Agricultural Component of the Afghanistan Surge?

[Surferbeetle]

If we are to accept the premise that Afghanistan will require an integrated DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic) solution to its problems then we might profitably consider the makeup of the future ‘Surge’ that is to be sent to this country, which is renowned for its isolating geography. (1, 2, 3)

The USDA estimates that about 80% of Afghanistan’s population works in Agriculture (4) Accordingly, I will focus exclusively upon an analysis of the feasibility of an Agricultural Component for the Afghanistan Surge because it is my preference to have Afghani’s working in Agriculture and its supporting industries rather than ‘working’ to harm our troops (the analysis takes into account that the growing season lasts only part of the year).

If we take the American Model to be the 100% Agricultural Solution it would seem that for ~ 400 million acres of arable productive farmland (5 -FAO) 21,000 Agricultural Specialists (6 - USBLS) (Subject Matter Experts on soil, crops, pests, etc.) would be needed. This works out to 19,048 acres per Ag Specialist.

Oftentimes when a soldier is ‘downrange’ a less than 100% solution is found to be ‘good enough’ in many instances. Lets assume a 70% solution is our upper limit and a 51% solution is our lower limit for a typical ‘good enough’ solution. Given that Afghanistan has approximately 20 million acres (1 ha = 2.47 acres) of arable productive farmland (7 - FAO) a 70% solution would require approximately 730 Agricultural Specialists, and a 51% solution would require approximately 530. If we are concerned about difficult geography we might plus up the force to 150% of what’s needed or a little more than 1560 Agricultural Specialists. We need to take into account the concept of sweat equity and have Afghani’s as the lead element in this effort. (8 - Wikipedia) USDA states that they have provided 70 technical specialists for Afghanistan since 2003 and that Congressional Funding is an issue of concern. (9 – USDA)

We would need to arm Agricultural Specialists with training, seed, fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides for crops that are both cultivatable in Afghanistan as well as desired by the Afghani’s from a business standpoint. This might include crops such as Almonds, Cotton, Pomegranates, Raisins, Tea, and Wheat. (10 - FAO) Planning and preparation could be best done now, while planting season is some months off.

The approximately 3 billion dollar floral industry is an agricultural business model that might apply to Afghanistan. (11 – USDA ERS) Columbia and some of its competitors in Africa provide many data points to consider. (12 – Business Daily Africa). India has expertise in this business as well. (13 Trade Journal) It’s certainly not the only business model for Afghanistan, but perhaps it could be part of a 51% to 70% ‘good enough’ solution focused upon an Agricultural Component of the Surge.

Opium’s importance in Afghanistan cannot be discounted, and may account for approximately half of the country’s estimated 4.4 billion dollar GDP. (14 - UN) Fulfilling demand for opium by pharmaceutical companies might be a small part of a solution to this complex and multi-faceted problem. (15 - Wikipedia)

An analysis similar to that of the proposed Agricultural Component of the Afghanistan Surge should also be prepared for the supporting project managers, irrigation specialists, hydraulics & hydrology specialists, and the water well specialists, needed to supply adequate water for the myriad small scale agricultural projects that might be accomplished as part of a Surge in Afghanistan.

The USAID, USACE, USISP, and others have already been thinking about and working on the roads needed to get agricultural supplies and products in and out of remote villages. (16, 17, 18, & 19) We could also build an estimate for the number of road crews, road security teams, truck drivers, mechanics, gas station personnel (as well as the appropriate specialists) that could be employed by focusing upon an Afghani led Agricultural Component of the Afghanistan Surge.

It is my opinion that by ensuring that the Afghanistan Surge has a thoroughly planned and resourced Agricultural Component we could reduce the impact, currently very visible in Afghanistan, of the old saying, ‘idle hands are the devils playground’. Iraq AAR lessons on this same issue are instructive. (20)

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[TheCurmudgeon]

While I agree with you in principal, we have to look at what is currently needed. Water seems to be the current issue with wheat production. http://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highli...2/Afghanistan/. Dependency on rainfall will continue to limit production and the simple, gravity fed irrigation systems are not particularly useful for wheat as they are for row crops.

What might be needed are wells with large scale watering systems (the large spoke style sprinklers used in the Midwest). Not sure the terrain and water table can sustain that.

I am not convinced that growing wheat will have any affect on opium production. If you look at the maps of where wheat is grown and where opium is grown you will see they do not coincinde. While I am not positive, I believe this has to do with the ability to grow each type of crop in the region. http://www.unodc.org/documents/front...fghanistan.pdf

[Surferbeetle]

TC,

Agree with you on the water issue. No water, no crops...

Thanks for the USDA link. This USDA report was from earlier in the year

Well-below normal rainfall and winter snowfall across the majority of Afghanistan during late 2007 and early 2008 have led to the worst drought conditions in the past 10 years

Here is an interesting (and dated) FAO report which provides some insight into Afghanistan irrigation issues:

Irrigation systems can be divided into four main categories:

* Kareze systems. A kareze (qanat) is an unlined tunnel in the hillside, bringing water by free flow from underground aquifers to be used for surface irrigation. Dug by local craftsmen from shafts at close intervals, they are small in size but may be many kilometres in length. It is estimated that 6 470 kareze still supply water to 167 750 ha, as in 1967, the date of the last inventory. It should be noted that kareze are often used for domestic water supply.
* Small-scale informal surface water systems. These are the traditional irrigation systems, many of which have been established for centuries. In the past, maintenance and reconstruction were generally arranged on a traditional informal or communal village basis, and water rights were determined and recognized in a similar manner. Technical knowledge and operational systems were thus dependent on traditional community structures, and were largely retained in the memory of individuals.
* Large-scale informal surface water systems. These are located mainly in the plains and along the main valleys. Although they are called informal, their operation and maintenance was highly structured. Repair and maintenance works can mobilize very large quantities of labour for a long period and farmers in the command area have to contribute in labour, cash or kind. Large parts of these schemes have been abandoned because of the sterilization of the land (waterlogging and salinization), particularly in the Hari Rud, Farah Rud and Helmand valleys.
* Formal irrigation schemes. Formally organized large-scale irrigation systems are a relatively recent innovation. However, by the late 1970s three large-scale modern irrigation systems had been built and were in operation: the Helmand-Arghandab system in the south-west, the Ghaziabad farms near Jalalabad in the east, and the Kunduz-Khanabad system in the northern part of the country. By 1993, only a very small part of these schemes was still operational. Land tenure was different from most traditional systems in that ownership of land was registered. Some schemes were operated under private land ownership agreements, while others were operated as state farms where land ownership was deeded to the State.

Qanats were a concept taught in some of my hydraulics courses, and I ran across Iraqis who knew about their use in Iraq:

A qanat (from Arabic: قناة‎) or kareez (from Persian: كاريز) is a water management system used to provide a reliable supply of water to human settlements or for irrigation in hot, arid and semi-arid climates. The technology is known to have developed in ancient Persia,[1][2][3] and then spread to other cultures.

Certainly there seem to be no easy answers other than sustained effort by local folks who are dedicated and who hopefully have some access to trained and dedicated folks who are willing to help out.

As a CA Bubba, I often feel that raising, training, resourcing, and motivating a local 'technocrat army' is not as high on our to do list as it should be.

Regards,

Steve

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thanks for the information on the qanat. I ran across one of these systems in Khost province. It was rather amazing as it ran better then ten kilometers from the river to and under a local town. The Afghans are so good at irrigation systems that they have learned how to make water run up hill. It is actually an illusion created by the step valleys but you would swear that it runs up hill.

Three other things. First, I think that the soil tends to fail from overuse and crops have to be rotated further limiting production.

Second, in places where that happens, and generally all around the country, orchards and in particular olives might be a better cash crop. I had heard while in county, but have been unable to verify, that prior to WWII Afghanistan had a flourishing olive oil business. I know these trees take years before they produce but they may be a better fit for the soil and conditions.

Finally, Pakistan and its constant battle with India still hampers the ability to export goods. Afghanistan is a few hundered miles from one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world but could never hope to get its goods to market there.

Food for thought.

[Surferbeetle]

Today's Washington Post has an Opinion Article that is of interest...

The result of letting the Pentagon take such thorough charge of the programs to create local police forces is that these units, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, have been unnecessarily militarized -- producing police officers who look more like militia members than ordinary beat cops. These forces now risk becoming paramilitary groups, well armed with U.S. equipment, that could run roughshod over Iraq and Afghanistan's nascent democracies once we leave.

Or consider another problem with the rising influence of the Pentagon: the failure to address the ongoing plague of poppy farming and heroin production in Afghanistan. This fiasco was in large part the result of the work of non-expert military personnel, who discounted the corrosive effects of the Afghan heroin trade on our efforts to rebuild the country and failed to support civilian-run counter-narcotics programs

[Tom Odom]

I saw that one and I guess if you want to write an extremist, conspiratorial viewpoint about how the Pentagon is out to conquer the US government, you can. Frankly it just shows that the person who wrote--despite his familial ties to the services through his father--has never served in the Pentagon.

Rumsfeld did push the boundaries and undercut other agencies. That does not leave those other agencies blameless, either in rolling over and accepting the Rumsfeldian push or later in faling to meet their own responsiblities.

Looks to me like the author is posturing for a job in the new administration.

Tom

[Ken White]

Today's Washington Post has an Opinion Article that is of interest...

The premise of the article, that DoD primacy in intelligence and foreign affiars is wrong and needs to be reined in is, IMO, correct -- however, he totally misses on almost all the reasons we are where we are.

He presents a State centric view of the current Administration -- which admittedly has screwed up a number of things. So, however, have the other 11 Administrations I've seem; every single one of them including FDR. All of them contributed in several ways to put DoD in its current position.

A combination of federal missteps, academic arrogance, media ignorance and Congressional errors and partisan stupidity in the vetting and Advice and Consent business have also conspired to insure that few civilians on any real competence and stature are remotely interested in Fedral service. Why would anyone really competent want to put up with that idiocy?

We are in the DoD primacy arena because State defaulted on their obligations a number of time over the years, because Congress is venal and corrupt and would prefer to fund big ticket defense items due to the fact that helps all Districts rather than properly fund foreign affairs and assistance (and to the fact that State has never been able to state their needs very well). He neglects the death of USAID and the US Information Agency virtually at the request of DoS. Two very big errors an both were fought for by State through several Administrations and were effected prior to this administration assuming power in 2000. He needs to speak to Warren and Maddie...

The unintended consequences of Truman's establishment of a DoD -- which was not necessary and arguably led to greater efficiency (at least nominally...) at the cost of less effectiveness and of Goldwater Nichols which placed the geographic CinCs in a position to dominate regions of the world while State did and said nothing and the ineffective Desk system at Foggy Bottom and a few marginal Ambassadors virtually demanded that something be done; DoD did it -- not necessarily because they wanted to, because somebody had to...

Physician heal thyself.

On the issue on former military folks in high places; a valid concern. he suggests placing competent civilians in those positions. I totally agree -- the question is, where do you find those kinds of folks? Take a look at the last few Cabinets. Big talent is rare.

ADDED: See also Tom's comment which is correct and if anything, understated and that of jkm_101_fso for an example of DoD filling a gap that exists because state drove USAID out of business.

Schweich LINK is also a piece of work for complaining about ranks when he uses his own -- rather temporary and , IMO undeserved -- to promote his agenda and he sure does have one...

Parochial and self serving article -- but his principal point is valid.