If we are to accept the premise that Afghanistan will require an integrated DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic) solution to its problems then we might profitably consider the makeup of the future ‘Surge’ that is to be sent to this country, which is renowned for its isolating geography. (1, 2, 3)

The USDA estimates that about 80% of Afghanistan’s population works in Agriculture (4) Accordingly, I will focus exclusively upon an analysis of the feasibility of an Agricultural Component for the Afghanistan Surge because it is my preference to have Afghani’s working in Agriculture and its supporting industries rather than ‘working’ to harm our troops (the analysis takes into account that the growing season lasts only part of the year).

If we take the American Model to be the 100% Agricultural Solution it would seem that for ~ 400 million acres of arable productive farmland (5 -FAO) 21,000 Agricultural Specialists (6 - USBLS) (Subject Matter Experts on soil, crops, pests, etc.) would be needed. This works out to 19,048 acres per Ag Specialist.

Oftentimes when a soldier is ‘downrange’ a less than 100% solution is found to be ‘good enough’ in many instances. Lets assume a 70% solution is our upper limit and a 51% solution is our lower limit for a typical ‘good enough’ solution. Given that Afghanistan has approximately 20 million acres (1 ha = 2.47 acres) of arable productive farmland (7 - FAO) a 70% solution would require approximately 730 Agricultural Specialists, and a 51% solution would require approximately 530. If we are concerned about difficult geography we might plus up the force to 150% of what’s needed or a little more than 1560 Agricultural Specialists. We need to take into account the concept of sweat equity and have Afghani’s as the lead element in this effort. (8 - Wikipedia) USDA states that they have provided 70 technical specialists for Afghanistan since 2003 and that Congressional Funding is an issue of concern. (9 – USDA)

We would need to arm Agricultural Specialists with training, seed, fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides for crops that are both cultivatable in Afghanistan as well as desired by the Afghani’s from a business standpoint. This might include crops such as Almonds, Cotton, Pomegranates, Raisins, Tea, and Wheat. (10 - FAO) Planning and preparation could be best done now, while planting season is some months off.

The approximately 3 billion dollar floral industry is an agricultural business model that might apply to Afghanistan. (11 – USDA ERS) Columbia and some of its competitors in Africa provide many data points to consider. (12 – Business Daily Africa). India has expertise in this business as well. (13 Trade Journal) It’s certainly not the only business model for Afghanistan, but perhaps it could be part of a 51% to 70% ‘good enough’ solution focused upon an Agricultural Component of the Surge.

Opium’s importance in Afghanistan cannot be discounted, and may account for approximately half of the country’s estimated 4.4 billion dollar GDP. (14 - UN) Fulfilling demand for opium by pharmaceutical companies might be a small part of a solution to this complex and multi-faceted problem. (15 - Wikipedia)

An analysis similar to that of the proposed Agricultural Component of the Afghanistan Surge should also be prepared for the supporting project managers, irrigation specialists, hydraulics & hydrology specialists, and the water well specialists, needed to supply adequate water for the myriad small scale agricultural projects that might be accomplished as part of a Surge in Afghanistan.

The USAID, USACE, USISP, and others have already been thinking about and working on the roads needed to get agricultural supplies and products in and out of remote villages. (16, 17, 18, & 19) We could also build an estimate for the number of road crews, road security teams, truck drivers, mechanics, gas station personnel (as well as the appropriate specialists) that could be employed by focusing upon an Afghani led Agricultural Component of the Afghanistan Surge.

It is my opinion that by ensuring that the Afghanistan Surge has a thoroughly planned and resourced Agricultural Component we could reduce the impact, currently very visible in Afghanistan, of the old saying, ‘idle hands are the devils playground’. Iraq AAR lessons on this same issue are instructive. (20)

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