Recommendation 4: U.S. forces, which should expect to live with a measure of violence, need to be ready to intervene quickly if violence reaches unacceptably extreme levels. This must be weighed against the political consequences (in both Iraq and the U.S.) of doing so, which could be damaging.
I am curious to see the task/org of this "intervening force". I would also be interested to see what "unacceptably extreme levels" of violence would be. Would the Iraqis have to ask? Or would we decide? Furthermore, I'm not in favor of potential U.S. QRF actions "being weighed politically" prior to intervention. Reference Fallujah '04 as an example.

Recommendation 10: Continue to press the Maliki government to pay the SOI and integrate greater numbers of them into the ISF and other government posts.
I've heard two things:
1. SOI is being integrated into the IA/IP
2. SOI is being "Transformed" into a uniformed militia, not a part of IA or IP.

Recommendation 11: The U.S. should press for a comprehensive settlement based on the UN recommendations between the KRG and the central government (of which the Kurds are also a part).
I think the U.S. at some point may have to choose sides, or at the least, it will appear as though we have to choose a side. On the surface, we will always support the GOI, but may have to push them on pro-Kurd issues. This could get ugly. Not sure if the UN will touch the independence issue. I can't imagine they would.

Recommendation 13: Establish trilateral U.S./Iraq/Turkey talks to buttress territorial settlement efforts and to deal with security concerns, particularly the PKK, a Kurdish terrorist group based in KRG territory.
Will be curious to see if the Turks get any more aggressive than have already been, in regards to military action against PKK. Will also be curious to see if the Turks hold Maliki more responsible for PKK and not Barzani.