An IW “Bottle of Scotch” Challenge

[William F. Owen]

Clausewitz warned that it was extremely important to understand the "nature of the war" in that it was the "setting forth of policy." Therefore I submit that the nature of IW is defined by the nature of the Policy. It's the WHY, not the HOW or the WHO.

Personally I've totally rejected the idea of IW/RW and Small v Big War. It's not a useful distinction and responsible for much of the current confusion and avant garde BS that surrounds it.

So, in pursuit of a bottle of whiskey...

"IW is a grossly simplified way of explaining that some forms of conflict fall out side regular armies comfort zone, because of a lack of education and training."

[Bill Moore]

"IW is a grossly simplified way of explaining that some forms of conflict fall out side regular armies comfort zone, because of a lack of education and training."

I recall in the past being in disagreement with your assertions many times, and felt your belief that war was war was too simple, but you are slowly winning me over. I think the issue in OIF and OEF-A was due to a lack of education and training. I also think IW is a forcing mechanism to correct that gap in education and training, but there is a danger if we try to separate from the concept of war as something different we'll end up training and teaching the wrong things to our future force.

However, that said I want to vote no on your proposed definition, because I really want that bottle of scotch.

[Ken White]

keep you away from demon alcohol and a descent into debauchery, I gotta vote for Wilf's definition:

"IW is a grossly simplified way of explaining that some forms of conflict fall out side regular armies comfort zone, because of a lack of education and training."

With a note that I still think the DoD version is acceptable; simply that if there must be a change, Wilf has come up with the most accurate suggestion to date. Now, if you can top that, I can change my vote...

(Not that anyone pays any attention to my votes... )

[Entropy]

I like Wilf's definition too. Hopefully he'll forget our frequent disagreements on air power and let me have a sip of that scotch!

[slapout9]

IW= A Conflict in which the Enemy intentionally violates the Laws of Armed Conflict in order to achieve his Objective.

[William F. Owen]

I also think IW is a forcing mechanism to correct that gap in education and training, but there is a danger if we try to separate from the concept of war as something different we'll end up training and teaching the wrong things to our future force.

Concur. That is further food for thought.

I like Wilf's definition too. Hopefully he'll forget our frequent disagreements on air power and let me have a sip of that scotch!

You can have whole bottle, a. Cos I don't drink, and b. Cos you disagree with me and that makes me think.

IW= A Conflict in which the Enemy intentionally violates the Laws of Armed Conflict in order to achieve his Objective.

Wouldn't this cover the British, German and French Armies in WW1?

[reed11b]

Personally I've totally rejected the idea of IW/RW and Small v Big War. It's not a useful distinction and responsible for much of the current confusion and avant garde BS that surrounds it.

I agree on one level, and that statement makes sense to theorists like us that feel that infantry is the core of any army, but I am afraid that it could also empower folks like Sparks that say that armored vehicles are the key to winning any war or ,nearly as bad, Air Power advocates. What say you to this, good sir...
Reed

[slapout9]

Wouldn't this cover the British, German and French Armies in WW1?

Wilf,it certainly could. Wars can start out RW and switch to IW or they could go the other direction too. I guess??? I don't like the term myself. Isn't UW also IW? why have so many?

[Rex Brynen]

Fighting against (or sometimes with) people who don't fight they way doctrine says they're supposed to?

[William F. Owen]

I agree on one level, and that statement makes sense to theorists like us that feel that infantry is the core of any army, but I am afraid that it could also empower folks like Sparks that say that armored vehicles are the key to winning any war or ,nearly as bad, Air Power advocates. What say you to this, good sir...
Reed

Well there's a difference between good theorists and poor theorists. I just subscribe to a collection of "ways and means."

The great problem with modern military theories is that a lot of them are not military. Mike and others always manage to confuse technology (and not a stellar understanding at that) with warfare, as though the two inextricably linked. They are not.

The Native Americans fought a nation state war to avoid annihilation, against an a "hybrid nation state" enemy, while using inferior technology. ...as did the Incas!

[Bill Moore]

The ongoing debate over the definition of IW and what it means to the military and the whole of government is creating much confusion, but that confusion is valuable and the debate is long overdue. Unfortunately IW will not lend itself to a simple definition due to its complexity and many shades of gray. Keep in mind that ultimately we're attempting to fix real problems based on our performance in numerous IW environments.

Many in my Special Forces community think we already have the doctrine required in our wealth of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense doctrine. Yet we have proven time and time again that the existing doctrine is insufficient in many regards. First, it is only intended for Special Forces, and not the Army or Joint community. Since any type of UW or FID operation will fall under the command and control of Geographic Combatant Commander GCC, it is clear that joint doctrine is needed (note, Joint doctrine for FID exists) for SF to be successful. Without it, we'll continue to hear we could have done better if higher knew what they were doing. Second, the current UW doctrine is largely focused at the tactical and operational level in support of a main conventional force effort. A recent article posted to the SWJ titled "Irregular Warfare: Everything yet Nothing" argued that our old UW doctrine said UW activities were focused against the enemy's military, not a civilian populace as stated in the IW definition. What they failed to address was the context that the doctrine was developed in. It was written post WWII to address the Soviet threat. The U.S. vision of UW then was uising it to collect intelligence and to disrupt Soviet military activities in the Soviet occupied areas in case of WWIII. It was UW in support of a conventional war, thus the tactical/operational focus. On the other hand, Mao and many others used UW as a strategic instrument, and the primary focus was on influencing various population groups as stated in our current IW definition. Of course they still had to defeat the hostile military force, but maintaining the support of the populace is what enabled them to defeat the hostile military forces. Therefore, the first and foremost objective was maintaining that support base.

The argument is further blurred when it is argued that conventional or regular warfare is easy (or easier than IW) because the focus is on defeating the enemy's capacity to wage war, which we generally assume to be their conventional military forces. I can't think of one conventional war where our politicians, thus our military strategists, didn't have to focus on maintaining or winning the support of different population groups, so that requirement is hardly unique to IW.

To further muddy the waters about unconventional, irregular, and conventional warfare, the DoD dictionary defines unconventional weapons as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. If we decided to drop a nuclear weapon on one of our enemies' cities to convince their population to cease supporting their government, is that conventional, unconventional or irregular warfare? Gaining influence over a specific populace can definitely be achieved with coercion; the terrorists prove this again and again.

Who is the "irregular"? General purpose forces cut off from their units can conduct guerrilla warfare, are they irregulars? If Special Forces are supporting an insurgency in another country are those SF soldiers considered irregulars? The character of the war (to some extent) would be same whether the insurgent is a non-state warrior or a Soldier. That implies we still would have use COIN/FID to counter the threat.

There are numerous shades of gray not discussed here, and while debating them over beer may be fun, we just may have to accept the fact that there is no perfect definition. In the long run what is important is that we address our shortfalls in addressing these non-conventional threats. Our history has shown time and again that we have struggled against the irregular threat, and now that this IW threat may be more dangerous to us than at any time in the past we can't afford to neglect it any longer.

Assuming that it is true that war is war, that argument hasn't been helpful in a practical sense. We developed UW, FID/COIN, and counterterrorism doctrine to respond to new types of threats because the existing doctrine was inadequate. We have once again come to that point where our current doctrine is insufficient to address the threats we face today.

I'm not prepared to propose a new definition yet even though I find the current definition troubling, yet in many ways I think it is adequate if we fail to develop a better one.

[Surferbeetle]

The ongoing debate over the definition of IW and what it means to the military and the whole of government is creating much confusion, but that confusion is valuable and the debate is long overdue. Unfortunately IW will not lend itself to a simple definition due to its complexity and many shades of gray. Keep in mind that ultimately we're attempting to fix real problems based on our performance in numerous IW environments.

On the other hand, Mao and many others used UW as a strategic instrument, and the primary focus was on influencing various population groups as stated in our current IW definition. Of course they still had to defeat the hostile military force, but maintaining the support of the populace is what enabled them to defeat the hostile military forces. Therefore, the first and foremost objective was maintaining that support base.

Bill,

For the most part, I like where your head is at on this one.

We forget our roots, however, when we think that a working IW definition is within our reach but outside of our grasp. Once upon a time our military forces had to be able to productively fit into the civilian populace most days and then, as needed, be able to step onto the battlefield to effectively fight an Army that was better trained and resourced than they were.

DIME and PMESII are acronyms which bear deep consideration both over beer and in formal settings. I see them as an attempt to formalize what we knew innately way back when...'when your back is against the wall and somebody is in your land anything goes'. There was outrage when we hid behind trees to take our shots when 'Real Armies' used line and column formations out in the open.

I am not yet at a point where I can provide a pithy one-line powerpoint definition of IW. My personal definition is longer than that and uses systems analysis. Our opponent lives in the AO, speaks the language, has time to think, and has a burning desire to kill us or throw us out or both. Perhaps we would all profit by seriously studying our opponent and looking at his definition of IW as well as ours.

Michael Scheuer's book Imperial Hubris (ISBN 1-57488-862-5) was an interesting start down this road for me.

Regards,

Steve

[slapout9]

Bill Just switch to SBW. SBW= People who act as soldiers but don;t look like soldiers. Using things as weapons that don't look like weapons. That use places as battlefields that don't look like battlefields. put that on your secret Bill Moore Green Beret website.

[MikeF]

Originally from Wilf: Personally I've totally rejected the idea of IW/RW and Small v Big War. It's not a useful distinction and responsible for much of the current confusion and avant garde BS that surrounds it.

I tend to agree that's why I try to simplify the discussion into a football metaphor. I don't see COL Gentile as anti-COIN and John Nagl as pro-COIN. I simply see them engaged in a healthy debate focused on what mixture of run/pass we should have within our military structure.

Originally posted by Bill Moore: The ongoing debate over the definition of IW and what it means to the military and the whole of government is creating much confusion, but that confusion is valuable and the debate is long overdue.

Bill's point is important. If WE disagree over our own definitions, how can our civilian policy-makers and bosses hope to understand what we do. This debate is healthy and much needed if only to educate so they can make informed decisions on how to employ us effectively.

v/r

Mike

[davidoff]

What is the point of defining IW? Is it so that we can classify and therefore work on strategies to counter it?

If this is the case then IW is, or is similar to, unconventional warfare and operations other than war. It is hard to prescribe a strategy without having boots on the ground because each situation can be different than it seems, and this reality will not be likely to present itself during the "fog of war".

Therefore, simplification may be helpful in that we work on strategies for specific situations without consideration of the type of warfare encountered.
In some ways IW can be defined as not fighting for territory or resources. Rather it is a a continuation of the cold war fight for ideology and does not confine itself to states or other boundaries. We need creative solutions on how to overcome ideas.

I know this definition is wide, but it is meant to encompass a lot of different types of adversaries and methods.

[William F. Owen]

In some ways IW can be defined as not fighting for territory or resources. Rather it is a a continuation of the cold war fight for ideology and does not confine itself to states or other boundaries. We need creative solutions on how to overcome ideas.

I know this definition is wide, but it is meant to encompass a lot of different types of adversaries and methods.

How does a fight for territory and and fight for ideology differ? Last I checked, only human beings have "ideas" and all humans live on land, or territory. I can't see how you can ever have a "war of ideas."

[selil]

How does a fight for territory and and fight for ideology differ? Last I checked, only human beings have "ideas" and all humans live on land, or territory. I can't see how you can ever have a "war of ideas."

Not all battles are for physical territory or using kinetic weapons. Sometimes trade, rights to transit across territory, inclusion in decision making, and other forms of soft power can be just as effective as bullets.

The use of kinetic power has only one utility. The cessation of the adversaries autonomic functions. Some times you want to keep an adversary alive as a wedge against another adversary. As such ideas are all you have and limited deterrence (another idea by the way).

[Stan]

Hey Slap, did you so happen to do some tours in Sub-Sahara

This SBW is some real spooky Sierra

Bill Just switch to SBW. SBW= People who act as soldiers but don;t look like soldiers. Using things as weapons that don't look like weapons. That use places as battlefields that don't look like battlefields. put that on your secret Bill Moore Green Beret website.

[jkm_101_fso]

I tend to agree that's why I try to simplify the discussion into a football metaphor. I don't see COL Gentile as anti-COIN and John Nagl as pro-COIN. I simply see them engaged in a healthy debate focused on what mixture of run/pass we should have within our military structure.

Would it be correct to say that COL Gentile wants to run the wishbone and only throw on third and long?
...and Nagl believes in the multi-formation "west coast" offense and wants to throw every other down (even on first sometimes)?

[William F. Owen]

Not all battles are for physical territory or using kinetic weapons. Sometimes trade, rights to transit across territory, inclusion in decision making, and other forms of soft power can be just as effective as bullets.

All true, but that's not war. It's something else. Diplomacy? Soft power cannot kill and cannot break will, therefore it is not part of warfare.

The use of kinetic power has only one utility. The cessation of the adversaries autonomic functions. Some times you want to keep an adversary alive as a wedge against another adversary. As such ideas are all you have and limited deterrence (another idea by the way).

The use of kinetic power is central to war and warfare. If no one dies then no war took place. War as an instrument of Policy/politics is concerned with people living on land. Even sea and air have their purpose on land.