Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory?

[Eden]

My question is, if the first "goal" ("Eliminating the safe haven al Qaeda enjoys on the Afghan-Pakistan border") were not at issue, would (should) the US have any national strategic interest in being the primary player with respect to all of the other "goals" ???

You hit the nail on the head. If we were able to turn Afghanistan into a Muslim version of Switzerland, with plump farmers tending their arugula fields, children laughing merrily in the streets, and the first Wal-Mart going up in Kabul, there would still be that safe-haven just over the border in Pakistan.

On the other hand, if Pakistan became safe, prosperous, and well-governed from Kashmir to Khyber, Al Quaeda would have to decamp for the Horn of Africa or Guatemala or wherever - regardless of what Afghanistan looks like.

I would argue that we have, in fact, eliminated AQ safe havens in Afghanistan, for what good it has done us. It's just we have chosen about the most difficult, expensive way to do it.

[Ken White]

was really necessary as stated and further question whether that goal could ever be achieved by anyone other than Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I strongly believe a response to the attack was called for and that Afghanistan correctly was and should have been the area selected for that initial response. I also believe that another response was due the ME for years of provocations.

However, I do not agree that we thus had an obligation to 'fix' Afghanistan or the ME -- I have significant doubt that we or anyone else outside those regions can do that. That doubt does not trouble me.

I guess it all goes back to the alleged Powell to Bush so-called Pottery Barn rule, "You break it, you own it." As has been since pointed out, Pottery Barn has no such rule. Neither do Nations. Bush decided that Powell's doctrine was inapplicable; he should have also decided that his rule was equally unnecessary.

Unfortunately, they didn't ask me and we are where we are. The question now is what is to be done and my perception is still that the US -- and NATO -- have no agreed answer to that question. As someone said, involving NATO was a political master stroke which precipitated a strategic and operational mess.

They need to implement John T's planning cycle... :G

[jmm99]

with the young chimps after you sold me the Erector Set Bridge. Yup, one of them has gone missiing; and taken my playbook with him. I suspect he has avoided our winter snows and has gone south to Florida.

Why else would you write this ?

I strongly believe a response to the attack was called for and that Afghanistan correctly was and should have been the area selected for that initial response. I also believe that another response was due the ME for years of provocations.

However, I do not agree that we thus had an obligation to 'fix' Afghanistan or the ME -- I have significant doubt that we or anyone else outside those regions can do that. That doubt does not trouble me.

I guess it all goes back to the alleged Powell to Bush so-called Pottery Barn rule, "You break it, you own it." As has been since pointed out, Pottery Barn has no such rule. Neither do Nations. Bush decided that Powell's doctrine was inapplicable; he should have also decided that his rule was equally unnecessary.

Unfortunately, they didn't ask me and we are where we are. The question now is what is to be done ....

Which is a long round-about way to say that I agree with you.

----------------------
Now, you (and everyone else) can disagree with me on a few thoughts I have:

1. Primary focus on Afghanistan is misplaced because it is only part of the "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem; and part of Afghanistan (the old Northern Alliance region) is not part of that problem.

2. The "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem is a trans-national (cross borders) problem. More Pashtuns live in Pakistan than in Afghanistan - as do more AQ since Tora Bora.

3. This problem is totally out of the book so far as "standard" COIN is concerned. The "book" there thinks in terms of a Host Nation (singular), which is assisted by another Nation (US) to control the sea in which the bad guys swim.

4. The analogous Host Nation in this case is Pashtunistan, which does not exist as we normally think of a nation state. It is not, in reality, anything close to a monolith. It is something akin to medieval France before the Crown consolidated, with multiple power centers. In Afghanistan, Mr. Karzai resembles the early kings of France who were surrounded by a ring of "castle keepers" protective against foreign invasiion, but many of whom were as or more powerful than the king. In Pashtunistan, there is not even that semblence of a central power structure other than the Taliban.

5. In formal nation-state terms, we have two Host Nations, Afghanistan and Pakistan, neither of which controls the sea in which we are interested. Application of the COIN "book", to the extent it can be applied here, would require both HNs to open the trans-national Pashtun region to us to perform COIN operations (assuming only for purposes of discussion, that we should be doing that); and also join in that effort with us.

6. While Afghanistan-Pakistan resembles Vietnam in its cross-border aspects (infiltration, etc.), it is quite different in most other respects. In Vietnam, the enemy was North Vietnam (the VC being the unconventional portion of the NVA, which also could be unconventional as suited); the Host Nation being South Vietnam; and we being caught between fighting an unconventional war on one hand and a conventional war on the other hand - a debate that still continues today.

7. The multiple Host Nation issue was avoided in Vietnam by the political decisions between 1958-1962 to remove Laos and Cambodia from our equation (they were not, of course, removed from Giap's equation). The 1964 election settled the issue of an aggressive roll-back strategy against North Vietnam and its "neutral" satellites Laos and Cambodia. What might be similar in Afghanistan-Pakistan is the existence of political constraints (albeit different from those in Vietnam), which could make a nullity of any comprehensive strategic plan before it gets on the ground.

8. Have there been counter-insurgency situations involving multiple Host Nations, where the target population (here, the Pashtuns) lived in both Host Nations and were a substantial population (here 42 million) ? My mind is presently blank on any such precedent.

9. The "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem is compounded by the existence of AQ-linked and AQ-leaning groups thoughout Pakistan, which like Afghanistan is very much a composite nation (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and "Paki-Pashtunistan" being its major component parts).

10. Can anything resembling the COIN "book" help in this situation; or will application of what might well be sound COIN principles elsewhere cause us to take our eyes off the ball ? The ball here being the nightmare that AQ will obtain access to Pakistan's nuclear devices.

[sapperfitz82]

But what if the end state is not a functioning state? What if the end state is a safe place to kill AQ in, preferably far from our shores and interests?

Given that most folks believe that this is not the kind of war that will end with a white flag and UBL handing over his scimitar, perhaps the best end-state is the one where we attrit them.

Seen from this perspective, the current war is working well. Our kill to casualty ratio is astronomical, the lasting negative affect of our strategy is confined to the countries we are in and the immediate surroundings, and we can exert pressure in the region from these bases (Astan and Iraq).

If this is the strategy, perhaps we should remove the DoS from the region entirely and just call it what it is. If AQ wants to fight, meet us in Astan, Iraq, where ever, and may the best man win.

It worked so well in Iraq (from this point of view) that they quit (apparently).

This is all just a WAG, but it makes me feel a little better about the guys at the top to think of it this way.

[Ken White]

JMM, I could quibble aout a comma here and there but essentially, I think you're correct. I'd only add that Afghanistan is not and has never been a COIN fight; there are insurgent aspects but it's far more complex than that and that it also consists of unconventional and conventional fights.

Sapperfitz 82 is on track I think. Right now our ratio is pretty favorable; one can never tell when such a ratio tips the opponents into a "We aren't getting anywhere with this..." mode. Some die hards will not tip but the majority may. Effectively, what he suggests is what we're doing. It lacks finesse but that doesn't mean it won't work. The flip side of that is how long the Congress and taxpayers will put up with us doing just what he suggests (and how long can the Army sustain it and at what rate).

The worst thing we could do is apply Iraqi lessons learned to Afghanistan; very different theaters, people, processes and potentials...

What's a word for 'theater' that starts with a 'p?'

[Devil's Advocate]

But what if the end state is not a functioning state? What if the end state is a safe place to kill AQ in, preferably far from our shores and interests?

Given that most folks believe that this is not the kind of war that will end with a white flag and UBL handing over his scimitar, perhaps the best end-state is the one where we attrit them.

Seen from this perspective, the current war is working well. Our kill to casualty ratio is astronomical, the lasting negative affect of our strategy is confined to the countries we are in and the immediate surroundings, and we can exert pressure in the region from these bases (Astan and Iraq).

If this is the strategy, perhaps we should remove the DoS from the region entirely and just call it what it is. If AQ wants to fight, meet us in Astan, Iraq, where ever, and may the best man win.

It worked so well in Iraq (from this point of view) that they quit (apparently).

This is all just a WAG, but it makes me feel a little better about the guys at the top to think of it this way.

Playing global whack-a-mole is not the path to success. If we focus on one area then AQ central would shift their support to another franchise (i.e. AQ in the Mahgreb, Horn of Africa, etc.)

We follow because the govt will continue to react to contact. The govt and the population's attention will shift once the stories of growing AQ (or whoever's) influence in Whereisthatastan. In the end we further AQ's narrative because we come off as the bully.

Maybe I give to much credit to the enemy, but why would they fight when they can live to fight another day and further their message.

[Ken White]

I think he meant that, rightly or wrongly, we are in Afghanistan and Iraq whacking moles. We're doing that pretty well. We are not doing other things well in either place but we're doing okay on the whacking, the ratio is good so let's just keep whacking there.

He's aware, as are most of us here, that our efforts in the other areas you name and in many different parts of the world are better planned and executed than in those two theaters so I think he's just suggesting that we're doing okay if not great and we can keep doing that until someone comes up with a better idea.

A lot of folks here have said the same thing you said, "React to contact is not a strategy."

They have suggested that we should be initiating contacts instead of reacting. I agree but see three reasons why we aren't doing that.

First; we have not developed the equipment and transport mechanisms to allow stealthy ingress and egress even though the need has been known since 1979. I believe we have purposely not done that to preclude our initiating contact and the senior leadership in DoD (and Congress) has for many years tacitly supported that. Not an accusation of malfeasance, just of excess caution.

Secondly, we are trying to expand our SOF. I have no doubt that great pain will be taken to avoid dilution of quality. Having been around for the last big expansion, I also have no doubt that those efforts will not succeed and that quality will drop and this will offer further reasons for us to not initiate contact. Again, an excess of caution, not criminality.

Thirdly we have become a risk averse and litigation prone society; this has produced armed forces that are quite risk averse and very attuned to the legal niceties. I believe this and our very unwieldy bureaucracy will preclude our initiation of contact and keep us in the reactive mode.

So. What's your proposal to fix this, stop reacting to contacts -- and what's a coherent strategy?

[sapperfitz82]

I am sure you have heard of a mouse trap, usually used in a police manhunt. Basically, if you can't go find the guy, you find where he will go or intice him to go where you are. Then you get him.

We have the distinct disadvantage in this war of having to respect a terrorist's host nation's sovereignty for the most part. We are not going to invade Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Saudia Arabia, and whole lot of other places for a bunch of good reasons. So how do we kill the terrorists there before they initiate action against us? We lure them to a nearby country and kill them there.

Seen in this light, the current fight is the exact opposite of react to contact, in fact it is closer to (sticking with tactical metaphors) a recon by fire. Point is, whatever we are doing strategically, this is getting a good target response and we are killing a lot of bad guys. Perhaps we don't publish body counts because it would be bad for business. Better we encourage them to come fight the infidel in Iraq and Afghanistan through Arab media.

Then we keep improving our ability to survive their action and kill them surgically in our "host countries."

Come into my web said the spider to the fly.

Piggybacking a bit on what Ken White was saying, we are also saddled (and getting more so) with a judicial burden of proof. Having a foreign national travel to a third country to attack you troops in uniform makes it real easy to justify killing him, even (espicially) if the FBI/CIA could apprehend him in his home country on criminal charges. Our judicial system does not currently inspire confidence on the counterterror front.

The cost, as I said earlier, is that this comes across as a State Dept. nightmare. Which it is. Maybe we don't care any more how the rest of the world feels about this and decided to look out for number 1 by the most effective means possible. One could argue that we will make more terrorists by doing this. Perhaps. My answer is, then we had better get real good at killing them.

The long term (50 year) plan should include stability. For the countries we are doing this in and for those that sponsor terror. I would argue that a coalition insurgency to turn the Iraqi Army against Saddam would have pressured Iran more and helped stabalize Iraq sooner (might have taken three years to overthrow SH) and that would be my suggestion for nation/regime change in the future.

Given our current situation, what's really wrong with destroying AQ by having them come to us on a mountain in Astan?

[jmm99]

I've always loved maps, since geography helps reality sense. This one (a clip and shoop from the OP article here) illustrates why a multi-HN approach has to be employed in dealing with the Pashtuns- if we do COIN by the "book", which doesn't quite cover this situation, anyway. So, why do it by the "book" ?

The old Northern Alliance region is fairly secure as a base of operations. What if the yellow-outlined Pashtun area were regarded as an ungoverned area (not part of any sovereignty) ? - like the white spaces on old 19th and 18th century maps.

What ? - heresy on the part of a lawyer trained in modern I Law and its obligatory nation-state concept. You have to admit that it would change the outlook, even viewed from the standpoint of the Operational Law Manual.

Anyway, this map is food for thinking. If there were no legal constraints (we simply "deem" them away - hell, it's a hypothetical), what would you do in the Pashtun area ?

You might also consider what the Paki-ISI did when it approached that area from the other side of its border. The ISI had advantages we do not have - one, same religion; two, many of them were Pashtuns.

[jmm99]

Why Pakistanis should be nervous is the story of this map.

The major groups (Punjabis, 44.68% of the population; Pashtuns, 15.42%; Sindhis, 14.1%) amount to almost 3/4 of the total population. The two other major groups (another 15+%) are largely in the Sindh.

from Wiki - Seraiki
The Seraiki or Multani people are an ethnic group from the south-eastern areas of Pakistan, especially in the area of the former princely state of Bahawalpur and the districts of Sukkur, Larkana, Dadu, Sehwan, Sanghar, Nawabshah, Hyderabad, Sindh, Mirpurkhas, Multan, Rajanpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, MuzafarGarh, Layyah, Bhakkar, Mianwali, Dera Ismail Khan, Karachi. A significant number of Seraikis also reside in India, with most concentrated in the state of Punjab, Maharashtra and Gujarat. The Seraikis maintain that they have a separate language and culture, but their language is often viewed as a dialect of Sindhi or Punjabi. While the majority of Seraikis follow Islam, a few also follow Hinduism and Sikhism.

from Wiki - Muhajir
Muhajir is a diverse term used to describe the Muslim refugees who migrated to Pakistan after the independence in 1947. Traditionally meaning the Muslim refugees who migrated from regions other than the Punjab state of India at the time of Pakistan's independence, in recent years, the term has come to include refugees who've arrived from Burma, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia and Iran but for all intents, when the term Muhajir is used, it generally refers to the Muslim refugees from British India.

The term Muhajir itself is now gradually being replaced by the more politically acceptable term "Urdu Speaker" or "Urdu" because of its connotations. Even though 'Urdu speaking' term is still not the correct term to identify a group of people since many of these people claim Middle Eastern, Turkish, Afghan and Indian decent. Many can trace their family roots to the Middle East and Central Asia prior to migration to North and Central South Asia. Many of these claims cannot be verified. The one uniting factor for the people regardless of their origin/race is that their mother tongue is Urdu.
......
The majority of people who migrated after the independence were settled in the port city of Karachi in southern Sindh and in the cities of Hyderabad, Sukkur, Nawabshah and Mirpurkhas.

As well as the above, many Urdu-speakers settled in the cities of Punjab mainly in Lahore, Multan, Bahawalpur and Rawalpindi

Today, in Pakistan, 7.6% of the population, or around 12 million citizens identify themselves as 'Urdu-Speaking'. Of this number around 8 Million reside in Sindh and around 4 million reside in Punjab and Islamabad.

You can see why the ISI concentrated on turning Afghanistan into a buffer, finally using the Taliban as the vehicle. Their scheme worked fine, except for 9/11.

There have been so many good thoughts planted in this thread, I have to sit back and think about all of this.

PS: sapperfitz82 - you are preaching to this choir on the following:

Our judicial system does not currently inspire confidence on the counterterror front.

The last few months of "pounding the War Crimes beat" are fully in agreement with you. Of the three options (convert, contain or kill), only the last seems applicable to hardcore AQ. Others may differ.

[sapperfitz82]

Seems we've been testing that with the cross-border ops recently. The predator attacks have softened the idea of sovereignty regarding the tribal areas in Pak., does anyone see that the raids will cause more problems than they solve?

I am a bit on the fence on this one. There is a definate danger in sparking a much wider movement against us in the area. I can see a contain/kill policy (pretty much what we've been doing) if we get a little better at the COP implementation and patrol a little more aggressively.

The onus in this senario is containing the pashtun/AQ problem in Pak. and that you have ID'd falls on the non-DoD types (3 letter guys/DoS).

To return to the thread topic, victory is when we have raised the price of being a terrorist to the point that it is no longer a viable option. This includes the cost in terms of life, money, sovereignty, and self-determination. When we are able to take these things away from our enemies at will, we will make other options more palatable.

[jmm99]

I don't want to turn this into an I Law thread; but here are the basics.

Our presence in Afghanistan is based on the UN Charter, Article 51 (Self Defense) and UN resolutions starting with:

(Operational Law Handbook 2007, p. 1-3)

f. UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) authorized the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Interim Authority. Additionally, this Resolution authorized member States participating in the ISAF to “take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate.”

As to cross-border incursions (by air or ground), the legal picture starts with the 1907 Hague Convention, which is here.

Laws of War : Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V); October 18, 1907

V - CONVENTION RESPECTING THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS AND PERSONS IN CASE OF WAR ON LAND

With a view to laying down more clearly the rights and duties of neutral Powers in case of war on land and regulating the position of the belligerents who have taken refuge in neutral territory;

Being likewise desirous of defining the meaning of the term "neutral," pending the possibility of settling, in its entirety, the position of neutral individuals in their relations with the belligerents;
.....
CHAPTER I The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers

Article 1.
The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.

Art. 2.
Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power.

Art. 3.
Belligerents are likewise forbidden to:

(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or other apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea;

(b) Use any installation of this kind established by them before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely military purposes, and which has not been opened for the service of public messages.

Art. 4.
Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents.

Art. 5.
A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory.

It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of its neutrality unless the said acts have been committed on its own territory.

Any fair reading of the facts requires an inference that Pakistan is in violation of Art. 5 because of AQ and Taliban activities there. The US position on neutrality violations is also clear:

(Operational Law Handbook 2007, p. 2-32)

XIV. NEUTRALITY

A. Neutrality on the part of a state not a party to an armed conflict consists in refraining from all participation in the conflict, and in preventing, tolerating, and regulating certain acts on its own part, by its nationals, and by the belligerents. In response, it is the duty of the belligerents to respect the territory and rights of neutral states. A primary source of law is Hague Convention V, Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land of 18 October 1907. The degree to which traditional “neutrality” has been modified by the Charter of the United Nations is unclear; it is generally accepted that neutrality law still provides some guidance, particularly regarding collective self-defense actions and jus ad bellum analysis. Historically, neutrality rights include the following:

1. The territory of the neutral state is inviolable. H. V. Art. 1. This prohibits any unauthorized entry into the territory of the neutral state, its territorial waters, or the airspace over such areas by troops or instrumentalities of war. Thus, belligerents are also specifically prohibited from moving troops or convoys of war munitions or supplies across the territory of a neutral state. H. V. Art. 2. In consequence, the efforts of the neutral to resist, even by force, attempts to violate its territory cannot be regarded as hostile acts by the offending belligerents. H. V. Art. 10. However, if the neutral is unable, or fails to prevent such violations of its neutrality by the troops of one belligerent, that belligerent's enemy may be justified in attacking those troops in neutral territory.

Like most wonderful I Law agreements, there is no clear mechanism for enforcement of 1907 Hague V. In the bad, old colonialist days, the Power offended by the Neutral Power's violation of Art. 5 would simply tell the "neutral" to clean up its act or we will do it for you.

As I Law developed during the Cold War (which coincided with the end of colonial empires), a definite "anti-colonialist" trend developed in I Law - e.g., the ICJ case of Nicaragua v. United States, which is sourced here at post #3, is a perfect example.

In short, the 600 lb. gorilla will be castigated by all the young I Law chimps - that is, until those young chimps are confronted by the same threat from another tribe of young chimps, when their tune will change.

The US position on Article 51 self-help is quite clear:

(Operational Law Handbook 2007, p. 1-6)

D. Anticipatory Self-Defense Under Customary International Law.

1. As discussed above, many States embrace an interpretation of the UN Charter that extends beyond the black letter language of Article 51, under the customary international law principle of “anticipatory self-defense.” Anticipatory self-defense justifies using force in anticipation of an “imminent” armed attack. Under this concept, a State is not required to absorb the “first hit” before it can resort to the use of force in self-defense to repel an imminent attack.

2. Anticipatory self-defense finds its roots in the 1837 Caroline case and subsequent correspondence between then-U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster and his British Foreign Office counterpart Lord Ashburton. Secretary Webster posited that a State need not suffer an actual armed attack before taking defensive action, but may engage in anticipatory self-defense if the circumstances leading to the use of force are “instantaneous, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.” As with any form of self-defense, the principles of necessity and proportionality serve to bind the actions of the offended State.

3. Because the invocation of anticipatory self-defense is fact-specific in nature, and therefore appears to lack defined standards of application, it remains controversial in the international community. Concerns over extension of anticipatory self-defense as a pretext for reprisal or even preventive / preemptive actions (i.e. the use of force before the coalescence of an actual threat) have not been allayed by contemporary use. The United States in particular, in actions such as OPERATION ELDORADO CANYON (the 1986 strike against Libya) and the 1998 missile attack against certain terrorist elements in Sudan and Afghanistan, has increasingly employed anticipatory self-defense as the underlying rationale for use of force in response to actual or attempted acts of violence against U.S. citizens and interests.

4. It is important to note, however, that anticipatory self-defense serves as a foundational element in the CJCS Standing ROE, as embodied in the concept of “hostile intent,” which makes it clear to commanders that they do not, and should not have to absorb the first hit before their right and obligation to exercise self-defense arises.

Since this concept is accepted in the CJCS Standing ROE, special operations in Pakistan - to prevent anticipated belligerent operations launched from there - suffer from no general legal bar. In short, a "whack a mole" type approach is legally defensible. IMO: I Law here is not an impediment - it is more a question of national resolve and the confluence of other national strategic policies.

However, a legal stability operation in Paki-Pashtunistan would require the full consent and co-operation of the Pakistan government. So, if that consent is not forthcoming and if stability operations in both Astan-Pashtunistan and Paki-Pashtunistan are needed to call our campaign a "success", emphasis on stability operations (as opposed to "whack a mole") would seem to lead nowhere.

Karzai (who is a Pashtun) recognizes the fact that the "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem cannot be addressed without dealing with the Pashtuns on a non-military level. So, we have seen the various attempts in the last few months to begin some wheeling and dealing with and among the Pashtuns.

Until the Pashtuns decide to "neuter" AQ (which Ken doesn't see happening any day soon), we are left with "whack a mole" in Pashtunistan on both sides of the border - and with a questionable stability operation on the Astan side of the border (because it can only deal with one arm of a back and forth flowing sea of fish).

[Devil's Advocate]

The problem is that despite our success we are not inflicting a prohibitive amount of casualties. We are not impacting the movement by killing scores of young zealots. Other movements, some related to our current enemies, have survived, and succeded against, far more repressive methods.

The lack of honest discourse has prevented the creation of a successful strategy. Empty slogans have replaced strategic principles.

I think that we would all agree that indigenous solutions are the only long term answers in the region. Anything we touch will be tainted (i.e. Karzai govt). What we must do is use selective incentives to force the hand of each respective government. If they do not support our policy goals, they do not receive the money they need to maintain their regimes. In short we find the guy who can deliver and support them.

However, the lack of clear strategy has forced us to go begging for supporters, with predictable results. Again, I see this as a direct result of the lack of intelectual rigor and a risk averse culture at the top.

Tactical success is great, but it is not the first step in developing a strategy. Until we have one, pass the ammo....

[jmm99]

Gian Gentile's op-ed is being discussed here, but his comment below seems relevant here.

from Gentile article

There are other ways to define the problem, or center of gravity, in Afghanistan. If the "enemy" there is defined as Al Qaeda, then perhaps other policy, strategy and operational options might be considered. In this different conceptual formulation, perhaps a substantial American combat presence on the ground might not be necessary and instead the "enemy" might be dealt with by other means of military power, rather than large numbers of conventional combat forces trying to win hearts and minds.

Food for thought.

[Ken White]

The problem is that despite our success we are not inflicting a prohibitive amount of casualties. We are not impacting the movement by killing scores of young zealots. Other movements, some related to our current enemies, have survived, and succeded against, far more repressive methods.

First off, I didn't and do not claim any 'success.' I did say we were sustaining a good ratio of killed which is not a success in my book; it's a simple fact but it's not success.

I did say this: ""...so I think he's just suggesting that we're doing okay if not great and we can keep doing that until someone comes up with a better idea.

A lot of folks here have said the same thing you said, "React to contact is not a strategy."(emphasis added / kw)"

While the second part of your statement quoted above is correct, the first part is a supposition. I would agree that it is a logical one but one cannot know where a tipping point is for another. Afghans are far more pragmatic than many...

Having said that, I believe if you'll review this thread and others -- always a good idea before jumping in -- on the topic you'll see that both Sapperfitz and I have previously complained of a lack of an achievable goal in Afghanistan and have done so on numerous occasions. So you're preaching to the choir.

The lack of honest discourse has prevented the creation of a successful strategy. Empty slogans have replaced strategic principles.

Is it lack of honest discourse or simply the usual diplomatic interplay between nations with the added complexity of trying to manage coalition combat operations?

I think that we would all agree that indigenous solutions are the only long term answers in the region.

True.

Anything we touch will be tainted (i.e. Karzai govt). What we must do is use selective incentives to force the hand of each respective government. If they do not support our policy goals, they do not receive the money they need to maintain their regimes. In short we find the guy who can deliver and support them.

Easily said; harder done. You are talking about two eastern nations who have no history of strong government behaving in accordance with strong nation western norms. Not going to happen. You are not going to find a guy -- or even a group of guys -- in either nation that can do what you suggest.

However, the lack of clear strategy has forced us to go begging for supporters, with predictable results. Again, I see this as a direct result of the lack of intelectual rigor and a risk averse culture at the top.

You're partly correct, there is a lack of clear strategy but it exists because the problem was approached -- as you are approaching it -- in western terms. Won't work. The lack of intellectual rigor was in that vein, trying to westernize the issue. The risk aversion is correct and compounded (continues to compound) the problem.

Tactical success is great, but it is not the first step in developing a strategy. Until we have one, pass the ammo....

No one said it was. We did say continue to pass the ammo until an achievable goal is determined.

Thus we seem to be in agreement...

[Ken White]

Gian Gentile's op-ed is being discussed here, but his comment below seems relevant here...Food for thought.

but we do not at this time have the capability required for dealing with AQ by other military means.

He's correct that many more troops won't make much difference and can do as much harm as good -- maybe more.

However, he forgets that AQ is not the only opponent there. Not by a long shot..

[Devil's Advocate]

While the second part of your statement quoted above is correct, the first part is a supposition. I would agree that it is a logical one but one cannot know where a tipping point is for another. Afghans are far more pragmatic than many...

--Exactly, they can chose not to fight. Which is not victory for us or defeat for them. That is what makes this stuff so interesting.

Having said that, I believe if you'll review this thread and others -- always a good idea before jumping in -- on the topic you'll see that both Sapperfitz and I have previously complained of a lack of an achievable goal in Afghanistan and have done so on numerous occasions.

--Very true, but I can't link to all of your posts

True.Easily said; harder done. You are talking about two eastern nations who have no history of strong government behaving in accordance with strong nation western norms. Not going to happen. You are not going to find a guy -- or even a group of guys -- in either nation that can do what you suggest.

--Government was a poor word choice because it implies a western solution. My "hollow slogan" comment was meant as a criticism of a western approach. My idea is to support what works in the region. If that is cronyism and warlordism, work with what is available. Idealism is a poor strategic foundation.

Thus we seem to be in agreement... [/QUOTE]

--Good, now we can solve the next problem

PS-evidently I can't figure out the multipe "quote option". Sorry for the ugly post.

[Ken White]

--Exactly, they can chose not to fight. Which is not victory for us or defeat for them. That is what makes this stuff so interesting.

I'd first say that in any operation like Afghanistan or any COIN operation (the two are not the same thing) -- or any politically limited war -- there is no defeat or victory. All one can obtain is a satisfactory outcome. What comprises that outcome is likely to vary over time and each side will have different goals.

Here's how to selectively quote:

(quote)Very true, but I can't link to all of your posts (/quote)

In the above example, replace the parentheses with brackets -- or highlight the text you wish and enable the quote button above the message box, the one furthest to the right at top center. Then you get this:

Very true, but I can't link to all of your posts

No need to link, simply read

Government was a poor word choice because it implies a western solution. My "hollow slogan" comment was meant as a criticism of a western approach. My idea is to support what works in the region. If that is cronyism and warlordism, work with what is available. Idealism is a poor strategic foundation.

Thus again we seem to be in agreement...

Good, now we can solve the next problem

Uh, okay if you say so -- I wasn't aware we'd solved this one ...

[slapout9]

I'd first say that in any operation like Afghanistan or any COIN operation (the two are not the same thing) -- or any politically limited war -- there is no defeat or victory. All one can obtain is a satisfactory outcome. What comprises that outcome is likely to vary over time and each side will have different goals.

Here's how to selectively quote:

(quote)Very true, but I can't link to all of your posts (/quote)

Testing 1...2...3...
yayayaya

In the above example, replace the parentheses with brackets -- or highlight the text you wish and enable the quote button above the message box, the one furthest to the right at top center. Then you get this:No need to link, simply read Thus again we seem to be in agreement... Uh, okay if you say so -- I wasn't aware we'd solved this one ...

Ken, splain that agin real slow?

[AmericanPride]

6. Decouple the Taliban from the drug trade.

Just talking crazy here, but I propose, in general, an effective strategy in regards to narcotics in Afghanistan would be to usurp, rather than destroy, control over the trade. The devil's in the details, of course, and it's probably "unethical", but if the trade could be directed towards an unspecified Afghan neighbor which poses a major risk to US security IOT destablize the regime and the subsequent funds invested in Afghan infrastructure, I'd be willing to consider removing the taboos on the drug trade.