Only ever having been a junior soldier (and a reservist at that, long ago), and never having been on any operational or overseas tours, I am not remotely as familiar or even acquainted with the real-world limitations that Western policies and the troops that try to carry them out encounter, have to overcome, find themselves blindsided by, or simply have to endure.
Still, Iran questions aside, what strikes me most about the war in Afghanistan, much more so than the war in Iraq, is how from the start, and for years afterwards, so many Western policy-makers and senior military authorities persistently failed to observe or even to recognize the practical limitations they faced or may have had to face when intervening abroad. Or, recognizing them, found themselves having to downplay them or to pretend they didn't exist because it wasn't politically acceptable or possible to do so. Mercifully it has taken only half a decade for this to be recognized, more or less, and for the right people to be elevated to senior policy-making and military command and staff appointments, and who know what they are doing. Hopefully there is now a solid strategy in mind and an achievable end-state in sight for Afghanistan.
To be sure, as wm stated earlier in the thread, whatever is to be done has to be the right thing, not just the expedient thing - such as in wm's example of having to be willing to suffer casualties instead of risking inflicting civilian casualties through resort to airstrikes - and that in turn has to be tempered by what can be done, not what we would like to do.
Following wm's example, if it is not possible to dig out insurgents in a given location without having to resort to airstrikes (or whatever additional fire support may be on hand) where civilians are in the way, then other means have to be resorted to. Go after the enemy at another time, in another place, and in a different way, if possible.
Counterinsurgency is a long process, and having to scrub some tactical operations that run up against such obstacles instead of risking civilian casualties is both the right thing to do, and an approach that seems to offer the "best" possibility of success over the long term. Best not to risk actions that can undo the work of months or even years in a given area with just a single mistake.
All of the above is obvious enough, I know, and is far clearer to very many of the other members on this board than it is to me.
sapperfitz82 wrote:
Agreed, and no arguments that it is probably the best possible outcome. But also agreed with Ken and others (if I am reading them correctly) that the sort of Imperial Expeditionary mindset that is required to make that really work is not the American (or for that matter, the modern Western) way anymore -though it would seem something like that may still be possible with some difficulty. Little more than two generations ago, it was still perfectly natural for some Western Armies (or Marines) to set out on an annual campaigning season (Brits in the NWFP being the classic example), or to engage in repeated expeditions to the same regions to cut local threats down to size from time to time as they emerged or re-merged. Granted in some cases they also stayed for years or even decades, but normally only in modest numbers.But what if the end state is not a functioning state? What if the end state is a safe place to kill AQ in, preferably far from our shores and interests?
None of this is likely to be very palatable to policy-makers scared of the media trumpeting for the umpteenth time how the umpteenth expedition to put down such-and-such local threat reveals a failure of national policy. That such a national policy (and whatever military strategies that arise from it) may well be just fine, and in fact may be the best possible way of dealing with threats that are both persistent and perennial, of course runs headlong into the practical political limitations imposed by a generally uniformed media and often career-oriented policy-makers, amongst others.
It's interesting that most of the additional U.S. troops going to Afghanistan will apparently be heading to positions in and around Kabul's approaches and environs. I hope it it buys enough time to enable the National Government in Kabul to emerge as the strongest out of all the many players in Afghanistan, and one that is able to establish useful ties, more or less, with at least some of the other more critical players within Afghanistan. And perhaps, trying to get around the above mentioned political limitations on resorting to an Imperial Expeditionary mindset, to also allow for a (modest and discreet) future Western presence or temporary base that is also available to deal with Al-Qaida when and where it pops up in the area.
If the strategy is for NATO to secure the cities while the ANA and ANP build up their strength, fine enough, but if the Taleban are able to succeed in turning the population, if not exactly in their favour, then at least against NATO and the Government, time may run out before the Afghan Government is able to stand on its own and then take the fight out into the country. It is not entirely clear that the Afghan National Police can be made into anything like an effective paramilitary police force, and the long-term survival of the National Government will depend at least as much upon the success of the National Police as upon the success of the ANA.
If this is the strategy that is now possible, and the desired end-state is one in which Kabul will be able to at least survive on its own, and hopefully be able to exert some degree(s) of influence in other parts of the country, okay. Not great, but good enough.
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