Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory?

[SWJED]

The 8 December edition of Newsweek Magazine - Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory? - Andrew J. Bacevich

In Afghanistan today, the United States and its allies are using the wrong means to pursue the wrong mission. Sending more troops to the region, as incoming president Barack Obama and others have suggested we should, will only turn Operation Enduring Freedom into Operation Enduring Obligation. Afghanistan will be a sinkhole, consuming resources neither the US military nor the US government can afford to waste.

[John T. Fishel]

analysis despite the overblown opening statement. The key question is what more US/NATO troops are expected to do. More troops may well be a necessary first step to getting where Bacevich desires. I certainly hope that GEN Petraeus' JSAT takes Bacevich's argument into account but there is more to the situation than can be stated in a brief article in Newsweek.

Cheers

JohnT

[slapout9]

It's almost an exact copy of Colonel Warden's plan that I posted here awhile back.

http://strategydevelopment.net/wordpress/

It actually goes back a lot farther than that, years as a matter of fact. I sat in his office just after we started bombing Astan and he said Pakistan is the real COG in the so called War on Terror. I know you guys are tired of hearing this but we better start listening to him or we are going to be in big trouble. He doesn't believe in COIN as we talk about it here but he certainly knows and believes in what we would call UW (By,With,and Through). Even General Van Ripper talks highly of him in his JEQ article on EBO which he points out Warden had nothing to do with in the crazy form it exists today. I will get off my soapbox now

[Ken White]

I'm inclined to agree with John, I rarely agree with Bacevich but do to an extent concur with this analysis. I agree that infusing a large number of additional troops is not wise and I agree that we need a definition -- not of victory, there will be no victory -- but of our aim in that nation and in the region.

I do disagree with the Bacevich statement that

"No country poses a greater potential threat to U.S. national security—today and for the foreseeable future—than Pakistan."

Hyperbole, I believe. Further, he ends

"Rather than sending more troops to the region, the new American president should start withdrawing them and devise a more realistic—and more affordable—strategy for Afghanistan."

Not smart and seemingly in contradiction to his concern for Pakistan as a threat.

Withdraw precipitously and leave a vacuum in the region? Bad plan. We don't need to devise a realistic and affordable strategy for Afghanistan. We do need to determine what precisely is the US and NATO goal in Afghanistan. From that, a logical operational plan will flow. We do not need to spend the next 20 or 30 years there trying to obtain the mirage of an effective government and a happy productive nation but too rapid a withdrawal would be unwise.

Slap, if Warden said: "Pakistan is the real COG in the so called War on Terror." Then I disagree with him also.

These two strategists, baby boomers both, are thinking in erudite terms but they grew up during the Cold War and that's colored their perceptions. In this age, there are no centers of gravity -- there are hundreds if not thousands of them. We're back to Victorian-Edwardian era chaos. You can shut down Pakistan and another 'COG' will quickly replace it. The current terror problem is amorphous, worldwide and not conducive to Clausewitzian treatment. Trying to make it so only confuses the issues. We're dealing with a Starfish -- cut off an arm and it will grow a new one, slightly different in form...

Better to watch the Starfish you know than create a new one that you may not recognize or otherwise lose sight of.

[jmm99]

(from Warden's webpage)
One of these Cardinal Rules especially important to follow in geopolitical strategy development is “Execute Good Enough Plans.” The near universal tendency is to try for perfect plans and perfect Future Pictures; as nice as it might be to realize a perfect Future Picture, the likelihood of doing so is vanishing small while the cost will almost certainly be prohibitive.

The devil really seems to be in the details of the "good enough plan" - and how one gets there.

COL Warden's plan ends up with this:

This cursory strategic review would suggest that the best course would be to end the war in return for an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation.

Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted.

If the Pashtuns would decide that AQ were no longer welcome, and if Pakistan would decide the same re: AQ-linked groups, one might say "good enough". "Afghanistan" (to the extent it is a nation in reality, as opposed to in law) is on the sidelines as to those decisions.

[slapout9]

Slap, if Warden said: "Pakistan is the real COG in the so called War on Terror." Then I disagree with him also.

These two strategists, baby boomers both, are thinking in erudite terms but they grew up during the Cold War and that's colored their perceptions. In this age, there are no centers of gravity -- there are hundreds if not thousands of them. We're back to Victorian-Edwardian era chaos. You can shut down Pakistan and another 'COG' will quickly replace it. The current terror problem is amorphous, worldwide and not conducive to Clausewitzian treatment. Trying to make it so only confuses the issues. We're dealing with a Starfish -- cut off an arm and it will grow a new one, slightly different in form...

Better to watch the Starfish you know than create a new one that you may not recognize or otherwise lose sight of.

You are right and Warden would agree with you and this is pointed out in the 5 rings analysis there are multiple COG's in a system. The answer he gave was in response to the question I asked him as in a comparsion between the two... Astan and Pstan which is the real COG. Bewteen the two I would say Pstan is the real COG...did I splain meself mo better this time

And my personal opinion Astan has a much greater potential to be a Vietnam then Iraq ever had.

[Ken White]

I agree with Warden in that first quote.

There is no devil in the detail of what constitutes a good enough plan; that's easy -- what's hard is convincing the risk averse to implement the plan instead of improving it until its too late or totally flummoxed...

The first quote from Warden contradicts his second quoted item. If he really believes

"an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation."

that's worrisome because such an agreement (1) Wuldn't be worth the paper on which it was printed; (2) Could not be enforced by an Afghan government no matter how well meaning; (3) Could not be easily verified (he obviously has not been to Afghanistan and moved about on the ground a great deal); and (4) Deviance couldn't be addressed at all well; payments are good -- for the other, what strategic targets within the nation? Ludicrous. I say contradicts because that plan doesn't meet the 'good enough' test.

JMM said:

"Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted."

Hopefully you said that in jest. 'Iron Clad' agreements mean nothing in the ME or South Asia. You can't enforce them and they know it. They will tell you what you wish to hear and do what they wish to do; the two will only rarely coincide.

"If the Pashtuns would decide that AQ were no longer welcome, and if Pakistan would decide the same re: AQ-linked groups, one might say "good enough". "Afghanistan" (to the extent it is a nation in reality, as opposed to in law) is on the sidelines as to those decisions."

I wouldn't even bet on that. The area is too volatile and the religion is chameleon like in its ability to adapt and twist.

One cannot look at Afghanistan with western norms in mind and expect to achieve success.

There was a time when we could have insisted and they (they being not necessarily Afghanistan but most nations) would have complied but 58 years of conducting 'limited war's and not adapting our Armed forces to changing norms and times has shown the world that we can be safely defied. that cannot be undone. It can be rectified to an extent and if we're smart, we'll do that but I'm not too hopeful. I'm afraid Colonel Warden and too many still serving senior folks are living in the past. Sorta sad when someone older than all of 'em says that...

[Ken White]

You are right and Warden would agree with you and this is pointed out in the 5 rings analysis there are multiple COG's in a system. The answer he gave was in response to the question I asked him as in a comparsion between the two... Astan and Pstan which is the real COG. Bewteen the two I would say Pstan is the real COG...did I splain meself mo better this time

I can 'gree widdat. Howsomeever, I still think that the COG bit can lead one astray today in this era of niceness and excessive global mobility and ease of communication because -- using Pakistan as an example, it is the 'COG' in the area but we are powerless to do much more than we've been doing, bribe heavily -- you can't always get to the COGs...

And my personal opinion Astan has a much greater potential to be a Vietnam then Iraq ever had.

If you mean a really long term effort with little progress or improvement, I agree. Same mistake was made going in, an idealistic, nice to have scenario was envisioned and realities on the ground were totally ignored.

We accrue a lot of benefits from our system of government. Or we used to; lately, I'm starting to wonder. Anyway, it's been pretty good but one of the really bad things is that due to big changes every four or eight years it does not at all lend itself to long term international projects.

Many today will tell you that a bipartisan foreign policy won the cold war. Heh. Dream on. There was as many missteps between 1947 and 1987 as there were forward steps -- maybe more. Everybody forgets the boo-boos because it turned out okay in the end and the chattering classes like to think we used to be nicer than we are today (we weren't, not at all). We just don't do long term well...

[Entropy]

I agree with Ken's comments almost completely (thanks for saving me some typing!), though I do tend to lean a bit more to Bacevich on the subject of Pakistan as potentially very serious threat. The threat of a destabilized Pakistan my not be the top potential threat, but I think it's easily in the top five and probably in the top 3.

One thing I will add is that the definition of victory as laid-out by our policymakers is not that muddled: An end to the threat of Al Qaeda's Astan sanctuary. We actually achieved that, but now the challenge is how can that success be sustained over the long term without a significant and enduring American presence. I've argued frequently here that our current response to that challenge (nation-building to create a democratic central state authority that is friendly to the US and can control its own territory) is unlikely to succeed for a whole host of reasons.

Additionally, in some ways I think many, including possibly Bacevich, are confusing means and ends - or rather the means have morphed INTO the ends, so that "victory" is redefined as successful nation-building and not the larger strategic goal of denying AQ a sanctuary in Astan over the long-term. In my judgment, this means-becoming-the-ends problem is preventing us and our policymakers from exploring other ways to achieve the strategic goal of preventing Astan from again becoming a terrorist (AQ or otherwise) sanctuary.

[jmm99]

JMM said:
Quote:
"Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted."

Hopefully you said that in jest.

with a couple of layers of irony and sarcasm.

[John T. Fishel]

I know only enough about the cultures of Afghanisatan and Pakistan to be dangerous. As an old MI puke, I know that developing an effective ends, ways, and means strategy for them requires good basic intel. Which is why I have kept my mouth shut regarding what we should be doing there and continuously expressing the educated guess that GEN Petraeus and his JSAT are doing the required legwork.

So, now I will venture into dangerous territory and lay out what I think are the critical tasks in outline form:
1. Define the threat in the region and from the region to us.
2. Describe our desired end state in realistic terms.
3. Indentfy the objectives that must be achieved to get us there.
4. Develop the COA to achieve the objectives.
5. Determine the resources required to carry out the COA.
6. Determine if carrying out the cOA will get us to the end state.
7. Determine if the resources available or that can be made available will do it.
8. Decide if the costs are bearable or too great (both economic and scial costs).
9. a. If bearable go ahead
b. If too great, revisit and revise #2....

(I'm sure you all recognize this approach.)

Cheers

JohnT

[slapout9]

John, if you don't express your opinion I want ever learn anything . Think of it as "Open Planning" no need to be right, just brain storm.

[slapout9]

Peter Bergens plan for Astan.

http://www.peterbergen.com/bergen/ar...ls.aspx?id=364

[John T. Fishel]

The Bergen piece is a good one. But, after reading it, I still don't know what his desired end state is and, therefore, I don't know whether achieving the objectives he lays out will do that. i don't see anything I really disagree with regarding his COA, but I am not sure what resources are required to carry them out. (Perhaps, that is asking too much of a short article.)

As I said, I don't know if what he proposes will achieve the overarching goal since I don't know what his end state is. I also don't know from what is given if the resources he hints at are sufficient or can be made availble in sufficient quantities. Finally, I don't know if the cost is too high - oneexample for the Afghans is the cost of reducing the drug trade even by the methods Bergen advocates.

Cheers

JohnT

[Eden]

Peter Bergen has his theory right - most of what he suggests is in line with classic COIN thinking. The problem is, as always, with applying that thinking to realities on the ground. A few caveats from my perspective:

1. Build the size of the Afghan army and police.
Right on. Has to be done. Bergen suggest roughly quadrupling the present force. However, keep in mind the following: the bill for training, equipping, and advising those folks is high...higher than amateur strategists generally realize. Moreover, the administrative infrastructure to support them - pay, schooling, housing, medical, etc. - doesn't exist. Building such a large Afghan Security Force implies a long-term (and I mean looooong-term) committment of men and money, or else they will do what they have traditionally done: sell themselves to the highest local bidder.

2. Solve the security shortfall in the short term.
Bergen's suggestion to establish tribal militias of 50 to 300 men for security at the district level is a good one. Though it does tend to conflict with the goals of Suggestion Number 1.

3. Reduce the size of the insurgency.
I agree that we shouldbe co-opting the Taliban. Just be aware the price will be high and will inevitably undermine any central government.

4. Embark on effective reconstruction.
I agree in principle, but I disagree with the emphasis on a few large-scale projects. In my opinion the way to go is micro-projects, in particular the reconstruction of the irrigation system. Three big problems, of course. First is you can't reconstruct without security, second is you are starting at absolutely ground zero, so we're talking a huge investment, third is the Afghans are entirely incapable of managing the aforementioned huge investment, so it will be another long committment of US government assets.

5. Hold a free, fair and secure election in 2009.

Even if one could be held, I don't think it would affect the course of events at all.

6. Decouple the Taliban from the drug trade.
Good luck. Bergen admits this would involve us taking over the Afghan judicial system and pretty much funding their entire agricultural effort. For a... all together now...long time. If you want Afghanistan to explode in violence, institute an effective anti-drug program.

7. Fix the problems in the NATO mission.
Everybody loves to beat up on our allies. Truth is, they inherited five years of US neglect, and frankly we haven't been doing that much better in the East than they have in the south. Yes, there is a lot of NATO deadwood, and yes we need to get more out of some of the big players in NATO. But things would be much worse today if the Canadians, Brits, Danes, Portugese, and Dutch hadn't been doing some of the heaviest fighting for the last two years or so.

8. End coalition air strikes that have a high probability of killing civilians.
Frankly, I don't think we execute many strikes that have a 'high probability of killing civilians'. The problem is, air strikes are the only way we have of attacking some of these folks. Minus air strikes, you have to go in with ground troops, and pulling off a surprise strike with ground troops is extremely difficult and extremely expensive and requires a lot more ground troops. Oh, and by the way, it doesn't always reduce the number of civilian casualties.

Anyway, all of these suggestions seem reasonable. But remember the old Afghan loop: you can't build a state until you reconstruct the economy; you can't reconstruct the economy until you establish security; you can't establish security until you grow an army; you can't grow an army until you build the state. State, economy, security, army: Bergen is basically suggesting we provide for or fund three out of the four (your choice) for the forseeable future. Big price to pay for an end state that is not likely to last for long.

[Ken White]

Entropy says:

"...our current response to that challenge (nation-building to create a democratic central state authority that is friendly to the US and can control its own territory) is unlikely to succeed for a whole host of reasons."

John mentioned that Peter Bergen did not posit an end state while Eden lays out the Bergen prescriptions quite accurately and ends with what anyone concerned about Afghanistan should be considering:

"Anyway, all of these suggestions seem reasonable. But remember the old Afghan loop: you can't build a state until you reconstruct the economy; you can't reconstruct the economy until you establish security; you can't establish security until you grow an army; you can't grow an army until you build the state. State, economy, security, army: Bergen is basically suggesting we provide for or fund three out of the four (your choice) for the forseeable future. Big price to pay for an end state that is not likely to last for long." (emphasis added / kw)

Note that he correctly says "...for the foreseeable future..." How long will that be? More importantly, my fear is that too many are unaware of or deliberately eliding the almost certain fact that Eden mentioned and I highlighted...

[wm]

We might try to substitute "success," but I'm not sure that this much better. We would only be defining that success from our own frame of reference. As Eden notes in the following quote, either process is unlikely to yield much of a long term solution.

. . . the old Afghan loop: you can't build a state until you reconstruct the economy; you can't reconstruct the economy until you establish security; you can't establish security until you grow an army; you can't grow an army until you build the state. State, economy, security, army: Bergen is basically suggesting we provide for or fund three out of the four (your choice) for the forseeable future. Big price to pay for an end state that is not likely to last for long.

A long term solution is a solution that is freely adopted by the conglomeration of folks that make up Afghanistan, not one that is forced down their throats by a bunch of do-gooder Westerners. If the US/NATO coalition can do things to help the local denizens achieve their goals, then that is what should be the way ahead for the coalition. If not, then the coalition troops need to redeploy to home station. I suspect we have overstayed our welcome. We have already done about as much as we can to show the "terrorists" that we can kick butt when we want and need to. All we now show them is that we are not as good at some other things (like nation building). The longer we stay, the more we will show them how small is the wardrobe of clothes that the emperor has for wear.

Separate point about the comments on airpower discussion below:

8. End coalition air strikes that have a high probability of killing civilians.
Frankly, I don't think we execute many strikes that have a 'high probability of killing civilians'. The problem is, air strikes are the only way we have of attacking some of these folks. Minus air strikes, you have to go in with ground troops, and pulling off a surprise strike with ground troops is extremely difficult and extremely expensive and requires a lot more ground troops. Oh, and by the way, it doesn't always reduce the number of civilian casualties.

Airstrikes, the "easier wrong", are not the only way we have to attack. They are the only way we have to do so without putting too many of our own troops at risk. Maybe we ought to take the "harder right" of putting our forces (rather than the non-combatant locals) at risk and force our decision makers to see what it really costs to go do "nation-building" in oddball places. That might readjust the Washington bureaucrats' sight picture enough to make them rethink such adventures in the future.

(Yes, Ken, I know that is a forlorn wish. )

[Ken White]

Having been one of said bureaucrats (who to me, are the career types), my perception is that they are not the problem, not at all -- the majority are far too cautious and self protective to take such risks. The problem is with the dolts we elect and the sub-dolts they appoint who believe their election has granted god-like powers to implement their Party's patented version of Nirvana -- world wide.

I agree with all the rest...

[jmm99]

Bergen says upfront in the article (albeit, shifting from "challenges" to "goals") that:

... it is important to define the greatest challenges facing the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in order of importance. They are:

• Eliminating the safe haven al Qaeda enjoys on the Afghan-Pakistan border.

• Providing security to the Afghan population.

• Eliminating the growing tactical threat posed by the Taliban on both sides of the border.

• Providing tangible reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan and in the tribal border regions of Pakistan.

• Ending, or at least curtailing, the opium/heroin trade in Afghanistan.

• Expanding the legitimate, largely agricultural economy in Afghanistan.

• Holding fair and secure presidential elections in 2009 in Afghanistan.

To achieve these goals, ...

My question is, if the first "goal" ("Eliminating the safe haven al Qaeda enjoys on the Afghan-Pakistan border") were not at issue, would (should) the US have any national strategic interest in being the primary player with respect to all of the other "goals" ???

Seems that is the question (raised by JTF) that has to be answered before the "how to" questions are addressed.

[wm]

Having been one of said bureaucrats (who to me, are the career types), my perception is that they are not the problem, not at all -- the majority are far too cautious and self protective to take such risks. The problem is with the dolts we elect and the sub-dolts they appoint who believe their election has granted god-like powers to implement their Party's patented version of Nirvana -- world wide.

I agree with all the rest...

Caught me on the terminology gaffe--I meant the elected and appointed mob that you referenced. Following a longstanding family tradition, I use bureaucrat as a derogatory term for those guys, saving the phrase "civil servant" for the long suffering paid employees forced to do the bidding of the dolts and sub-dolts.

And while we are picking nits , I'm not sure that the Party's patented version of Nirvana is what they are implementing. More likely it is the Nirvana aspired to by the finanacial backers who fund (and script the rhetoric of) the Party's mouthpieces and affiliated lobbyists/think tanks. But this is not a political board . . .