Agricultural Component of the Afghanistan Surge?

[Surferbeetle]

Today's Washington Post has an Opinion Article that is of interest...

The result of letting the Pentagon take such thorough charge of the programs to create local police forces is that these units, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, have been unnecessarily militarized -- producing police officers who look more like militia members than ordinary beat cops. These forces now risk becoming paramilitary groups, well armed with U.S. equipment, that could run roughshod over Iraq and Afghanistan's nascent democracies once we leave.

Or consider another problem with the rising influence of the Pentagon: the failure to address the ongoing plague of poppy farming and heroin production in Afghanistan. This fiasco was in large part the result of the work of non-expert military personnel, who discounted the corrosive effects of the Afghan heroin trade on our efforts to rebuild the country and failed to support civilian-run counter-narcotics programs

[Tom Odom]

I saw that one and I guess if you want to write an extremist, conspiratorial viewpoint about how the Pentagon is out to conquer the US government, you can. Frankly it just shows that the person who wrote--despite his familial ties to the services through his father--has never served in the Pentagon.

Rumsfeld did push the boundaries and undercut other agencies. That does not leave those other agencies blameless, either in rolling over and accepting the Rumsfeldian push or later in faling to meet their own responsiblities.

Looks to me like the author is posturing for a job in the new administration.

Tom

[Surferbeetle]

Tom,

Like you I am biased and don't see it all as horrible/evil thing, but this article does serve to illustrate some of the perceptions we bump into out in the field. I have had to spend more time than I thought would be necessary with my DOS, OGA, USAID, and USACE friends working through the one team one fight concept. Change is tough.

I feel that we also need to look at why many of our Inter-Agency brothers have this perception...the whole where there is smoke there is fire thing does apply to a certain extent. We have not conquered our inter-service/inter-agency tribal tendencies and have yet to really make the DIME concept work in this fight. I believe that the force-mix requests and staffing are very telling in the upcoming Afghanistan Surge. I see little to no info about a surge in the D,I, & E components...

Best,

Steve

[jkm_101_fso]

The Kansas Army National Guard was selected to take the "Agricultural Development" mission in AFG for the next three years. Guard units in Kansas screened Soldiers in their formations with Ag backgrounds and asked for volunteers. With Kansas State being a huge aggie school, there are plenty of experts around, plus all of the small farmers. A friend of mine was picked up for a year long tour. He is a CPT and has an agronomy degree. He has been told that the mission consists of teaching afghans new methods of planting, irrigation and harvest. Plus he will be doing some soil work.

I'll post more as I find out. He leaves next month.

I found this:
http://www.army.mil/aps/08/informati...ment_Team.html

[Tom Odom]

Tom,

Like you I am biased and don't see it all as horrible/evil thing, but this article does serve to illustrate some of the perceptions we bump into out in the field. I have had to spend more time than I thought would be necessary with my DOS, OGA, USAID, and USACE friends working through the one team one fight concept. Change is tough.

I feel that we also need to look at why many of our Inter-Agency brothers have this perception...the whole where there is smoke there is fire thing does apply to a certain extent. We have not conquered our inter-service/inter-agency tribal tendencies and have yet to really make the DIME concept work in this fight. I believe that the force-mix requests and staffing are very telling in the upcoming Afghanistan Surge. I see little to no info about a surge in the D,I, & E components...

Best,

Steve

Steve

I agree that the biases and perceptions play a large role and do affect what we try and do. But where I disagree with this opinion piece are the ideas that:

a. The Pentagon is a monolith capable of acting as the inner evil empire; there are as many agendas inside the Pentagon as there are outside, perhaps more.

b. That inner agency friction is somehow a new phenomenon and that the Constitution is under attack as a result of the evil empir (see a.)

In 15 years of inter-agency work, the turf battles never stopped. At best, good leaders--civilian or uniformed--minimized the friction. At worst, bad leaders--civilian or uniformed--only thought in terms of their own agencies agenda. Based on this author's criticisms, I would tentatively place him in the latter category.

Best

Tom

[Ken White]

Today's Washington Post has an Opinion Article that is of interest...

The premise of the article, that DoD primacy in intelligence and foreign affiars is wrong and needs to be reined in is, IMO, correct -- however, he totally misses on almost all the reasons we are where we are.

He presents a State centric view of the current Administration -- which admittedly has screwed up a number of things. So, however, have the other 11 Administrations I've seem; every single one of them including FDR. All of them contributed in several ways to put DoD in its current position.

A combination of federal missteps, academic arrogance, media ignorance and Congressional errors and partisan stupidity in the vetting and Advice and Consent business have also conspired to insure that few civilians on any real competence and stature are remotely interested in Fedral service. Why would anyone really competent want to put up with that idiocy?

We are in the DoD primacy arena because State defaulted on their obligations a number of time over the years, because Congress is venal and corrupt and would prefer to fund big ticket defense items due to the fact that helps all Districts rather than properly fund foreign affairs and assistance (and to the fact that State has never been able to state their needs very well). He neglects the death of USAID and the US Information Agency virtually at the request of DoS. Two very big errors an both were fought for by State through several Administrations and were effected prior to this administration assuming power in 2000. He needs to speak to Warren and Maddie...

The unintended consequences of Truman's establishment of a DoD -- which was not necessary and arguably led to greater efficiency (at least nominally...) at the cost of less effectiveness and of Goldwater Nichols which placed the geographic CinCs in a position to dominate regions of the world while State did and said nothing and the ineffective Desk system at Foggy Bottom and a few marginal Ambassadors virtually demanded that something be done; DoD did it -- not necessarily because they wanted to, because somebody had to...

Physician heal thyself.

On the issue on former military folks in high places; a valid concern. he suggests placing competent civilians in those positions. I totally agree -- the question is, where do you find those kinds of folks? Take a look at the last few Cabinets. Big talent is rare.

ADDED: See also Tom's comment which is correct and if anything, understated and that of jkm_101_fso for an example of DoD filling a gap that exists because state drove USAID out of business.

Schweich LINK is also a piece of work for complaining about ranks when he uses his own -- rather temporary and , IMO undeserved -- to promote his agenda and he sure does have one...

Parochial and self serving article -- but his principal point is valid.

[Surferbeetle]

Ken,

As always I learn from your posts and am interested in references if you are willing to share. The DOS/USAID splits are of particular interest as well as the Goldwater Nichols history.

jkm_101_fso 's post(thanks for the link jkm) is significant in several ways.

It's good to see the need for an agricultural surge officially acknowledged. A quick back of the envelope calculation tells me that if your average Afghani Farmer works for 6 months, takes every Friday off, and only works eight hours a day (most farmers work more), then he would be spending 1248 hours focused on improving his, his family's, and his nation's condition through agriculture as opposed to spending this time engaged in warfare. Depending upon the size of the force opposing us as well as the number of folks needed to push the country to stability, the total number of hours at stake is not insignificant. It would be wise of us to help the Afghani's to spend these hours on agriculture.

From the article I gather that 6 ADT's will be deployed to a country that has ~ 20 million arable acres. The ADT's are not alone

John Santas, an associate director of international agricultural programs at the University of Illinois, and Myers, a not-so-retired professor of plant genetics at SIUC, are heading a new project funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development to revitalize agricultural education in Afghanistan as part of postwar reconstruction efforts.

From a practical standpoint as one who has been dropped off in the boonies with a couple of duffle bags and told 'figure it out' I still have questions:

1) Who's in charge of the Ag Effort?
2) Will DOD, DOS, USAID, USACE, & Coalition Forces support this?
3) How is it prioritized and resourced?
4) How are we tying ADT's, PRT's, Universities, NGO's, IO's, and Coalition forces together?
5) What are the metrics for 2009 (ie how many tons of wheat, cotton, pomegranates etc.)?
6) Who is the CIO and what are the digital languages we will speak during this effort?

As I look for answers to these and other questions I am struck by the diMe as opposed to DIME emphasis. Once again it seems we (M=Military) are going to be planning, blocking, and carrying the ball while most everybody else will be smoking and joking on the bench.

Going back to the article, if we keep doing the same things I predict that we can except the same perceptions and outcomes.

Regards,

Steve

[ODB]

I recall reading some years back that prior to the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan was 3rd in the world for tourism and much of the land was covered with orchards. The Soviets knocked out most if not all the irrigation infastructure (down to 3%) and in the process created a climate change in the region. Creating a much drier climate than they already had, when there in 2002 many Aghans commented when it rained in Kandahar it was the first rain something like 10 years. Wondering if others have read/heard the same? If they actually had this once before can it not be done again? I understand the time to get trees to maturity to bear fruit, but in the process can we not reverse the climate in the region? In doing so making the region much more productive overall.

[Ken White]

...am interested in references if you are willing to share. The DOS/USAID splits are of particular interest as well as the Goldwater Nichols history.

There's no share to it, I have no file on the topic. It's all out there and Google works.

Not at all hard to find LINK. Note that Democratic foibles in 1971 and 1978 lead to emasculation which was completed by the Peace, Prosperity and Democracy Act (heh. How pathetic is that name...) of 1994.

That set the stage for the Administration to jawbone the Congress:

Arguing that the Secretary of State should have more direct control over all tools of U.S. foreign policy, a number of analysts and members of Congress proposed in the mid-1990s to abolish the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and USAID, and consolidate their operations within the State Department. After three years of debate, Congress enacted legislation in 1998 (Division G of P.L.105-277), transferring USIA and ACDA into State, but retaining USAID as an independent agency. The legislation, however, further required that the USAID Administrator report to and serve under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State. This remains the current relationship between USAID and the Department of State.

The 'analysts' above cited were mostly from DoD and the Congroids were those Bill got to push his vision -- and State's -- to consolidate their power and get hold of the AID budget to an extent. Bill pushed ececutive power like all Presidents have (and will...), he was just a shrewder politician in the way he went about it than many.

The above quote is from a CRS study LINK and is on Page CRS 9 . Note (Pages CRS 3 and 4) that for 2006, State managed $10.6B, USAID managed $4.37B and the two jointly managed $2.6B. It's all about money...

Addressing part of the flaky article's point, note on Page CRS 10 that the funding lines are still opaque -- that's the way Congress likes it -- that way they get to allocate $$$ and don't have to answer questions about it.

Going back to the article, if we keep doing the same things I predict that we can except the same perceptions and outcomes.

Foolish and pointless article -- his 'solutions' are aimed at a symptom, not the problem; as I said above (to and for State) "Physician, heal thyself."

In order for change to be made, State will have to correct it's ideological bias (unlikely) AND Congress will have to put the good of the nation above partisan politics (even more unlikely) and our system of budgetary allocation will need to be changed (still more unlikely). That sounds bad -- and it is -- yet, incremental change, always the American way, can and does occur. Unfortunately, it's usually one step forward and two back but every now and then, with a charismatic President (I see none in the near future, including the next), a good Congress (those do occur with moderate frequency) or a significant event (hopefully not... ) we get three steps forward and only one back.

As for Goldwater Nichols, I'm not sure what you're asking for. The Act itself is out there, plenty of discussion about it is also easily found. What I said about it was: ""Goldwater Nichols which placed the geographic CinCs in a position to dominate regions of the world while State did and said nothing..."" I'm unsure why that needs amplification as I thought it was pretty much common knowledge.

The point is that was an unintended consequence; the Act was designed to strengthen the power of combatant commanders versus the DC DoD and Service Chief bureaucracies. It did that but it also inadvertently created a series of regional bureaucracies which provided Pro Consuls or Satraps in the form of the Cincs who were and are located in (mostly) and looking at large multinational regions on a consolidated and daily basis. At the same time, State had only individual Ambassadors in each country, the regional focus was effective only within the State bureaucracy in DC and those folks did not have the clout that the individual Ambassadors had or have. Nor did they have the clout that more money and visibility gave the Cincs. Congress frequently outsmarts itself like that...

[jkm_101_fso]

Found some more info...

KANSAS NATIONAL GUARD WILL DEPLOY AGRIBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT TEAM TO AFGHANISTAN


One of the things the United States is known for is its military might, but a group of Kansas National Guardsmen will soon be demonstrating that there is more to the National Guard than that as they deploy in February 2009 to show the people of Afghanistan how to do something that Kansans are known for: farming.


A joint Kansas Army and Air National Guard team of approximately 60 personnel will go to Afghanistan next year as an Agribusiness Development Team (ADT). The team, comprised of personnel with backgrounds and expertise in various aspects of the agribusiness field, will work in conjunction with the Provincial Reconstruction Team, USAID, USDA, the Department of State and other agencies in Afghanistan's Laghman Province. Their year-long mission is to assist in building capabilities for increased agricultural production, training and services, and improving the safety of food and other agricultural products that are produced and distributed to the Afghan people. They will also assist in the development of sustainable agriculture and other related enterprises that will increase the economic well-being of the Afghans.


The Kansas National Guard will be performing this mission in partnership with Kansas State University over a three year period to build continuity and relationships with local and regional Afghan individuals and leaders.

Entire article:
http://www.kansas.gov/ksadjutantgene...008/08-122.htm

More:

Military team melds farming, business savvy for Afghanistan

by Mike Belt
November 23, 2008

A team of Kansas National Guard troops will go to Afghanistan next year to combine its military and civilian skills and help to improve the country’s agricultural capabilities.

“We’re looking at agricultural-type tasks, while at the same time we have to provide security for when we go out to villages and interact with the populace,” said Capt. Trent Miller, of Eudora. “We’ve got two ongoing missions rolled into one.”

A team of 60 Army and Air Guard members has been specially selected for an agribusiness development team.

In February, the team’s members will begin their year-long deployment to Laghman Province in northeastern Afghanistan.

Article: http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2008/no...ni/?city_local

[Surferbeetle]

Much more at the link

Accordingly, numerous Soviet-sponsored attempts to enlist popular support foundered. In 1981, the government announced formation of the National Fatherland Front, conceived as a coalition reaching out beyond the ranks of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan to village and tribal leaders. Although official claims, by 1986, asserted a total membership of over a million, the support was entirely illusory and its impact minimal. Other visible attempts to mobilize support entailed land reform, construction projects, literacy campaigns, and the promotion of greater civil equality for women. None of these initiatives, not even land reform, achieved much progress. Failure to resuscitate the Afghan economy, an important component for improving popular perceptions of the regime, also hampered the Soviets. In fact, the war—as evidenced by the effects of massive bombing—crippled development prospects by exacerbating agricultural shortages and driving up prices.30 As asserted in a retrospective analysis by M. A. Gareev, deputy chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the Soviet Army and later the General Staff, reform imposed from above had little prospect of success. Rather, he argued, support should have been built from below, beginning with the Moslem clergy, who numbered perhaps 40,000 and wielded tremendous influence.31 Still other measures that produced meager results included proclamations of amnesty for deserting soldiers and well-publicized agreements of cooperation with Islamic institutions.

An Afghanistan food price report from Reuters

Wheat prices have seen a marginal but steady decline since May in all the provinces in line with the "decreasing trend of wheat prices on global markets", it said.

Wheat prices have fallen by up to 17 percent in global markets over the past few months.

And a link on cloud seeding for ODB

Cloud seeding, a form of weather modification, is the attempt to change the amount or type of precipitation that falls from clouds, by dispersing substances into the air that serve as cloud condensation or ice nuclei, which alter the microphysical processes within the cloud. The usual intent is to increase precipitation (rain or snow), but hail and fog suppression are also widely practiced in airports.

[davidbfpo]

An excellent article on development work in Afghanistan, I concede there maybe some spin at work here: http://www.spectator.co.uk/the-magaz...e-let-it.thtml

A Google search on the author Clare Lockhart found she's been on the Charlie Rose show, which appears to be a badge of success.

davidbfpo