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Thread: Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience

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  1. #1
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    Default Agreed Ken but BC

    was talking specifically about CA folk. I would include anyone assigned to a PRT regardless of branch. But at a minimum, the officers need to see the people in the "local fauna."

    I would note that my experience in Honduras was military while the other sitautions were civilian. My experience in El Salvador was also military and perhaps more relevant to what you were pointing out - nevertheless, asking the local people, engaging them is a great source of intel whether you are MI, CA, or merely a grunt...

    cheers

    JohnT

  2. #2
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Oh? I thought she specifically mentioned the security detail...

    Quote Originally Posted by John T. Fishel View Post
    was talking specifically about CA folk. I would include anyone assigned to a PRT regardless of branch. But at a minimum, the officers need to see the people in the "local fauna."
    Those are grunts (or they're Joe / MP or MOS Immaterial; little difference in this case)...
    ...nevertheless, asking the local people, engaging them is a great source of intel whether you are MI, CA, or merely a grunt...
    I agree but it's been my observation that Grunts in general do not do that well; that in units, detachments or elements and 'on the job' they generally do not do it at all and that, lacking the language most will actually go out of their way to avoid it. Most Troops that age do not like to think they're being talked about or laughed at by strangers with no option for a macho response.

    Good Grunts (or bad Grunts who are competent at their job) are also very much guided by rules 21 and 22:

    21. Be polite. Be professional. But, have a plan to kill everyone you meet.
    22. Be courteous to everyone, friendly to no one.

    Most of us tend to not get friendly with people we may have to shoot. 'Courteous' to a working (as opposed to an off duty) Grunt means a nod, not chit chat. The NCOs also will have one way or another told the Troops that they are in no circumstances to embarrass that NCO.

    All the foregoing is not an argument or discussion stimulant and in no way disputes anything you've written. I read BC#1's comment and it resonated, I smiled and wrote merely a response to her comment and not to yours. I did it solely for informatory purposes based on my observations of a lot of young Grunts a lot of places for those who wish to contemplate methodologies and strategeries for the future...

    I will also note that if you tell them (and get the agreement of their Squad Leader, PSG or NCOIC) to be sociable, they will do so in spades. However, if you do that, do not upbraid them for neglecting their security 'job' because they will go into their shells and will never socialize in front of you again. IOW, remember they're 19 and be careful what you want and tell them you want.

    NOTE: As is true of all generalities pertaining to people, there are occasional or frequent at times exceptions in all directions to the norms I cited. Equally true is that many here know all that. However, many do not...

  3. #3
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    Default On re-reading BC #1's comment

    Ken, it is not entirely clear to me whether she was referring to the security detail or the CA folk or both. I think, when all is said and done, we agree. My inclination would be to make it SOP to greet the locals with Salaam - a greeting is not being sociable, just courteous. But with all the caveats implicit and explicit in your post...

    Reminds me, however, of an incident in Panama on Easter Sunday 1987. I was walking in the Balboa section of Panama City that morning and the streets were deserted except for 2 PDF cops. As I approached them I greeted them and wished them a Happy Easter - their jaws dropped. It was like nobody ever said anything at all to them in a courteous way, let alone some gringo speaking their language.

    Cheers

    JohnT

  4. #4
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Heh. Yep. Agreed. I've always tried to learn as much of the local

    language as I could; thus I can ask for beer and cigarettes and count to ten in eight languages (Apparently not including English according to my over educated wife... ).

  5. #5
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    Default Baghdad Vignettes (Drawdown Edition)

    Yet another update from Iraq, courtesy of Biker Chick #1:

    The Iraqi joke goes something like this:

    A young Iraqi boy runs into his family's Baghdad home yelling "Mother, Mother! Father was in the garden watering plants and he got electrocuted!" and the mother says, "Praise be to God... We have electricity!"

    __________________________________________________ ____________


    FOB Falcon, the base that I've called home for the past six months, is being closed down.

    As most of you are probably aware, September 1st was the deadline for the last "combat troops" to leave Iraq. As of 1 September we have officially ended Operation Iraqi Freedom (the American joke goes something like this: They were going to call it Operation Iraqi Liberation until they thought about the acronym...) and are surging forward into Operation New Dawn, which does not form a catchy acronym of any kind. New Dawn is meant to be characterized by the end of combat operations, the presence of "Advisory and Assistance Brigades", and transfer of full responsibility to the Iraqi government, as the US takes a supporting role. Reconstruction is now meant to be civilian-led, though judging from the number of State Department-hired Xe (Blackwater's new monkier) goons who shared the C-130 ride into Baghdad with me, it looks security will be buttressed in other ways. It's also characterized by the closing of bases, and their transferral to the Iraqi Security Forces. Which is exactly what we were doing with Falcon, as I started writing this email.

    As we were packing up the office, I walked outside to see two thick-biceped soldiers from Civil Affairs at the small gazebo outside our office. They were taking sandbags, piled two- or three-high around the outside of the structure, and emptying their contents onto the ground. I grinned.

    "Have we determined that there is no longer a credible threat to the gazebo?" (Full disclosure: I'd never really understood why we hand sandbags there in the first place.)

    The soldiers paused and looked at me, the sand still draining out of the sacks in their hands. " Well, since the Iraqi Army is moving into this base eventually, command asked us to knock this down. It's leaning."

    I cock my head and squint at the gazebo. It is leaning. But just slightly, maybe 4 or 5 degrees, depending on how you looked at it. We'd spent long nights sitting in that gazebo smoking shisha, hammering out ideas, bantering about the day. I'd hidden lighters in it's rafters and clambered on it to retreive them.

    "It's not going to fall over, and it's a waste to destroy it, isn't it? Anyway, are you convinced that the IA is going to build something more structurally sound?"

    The soldiers continued their work. This what they were told to do, they said. And so, unquestioning, they were doing it.

    __________________________________________________ ____________


    It takes an enormous amount of work to close a base. Up-armored convoys were going out every day, lugging giant metal boxes filled to their tops with equipment of all sorts. Much of what is there, the US cannot take home. There are fields of trailers being sold off by the US Army to Iraqi dealers at junkyard prices, who then in turn sell them to local Iraqi civilians. The same goes for bunkbeds, conference room furniture, rolls of wire, generators, air conditioners... anything the Army doesn't deem worth sending home. Even when we've packed up everything worth keeping, and sold everything worth selling, the detritus of the occupation will end up remaining in the rooms we abandoned. The shelves of our storeroom were vacant apart from a few empty shell casings, a busted neon yellow Nike running shoe, several Christmas-themed tins, and a year-old US Weekly magazine mouring the death of Brittany Murphy on the cover. I can't imagine what other artifacts will be found on base when it is re-occupied.

    Our Iraqi partners are doing their absolute best to capitalize on our flight from the base. The good folks from Beekeeping for Widows (the almost Python-esquely named Provincial Reconstruction Team project) took most of our office furniture, loading up pickup trucks so high that they had to be tied down with string, and even then they looked precarious. A major from our local Iraqi Army division raided the Information Operations closet, taking stacks upon stacks of leaflets, handbills, tip cards, posters, as well as boxes of children's backpacks and soccer balls. The US Army major in charge of the room just looked blankly at the young IA minions carrying off the supplies. "You know," he said, "we've given out so many soccer balls in this country that every kid should have ten. They should be littering the streets and blocking drains. I have no idea where it all went."

    The groups we work with, be it the Iraqi security forces or NGOs, are all accutely aware of our imminent withdrawal. When asked what he would do with the 20,000 posters he requested, the Iraqi major said, quite honestly, "We are stockpiling. We know that when you leave, we won't have these resources anymore. So we have to get as much as we can, and we have to get it now."

    __________________________________________________ ____________


    There's frustration, there's disillusionment, and there's malaise.

    It's spread thick across our brigade, and I'd imagine the other brigades in country. The frustration: The Iraqi Army is now in charge of security operations, and while that's the goal, there's no way of insuring that they'll do anything with the information, support, or equipment that the US provides them. Over 1,000 warrent support packages have been sent to the IA this year so far, but there's no record anywhere of how many of these packets have been used, or how many of these individuals have been convicted. Missions can be arranged, coordinated, locations scouted and planned, men mustered, and the IA can simply not show up. The disillusionment: The standard line you hear from soldiers and staff is "Well, we haven't accomplished it in the past seven years, I doubt we're going to accomplish it before we leave Iraq." You can apply this to the water/electricity crisis (see above joke, apologies for the black humor) or almost any other larger scale reconstruction project here. The malaise: The brigade leaves at the very beginning of December. Part of my job is assessing brigade needs and trying to assist them with their questions or the tasks they want to accomplish in Baghdad before they redeploy. The standard answer there? Just get through the next 62 days. Not that anyone's counting. They say that this is one war that has been fought seven times. In November a new brigade will arrive who have never worked in the Baghdad area before, and we will start the war all over again.

    I spent the afternoon with a prominent Iraqi sheikh in the area I'm currently working in. He hosted us for an enormous meal of grilled lamb, chicken, spiced rice, okra, vegetables, soups, and fresh bread, all laid out on giant platters. As we sat down, stuffed, to drink tea and get to the meat of the meeting, the commander asked the sheikh about the increase in assassinations of leaders in the area - government officers, sheikhs, Sons of Iraq, soldiers and policemen have all been targeted throughout Iraq. The sheikh shook his head and said, "You know, with the government not formed yet, it's not just the terrorists trying to get ahead; the political parties are out there too. At times it's impossible to tell the difference. We don't know who is behind the killing anymore." He told us that he awaits the day that he's kidnapped or detained by the government on faulty intelligence. At a certain point it becomes clear that this hospitality is one part traditional Middle Eastern hospitality, one part insurance that if he does disappear, the US Army will come looking after him. With the drawdown and the US stepping back to leave the Iraqi Security Forces in control, there was no guarentee that we could even do that.
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


  6. #6
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Vuja De. Never been there...

    Iraq during this unpleasantness, that is. How some ever I've been there and thus could have predicted this end result -- except I hoped we'd be smater this time 'round. The effects, though, I've sure seen before. Korea, Dominican Republic, Viet Nam. What a waste. Of time, effort, money and troops. Especially troops...

    You'd think we'd learn. We apparently cannot because each new iteration of 'leaders,' political and military, must do things their way -- 'and this time it'll be done right...'

    Then it turns out you can only do so much with a given concept and set of troop hiring, training and employment guidelines and ideas (or a lack of them...).

    Interesting comment on the front page by one Ali:
    "The best things for USA is to understand that ground and its realities can temporarliy be altered but never changed completely.They have tried it in Veitnam, then in Afghanistan and now trying to manipulate the same in Pakistan.The common denominator is all this is only the partial success which must be weighed sensibly against the cost and resources being diverted for such misadventures."
    Too true; if he and I can figure that out -- as can many others -- why can't those so called 'leaders' see it?

  7. #7
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    Default We know how to do this?

    John posted,
    We know how to do this. We have decades of experience in wartime and peacetime. The first step is always to find out what the local people say they need and then make it possible for them to get it.
    I think Biker Chick 1's observations paint another picture entirely. Of course part of it was the corrupt process we established initially due to political loyality (U.S.) over hiring folks who "may" have been effective, but to be honest I question if we have ever been good at this (under Republican or Democractic adminstrations). We love to spend millions of dollars, and call that spending a success metric. Ask any Civil Affairs staff officer and USAID member "how do you know you have been successful?", and they'll tell you how much money they spent. You better check your wallet and make sure they didn't take it, because it was your tax dollars they just spent.

    Again have we ever been good at this? I believe the Ugly American was written in the early 60s? It addressed the same issues. What did we accomplish in Somalia or Haiti? Did reconstruction after our Civil War work?

    I remain aghast that we still have so many people who are true believers in wasting our tax dollars on these projects. I guess if you don't let the truth get in the way our your assessment, then we're doing a great job. We spent millions, so we must be doing good. I find the pro COINdista arguments particularly funny, since the CNAS propagandists continue to promote more of this as key to our national security? There are none so blind as those who will not see.

    I wish Biker Chick would write an expose on this activity, it is simply criminal, and yes it is our tax dollars being wasted, so we have every reason to be concerned. This isn't national security, it is a sad comedy. Rough starts are understandable, repeating the same mistakes year after year and cover them with whitewash is criminal.

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