An IW “Bottle of Scotch” Challenge

[Bill Moore]

As an aside this book was an excellent analysis of Vietnam and Malaya. But as we wrestle with the meaning of IW (and especially those among us who think they are coming up with something new) we should consider that everything we are talking and writing about has been discussed in past writings.

Agreed, but what was written in the past is insufficient for what DoD is looking for today. Still there was much written that was very relevant to today's challenges, but for whatever reason it didn't seem to help us too much with our current challenges. Reminds me of what my old boss used to say, we have lessons, we don't have lessons learned.

However, before we fix anything, we first need to address IW as a policy, or policy enabler. What do we really want to be capable of doing? Why? Then it shouldn't be so hard to identify the gaps and where we need to go. I hope we don't envision Iraq and Afghanistan as models for future war, but that is exactly what it sounds like. Perhaps we simply need to learn how to develop more feasible strategies, employ our forces correctly, and then maybe we'll find the gap isn't as large as we may think.

[Surferbeetle]

CSM Analysis; Promoting Peace in Afghanistan

Born out of the mantra that the war in Afghanistan cannot be won by military means alone, the mission of these small units – 26 in total – is to coordinate with local leaders and do development work – thus winning Afghan hearts and minds.

It was not always like this. As the war here began in October 2001, there was much talk about the need for reconstruction. But a RAND Corp. study found that, even as President Bush was promising a "Marshall Plan" for Afghanistan, the country received less assistance per capita than postconflict Bosnia, Kosovo, or Haiti, and less than half of what later would be spent in Iraq.

Last year, though, the budget for reconstruction projects here tripled, USAID development experts were shipped out by the dozens, and the PRTs were given new status. The US has now spent more than $32 billion on assistance to Afghanistan – 32 percent of which was allocated to development and humanitarian assistance. That number, according to the US State Department, will continue to climb in 2009.

With the understanding that quantity does not necessarily equate to quality (a SOF truth if I recall correctly, and assuming that my research gathered accurate data - the UK numbers seem pretty low) I built a quick set of Diplomatic Ratios for comparison purposes among some of the coalition forces. The Diplomatic Personnel to Inhabitants ratios work out to be: US = 1:213,000 UK = 1:29,850 France = 1:3,687 and Germany = 1:12,692; and the Diplomatic Personnel to USD/Euro/Pounds ratios work out to be US = 1:818,571 UK = 1:42,500 France = 1:273,340 and Germany = 1:200,000

Diplomatic Snapshot of the United States

The DOS has 14,000 personnel, a budget of 11.46 billion dollars, and diplomatic and consular activities in 180 plus countries. The US has 298.2 million inhabitants. (1), (2)

Diplomatic Snapshot of the UK

Over 2,000 personnel deliver counselor service, with a budget of 85 million pounds, and 261 embassies, high commissions and other diplomatic posts worldwide. The country has 59.7 million inhabitants. (3), (4)

Diplomatic Snapshot of France

French Foreign and European Affairs Ministry has 16,463 personnel, a 4.5 billion euro budget, and 158 embassies. The country has 60.7 million people. (5)

Diplomatic Snapshot of Germany

Foreign Service has 6,500 Staff, a 1.3 billion euro budget and 226 missions abroad. The country has 82.5 million inhabitants. (6), (7), (8)