Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post
I have noticed that when it comes to military theorists, the grander and vaguer the theory, the more popular support it receives. Those that focus on small and achievable changes seem to receive very solid resistance. Examples of large and indistinct theories include 4GW, EBO and Maneuver Warfare. Focused theories would be ones like Wilf's patrol based infantry.
Grandiose theories are like vapor and seem to change to conform to the users desires of the moment, perhaps this is why they are popular, but what real and beneficial purpose do they serve?
I consider this as a wrong impression.

Many factors provoke such an impression:

1) No really good AND war-proven new strategical, operational or tactical concepts float around as theory. That's the real shortcoming.
There wasn't much improvement since WW2 and the examples of good theory that succeeded are long since accepted as practice.
(The military art & science of 2008 feels like 1913 to me.)

2) The grandiose concepts like Maneuver Warfare, EBO, 4GW face huge resistance, albeit that resistance can be judged as too small by those who dislike these concepts.

3) 'Small' concepts are often highly technical and not easily accessible by a large audience.

4) 'Large concepts' often address very widespread deficiencies. Maneuver warfare was a counterweight to an excessive belief in firepower, for example. Their usefulness can be seen in opening the eyes of the interested audience for previously ignored aspects. Such large concepts like Maneuver Warfare don't need to be helpful tools when an officer plans an operation - they rather shape his military intellect.

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Large concepts can easily be superior to focused concepts.

Imagine this; someone designs a recon-strike complex of counter-artillery radars, aerial SAR/GMTI radars, SatCom and guided MLRS. The complex is able to detect firing artillery, identify it, track its redeployment and initiate the precision counterfire once the target is in its new location.
That would be a focused concept if I understood you correctly.

Now recall the large and non-focused concept of 'Maskirovka' and CCD.
There are hundreds of wicked ways how to de-value such a complex.

What's more important?
To train an officer to be aware of CCD potential for his own and for opposing forces or is it more important to teach him schematics about the tactical employment of hardware?

I bet you'd prefer to teach him both.