Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience

[Ken White]

Iraq during this unpleasantness, that is. How some ever I've been there and thus could have predicted this end result -- except I hoped we'd be smater this time 'round. The effects, though, I've sure seen before. Korea, Dominican Republic, Viet Nam. What a waste. Of time, effort, money and troops. Especially troops...

You'd think we'd learn. We apparently cannot because each new iteration of 'leaders,' political and military, must do things their way -- 'and this time it'll be done right...'

Then it turns out you can only do so much with a given concept and set of troop hiring, training and employment guidelines and ideas (or a lack of them...).

Interesting comment on the front page by one Ali:

"The best things for USA is to understand that ground and its realities can temporarliy be altered but never changed completely.They have tried it in Veitnam, then in Afghanistan and now trying to manipulate the same in Pakistan.The common denominator is all this is only the partial success which must be weighed sensibly against the cost and resources being diverted for such misadventures."

Too true; if he and I can figure that out -- as can many others -- why can't those so called 'leaders' see it?

[Global Scout]

John posted,

We know how to do this. We have decades of experience in wartime and peacetime. The first step is always to find out what the local people say they need and then make it possible for them to get it.

I think Biker Chick 1's observations paint another picture entirely. Of course part of it was the corrupt process we established initially due to political loyality (U.S.) over hiring folks who "may" have been effective, but to be honest I question if we have ever been good at this (under Republican or Democractic adminstrations). We love to spend millions of dollars, and call that spending a success metric. Ask any Civil Affairs staff officer and USAID member "how do you know you have been successful?", and they'll tell you how much money they spent. You better check your wallet and make sure they didn't take it, because it was your tax dollars they just spent.

Again have we ever been good at this? I believe the Ugly American was written in the early 60s? It addressed the same issues. What did we accomplish in Somalia or Haiti? Did reconstruction after our Civil War work?

I remain aghast that we still have so many people who are true believers in wasting our tax dollars on these projects. I guess if you don't let the truth get in the way our your assessment, then we're doing a great job. We spent millions, so we must be doing good. I find the pro COINdista arguments particularly funny, since the CNAS propagandists continue to promote more of this as key to our national security? There are none so blind as those who will not see.

I wish Biker Chick would write an expose on this activity, it is simply criminal, and yes it is our tax dollars being wasted, so we have every reason to be concerned. This isn't national security, it is a sad comedy. Rough starts are understandable, repeating the same mistakes year after year and cover them with whitewash is criminal.

[Rex Brynen]

Demise of Iraqi water park illustrates limitations, abuse of U.S. funding program

By Ernesto Londoño
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, January 3, 2011; 12:59 AM

BAGHDAD - In the spring of 2008, Gen. David H. Petraeus decided he had spent enough time gazing from his helicopter at an empty and desolate lake on the banks of the Tigris River. He ordered the lake refilled and turned into a water park for all of Baghdad to enjoy.

The military doctrine behind the project holds that cash can be as effective as bullets. Under Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq at the time, that principle gained unprecedented emphasis, and it has become a cornerstone of the war effort in Afghanistan, now under Petraeus's command.

But today the Baghdad park is nearly waterless, more than two years after a U.S. military inauguration ceremony that included a marching band and water-scooter rides. Much of the compound is in ruins, swing sets have become piles of twisted steel, and the personal watercraft's engines have been gutted for spare parts.

The troubled history of the venture speaks to the limitations and mishandling of a program that has provided U.S. military commanders with $5 billion for projects in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past six years....