Partly agree. I think McMasters realizes
that military power does not come from maximizing capabilities. Seems to me he's saying that they should be doctrinally based on needed capabilities, not the same thing as our current technique, thus his use of the words "so-called."Originally Posted by William F. Owen
He's also aware of our (and most everyone's) problem of political dithering and meddling in the force design process.
I find these concluding lines of the piece to be the most compelling.The point made here is the need to be flexible. And flexibility applies as much to one's thinking as to one's force structure. Until reform of the "personnel manglement" systems inculcates a selection bias towards flexibility and innovation as character traits, I suspect we will continue to see material solutions and organizational structures that are as agile as 200 car freight train negotiating the Tehachapi Loop.no matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to predict precisely the character of future conflict. The key is to come close enough to be able to adjust as new challenges to security emerge. (Mcmaster, H. R. (2008) 'On War: Lessons to be Learned', Survival, 50:1, 28)
I think the elephant in the room on this is the FCS system of systems. Every time you see the word transformation in this paper think "FCS."
Example is better than precept.
OK, BUT do you mean or elephant like capability? Do we want to maximise our elephants or merely replicate their effect, but using grey mice with big noses?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
No, I mean the FCS is based on a flawed premise. Not only that, it replicates nothing. It takes the Soldier out of the armored game and turns him into a technician. Hell, I can't even roll the damned vehicle with my head out of the hatch.OK, BUT do you mean or elephant like capability? Do we want to maximise our elephants or merely replicate their effect, but using grey mice with big noses?
In short, it's a piece of sh!t.
Example is better than precept.
Joe will figure out how to defeat that
in less than three days."Hell, I can't even roll the damned vehicle with my head out of the hatch."
Not to worry. The budget cuts will thankfully kill it and we can spin off the good stuff. Works for me.
Was thinking the same thing. But I think that ship has already sailed.
Interesting discussion...but...
can we at least get his name right? It's McMaster, not McMasters. That last 's' doesn't belong.
Pet peeve of mine.
As for Anaconda...there was certainly enough blame/confusion/whatever to go around, but it also played into what the AF does not really want to do: CAS. They don't like it. Never have, no matter how much lip service it gets. We've had instructors here dismiss it as a waste of assets (and yes...I'm serious. And we're talking about O-5s instructing future AF officers). The Army messed up to be sure in a number of areas (some of which can be traced back to Franks, who is not high on my favorite 'leader' list), as Ken points out.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Apples and Oranges?
It seems to me that this is comparing apples and oranges. I think somewhere between McMasters and Dunlap is the right place...
You need to have a spectrum of capabilities. The effects or capabilities based doctrine is supposed to mean that you don't use a jackhammer when a chisel is required or vice-versa - IE, you look at the strategic objectives (ends), determine the effects required to achieve them (ways), then determine what forces can best achieve those effects (means). I am sure most people here agree with that. You can't predict what future war will be like, so you must organize/train/equip a spectrum of capabilities as a hedge against your vision of future war being wrong.
I don't see OIF as a renunciation of the effects based doctrine. I see it as an example of the wrong effects being used... due to not understanding the actual effects required to achieve our objectives. As far as defeating Saddam's fielded forces and removing him from power, we did pretty well... quick victory and fairly low casualties - hardly a failure. The following ops were just the opposite - we didn't understand the effects required.
It should not be a zero sum game... IE, having the ability to dominate at the high end with "transformational forces" should not exclude having the capability to do a manpower-intensive lower end COIN war... we need to maintain a spectrum of capabilities. If the nation can't afford both, then maybe we should avoid COIN ops/nation building-if you're not willing to do it right/spend the money to do it right, then you shouldn't do it at all. Clearly we must be able to protect our survival and vital interests, which typically won't involve COIN but more high intensity conflict. So if we are funds limited, you have to make choices, and maybe the low end, nice to have capabilities fall out. I personally think that we can afford to maintain a reasonable high end force (380 F-22s, new bombers, B-2 replacement for the AF, 300 ships for the Navy, FCS for Army) and still afford the low end (COIN aircraft, increase size of SOF forces, maintain robust light infantry forces). It seems that rejecting the RMA is just as invalid as thinking that the RMA's transformational charachteristics will apply to all wars. If we failed in Iraq by thinking that it would follow the OEF model, won't we potentially fail in the next war by thinking that it will follow the 2005-2008 OIF model?
I agree wholeheartedly for the need to reform the interagency process. I'll be very curious to see if the next president does this... a new Goldwater Nichols for the interagency?
Not having been there I can't be certain, but folks who were involved in Anaconda at both the strategic/operational level (in the CAOC) as well as the tactical level (some of the first A-10s on scene) all have said that the Army and AF were NOT well coordinated prior to Anaconda. While Col McMasters' statements about UAV surveillance may be true, I don't think the AF was ready at all for Anaconda. It seems that both services are at fault- the Army for not making sure the AF was ready to support/wanting the support, and the AF for not making sure they knew what the Army had planned and lining up the proper support. Not our joint forces finest hour...
Anyway definitely a well thought article!
V/R,
Cliff
Perhaps
though McMaster,an Army guy, is,as RTK says, inveighing against the purchase of the FCS while Dunlap is fighting for more birds...Of course you do.You need to have a spectrum of capabilities...I suspect you're correct, most not only agree with it but they know it. However, That's not the issue McMaster is surfacing....The effects or capabilities based doctrine is supposed to mean that you don't use a jackhammer when a chisel is required or vice-versa - IE, you look at the strategic objectives (ends), determine the effects required to achieve them (ways), then determine what forces can best achieve those effects (means). I am sure most people here agree with that...That's in essence what McMaster is saying, he's just pointing out two big truths; first, he said:...You can't predict what future war will be like, so you must organize/train/equip a spectrum of capabilities as a hedge against your vision of future war being wrong.
He's merely stating the obvious but he's correct in saying we were planning for the war we wanted to fight -- not those we might have to. I suggest Dunlap is still in that mode, looking for the war he wants to fight. He's a smart guy, probably a good lawyer. He ought to stick to that...."Proponents of what became known as military transformation
argued for a ‘capabilities based’ method of thinking about future war. In
practice, however, capabilities-based analysis focused narrowly on how the
United States would like to fight and then assumed that the preference was relevant...(emphasis in original / kw)
Self-delusion about the character of future conflict weakened US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as war plans and decisions based on flawed visions of war confronted reality. This self-delusion has not been limited to the United States..."(emphasis added / kw)
Secondly he makes the same point you make here:Precisely and that was due to two factors; poor national level intel but, even more so, trying to fight the war we wanted to instead of the war we went to. None of the services were ready to do that because all had concentrated for almost 30 years on fighting the "big war." Even after Viet Nam when it was quite obvious that such smaller wars would be foisted upon us in the future. In 1986, the Army acknowledged that fact -- but still kept its head in the sand and prepared to fight across the north German plain; the Navy insisted it was 'blue water' and the USAF was prepared to take on Migs once again....I don't see OIF as a renunciation of the effects based doctrine. I see it as an example of the wrong effects being used due to not understanding the actual effects required to achieve our objectives...
By 1990 it was glaringly obvious that the USSR was not going to be threat for a long time if ever again -- and all the Services did nothing to adapt (or, very little to do so...). Preparations to fight the most likely kinds of war were ignored pretty much by all the services.
We got caught up short and had better admit that -- or we're likely to repeat the failure to adapt.Worse than that -- we didn't know how to apply the effect once we figured out we'd been suckered by Saddam....The following ops were just the opposite - we didn't understand the effects required.We can agree on that, we need a full spectrum capbility in all services -- which means the USAF needs to boost up AFSOC.It should not be a zero sum game... IE, having the ability to dominate at the high end with "transformational forces" should not exclude having the capability to do a manpower-intensive lower end COIN war... we need to maintain a spectrum of capabilities.
I think we can afford it but Congress does like the big ticket items; jobs for the boys in multiple districts (also a part of the pre 9/22 stupidity and still a problem). The real question is will the voters put up with the sustained effort required for COIN efforts -- because they're long dirty slogs and that isn't going to change....If the nation can't afford both, then maybe we should avoid COIN ops/nation building-if you're not willing to do it right/spend the money to do it right, then you shouldn't do it at all...As has been said here by many and often; we can afford to lose a COIN effort, we cannot afford to lose a major war. No question about that in my mind. The question that needs to be asked though is how many COIN efforts can we afford to lose?...Clearly we must be able to protect our survival and vital interests, which typically won't involve COIN but more high intensity conflict.That low end isn't nice to have it's a part of being full spectrum -- and that "nice to have" is repeating the same flawed logic that got us stuck in Iraq....So if we are funds limited, you have to make choices, and maybe the low end, nice to have capabilities fall out.So do I but I'm not voting for a whole lot of money for the FCS -- and you left out the F35 which I think is every bit as valuable as the F22. Not to mention that we have half dozen International Agreements about the little bird.I personally think that we can afford to maintain a reasonable high end force (380 F-22s, new bombers, B-2 replacement for the AF, 300 ships for the Navy, FCS for Army) and still afford the low end (COIN aircraft, increase size of SOF forces, maintain robust light infantry forces).I don't know anyone who's rejecting it. I do know a lot of us with scars are skeptical that anyone has all the answers......It seems that rejecting the RMA is just as invalid as thinking that the RMA's transformational charachteristics will apply to all wars.Nor is anyone suggesting that -- full spectrum; that's what you said and with that, most agree. Full spectrum means that if you hit an OIF like situation you at least know what to do -- ALL the Armed forces of the United States hit OIF and took 18 months to figure out what to do and another 18 months to turn the massive bureaucracy around and start doing things right -- we may not have that that luxury next time.If we failed in Iraq by thinking that it would follow the OEF model, won't we potentially fail in the next war by thinking that it will follow the 2005-2008 OIF model?I hope not; G-N needs to die IMO. Nor will it be totally up to the Prez; Congress, the senior civilians and the AFGE will have a big say in that Interagency bit.I agree wholeheartedly for the need to reform the interagency process. I'll be very curious to see if the next president does this... a new Goldwater Nichols for the interagency?Anaconda was an equal opportunity screwup; most everyone participating in that fiasco erred. In fairness to all of them, almost everybody was doing stuff they'd never done for real before.Not having been there I can't be certain, but folks who were involved in Anaconda at both the strategic/operational level (in the CAOC) as well as the tactical level (some of the first A-10s on scene) all have said that the Army and AF were NOT well coordinated prior to Anaconda. While Col McMasters' statements about UAV surveillance may be true, I don't think the AF was ready at all for Anaconda. It seems that both services are at fault- the Army for not making sure the AF was ready to support/wanting the support, and the AF for not making sure they knew what the Army had planned and lining up the proper support. Not our joint forces finest hour...
More importantly, they were doing stuff they hadn't even trained for -- or thought about. A repetition of that is what McMaster is trying to preclude.
I do not think you need a spectrum of capabilities. A defined capability provides the spectrum. An M1A2 is a discrete and definable capability. It can operate across a spectrum. FCS seeks to undermine that logic, with creating "M1A2" effects or capabilities from something that is not an M1A2. Suppose it might be Stryker MGS (i know it is not) - and that is very limited and cannot operate across the spectrum M1A2 can.
Military power is military power. If you have it, you have it. It's simple coherent and logical.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I agree
..you do have to procure discrete capablities...
I agree with you when you say a system can have a range of effects.
I think that you do need to procure a range of capabilities to cover the range of potential conflicts/threats you might face. The FCS can have some of the M1's effects vs. armored forces... but you have to consider the M1's psychological effect in other situations...
I think the execution phase is when effects based thinking is most appropriate... you can then consider the desired outcome, what effects will achieve this, and then pick the systems that generate the desired effects instead of having a system and then trying to tailor its effects to the desired level. Of course this assumes you have multiple systems to choose from (Heavy forces, Stryker, Light inf, SOF....) etc...
V/R,
Cliff
Cliff,It should not be a zero sum game... IE, having the ability to dominate at the high end with "transformational forces" should not exclude having the capability to do a manpower-intensive lower end COIN war... we need to maintain a spectrum of capabilities. If the nation can't afford both, then maybe we should avoid COIN ops/nation building-if you're not willing to do it right/spend the money to do it right, then you shouldn't do it at all. Clearly we must be able to protect our survival and vital interests, which typically won't involve COIN but more high intensity conflict.
I thought your post was good and thought provoking. But, I take issue with the elimination of COIN and thinking our vital interests won't necessarily involve COIN. Most did not think Iraq would see an insurgency...often times we may go somewhere and find ourselves in a COIN role. Eliminating training for that or ignoring it will see us in our current situation (or 2004 in Iraq) or leaving because we don't want to do it. You have to have both...how expensive is COIN? I'm willing to bet a lot cheaper to train than to buy a lot of the weapons we currently have and probably don't need.
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