics in Afghanistan are not a problem -- western agreement on what to do about them is a problem.

[jmm99]

Perhaps, I am reading too much of my own "inner voice" into what COL Gentile says. Anyway, your comments are my starting point.

(from Ken)
1. .... we do not at this time have the capability required for dealing with AQ by other military means.
(and)
2. ... AQ is not the only opponent there. Not by a long shot..

1. As I am reading Gentile, he is contrasting a large force engaged in "hearts and minds" (stability ops, "nation building", whatever) with "other military means". Since he doesn't define the latter term, I guess it's left to our imaginations. My image is mobile light infantry (conventional, special ops and extra-special ops) knowing where it's going and what it will do when it gets there. What did "other military means" mean to you and what capability is missing ?

2. I read Gentile as focusing on AQ as the "main enemy" in that theatre - similar to the KGB looking at the US and its intel agencies as being the Main Adversary in the Cold War. Since various groups are AQ-linked or AQ-leaning (e.g., Taliban), they also get in our way - so, they too may be opponents. Whom do you see as the opponents ?

[AmericanPride]

Narcotics in Afghanistan are not a problem

I agree. I was only advancing the idea that it is a possible solution to two separate problems.

I can't think of any neighbors that we'd like to see less stable than they are.

I think it would be beneficial for Iran to be less stable, should our credibility improve with the general populace in regards to our self-proclaimed political principles. Pushing drugs into Iran would, I imagine, force the government and people into confrontation. The Soviet transition to "democracy", however absurd or shallow, illustrates that certain conditions make it possible for a nuclear-armed state (which I assume would be one of the highest causes of concern) to more or less safely navigate changes in regime. I'm sure that statement contains many debatable assumptions also.

As for usurping the drug trade, apparently you aren't aware of the various loud screams and wails about the mere allegation of drug involvement by the CIA and / or others in South East Asia or Central America during either of those two dust-ups. I can hear the media and Congress now. Much less NATO...

Also agree here. But I think if a few bones were thrown to major campaign donors to receive some kind of cut in the policy, it could move its way around Congress. Maybe through agricultural contracts in Afghanistan? I don't have the expertise yet to pinpoint the details. I also don't remember Congress ever complaining about other "dust-ups" until they no longer perceived some kind of gain from it (i.e. intelligence supporting the Iraq War).

Not to mention the fact that if you were in the drug trade, would you easily let someone interrupt your efforts

True. But the relationship between 'us' and the 'enemy' would change as some of them buy into the policy. Our goal isn't to destroy the Taliban (or is it?) -- they're just in the way of some other ends we have in the country and region. Maybe co-opting them would lessen resistence. Maybe not.

[Entropy]

The opium "problem" in Afghanistan is a perfect example of taking our eyes of the strategic ball and mission creep. We should only be concerned as far as that trade benefits our opponents and even then we need to tread very carefully.

[Ken White]

I think it would be beneficial for Iran to be less stable, should our credibility improve with the general populace in regards to our self-proclaimed political principles. Pushing drugs into Iran would, I imagine, force the government and people into confrontation.

In reverse order, you need to do some research -- Iran already has a massive drug problem. The people of Iran and the government are already in a 'confrontation' and that government still exists because it has enough force to cow the very unhappy majority into acceptance. Our credibility with the bulk of Iranians is good enough as is -- they generally like Americans and know we aren't the problem. They are less concerned about what you term 'our self proclaimed political principles' than are many in this country because they're more aware of how the world works and don't get trapped in a false sense of idealism that has never been and never will be -- not because we're Americans but because Americans are people; humans have foibles -- the Iraniha are cosmopolitan enough to know that and accept it without getting silly. The problem with an unstable Iran is that the Persians have a lot of pride and are rather xenophobic; make it less stable than it is today and little good will come of that.

The Soviet transition to "democracy", however absurd or shallow, illustrates that certain conditions make it possible for a nuclear-armed state (which I assume would be one of the highest causes of concern) to more or less safely navigate changes in regime. I'm sure that statement contains many debatable assumptions also.

For openers, I'd suggest qualifiers like 'absurd' and 'shallow' make all that come after sort of inconsequential or at least questionable. I know many are worried about Iran having nukes; I'm not.

Also agree here. But I think if a few bones were thrown to major campaign donors to receive some kind of cut in the policy, it could move its way around Congress.

There are few on this board who have said as many bad things about Congress as me but even I wouldn't go that far on their venality. I doubt you're correct on that assumption -- with the caveat that there are always a few but you're not at all likely to get the numbers you need. Part of the problem is that whichever party is in opposition will blow the whistle to the press on the then current Administration.

Maybe through agricultural contracts in Afghanistan? I don't have the expertise yet to pinpoint the details.

Agricultural contracts? For what? The Afghans barely feed themselves and if the Poppy harvest were converted to a cash crop, there'd be no heroin problem...

I also don't remember Congress ever complaining about other "dust-ups" until they no longer perceived some kind of gain from it (i.e. intelligence supporting the Iraq War).

I'm sure you don't; they occurred in the 1970s and 1980s and I suspect you had other things on your mind then. Here is a LINK to a timeline; essentially, every time you see the initials CIA, there was much fury raised by Congress AND the Media -- I'm sure you can Google tons of specifics.

True. But the relationship between 'us' and the 'enemy' would change as some of them buy into the policy. Our goal isn't to destroy the Taliban -- they're just in the way of some other ends we have in the country and region. Maybe co-opting them would lessen resistence. Maybe not.

Generally speaking, the Talibs are not involved in the heroin trade; some of their branches -- and there are many sub sets -- aid in the smuggling to earn money but nominally, the trade as opposed to just growing innocuous poppies is haram. Actually, the smugglers pay the Talibs to attack coalition or ISAF troops that might interfere with smuggling and to guard the smuggling convoys; that'[s sort of a no-no but the quest for power makes strange bedfellows --as it does in the west. The trade is run by the old line smugglers who've been plying their trade for centuries and do not wish to stop because they're making big bucks; they're mostly crooks, plain and simple.

The Taliban, in a sense are not really the problem, nor are the smugglers though both contribute to the greater goal. The problem is that Afghanistan has never been effectively centrally governed and simply does not wish to be. That's the greater goal -- to avoid that.

[AmericanPride]

Iran already has a massive drug problem. The people of Iran and the government are already in a 'confrontation' and that government still exists because it has enough force to cow the very unhappy majority into acceptance.

I'm aware of Iran's drug problem. What I don't think is that it's sufficiently "massive" to warrant the kind of political repression necessary as a catalyst for popular action. Opium is one of the few leverages potentially available to the US in regards to Iran's domestic politics IMO.

Our credibility with the bulk of Iranians is good enough as is -- they generally like Americans and know we aren't the problem.

I think the popular election of Ahmadinejad after we more or less alienated Khatami speaks against that assertion to some degree. Yeah -- the Iranians don't have a general negative opinion of Americans, but I've heard of few Iranians speaking positively of our policies; especially the ones targetted at Iran itself. How many Americans recognize that it's the government and not the people of Iran that's the problem? However wide or real, there is a perceived disconnect between our policies and our principles. The consequent degradation of our credibility diminishes the already limited access we have with the Iranian people.

The problem with an unstable Iran is that the Persians have a lot of pride and are rather xenophobic; make it less stable than it is today and little good will come of that.

What is the relationship between what you describe as Iranian national traits and the stability of the country (and presumbly its impact on the region)? Some argument could be made that expansionism and aggression are consequences of instability, which I assume is your point.

I'd suggest qualifiers like 'absurd' and 'shallow' make all that come after sort of inconsequential or at least questionable. I know many are worried about Iran having nukes; I'm not.

The terms "absurd" and "shallow" were in reference to the Soviet transition to democracy, not necessarily that the Soviet government made a transition of some kind. My apologies for not being more clear. So I suppose again the question becomes: why do you think an unstable Iran would be negative for US policy? What if we included the assumption that Iran could potentially become a cooperative partner to US policy through a successful negotiation of said instability?

Agricultural contracts? For what? The Afghans barely feed themselves and if the Poppy harvest were converted to a cash crop, there'd be no heroin problem...

Again, my apologies. I should have been more clear: I believe US corporate cooperation in Afghan opium could be hidden in contracts; I assumed that said contracts would be in the category of agriculture. I'm not particularly concerned about the categorization; more concerned with how to make US involvement in the proposed policy less (1) transparant and obvious and (2) more acceptable to those elements of our society which have significant sway in our government. Maybe this part of the proposal is unworkable; I don't know. I'm only exploring ways in which to make the plan acceptable to those relevant in the decision-making process. And yes -- I'm assuming our politicians are realists and not idealists.

I'm sure you don't; they occurred in the 1970s and 1980s and I suspect you had other things on your mind then

I wasn't born then since I really didn't have anything on my mind whatsoever. Since it's apparent we already have widespread involvement in the drug business, I don't see the objections against doing it again if done "right". By "right", I mean effectively for as long as possible since anything will eventually fail if run long enough. Yeah -- Congress will raise a fuss at some point, some heads will roll, and some other strategy will be found until that is compromised too. Isn't that how politics works anyways?

Generally speaking, the Talibs are not involved in the heroin trade

True. Got me. I admit mistakenly using "Taliban" as a synonym for "bad guys" in Afghanistan. I include the smugglers, whatever their identity, in the "bad guy" category for the reasons you cited. OK -- so we co-opt the "crooks" and the farmers involved in opium, make a few bucks, and, most importantly IMO, invest all that hard-earned cash in developing infrastructure for "[effective central government]" in a country which never has experienced it. That's my primary concern; I threw in Iran as a second goose egg, but I'm not really concerned where the opium would end up if it does not adversely impact US security interests.

So I suppose a rework of the presentation is necessary.

[Ken White]

I'm aware of Iran's drug problem. What I don't think is that it's sufficiently "massive" to warrant the kind of political repression necessary as a catalyst for popular action. Opium is one of the few leverages potentially available to the US in regards to Iran's domestic politics IMO.

No, it's not that massive but it is massive enough. Nor would increasing the size of that problem increase the potential for overthrow of the Mullahs.

I think the popular election of Ahmadinejad after we more or less alienated Khatami speaks against that assertion to some degree.

Not really. It speaks to the power of Ayatollah Khameini to keep any effective opponent of the ballot and to the power of the Pasdaran to ensure that turnput was low --as it was -- and that votes went where they were supposed to.

Yeah -- the Iranians don't have a general negative opinion of Americans, but I've heard of few Iranians speaking positively of our policies; especially the ones targetted at Iran itself.

That's because our policies are dumb.

How many Americans recognize that it's the government and not the people of Iran that's the problem?

Most I talk to and I suspect that's a more eclectic crowd in age, social status and experiences than most. Americans, collectively, aren't nearly as dumb as the media and academy like to think.

However wide or real, there is a perceived disconnect between our policies and our principles. The consequent degradation of our credibility diminishes the already limited access we have with the Iranian people.

The disconnect between our policies and our 'principles' is in the mind of those who select unrealistic principles IMO.

Just as an idle question, doesn't your concern for our principles sort of clash with your 'proposal?'

What is the relationship between what you describe as Iranian national traits and the stability of the country (and presumbly its impact on the region)? Some argument could be made that expansionism and aggression are consequences of instability, which I assume is your point.

The cessation of 2.5M barrels per day of oil exports. We would REALLY like China and India to have all the oil they want. The relationship of that to what I said is that they would not want to accept any 'help.' They'd probably resist it and, trust me, we do not want to fight in Iran. I spent two years there ; it's not as bad as Afghanistan terrain wise but it's close; it's over 2.5 times as big and it has twice the population. So we mess up the world oil supply -- which was one thing we were quite careful NOT to do in going into Iraq...

The terms "absurd" and "shallow" were in reference to the Soviet transition to democracy, not necessarily that the Soviet government made a transition of some kind. My apologies for not being more clear.

Not a problem, I knew what you meant. My point was that such words prejudice your following statement whatever it might be. With respect to the specifics, Russia and Iran are different. Russia is not totally western, there's some of the east in there but it is essentially western in most processes. Iran is totally Eastern, it is not at all western in thought processes.

So I suppose again the question becomes: why do you think an unstable Iran would be negative for US policy?

As above.

What if we included the assumption that Iran could potentially become a cooperative partner to US policy through a successful negotiation of said instability?

We aren't going to do that; though you certainly may. I don't like to deal in assumptions.

Again, my apologies. I should have been more clear: I believe US corporate cooperation in Afghan opium could be hidden in contracts; I assumed that said contracts would be in the category of agriculture. I'm not particularly concerned about the categorization; more concerned with how to make US involvement in the proposed policy less (1) transparant and obvious and (2) more acceptable to those elements of our society which have significant sway in our government. Maybe this part of the proposal is unworkable; I don't know. I'm only exploring ways in which to make the plan acceptable to those relevant in the decision-making process. And yes -- I'm assuming our politicians are realists and not idealists.

Some of both -- however, what you propose is I believe a little much for most of them to accept.

I wasn't born then since I really didn't have anything on my mind whatsoever.

That was obvious.

Since it's apparent we already have widespread involvement in the drug business, I don't see the objections against doing it again if done "right".

Actually it's not apparent; while there was some, it was not as widespread as the media and some in Congress wanted to think. If you don't see any reason not to do what you suggest, you may want to reconsider any oaths you might have to take in the near future.

By "right", I mean effectively for as long as possible since anything will eventually fail if run long enough. Yeah -- Congress will raise a fuss at some point, some heads will roll, and some other strategy will be found until that is compromised too. Isn't that how politics works anyways?

If you are a heroin user, then I suppose you're entitled to use the word 'right' in any effort that might enable the trade. If you aren't one, that's probably a bad word to use in deference to those it'll harm. The War on Drugs is not working and is a dumb idea but enabling a trade that does as much damage to people and nations is even more dumb.

True. Got me. I admit mistakenly using "Taliban" as a synonym for "bad guys" in Afghanistan. I include the smugglers, whatever their identity, in the "bad guy" category for the reasons you cited. OK -- so we co-opt the "crooks" and the farmers involved in opium, make a few bucks, and, most importantly IMO, invest all that hard-earned cash in developing infrastructure for "[effective central government]" in a country which never has experienced it. That's my primary concern; I threw in Iran as a second goose egg, but I'm not really concerned where the opium would end up if it does not adversely impact US security interests.

So I suppose a rework of the presentation is necessary.

This from the guy who is derisory about "our self-proclaimed political principles." One who states "However wide or real, there is a perceived disconnect between our policies and our principles" then advocates a totally unprincipled effort...

Either mediocre satire or bad taste, not sure which. Both ?

Tilting at windmills is fun but I think I'll go sack out and rest my lance.

[Ken White]

As I am reading Gentile, he is contrasting a large force engaged in "hearts and minds" (stability ops, "nation building", whatever) with "other military means". Since he doesn't define the latter term, I guess it's left to our imaginations. My image is mobile light infantry (conventional, special ops and extra-special ops) knowing where it's going and what it will do when it gets there. What did "other military means" mean to you and what capability is missing?

Partly what you said but a couple of other things not for an unclassified discussion. We do not right now have the full capability required in any of those things though all are being developed.

I read Gentile as focusing on AQ as the "main enemy" in that theatre ... Whom do you see as the opponents ?

The various Taliban groups (there are a number) plus the Heroin smugglers and the many various warlords and tribes who very much do not want a strong central government * and, if we get dumb or too careless, most of the rest of the population who do not like foreigners but, so far, are being nice and polite as is their wont.

* They will be low key and play both ends against the middle but will fight if they feel too much progress is being made.

Gian is right, AQ is the main effort as far as I can tell, I just like to remind folks there's more to it than that. I also strongly suggest that any 'leaning' in Afghanistan is strictly a matter of convenience and is quite temporary unless there is heavy family involvement.

[AmericanPride]

This from the guy who is derisory about "our self-proclaimed political principles." One who states "However wide or real, there is a perceived disconnect between our policies and our principles" then advocates a totally unprincipled effort...

Just as an idle question, doesn't your concern for our principles sort of clash with your 'proposal?

Not particularly. Principles are not ends of themselves. They serve some other purpose, which is usually, not always, the justification of whatever policy is being implemented. So political principles are important insofar it appears that a state is principled, not that it actually acts in such a way. Because sometimes necessity compels states to act in ways which are in contradiction to whatever principles it claims to uphold.

Nor would increasing the size of that problem increase the potential for overthrow of the Mullahs.

I disagree. Small communities are regularly "destablized" by the influx of drugs. So are a few countries. I think the same pattern can be generally applied to a state as a whole.

It speaks to the power of Ayatollah Khameini to keep any effective opponent of the ballot and to the power of the Pasdaran to ensure that turnput was low --as it was -- and that votes went where they were supposed to.

True -- hence the "to some degree" modifier.

That's because our policies are dumb.

What makes the policies "dumb"?

If you are a heroin user, then I suppose you're entitled to use the word 'right' in any effort that might enable the trade. If you aren't one, that's probably a bad word to use in deference to those it'll harm. The War on Drugs is not working and is a dumb idea but enabling a trade that does as much damage to people and nations is even more dumb.

"Right" in the context of politics, IMO, has no moral connotation. "Right" can only be used in the context of what objective is being sought. So the idea a policy is "dumb" on the basis that it causes "damage to people and nations" is not an effective inference because sometimes it is necessary to inflict damage on people and nations; whether that's war, economic sanctions, or the drug trade. Not sure how there is any moral variance in the means if the reciepient is killed or otherwise disenfranchised regardless.

The cessation of 2.5M barrels per day of oil exports. We would REALLY like China and India to have all the oil they want. The relationship of that to what I said is that they would not want to accept any 'help.' They'd probably resist it and, trust me, we do not want to fight in Iran. I spent two years there ; it's not as bad as Afghanistan terrain wise but it's close; it's over 2.5 times as big and it has twice the population. So we mess up the world oil supply -- which was one thing we were quite careful NOT to do in going into Iraq...

Not sure if I agree with the initial assertion of China (and to lesser degree, India). Wouldn't the consequent rise in cost of Chinese/Indian exports make US companies more competitive, and therefore to some degree revitalize American industry? As I said earlier, the Iran portion of this idea is secondary to enfranchising some of the prime movers in Afghanistan by legitimizing their trade, and using it to build a stake in the subsequent development of government and infrastructure. It could also potentially separate the Taliban/AQ from an ally of conveinance. A State official once remarked that the military turns a blind-eye towards opium production -- my question is why not take that a step further and exploit it to our advantage?

[Entropy]

AmericanPride,

"Right" in the context of politics, IMO, has no moral connotation. "Right" can only be used in the context of what objective is being sought. So the idea a policy is "dumb" on the basis that it causes "damage to people and nations" is not an effective inference because sometimes it is necessary to inflict damage on people and nations; whether that's war, economic sanctions, or the drug trade. Not sure how there is any moral variance in the means if the reciepient is killed or otherwise disenfranchised regardless.

Your arguments here disturbingly appear to simply be "ends-justify-means." It's one thing to actively oppose the drug trade or to largely ignore it. It's something else entirely to promote it against foes, most of whom will be noncombatants.

By such reasoning we should ignore many other moral standards of conflict that stand in the way of inflicting the "necessary" damage on people and nations you seem to desire. Heck, why stop with just drugs? Lace them with lethal agents, or use a bioweapon to destroy the enemy's agriculture to cause destabilization through starvation. As you say, "right" is only about "the context of what objective is being sought."

What you seem to advocate here is not a slippery slope - it is a vertical ice rink straight into barbarity.

[AmericanPride]

Your arguments here disturbingly appear to simply be "ends-justify-means."

More or less. My question to you is: what is the alternative to "ends-justify-means"? Isn't that how we operate? We come up with some goal, then put together plan a that will attain it. Doesn't the "end" compel us to use some particular "means" that otherwise would not be done?

By such reasoning we should ignore many other moral standards of conflict that stand in the way of inflicting the "necessary" damage on people and nations you seem to desire.

Not necessarily. It's one thing to break "standards" which have no meaning and no power; but legal instruments, media exposure, and international perception, etc are all relevant variables to consider. Sometimes they're relevant -- sometimes not. Depends on the circumstances. Intangibles can be just as dangerous to our policy goals as the tangibles. So -- no -- I'm not advocating an "anything goes" policy. We simply do not have the power to dominate everyone all of the time; cooperation, give-and-take, is necessary more often than not.

It's one thing to actively oppose the drug trade or to largely ignore it. It's something else entirely to promote it against foes, most of whom will be noncombatants.

IMO, that's one of the greatest problems: we find little caveats to applying the moral principles we claim to uphold. They're not applied consistently so I don't understand the large fuss that's made about recognizing that fact.

[Entropy]

More or less. My question to you is: what is the alternative to "ends-justify-means"? Isn't that how we operate? We come up with some goal, then put together plan a that will attain it. Doesn't the "end" compel us to use some particular "means" that otherwise would not be done?

The difference is that our means are recognized as legitimate, legal, are "best practices" and are in keeping with the standards and character of our nation. A policy that would have the US government become a drug lord for Iranians is none of those things.

IMO, that's one of the greatest problems: we find little caveats to applying the moral principles we claim to uphold. They're not applied consistently so I don't understand the large fuss that's made about recognizing that fact.

I might suggest there's a huge difference between the kind of "lawyering" that creates some wiggle room inside a particular set of rules or standards, and completely tossing those rules and standards out the window in pursuit of some goal. In the case here you appear to be advocating for a policy where the US government facilitates the opium trade to Iran for the purpose of destabilizing Iran. In doing so, you would have the US government violate a host of its own laws as well as international law and various treaty agreements. That's only the most obvious of many problems. If violating the letter and spirit of the law, long-standing US policy, and American moral standards is not an "anything goes" policy, then what is?

Again, there is a world of difference between largely ignoring the drug trade in Afghanistan or usurpation by, for instance, buying raw crops then destroying them so the product does not reach the market, and actively participating in, colluding with, and providing profits for the elements running the opium trade.

[Ken White]

Not particularly. Principles are not ends of themselves. They serve some other purpose, which is usually, not always, the justification of whatever policy is being implemented. So political principles are important insofar it appears that a state is principled, not that it actually acts in such a way. Because sometimes necessity compels states to act in ways which are in contradiction to whatever principles it claims to uphold.

Nice cynical and somewhat immature view of the process. Incorrect IMO because IF the principles are sensible (and most of ours are) then the disregard of those principles is a temporary expedient for short term gain. That almost invariably comes back to haunt. Witness Iran and our policies for an example.

I disagree.

We can disagree on that as well.

What makes the policies "dumb"?

I should think that would be obvious to a superior intellect -- the simple fact that after all these years, they have not worked.

"Right" in the context of politics, IMO, has no moral connotation. "Right" can only be used in the context of what objective is being sought.

Unfortunately, many politicians seem to agree with you. You'll find a few soldiers do as well. You'll also find that most of the latter do not agree; that for two very practical reasons. First, if something falls into the not 'right' category as viewed by most people, there's a reason for that and you ignore it at your own peril. Secondly, if one does something that is not 'right' then one invites the opponent to do the same thing thus creating a self defeating spiral. Most soldiers instinctively realize those two things and behave sensibly; the few that don't generally end up paying for their errors.

So the idea a policy is "dumb" on the basis that it causes "damage to people and nations" is not an effective inference because sometimes it is necessary to inflict damage on people and nations; whether that's war, economic sanctions, or the drug trade. Not sure how there is any moral variance in the means if the reciepient is killed or otherwise disenfranchised regardless.

There is IMO, your opinion may certainly differ. The real issue is whether the pain is being inflicted on the deserving recipients of pain or the innocents around them.

Not sure if I agree with the initial assertion of China (and to lesser degree, India). Wouldn't the consequent rise in cost of Chinese/Indian exports make US companies more competitive, and therefore to some degree revitalize American industry?

Not IMO and in that of most economists -- but I'll acknowledge Economists are like Doctors, don't like what you hear? Get a second opinion.

As I said earlier, the Iran portion of this idea is secondary to enfranchising some of the prime movers in Afghanistan by legitimizing their trade, and using it to build a stake in the subsequent development of government and infrastructure.

You're missing the major point that the smugglers are not prime movers (though they pay some of them) and, more importantly, that many do not want that government and infrastructure; ergo as soon as they tumble to what your scheme is, they'll resist.

It could also potentially separate the Taliban/AQ from an ally of conveinance. A State official once remarked that the military turns a blind-eye towards opium production -- my question is why not take that a step further and exploit it to our advantage?

State officials say a lot of stupid things. The military does not turn a blind eye toward it; it does not have the wherewithal to do much about it and is leery of adding further instability -- a process you seem to espouse.

In a response to Entropy, you said

IMO, that's one of the greatest problems: we find little caveats to applying the moral principles we claim to uphold. They're not applied consistently so I don't understand the large fuss that's made about recognizing that fact.

You of course realize the cause of not consistently applying our principles is that smart guys like you come up with seemingly brilliant ideas that abrogate those principles as your proposal does -- and then the rest of us are stuck with the cleanup.

[wm]

Principles are not ends of themselves. They serve some other purpose, which is usually, not always, the justification of whatever policy is being implemented. So political principles are important insofar it appears that a state is principled, not that it actually acts in such a way. Because sometimes necessity compels states to act in ways which are in contradiction to whatever principles it claims to uphold.

A couple of aphorisms to remember:

1) Never fight with a pig--you both get dirty and the pig enjoys it.
2) Never argue with an idiot--it brings you down to his level and he beats you on experience.

If we do not take the moral high ground (and there is always moral high ground) when engaged in combat, we are almost certain to go the way of such wonderful "empires" as the Spanish in the Western Hemisphere, the Crusaders in the Holy Land, and the Mongols in Eurasia. Lasting solutions are built upon strong moral groundworks, not from slippery consequentialist calculations set in a future that is not really predictable.

[reed11b]

The more I read into this thread, the murkier things become. Allow me to articulate my thought process so far, so that I can have some help in summarizing what is being stated on this and other afghan threads. One, I reject the claim that this is an un-winnable quagmire. It is an insurgency and can be defeated. Victory will be defeating AQ and the Taliban so that they never offer an armed threat to the US. It is complicated in that it is a cross-border insurgency but winnable all the same. There are things that we have all ready done well. Making the effort multi-national was good even if it made for a tactical C&C mess. Using "kid gloves" until a plan is formulated has also been wise, though the "plan" has been overly slow in coming. The reason I state these as good is because they keep the insurgency an insurgency without the support of the majority of the population. Not focusing on infrastructure has been wise as well. While it is good that we have put some effort into this since it is the "right" thing to do, it is not a strategy for winning COIN. We have focused on quality and long term training of the ANA and allowed them to lead in operations as early as permissible. What we have done poorly is to not "roll up or sleeves" and come up with a plan to defeat the Taliban and AQ. They have means of financing and re-supplying and a method of C&C, and these can be attacked if they can be identified. Their freedom of movement is another viable target. Attacking the opium trade to hurt the Taliban and AQ makes sense. Attacking it everywhere, whether or not it supports them does not. We also need to create a tactical line of C&C that is more then US forces. The big confusing question for me regarding A-stan is Pakistan and India. I want to say support Pakistan and coordinate with them in destroying Taliban and AQ elements in Pakistan. My support for this is eroded by the constant actions on Pakistan's part that suggest they are not working in anybodies best interests. I had thought about supporting India as a counterbalance and a central effort in the region for fighting terrorism (with the added bonus of helping to keep China in check) but the idea just doesn't pass the sniff test. So now what?
Reed

[AmericanPride]

The difference is that our means are recognized as legitimate, legal, are "best practices" and are in keeping with the standards and character of our nation. A policy that would have the US government become a drug lord for Iranians is none of those things.

"Acceptability". That's what "legitimate", "legal", "best practices", and "standards and character" come down to. And all of those things are interpreted differently by whomever so happens to be making the decision at the time. They certainly have a place in politics; that I have no doubt. But their place, I would argue, is purely instrumental. Is it unacceptable by those terms? Absolutely. But we're talking about what is essentially a political decision, not a moral one.

Again, there is a world of difference between largely ignoring the drug trade in Afghanistan or usurpation by, for instance, buying raw crops then destroying them so the product does not reach the market, and actively participating in, colluding with, and providing profits for the elements running the opium trade.

There is a moral difference, certainly. But the realist and classical theories of political power do not contain moral considerations as ends of themselves. The final and greatest consideration is whether or not the course of action advances the position of the state relative to its adversaries (which is everyone else).

If violating the letter and spirit of the law, long-standing US policy, and American moral standards is not an "anything goes" policy, then what is?

It depends on the context. The context is defined by state objectives. Even the same exact act has moral variation depending on its context.

Nice cynical and somewhat immature view of the process. Incorrect IMO because IF the principles are sensible (and most of ours are) then the disregard of those principles is a temporary expedient for short term gain. That almost invariably comes back to haunt. Witness Iran and our policies for an example.

What I described is essentially the realist position on morality and principles in politics. Your second sentence in the quoted statement reinforces that view. Destroying one's own credibility is not in one's own interest. Therefore, one should at least maintain the appearance of credibility. "Sensible" principles would be a way to construct an appearance of credibility.

Unfortunately, many politicians seem to agree with you. You'll find a few soldiers do as well. You'll also find that most of the latter do not agree; that for two very practical reasons. First, if something falls into the not 'right' category as viewed by most people, there's a reason for that and you ignore it at your own peril. Secondly, if one does something that is not 'right' then one invites the opponent to do the same thing thus creating a self defeating spiral. Most soldiers instinctively realize those two things and behave sensibly; the few that don't generally end up paying for their errors.

I agree. Politics and soldiering are completely different. One requires deception, manipulation, and exploitation. The other requires absolute trust, courage, and exertion. It's why I'm involved in one and not the other.

You're missing the major point that the smugglers are not prime movers (though they pay some of them) and, more importantly, that many do not want that government and infrastructure; ergo as soon as they tumble to what your scheme is, they'll resist.

Which of course leads to the question of the extent of influence enjoyed by those in the opium trade.

You of course realize the cause of not consistently applying our principles is that smart guys like you come up with seemingly brilliant ideas that abrogate those principles as your proposal does -- and then the rest of us are stuck with the cleanup.

That's one cause, certainly. Another, perhaps, is that we really have no national concensus of what consistute our values.

If we do not take the moral high ground (and there is always moral high ground) when engaged in combat..... Lasting solutions are built upon strong moral groundworks....

I agree but I'd like to understand your perception better if you would be so kind as to provide a short explanaition of your meaning.

[Ken White]

I'll just address those points you made with respect to my comments.

...What I described is essentially the realist position on morality and principles in politics.

No, what you described is the textbook version of that position. Reality has a very different take.

Your second sentence in the quoted statement reinforces that view. Destroying one's own credibility is not in one's own interest. Therefore, one should at least maintain the appearance of credibility. "Sensible" principles would be a way to construct an appearance of credibility.

Again you promote academic theory; we have numerous examples of bright young things doing that over the years, Bundy, Wolfowitz... As the Actress said to the Bishop "You not only shouldn't do anything that's wrong, you should not even give the appearance of doing anything that's wrong..." Unfortunately, the very bright are not inclined to listen to an actress.

I agree. Politics and soldiering are completely different. One requires deception, manipulation, and exploitation. The other requires absolute trust, courage, and exertion. It's why I'm involved in one and not the other.

Interesting. May I ask which you are involved in?

Which of course leads to the question of the extent of influence enjoyed by those in the opium trade.

Directly contingent upon family ties (which your scheme cannot replicate) and secondarily the amount of money flowing, I'm quite sure.

That's one cause, certainly. Another, perhaps, is that we really have no national concensus of what consistute our values.

I disagree, aberrant schemes have caused most of our foreign policy gaffes and deviations from principle. They have almost always been dreamed up by bright young things who see no problem in just a little deviation from principle for impressive gains. Such idiotic thinking put us in Viet Nam and put us in Iraq in a less than satisfactory mode. The slight deviations from principle have invariably caused more problems than they solved and as one who spent over 45 years cleaning up after those kinds of dipwad screwups, I'm not at all in favor of them. I've got a son who's now doing cleanup work -- he's not in favor of them either.

You're also incorrect in your assertion there is no national consensus on what constitutes our values. There is one -- the problem is that the values (and I use the term loosely) of academe and our national media do not sign on to that consensus -- which is essentially, do what's right. In any nation of over 300 million, there will always be many views on any topic -- but a consensus of a slight majority is pretty well convinced of what is right and what is wrong; the quibbling voices arguing other positions do not change that, nor does the matter that the educational and media establishments also differ alter the fact.

You earlier asked this:

More or less. My question to you is: what is the alternative to "ends-justify-means"? Isn't that how we operate? We come up with some goal, then put together plan a that will attain it. Doesn't the "end" compel us to use some particular "means" that otherwise would not be done?.

No, it is not how we operate -- again regardless of the jaundiced view of many in the halls of ivy and the media. It is, regrettably, how we have on occasion operated, thus the partial justification for their view -- and we are still paying the price for most of those aberrations everyday. No, the end does not compel us to do what you or others suggest; we have sometimes done so not because of compulsion but simply because it seemed easier at the time. It was not. It never is.

[Entropy]

AmericanPride,

To be honest, I'm not sure what you're arguing anymore. At first it was about the US pumping opium into Iran to destabilize the regime. Now it seems to be a relativistic philosophical argument about something completely removed from the reality of Afghanistan or Iran. Since this is a thread about Afghanistan, I'm not really interested in discussing political theories.

So the only thing I'll say is that a US attempt to destabilize Iran with heroin is a terrible idea, even if it were an honorable course of action (which it isn't). It's questionable the attempt would do much, if anything, to the Iranian regime, while the downsides an negative consequences are both severe and quite likely. So it doesn't even pass a simple cost/benefit test. No amount of theorizing will change that.

[Ron Humphrey]

some of the things you suggest PRIDE,

But since others are doing such an excellent job of addressing that I'll limit myself to something simple that I can handle without possibly breaking my brain

Principles when looked at as prisms may very easily be confused as having no more solidity then traditions. In so far as ones ability to pick and/or choose in order to facilitate actions in order to attain given goals.

Fortunately for the human race mankind does have the inherent knowledge that right and wrong do exist and as such conscience can and should play a prominent role in decisions.

A principled man will make mistakes both ignorantly or by choice, he will however if he knows what those principles are have to ability to judge himself in such a manner as to hopefully not continue along foolhardy paths.

For he that chooses to manipulate those principles in such a way as to legitimize his own wants without regard to others life will be very painful in both the short and the long term.

This goes doubly for a govt. These exist for a purpose and as such interact for a purpose. When these interactions take place without attention and consideration for those whom govt represents then you can take what the unprincipled man gets and multiply it by about a million.

There will always be "easier" ways and the right way, as Ken pointed out the former more oft than not results in great sorrow and burden for many and rarely achieves that which it sought.



On the Iran thing-

A race car driver wants to win the race so he does everything he can to make his car the fastest, then for good measure he tampers with the opponents car.

HE wins

The rest of the story-

half way through the race the opponents car breaks down, and in doing so runs into the car next to him. This causes the opponent to spin into the wall where he is then run into by twenty other cars. He survives but three others in the pile up don't, one of which was the younger brother of the driver who won.

And the first car that was hit by the opponents vehicle was run off the racetrack over the barrier into the pit crew areas where 4 are injured and the father of our winner was crushed .

Long story short, you may get what you want but more often than not you probably won't like what you got.