An IW “Bottle of Scotch” Challenge

[Surferbeetle]

From wikipedia

A blockade is any effort to prevent supplies, troops, information or aid from reaching an opposing force. Blockades are the cornerstone to nearly all military campaigns and the tool of choice for economic warfare on an opposing nation. The International Criminal Court plans to include blockades against coasts and ports in its list of acts of war in 2009.

Blockades can take any number of forms from a simple garrison of troops along a main roadway to utilizing dozens or hundreds of surface combatant ships in securing a harbor, denying its use to the enemy, and even in cutting off or jamming broadcast signals from radio or television. As a military operation, blockades have been known to be the deciding factor in winning or losing a war.

[slapout9]

Hey Slap, did you so happen to do some tours in Sub-Sahara

This SBW is some real spooky Sierra

Hi Stan, while the name SBW is said in jest the rest is serious that is their MO!! Alot of advatanges to looking at this IW stuff from an LE perspective...in the end IW people act just like criminals don't have to worry about what Wing Wang Zu or Karl Von Bergermeister said 500 years ago. Just study the facts....understand the system....and counter it.

[slapout9]

The Last President to understand IW explains it for everyone. He should get the bottle of Scotch!


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C4cqS...eature=related

[ginspace]

Sorry WillF, but I totally disagree...war is about breaking the will of your enemy and forcing him to accept your ideas, not about killing. It may involve kinetic effects, but certainly doesn't have to, and it definitely doesn't always have to be about the control of land.

While the redistribution of territory is often an outcome of treaties, wars have always been fought over religion, ethnicity, and economics to mention just a few root causes. Wars have certainly been fought over the control of sea lanes, and the only reason wars haven't been fought in space is because we don't live there yet. You can be assured that there will be wars fought in cyberspace in the future, and although these attacks may result in death due to economic and infrastructure collapse, the initial effects will not be kinetic.

if you think your will can't be broken with soft power, you haven't learned the lessons of the Vietnam war, the Algerian revolution, or any other irregular war won by an insurgency. Information and psychological warfare is often the only tool of IW, and it is very effective against a liberal democracy. Killing may play a role, but it is by no means the defining characteristic of war.

Speaking of irregular warfare, the last QDR defined it as "conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nation states." This includes civilians and is a type of warfare that occurs at every level in what the Chinese call Unlimited Warfare.

We are currently engaged in an "unlimited war of ideas" with radical Islamists (and have been for over a millenium) that transcends mere kinetic effects and petty squabbles over who gets the water, oil, and olive trees. It is a clash of civilizations as Huntington theorized, but there's no reason for it to end in the destruction of one or other.

I am a believer that warfare is not a zero-sum game, and that there is a moderate solution to every problem where both parties can emerge better off than they were. Irregular warfare requires an irregular approach to victory.

[William F. Owen]

Sorry WillF, but I totally disagree...war is about breaking the will of your enemy and forcing him to accept your ideas, not about killing. It may involve kinetic effects, but certainly doesn't have to, and it definitely doesn't always have to be about the control of land.

OK, so which wars in history have resulted in NO casualties? War is killing. Read Clausewitz. Changing someone's ideas without killing is marketing or diplomacy, and nothing to do with the military. Killing is what makes war a distinct and discrete human activity. It's what defines war.

We are currently engaged in an "unlimited war of ideas" with radical Islamists (and have been for over a millenium) that transcends mere kinetic effects and petty squabbles over who gets the water, oil, and olive trees. It is a clash of civilizations as Huntington theorized, but there's no reason for it to end in the destruction of one or other

.
The "Radical Islamist" have terrain based objectives. A Pan Islamist Caliphate or a US withdrawal from Iraq/Afghanistan and the "land of two mosques." It may even be "world domination." How is this not about land?

Speaking of irregular warfare, the last QDR defined it as "conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nation states." This includes civilians and is a type of warfare that occurs at every level in what the Chinese call Unlimited Warfare.

So which combatants who are not regular military forces of nation states have causes not attached to land or their people who hark from a specific geographic area?

I have read Unlimited Warfare. I don't bother reading it anymore.

I am a believer that warfare is not a zero-sum game, and that there is a moderate solution to every problem where both parties can emerge better off than they were. Irregular warfare requires an irregular approach to victory.

I believe Warfare is about getting what my people want and that is not a moderate solution, because the other side is Not moderate. If they were I wouldn't need to kill them. Irregular Warfare just means being careful about who you kill, and why you kill them. That's the only difference.

[William F. Owen]

if you think your will can't be broken with soft power, you haven't learned the lessons of the Vietnam war, the Algerian revolution, or any other irregular war won by an insurgency. Information and psychological warfare is often the only tool of IW, and it is very effective against a liberal democracy. Killing may play a role, but it is by no means the defining characteristic of war.

The Vietnam was was not won by an insurgency. The NLF had been soundly defeated by 1970-71. Vietnam 1964-75 was a war between nation States (North Vietnam, China and Russia, versus an Allied Coalition) with a 60K US dead. Not much soft power involved. Dead US Soldiers broke the will of the US Govt to commit to a military solution as they had done in Korea. The Republic of South Vietnam was militarily defeated, by conventional military forces.

The Viet Minh, Militarily defeated the French, using conventional military strength (Infantry and artillery). Again, not much "soft power" involved.

Both Algerian "civil wars" saw vast amounts of killing. The French withdrew because they could not hold onto power in an effective or legitimate way.

Information and Psychological means are adjuncts to violence. The are violence enhancers. If they are employed without violence, then they are marketing or diplomacy, and nothing to do with war.

[Bill Moore]

Information and Psychological means are adjuncts to violence. The are violence enhancers. If they are employed without violence, then they are marketing or diplomacy, and nothing to do with war.

Since when is violence considered separately from psychological operations? The U.S. wants to fight a politically correct form of war, but those who are experts are at irregular warfare fully understand the power of armed propaganda.

The debate is over what audience the propaganda is aimed at. If the relevant audience is not the opposing military, but rather another relevant population then according to the definition it is IW. This definition is less than useful.

Good comments on the Vietnam conflict. I like Nagl's book on "Eating Soup with a Knife", but found his comparision of Vietnam to Malaysia greatly flawed. Still his obseveration that we failed to learn and adapt quick enough was generally correct.

[William F. Owen]

Good comments on the Vietnam conflict. I like Nagl's book on "Eating Soup with a Knife", but found his comparision of Vietnam to Malaysia greatly flawed. Still his obseveration that we failed to learn and adapt quick enough was generally correct.

I don't think the US did fail to adapt. It's a myth. If you assume US involvement being from 1965-71, when the NLF was pretty much irrelevant, that was about 7 years.

The Malayan Emergency started in 1948, and 7 years later in 1954, was still very much an issue. It wasn't declared over till 1960!

We certainly didn't get ahead of the game in Northern Ireland in the first 7 years.

Also, there is just no sensible comparison to be made between the two conflicts. I might also suggest that by 1972, the US was probably the equal of any nation on earth, when it came to COIN.

IMO, Why it all got forgotten was what Nagl should have written about.

[Bill Moore]

It pains me to this day to continue to see the misinterpretations of the Vietnam War. You are absolutely correct that we did adapt relatively quickly, and we defeated both the regular and irregular threats. When I hear senior military officers spread the myth that we didn't understand the nature of the war, I have to wonder about how much the extreme left has influenced our thinking.

On the other hand, while we won, the S. Vietnamese lost. As you stated it was due to a large scale conventional invasion from the North, not a people's uprising. The reason we didn't intervene with air power is due to our lack of political will, a sitting President who was not elected, etc. Our political will seemed to be drained by the narratives presented by our media. We didn't "learn" how to counter that. To make matters worse we didn't sufficiently exploit the atrocities that the N. Vietnamese commited after they invaded. Thousands of people of murdered (not killed in combat). Not sure our left leaning academia and press understood this, or simply blocked it out because it was too unpleasant and they didn't want to admit they were wrong.

However, there was one area where we failed to adapt quickly enough, and that was our attempt to fight the insurgents using the same tactics we used to fight the conventional NV forces. The push to deliver body counts statistics instead of controlling the populace set us back tactically and strategically. Westmoreland took CIDG members who were trained and equipped to defend their villages against communist inflltration and used them as front line troops to fight conventional forces. There was one war, but it required two strategies, and while we did adapt quicker than the Brits did in Malaysia, we didn't adapt quick enough to keep the media and left leaning academia at bay.

[ginspace]

I'll grant that the Vietnam conflict was not won by the insurgency, but it certainly started as one when the VietCong communists staged uprisings against the oppressive Diem government. It then became a civil war between North and South, and the North had the political will to continue a fight that the South may have won had they been able to establish a viable government. Unfortunately, we were caught in the middle because of our policy to support anyone who was anti-communist, no matter how corrupt.

That said, I never suggested wars were won without casualties. Like you alluded, Clausewitz cautions repeatedly against strategists who believe war can be won without bloodshed. He also states the only difference between war and other great conflicts of nations is that war is settled with bloodshed. However, there are plenty of examples of "wars" between princes in the era of Machiavelli that ended when their private mercenary armies either came to a resolution on the battlefield without actual fighting, or one side capitulated after maneuvering to a severe disadvantage.

I will also grant that a moderate solution cannot be reached until one side is convinced they cannot prevail on their terms, which often involves killing a lot of people. But the Algerians didn't just kill Frenchmen and pied noirs, they killed a lot of their own Muslim population just to spread a sense of terror, which is why the French were unable to establish a legitimate government. This is a very difficult problem to solve...when your enemy is suicidal, killing them is just giving them what they want and massive reprisals against a population you aren't familiar with just creates more radicals.

Insurgencies and irregular warfare take a lot of time and energy and require intimate knowledge of the entire political, economic, cultural and military situation in order to defeat the enemy. In that way, IW is not just about killing, though I agree, you have to root out and eliminate the radical, sometimes there are people you can convince to be on your side without killing them.

I still say that the only reason war is about land is because people need to live and practice their ideas somewhere. If we could live in a bubble in the sky, people would fight over the bubbles too.

[DJL]

I've been content to just read SWJ for a while, but the single malt gauntlet has brought me out of the woodwork.

It seems that many definitions of conventional and irregular warfare focus too much on tactics, types of forces involved, and legal definitions rather than focusing on the distinctions between the ways the modes of warfare are intended to work. Agreed, both are intended to either force your opponent to accept your will by either 1. killing him, eliminating his vote, 2. forcing him to accept the reality that resistance is futile, or 3. actually converting him to your cause by making him a stakeholder in the new status quo. Agreed, that violence or the threat of violence is implicit in either conventional or IW approaches, but is not mutually exclusive nor necessarily the most important aspect compared to "soft" approaches in every case.

The current Joint Operating Concepts discern between the modes of warfare based on the populations we focus on, with conventional focusing on the enemy's military forces and IW focusing on the population. In a comprehensive theory of war, both types focus on the population, but the conventional definition acknowledges that one subset of the enemy population, the military, presents a significant "speedbump" in the road to convincing the rest of the population to agree with or at least acquiesce to your point of view. Could we look at the difference in the modes of warfare in terms of strategies based on the relative military strengths of the opponents, and how the combatants choose to deal with them within a given amount of time?

Conventional warfare: Direct confrontation against the opponent's military strength, primarily using attrition to force a political decision in the short term.

Irregular warfare: Using multiple, short duration acts of violence against enemy weak spots to bypass an opponent's military strength, primarily using exhaustion to force a political decision in the long term.

OK, feel free to start shooting holes in these, but I think the key points are that 1. one mode confronts the enemy's military strength directly while the other avoids it, and 2. time has got to be part of the distinction between the modes of warfare.

Ready for your spears...

DJL

[Bob's World]

Just spent the last four days loading and then driving a 26' Penske truck and Uhaul trailer from California to Florida by myself. Talk about irregular warfare....

Anyway, while I belive the term IW must be tossed as soon as possible for one more suited for the purpose that this concept is supposed to address ( Sorry Mr. Vickers, but while I realize you are very tied to this term, it absolutely turns off the rest of the US Government whose support you are attempting to garner with this concept).

My shot at the definition is built upon the existing one, but with some major modifications:

"IW consists of actions conducted by the whole of government, typically in times of peace, to shape the struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence with relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may require the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to create conditions favorable to U.S. national interests and the well-being and good governance of the focus populace."

(If this passes muster, I drink Dalmore. Though I'd prefer a nice bottle of Irish, Tullamore Dew on that count)

[Bill Moore]

"IW consists of actions conducted by the whole of government, typically in times of peace, to shape the struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence with relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may require the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to create conditions favorable to U.S. national interests and the well-being and good governance of the focus populace."

If we agree that IW is something that we do (like UW), versus an environment, then I think your first sentence sums it up nicely. The remaining sentences are too presuming and to be frank too politically correct or lawyer like . Seriously, the remaining sentences "assume" that there is a prescribed approach without considering all the variables and our national objectives for each situation. Sometimes direct versus indirect actions may be desired, such as punitive expeditions, versus the lofty goal of government reform. Swinging a big stick, just as spanking a kid (I know from getting my butt whacked a few times), can modify our foe's behavior also (in some situations). Is it really in our national interests to spend millions of dollars in a vain attempt to reform the world? In some cases yes, but I argue in most that isn't the case.

The point is don't restrict the definition to "favors indirect and asymmetrical approaches".

Just leave your definition as "shape the struggle between state and non-state actors for legitmacy and / or (added) influence with relevant populations". That definition will still serve as a forcing mechanism to drive any needed doctrinal changes, and it does add much clarity in my opinion.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Good points, less is usually more. I do think that IW is intended to be an umbrella of a wide range of operations that we conduct, and not to describe an environment. Fact is, as you well know, understanding the environment you are operating in, and what it is that you actually have to accomplish to achieve your desired ends are the two most important things to get right. What you call it is really moot.

This is a concept, that for all of its flaws (horrible name, no acceptable definition), that will not go away, nor should it. The U.S. military is pretty good at waging war, but not so much at waging peace. That is probably why we try to turn every situation into war, we know we are good at it.

IW is really about waging peace, and that can be a very tricky, dangerous business, but it is what we need to get our arms around as it is the majority of projected operations. We also need to get our brains around the fact that though DoD may bring the bulk of the resources, it is most often a situation that requires a civilian lead, both for the HN, and for the U.S. involvement. IW was intended to garner not only that lead, but greater non-DoD support. Problem is that we had to go and call it war. "Irregular Peace" is more apt, and also more likely to garner the support we seek.

Everybody have a safe and merry Christmas. And when you pause to remember our brave young men and women down range, say an extra prayer for those fine infantrymen like my boy. Regardless of how clever our strategies are, or what we call the latest concept, it always boils down to a frontal assault for the lead squad....

[William F. Owen]

I still say that the only reason war is about land is because people need to live and practice their ideas somewhere. If we could live in a bubble in the sky, people would fight over the bubbles too.

Concur, which is why land is at the centre of all Strategic thought.

That definition will still serve as a forcing mechanism to drive any needed doctrinal changes, and it does add much clarity in my opinion.

OK, I can dig that, but why not have a doctrine to drive doctrinal change. Why not teach war better so that folks have better understanding?

[Bob's World]

William,

Your right in that as it applies to "War," IW does not make sense. That is the point that I was attempting to highlight in my earlier posts. IW is not war. IW is that family of engagement that the military does primarily in peace. To try to make it war is as frustrating as trying to get the proverbial square peg into the round hole.

Granted, many of the operations that fall under this umbrella term are also conducted ancillary to true war (the OSS with the French Resistance in WWII for example, or the Russian resistance movement that tormented the Germans).

My take as a fairly close observer and even participant in this latest ideological struggle within the military heirarchy is that everyone is talking past each other, blinded by their own preconceived notions of what war is, what their branch or service should do in war, and even what the role of DoD and the other agencies are in our overall scheme of national security. The very real changes in the environment are driving the need for very real changes in both our response mechanisms and how we think about applying those responses.

Regardless of changes in the environment, the nature of war, just as the nature of insurgency, does not change, it just occurs within that new environment. At the end of the day, our military must be able to wage war, and it must be able to conduct UW in places where we want an insurgency to prevail, and FID where we want the existing troubled government to sort things out with its populace. But as we wage the peace, we need to get smarter about how to do it in this new environment, how we operate as a military, and how other agencies operate, and how we operate with each other...thus the need to sort this out. Sadly that sorting out has been packaged as IW.

[DJL]

Gents,

A few thoughts:

Isn't it still useful to reserve the term "warfare" for the aspects of a comprehensive approach that involve force or the threat of force, whether that force be lethal or non-lethal? Agree that IW cannot be conducted without the "unity of effort" you describe, but to include all of the political and economic lines of effort under IW may be extending the definition into aspects which would more correctly fall under politics or economic competition rather than warfare. Gets tough to draw the lines since we're increasingly realizing the interdependence of the efforts - guess that's a good thing. The bad thing is that it's still the military that has to do all of these at the same time in most cases.

Do we really want to try and tie IW to non state actors? Seems to artificially narrow the definition to match current conditions, but doesn't acknowledge the historical or current practices of state actors useing IW whether overtly or covertly.

Final Devil's advocate question: Isn't the mind of the opponent really the center of all strategic thought? (Guess I'll show my cards as a Boyd fan with that one). That said, thank God for infantrymen like Bob's World's son, and bless 'em all.

Happy Holidays!

DJL

[Bob's World]

Just as war is a continuation of Politics, IW is part of that continuation as well, typically well short of what we would consider "war."

My newly edited definition:

"IW consists of actions conducted by the whole of government, typically in times of peace, to shape the struggle for legitimacy and influence with relevant populations. Military activities favor indirect and asymmetric approaches in a supporting role, though at times may require the full range of options."

[max161]

Below is from a thesis I wrote on Unconventional Operations in 1994-95 when I was trying to describe the Post Cold War World. Obviously not a definition but a description:

Conflict is defined as "an armed struggle or clash between organized political parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives." This definition, though somewhat more ambiguous than war, is still rather straightforward and simple to understand. However, non-conventional conflict is something even more ambiguous and difficult to understand. It extends the continuum of conflict. Conflict in the conventional sense begins when the armed struggle begins; however, non-conventional conflict encompasses all of the types of conflict listed above, starting with the threat or possibility of conflict and extending past conflict termination, because the conditions that gave rise to hostilities in the first place may still remain, though not visible or easily recognized. It also includes armed clashes by unorganized groups that are not seeking to achieve any political or military objectives.

Non-conventional conflict encompasses the lawlessness of a society in which the governmental system has collapsed, but no organized group has risen to take its place. Violence and terrorist-like activity can occur out of frustration with no identifiable purpose. This type of conflict is non-conventional, because it is difficult to determine the objectives and methods of the actors, perhaps difficult to even determine the actors, and thus it is difficult to apply conventional elements of power. This is the sensitive and complex environment in which operations may increasingly take place. Although the situation may not be a traditional insurgency, there will likely be many of its characteristics present. In these types of non-conventional environments it is the issue of perceived legitimacy by the people and the political powers involved that places new stresses on military forces whose legitimacy is no longer a matter of fact.

[Surferbeetle]

Gentlemen,

Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0, 11 September 2007 has a section that I found worth ripping off and incorporating into my personal definition… IW is the use of any means available to attrite, influence, and or exhaust an opponent in order to have him succumb to your will.

Ok, where is that scotch?