Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory?

[SWJED]

The 8 December edition of Newsweek Magazine - Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory? - Andrew J. Bacevich

In Afghanistan today, the United States and its allies are using the wrong means to pursue the wrong mission. Sending more troops to the region, as incoming president Barack Obama and others have suggested we should, will only turn Operation Enduring Freedom into Operation Enduring Obligation. Afghanistan will be a sinkhole, consuming resources neither the US military nor the US government can afford to waste.

[John T. Fishel]

analysis despite the overblown opening statement. The key question is what more US/NATO troops are expected to do. More troops may well be a necessary first step to getting where Bacevich desires. I certainly hope that GEN Petraeus' JSAT takes Bacevich's argument into account but there is more to the situation than can be stated in a brief article in Newsweek.

Cheers

JohnT

[slapout9]

It's almost an exact copy of Colonel Warden's plan that I posted here awhile back.

http://strategydevelopment.net/wordpress/

It actually goes back a lot farther than that, years as a matter of fact. I sat in his office just after we started bombing Astan and he said Pakistan is the real COG in the so called War on Terror. I know you guys are tired of hearing this but we better start listening to him or we are going to be in big trouble. He doesn't believe in COIN as we talk about it here but he certainly knows and believes in what we would call UW (By,With,and Through). Even General Van Ripper talks highly of him in his JEQ article on EBO which he points out Warden had nothing to do with in the crazy form it exists today. I will get off my soapbox now

[Ken White]

I'm inclined to agree with John, I rarely agree with Bacevich but do to an extent concur with this analysis. I agree that infusing a large number of additional troops is not wise and I agree that we need a definition -- not of victory, there will be no victory -- but of our aim in that nation and in the region.

I do disagree with the Bacevich statement that

"No country poses a greater potential threat to U.S. national security—today and for the foreseeable future—than Pakistan."

Hyperbole, I believe. Further, he ends

"Rather than sending more troops to the region, the new American president should start withdrawing them and devise a more realistic—and more affordable—strategy for Afghanistan."

Not smart and seemingly in contradiction to his concern for Pakistan as a threat.

Withdraw precipitously and leave a vacuum in the region? Bad plan. We don't need to devise a realistic and affordable strategy for Afghanistan. We do need to determine what precisely is the US and NATO goal in Afghanistan. From that, a logical operational plan will flow. We do not need to spend the next 20 or 30 years there trying to obtain the mirage of an effective government and a happy productive nation but too rapid a withdrawal would be unwise.

Slap, if Warden said: "Pakistan is the real COG in the so called War on Terror." Then I disagree with him also.

These two strategists, baby boomers both, are thinking in erudite terms but they grew up during the Cold War and that's colored their perceptions. In this age, there are no centers of gravity -- there are hundreds if not thousands of them. We're back to Victorian-Edwardian era chaos. You can shut down Pakistan and another 'COG' will quickly replace it. The current terror problem is amorphous, worldwide and not conducive to Clausewitzian treatment. Trying to make it so only confuses the issues. We're dealing with a Starfish -- cut off an arm and it will grow a new one, slightly different in form...

Better to watch the Starfish you know than create a new one that you may not recognize or otherwise lose sight of.

[jmm99]

(from Warden's webpage)
One of these Cardinal Rules especially important to follow in geopolitical strategy development is “Execute Good Enough Plans.” The near universal tendency is to try for perfect plans and perfect Future Pictures; as nice as it might be to realize a perfect Future Picture, the likelihood of doing so is vanishing small while the cost will almost certainly be prohibitive.

The devil really seems to be in the details of the "good enough plan" - and how one gets there.

COL Warden's plan ends up with this:

This cursory strategic review would suggest that the best course would be to end the war in return for an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation.

Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted.

If the Pashtuns would decide that AQ were no longer welcome, and if Pakistan would decide the same re: AQ-linked groups, one might say "good enough". "Afghanistan" (to the extent it is a nation in reality, as opposed to in law) is on the sidelines as to those decisions.

[Ken White]

I agree with Warden in that first quote.

There is no devil in the detail of what constitutes a good enough plan; that's easy -- what's hard is convincing the risk averse to implement the plan instead of improving it until its too late or totally flummoxed...

The first quote from Warden contradicts his second quoted item. If he really believes

"an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation."

that's worrisome because such an agreement (1) Wuldn't be worth the paper on which it was printed; (2) Could not be enforced by an Afghan government no matter how well meaning; (3) Could not be easily verified (he obviously has not been to Afghanistan and moved about on the ground a great deal); and (4) Deviance couldn't be addressed at all well; payments are good -- for the other, what strategic targets within the nation? Ludicrous. I say contradicts because that plan doesn't meet the 'good enough' test.

JMM said:

"Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted."

Hopefully you said that in jest. 'Iron Clad' agreements mean nothing in the ME or South Asia. You can't enforce them and they know it. They will tell you what you wish to hear and do what they wish to do; the two will only rarely coincide.

"If the Pashtuns would decide that AQ were no longer welcome, and if Pakistan would decide the same re: AQ-linked groups, one might say "good enough". "Afghanistan" (to the extent it is a nation in reality, as opposed to in law) is on the sidelines as to those decisions."

I wouldn't even bet on that. The area is too volatile and the religion is chameleon like in its ability to adapt and twist.

One cannot look at Afghanistan with western norms in mind and expect to achieve success.

There was a time when we could have insisted and they (they being not necessarily Afghanistan but most nations) would have complied but 58 years of conducting 'limited war's and not adapting our Armed forces to changing norms and times has shown the world that we can be safely defied. that cannot be undone. It can be rectified to an extent and if we're smart, we'll do that but I'm not too hopeful. I'm afraid Colonel Warden and too many still serving senior folks are living in the past. Sorta sad when someone older than all of 'em says that...

[slapout9]

Slap, if Warden said: "Pakistan is the real COG in the so called War on Terror." Then I disagree with him also.

These two strategists, baby boomers both, are thinking in erudite terms but they grew up during the Cold War and that's colored their perceptions. In this age, there are no centers of gravity -- there are hundreds if not thousands of them. We're back to Victorian-Edwardian era chaos. You can shut down Pakistan and another 'COG' will quickly replace it. The current terror problem is amorphous, worldwide and not conducive to Clausewitzian treatment. Trying to make it so only confuses the issues. We're dealing with a Starfish -- cut off an arm and it will grow a new one, slightly different in form...

Better to watch the Starfish you know than create a new one that you may not recognize or otherwise lose sight of.

You are right and Warden would agree with you and this is pointed out in the 5 rings analysis there are multiple COG's in a system. The answer he gave was in response to the question I asked him as in a comparsion between the two... Astan and Pstan which is the real COG. Bewteen the two I would say Pstan is the real COG...did I splain meself mo better this time

And my personal opinion Astan has a much greater potential to be a Vietnam then Iraq ever had.

[Ken White]

You are right and Warden would agree with you and this is pointed out in the 5 rings analysis there are multiple COG's in a system. The answer he gave was in response to the question I asked him as in a comparsion between the two... Astan and Pstan which is the real COG. Bewteen the two I would say Pstan is the real COG...did I splain meself mo better this time

I can 'gree widdat. Howsomeever, I still think that the COG bit can lead one astray today in this era of niceness and excessive global mobility and ease of communication because -- using Pakistan as an example, it is the 'COG' in the area but we are powerless to do much more than we've been doing, bribe heavily -- you can't always get to the COGs...

And my personal opinion Astan has a much greater potential to be a Vietnam then Iraq ever had.

If you mean a really long term effort with little progress or improvement, I agree. Same mistake was made going in, an idealistic, nice to have scenario was envisioned and realities on the ground were totally ignored.

We accrue a lot of benefits from our system of government. Or we used to; lately, I'm starting to wonder. Anyway, it's been pretty good but one of the really bad things is that due to big changes every four or eight years it does not at all lend itself to long term international projects.

Many today will tell you that a bipartisan foreign policy won the cold war. Heh. Dream on. There was as many missteps between 1947 and 1987 as there were forward steps -- maybe more. Everybody forgets the boo-boos because it turned out okay in the end and the chattering classes like to think we used to be nicer than we are today (we weren't, not at all). We just don't do long term well...