McMaster on war (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

A "lurker" asked if SWC had spotted this speech by BG McMaster, at CSIS, on March 20th 2013. It appears to be mentioned on SWJ and was in the Daily News round-up.

The title was 'Raiders, Advisors And The Wrong Lessons From Iraq' and one news report was:http://breakingdefense.com/2013/03/2...ons-from-iraq/

Link to CSIS video:http://csis.org/event/ground-force-m...-still-matters

[davidbfpo]

The latest McMaster article in the NYT; which ends with:

What we can afford least is to define the problem of future war as we would like it to be, and by doing so introduce into our defense vulnerabilities based on self-delusion.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/op...pagewanted=all

Makes an interesting comparison with the restrictions placed on serving British soldiers to write a book chapter, a very different public exposure when compared to the NYT.

[Bill Moore]

The latest McMaster article in the NYT; which ends with:

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/op...pagewanted=all

Makes an interesting comparison with the restrictions placed on serving British soldiers to write a book chapter, a very different public exposure when compared to the NYT.

Excellent article by one of our few clear thinkers on war on active duty. He doesn't reject the value of technology, but the Rumfield like hubris associated with it. Shock and awe sort of worked against the Iraqi military, but there were a lot of social and political factors at play that influenced the collapse the military that we chose to ignore (silient evidence). Shock and awe had no discernible impact on the subsequent rebellion against our occupation, AQ in Iraq, or the civil war. Sure it gave a tactical edge that I don't recommend sacrificing, but as MG McMasters pointed out, we initially forgot the old truths that war is political, human, and uncertain.

It seems we started down this path under McNamara with his obsession of measuring progress in war, there by creating a pseudo-science of sorts that eventually resulted in a dysfunctional strategic approach in Vietnam. That eventually evolved into the toxic effects based operation (EBO) doctrine and Warden's Systems approach that attempted to replace uncertainty with certainty. It viewed the world as red and blue, and if blue did a particular action then red would respond a certain way. It neglected to recognize the multiple factors that influence political and social behavior and both concepts failed, yet Congress still seems to want to embrace the concept of what MG McMaster's calls the "Simple War."

defense was driven by ideas that regarded successful military operations as ends in themselves, rather than just one instrument of power that must be coordinated with others to achieve, and sustain, political goals

I will take a step further, although on the books we allegedly have a system for synchronizing all elements of our national power with the National Security Council and Staff, I don't think any of us would invest in these entities if they were companies because they have repeatedly failed to produce a profitable service.

Thucydides identified nearly 2,500 years ago: fear, honor and interest. But in the years preceding our last two wars, thinking about defense undervalued the human as well as the political aspects of war.

He correctly points out we under appreciated this initially in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but then adapted.

THIRD, war is uncertain, precisely because it is political and human. The dominant assumption of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” was that information would be the key to victory.

But in Afghanistan and Iraq, planning did not account for adaptations and initiatives by the enemy

My favorite quote in the article is,

clear thinking about war costs nothing

, but that unfortunately is part of the problem. What lobbyist on Capital Hill is going to push for this?

[davidbfpo]

McMaster at a Brookings seminar is reported as having made the Army’s case in his characteristically blunt language.

“What concerns me the most is really that we’ll engage in wishful thinking that’s motivated mainly by budget constraints,” he said. “You get the army that the people are wiling to pay for in a democracy, and it’s our job to do our best with it.”

The “wishful thinking” that McMaster fears is what he calls “four fallacies” about future conflicts that promise “easy solutions”:

“The return of the revolution in military affairs,” a theory thought discredited in Iraq — “it’s like a vampire,” he said — with its promise that long-range sensors and precision strikes will let air and sea forces win wars cleanly and bloodlessly (for us) on their own.

“The Zero Dark Thirty fallacy” that we can solve our problems almost bloodlessly with Special Operations raids, “something akin to a global swat team to go after enemy leaders.”

What might be called the Mali Fallacy (my words, not his) that we can rely on allies and local surrogates to do the fighting on the ground while the US provides advisors and high-tech support.

All three fallacies, he said, begin with a core of truth: Air Force, Navy, Special Operations, advisors, and allies are all impressive and essential capabilities, but we can’t count on them to prevail alone.

The fourth fallacy, by contrast, McMaster considers just plain “narcissistic.” The idea that the US can “opt out” of certain kinds of conflict — say, counterinsurgency, or ground warfare in general — without giving our adversaries credit for what they may be able to force us to do. Invading Afghanistan seemed ludicrous on September 10, 2001, after all, and inescapable on September 12th.

Link:http://breakingdefense.com/2014/02/t...s-4-fallacies/

[carl]

I think McMaster's primary point is a very basic one. We don't understand the nature of war because we don't want to understand the nature of war. Our thinking regarding the subject is poor, willfully poor and it is immature. We act like teenagers who really really want it to be like we want it to be and that is how we will view it the facts and history be damned.

This is a flaw of fundamental nature. The guys on the spot can overcome it to certain extent if they have enough time, as they did in Iraq and Afghanistan. But we won't have the time always, especially if something big happens. Our challenge is to rejigger our thinking before that happens. I don't know if we can do it. The Prussians couldn't before 1806 even though the people who transformed the Prussian army afterward were the same people they had before that year. They needed a disastrous defeat to effect change. They could afford it because the English and the Russians were around. If we have to go the same route, we won't have it so good because there is no analog to England and Russia now.

Grant Martin made a comment on the Journal about how 'system' seems to be invincible. Nothing seems to alter it. Nothing. I think 'the system' cannot win a war, any war. We will be defeated at anything we try as long as 'the system' exists. The puerile thinking McMaster decries underlays 'the system' and if we can't change things we are looking at hard times to come.

[davidbfpo]

Nick Prime, a PhD student, on the relaunched Kings of War responds to HR's latest comments, it is very critical:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2014/02/rem...ys-narrative/?

[carl]

Not impressed with that article. I think McMaster's primary objection to "RMA" is intellectual in that it presumes to remove uncertainty from war. The author turns that into criticism of a single procurement decision. The author also stated that recent experience demonstrates that protection should trump maneuverability and firepower. That is an extreme oversimplification.