McMaster on war (merged thread)

[SWJED]

Conference comment - What we lost in the 90's was the understanding that land warfare is fundamentally different from aerospace and maritime warfare because of the presence of a population and the complexity of geography. We have to capture that again...

[SWJED]

Conference comment - In consideration of the Capstone Concept and the implications and solutions it suggests we have to be careful that we do not overcorrect...

[SWJED]

Conference comment - The 2009 Army Capstone Concept fits nicely with US Joint Forces Command's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations.

[Mark O'Neill]

lack context in the 'vs' , Can you elaborate?

Thanks

Mark

[SWJED]

Mark - context was in previous theory (90's) vs. the reality we eventually encountered.

[Westhawk]

BG McMaster delivered a broad attack on the DoD’s transformation plans from the 1990s. He asserted that the technological focus of that time neglected the human, social, cultural, and political factors necessary to prevail on the modern battlefield. According to McMaster, events of this decade have shown how adversaries have adapted to previous U.S. methods thus negating them.

McMaster’s capstone concept seeks to reverse many of the precepts and assumptions of the 1990s defense transformation program. Under McMaster’s vision, in order to prevail in ground combat U.S. forces will need to “go local,” by getting very close to the enemy and sustaining long-term operations deep into a variety of indigenous population.

During yesterday’s staff ride of the Gettysburg battlefield, we discussed how any army is the product and reflection of the society from which it comes. The nature of U.S. Southern culture favored the Confederacy early on, but the more industrial and commercial nature of the North later asserted its dominance.

The question for today is whether U.S. society can produce the kind of soldiers and the Army necessary to implement the capstone concept McMaster described. And whether U.S. society can support the operational concept McMaster believes is required to prevail.

-Robert Haddick

[marct]

There is an interesting dynamic at work in this presentation - it is a paradigm shift in the classic, Kuhnian sense. My immediate perception of most of the concern and debate is that it not involve a total paradigm shift, aka a Revolution but, rather, a modification and adaptation of the basic epistemology to bring it more in line with lived reality.

[Anlaochfhile]

BG McMaster delivered a broad attack on the DoD’s transformation plans from the 1990s. He asserted that the technological focus of that time neglected the human, social, cultural, and political factors necessary to prevail on the modern battlefield. According to McMaster, events of this decade have shown how adversaries have adapted to previous U.S. methods thus negating them.

McMaster’s capstone concept seeks to reverse many of the precepts and assumptions of the 1990s defense transformation program. Under McMaster’s vision, in order to prevail in ground combat U.S. forces will need to “go local,” by getting very close to the enemy and sustaining long-term operations deep into a variety of indigenous population.

During yesterday’s staff ride of the Gettysburg battlefield, we discussed how any army is the product and reflection of the society from which it comes. The nature of U.S. Southern culture favored the Confederacy early on, but the more industrial and commercial nature of the North later asserted its dominance.

The question for today is whether U.S. society can produce the kind of soldiers and the Army necessary to implement the capstone concept McMaster described. And whether U.S. society can support the operational concept McMaster believes is required to prevail.

-Robert Haddick

Excellent point. We live in a society that is overall much more enamored with technology and hard sciences than with the humanities. How can a nation that routinely lags behind much of the world in social studies, geography, language arts, and other liberal arts studies hope to field armies that are culturally adept enough for the small wars that are likely to be a significant part of our future? The services are certainly making an effort, but without a solid grounding in our own culture, these efforts seem unlikely to ‘stick’.

I highly recommend Dr. Adrian Lewis’ book The American Culture of War: the History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom, which focuses on the role that American culture plays in how our forces organize, equip, and fight. It has some keen insights in this regard.

[Mark O'Neill]

Mark - context was in previous theory (90's) vs. the reality we eventually encountered.

thanks for the clarification for a remote Aussie.

[William F. Owen]

Mark - context was in previous theory (90's) vs. the reality we eventually encountered.

Well that does beg the question as to how the "theory" of the 90's became accepted in the face of no evidence and a body of historically informed "best practice" which has remained largely the same since 1918.

The only reason I point this out, is that an organisation that is prone to making poor decisions, usually avoids finding out why the bad decisions get made.

EG: On what planet was "Command from the FOB vs. command from the front" ever a good idea, and how is video feeds from UAVs helping solve this problem?

[Fuchs]

"Brigadier General H.R. McMaster on Setting Conditions and The Army Capstone Concept"

Where's the primary source?

[Brasidas]

A quick point. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff document of his vision on how joint forces would operate 2016-28 in the face of assorted challenges. CCJO incorporates USJFCOM's work in the document: Joint Operating Environment, threats and trends that could face the future force. The JOE is a companion document to CCJO.

[SWJED]

Thanks Brasidas, you are very correct that the CCJO is a CJCS document.

On the draft Army Capstone Concept - this document is the product of a writing team of 20 personnel...

[SWJED]

I highly recommend Dr. Adrian Lewis’ book The American Culture of War: the History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom, which focuses on the role that American culture plays in how our forces organize, equip, and fight. It has some keen insights in this regard.

Thanks Anlaochfhile...

The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom

The American Culture of War is a comprehensive and authoritative survey of American conduct in war from World War II to the present, including both Iraq wars. It traces the evolution of American strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine, including the national command structure, civil-military relations, the role of the media, military technology, the military personnel system, airpower doctrine, the role of Congress, and numerous related aspects of national defence. The American Culture of War will be an indispensable text for upper-division undergradudate courses on the history of war as well as history courses on the Vietnam War and the 1960s.