In regards the conversation as a whole
I think Mr Collins had it right back in 85, As you get better in one type of fight the threshold for a different type of fight is lowered. Would seem to reason as wel for HIC/LIC, CONV/COIN, whatever as it did for Conv/Nuclear
In that that doesn't mean either type won't happen just seems that it's all the more important to figure out just what "Balanced" looks like and get to working on it.
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
Was doing a bit of reading over at DID where they linked McMaster's article along with this one from 2006 that I hadn't read before and found quite interesting. It examines RMA and "transformation" developments during the inter-war years in Germany and France which I think are important to consider today. Some excerpts:
With the benefit of hindsight, France's preparations for war with Germany are an easy target of critique. It is another matter, however, to derive guidelines that might reliably help us avoid errors in our present efforts to envision future war and prepare for it. In fact, French planners conformed in a general way to dictums that are today supposed to help planners avoid obvious mistakes. They sought to "learn the lessons of the last war" and not prepare to re-fight it. But for the dominant clique in French leadership this meant resisting the "cult of the offensive" that had sent millions to their deaths against barbed wire and artillery during the Great War.
This disposition did not imply the abandonment of offensive capabilities and operations altogether. But it did place emphasis on defensive preparations and defensive operations in the opening stages of war as a way of buying time and setting the stage for a subsequent counter-offensive. This approach also accorded with the French leadership's assessment of what types of support it might expect from its allies, how much, when, and under what circumstances. In other words, France's strategic disposition reflected its view of its strategic circumstances.The entire thing is well worth a read.Drawing useful lessons from the experience of interwar force developments and their subsequent application requires that we relinquish the privilege of hindsight. The question is: What might the historic players have done differently given what they knew at the time? And, moreover: Can their mistaken choices be structurally associated with predispositions that others might avoid? In other words, can we identify a "character flaw" in their planning or execution?
As noted above, the case of the French air force warns against the politicalization of RMA efforts, while also suggesting that service interests can distort RMA development. The troubled experience of French ground force development illustrates how tying an RMA vision closely to a particular strategic disposition (as though one entails the other), can cloud the appreciation of operational opportunities.
The German case points to how a nation's strategic disposition can disable the perception of operational limits. The contours of the new synthesis in land warfare were not fully drawn until Kursk. Before this, what the Germans saw was how a particular instantiation of the new synthesis might resolve, at least temporarily, a particular operational impasse. What the Russians saw subsequently was how the synthesis might be applied to spoil the German solution. What the French saw was neither.
None of the provisos outlined above promise a way to reliably surmount the problem of RMA uncertainty, of course. At best, they flag some predispositions that can distort the development and application of new capabilities. As always, the real challenge is applying the precepts to entirely novel circumstances.
It is indeed well worth a read.
This, in particular is worthy of being burned in the memories of many people:All simple basic common sense -- and all far too often ignored totally due to egos and agendas.First, we can somewhat mitigate RMA uncertainty by means of extensive, independent, and competitive experimentation, field trials, and exercises - both single service and joint. We also can seek to sharpen the debate among competing RMA schools, service visions, and branch perspectives - while insulating these from partisan politics and commercial interests.
Second, despite our best efforts, a substantial degree of uncertainty will persist; the only decisive test of vision is war. This humbling fact argues for avoiding over-commitment during periods of great strategic uncertainty, retaining flexibility, and developing our facilities for rapid adaptation. Adaptation is best served by substantial equipment and unit prototyping, which would offer multiple potential paths of development. Also useful is modularization of capabilities, units, and training regimes - an approach that allows rapid change through "add-ons" and supplemental training. (emphasis added, both / kw)
Third, pervasive uncertainty tends to strengthen the position of the status quo, especially during periods of significant strategic change. For institutional reasons, the default position may be to extend the status quo into the future. However, this is not a neutral position. When the world is changing rapidly the preservation (or recapitalization) of the status quo involves a "future vision" as risky and open to question as any - if not more so.
Finally, "uncertainty" by itself does not constitute a strong rationale for either sitting still or moving decisively down a new path. It lends positive support only to efforts to reduce uncertainty or improve our capacity to react, recover, and respond to surprise (that is, to adapt).
That I underlined is harsh reality, that I placed in bold type is the only way to preclude not being prepared for that reality; one or the other will not work -- we have to be able to do either/or. Or even 'whatever'...
tactics are not strategy
I think this excerpt from BG McMaster's article captured the essence of the problem. This article combined with Robert Jone's article in SWJ, "Populace Centric Engagement" help paint a picture that points to one Sun Tzu's cautions, "tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.Policy and Strategy Must Determine Force Development
U.S. force development should be driven by how our forces might be employed to protect vital national interests. Prior to 9/11, “capabilities-based” defense analysis reinforced shallow thinking about war and disconnected war from policy and strategy. The belief that surveillance and information technology could lift the fog of war elevated a desired military capability to the level of strategy. After 9/11, military operations were not clearly subordinated to comprehensive plans that aimed to achieve policy goals and objectives.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008...engagement.php
We are not struggling in this conflict due to the technological gains resulting of RMA, but rather because we tended to perceive war in a new way, or more simply we tried to model conflict to fit our preconceived technological solutions to it. Quite simply we created a lie. The technological gains have allowed us to be wildly successful at the tactical level, but tactical successes do not always equate to strategic success. BG McMaster's assessment that the capabilities approach to RMA reinforced shallow thinking about war and disconnected it from policy is spot on. RMA methodology has reinforced myths about war, but the question remains is a capabilities approach the wrong approach to drive technological evolution of our military forces? I don't think we know what the future will look like, and developing capabilities to address a wide range of potential threats is prudent, but a capability is not a strategy, it is simply a tool in the tool box. Perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional develop curriculum?
I'd certainly endorse that...
Strongly endorse, in fact...Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Had to run
I wanted to read over my post before I hit submit, but house hold six gave me an order to get off the computer so we could make our appointment, what's a guy going to do?
Perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional develop curriculum? Anyway, what I meant to write was, "perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional development curriculum.
On further thought, that professional development revolution needs to be pushed throughout the Whole of Government WOG. Many folks agree that the current system is far from ideal, but they're content to wait for the bureaucracy to change, but based on my experience that is a receipe for the same ole crap. Dynamic leaders push out beyond the culturally defined rules/limitations, then let bureaucracy catch up with reality. The key is to success is to develop these leaders, and then reward them with the right incentives to stay in, not place them in a dead end job because they're making waves. When people see innovative behavior rewarded, we'll once again see our greatest resource (our people) raise to the occassion of today's and tomorrow's challenges.
I'm still agreeing with you
However, that is going to require Congress to change their ways to an extent and I'm not sure that can be done.
What the Army -- all of DoD -- can do is take your thought and apply it internally at all levels. I'd submit that in addition to a revolution in professional development, we need and can have a revolution in initial entry training, officer and enlisted.
We also need and can have a significant loosening of the systemically imposed stifling and initiative killing cultural norms to achieve real loosening of the de facto, over-cautious restraints on leaders so they not only permitted but actually encouraged to be dynamic leaders and push out beyond the culturally defined rules/limitations, and let the bureaucracy catch up with reality.
That is 'do-able,' Congress really can't stop it and those serving and most Americans will applaud it. Do wonders for the retention of Captains...
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