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  1. #1
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
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    Default McMaster on war (merged thread)

    Successful COIN in Tal Afar, Iraq - New Yorker Magazine narrated slideshow on 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the CO - COL H.R. McMaster. Also see this 16 February Washington Post article by Tom Ricks - The Lessons of Counterinsurgency and this PBS Frontline interview of COL McMaster.
    Last edited by SWJED; 04-09-2006 at 01:14 AM.

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Smile Iraqi Army in Fallujah

    In The Sunday Telegraph (London) today is a short article based on an interview of an Iraqi colonel in Fallujah. Nothing too startling, but interesting.

    The link is: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main...ixnewstop.html

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Disruptive thinker

    There are numerous hits on 'McMaster' and he appears to have four threads and they will be merged, with a new title.
    When the US army, at the request of Colonel H R McMaster, set up small military bases within the Iraqi town of Tal Afar during 2006, he pioneered a new strategy of bottom-up leadership. In his talk at TEDxWarwick 2011, Tim Harford, Economist and senior columnist for the Financial Times, suggests that the success that followed was not just due to the bottom-up approach, but was also based in Colonel McMaster's ability to recognise and react to local problems and challenges.
    Which ends with:
    Other businesses are also decentralising their management as they acquire new technology, with a realisation that there is no substitution for political knowledge of time and place. This, Harford states, is the management lesson of the war in Iraq and one that we all can learn from.
    Link:http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/knowledge/...04/timharford/
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 06-25-2012 at 09:23 AM.
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    Default Dereliction of Duty

    Just finished reading "Dereliction of Duty" by H.R. McMaster. Great analysis of the background to the American war in Vietnam. I guess history does repeat itself. Substitute Rumsfeld's name for McNamara and this book could have been pasted from today's Washington Post.

    Although it pains me to see the retired generals criticize a current SecDef, I'm glad someone is pointing out the obvious.

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    Default Dereliction of duty

    While it is a good book, it is wrong to compare the situation in the book to the situation with respect to Iraq. In Vietnam, specific troop request were denied or cut in half. In Iraq, no one in the chain of command ever had a troop request denied. Ever. While people can make legitimate arguments over Gen. Abizaid's "small foot print" strategy, it is his strategy and there is no evidence that it was forced on him. In fact there is considerable evidence to the contrary. Both the President and the Secretary of defense have indicated on numerous occassions that if the commanders in the field say they need more troops they will get them. When testifying before congress Gen. Abizaid and Gen Casey have also made it clear that they have made no request for additional troops.

    Let's have an honest debate over the small foot print strategy instead of trying to scape goat civilian leadership over a commanders strategy that some may disagree with. If you read Tommy Franks book American Soldier, it is clear that he and his component commanders got the troops they requested and that it was their plan that was approved for execution in Iraq. There is little doubt that through Phase III of the plan it was one of the most brilliant plans for combat operations ever. It is the Phase IV aspect of the plan that has come into question. The problem with most of the complaints about the Phase IV aspect of the plan is that the enemy was forced to change his plan and adapt to the reality of losing the war and come up with a new plan to continue fighting. He is continuing to adapt as we adapt to his plans.

    It is not only an unfair criticism of civilian leadership to blame them for not knowing plans that the enemy did not even have at the time, it is a disservice to the military commanders in the field who are dealing with an adapting enemy.

    One more point about McMaster should be made. His innovative plan for the liberation of Tal Afar is an example of our military adapting and dealing with the enemy in a very successful operation. There is no indication that civilian leadership inhibited his planning and execution of his assignment in Tal Afar, particularly the way civilian leadership did in operations in Vietnam. The Tal Afar operation is in many ways a vindication of Gen. Abizaid's small footprint strategy which includes reliance on Iraqi troops to get the force to space ratio needed to cutoff and kill the insurgency. The real problem with the strategy was its requiring US forces to buy the same real estate more than once during the period before there were sufficient Iraqi troops to hold territory taken from the enemy.
    Last edited by Merv Benson; 04-22-2006 at 03:22 PM.

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    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
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    Default 3rd ACR Loses Its Famous Chief

    29 June Colorado Springs Gazette - 3rd ACR Loses Its Famous Chief.

    3rd ACR Loses Its Famous Chief

    McMaster, who used cultural and war strategy in Iraq, heads to think tank

    By Tom Roeder, The Gazette

    The most famous commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment since World War II hero George S. Patton will hand over the reins of the unit in a ceremony today at Fort Carson.

    Col. H.R. McMaster, described in some circles as the Bush administration’s poster boy for the Iraq war, has led the regiment since 2004, earning presidential praise for tactics that drove insurgents from the city of Tal Afar.

    His troops first surrounded the city and then ordered a mass evacuation, assuming that only the enemy would defy the order. Then the troops launched a house-tohouse sweep to root out insurgents.

    The tactics in Tal Afar countered a problem that plagued American commanders in Iraq — insurgents who would evade capture by fleeing when the Army showed up. McMaster’s approach has been adopted by the Army and Marines in sectors of Baghdad and Ramadi.

    President Bush praised McMaster’s success in Tal Afar...

    McMaster’s next assignment is a think-tank job at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, where he’s charged with devising better tactics to battle terrorism...

    Many of the 5,200 soldiers who served under McMaster in the 3rd ACR worship him as a leader whose sheer intelligence saved lives in Iraq.

    Capt. Russ Nowels said McMaster was so well-studied in Arabic language, history and culture that he gained instant respect from the Iraqis he encountered...

    McMaster, a 1984 graduate of West Point who holds a doctorate in military history, ordered his officers to complete an extensive reading list on the Middle East before their Iraq deployment and emphasized cultural training for his troops.

    Nowels said the training ordered by McMaster better prepared soldiers for Iraq, where they are part-time warriors and part-time peacekeepers...

    Between the two Iraq wars, McMaster stayed in the spotlight as a critic of American leadership during the Vietnam War.

    His 1997 book, “Dereliction of Duty,” which outlined the failures of leadership that led to defeat in Vietnam, became a Pentagon must-read. Its criticism of military leaders who refused to speak out against disastrous policies set by the Johnson administration has emboldened military critics of the Iraq war, who have cited McMaster’s work as a reason generals should stand up to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

    McMaster has also penned scholarly papers on the military’s modernization plans. He has labeled as nonsensical the military’s assumption of the possibility of total knowledge on future battlefields through technology...

    McMaster is especially critical of the Air Force and its high-technology satellite and aircraft purchases.

    “The Air Force has become a force that is marketing flawed ideas that harm our defense,” he said.

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    Council Member jonSlack's Avatar
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    Default

    One day I was home watching a History Channel program on Desert Storm while I was eating lunch. There I saw a CPT McMaster interviewed because of his command of Eagle Troop/3rd ACR, which wiped out an entire Republican Guard BDE. I saw his name and thought "Gee, I wonder if he is still in the Army." I AKO White Paged him and was surprised that he was the current Regimental Commander of the ACR.

    Finding that was neat.

    Jon Slack

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    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Default On War: Lessons to be Learned by Colonel H.R. McMaster

    I brought this over from the Blog -

    On War: Lessons to be Learned by Colonel H.R. McMaster

    Money Quotes:

    "During the decade prior to the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, thinking about defence was driven by a fantastical theory about the character of future war rather than by clear visions of emerging threats to national security in the context of history and contemporary conflict. Proponents of what became known as military transformation argued for a ‘capabilities based’ method of thinking about future war. In practice, however, capabilities-based analysis focused narrowly on how the United States would like to fight and then assumed that the preference was relevant."
    And

    "So-called capabilities-based approaches to force development and constructive simulations that validate those approaches ought to be abandoned in favour of clear-headed thinking about contemporary and future conflict. Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon reveal the need for balanced joint capabilities and additional capacity in other agencies to assist in postconflict stability and counter-insurgency operations. At the operational level, forces must be capable of conducting counter-insurgency, stability or state-building operations. At the tactical level, forces must be able to fight under conditions of uncertainty and be employed in sufficient force and in the right combination to establish security and overwhelm the enemy in their area of operations."
    A stinging and on target commentary. Doubt it will help him on the third look to BG.
    Last edited by Cavguy; 02-15-2008 at 05:43 AM.
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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Yes, it is on target

    It should guarantee his pickup -- but you may be right. Unfortunately.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default

    "So-called capabilities-based approaches to force development and constructive simulations that validate those approaches ought to be abandoned in favour of clear-headed thinking about contemporary and future conflict. Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon reveal the need for balanced joint capabilities and additional capacity in other agencies to assist in postconflict stability and counter-insurgency operations. At the operational level, forces must be capable of conducting counter-insurgency, stability or state-building operations. At the tactical level, forces must be able to fight under conditions of uncertainty and be employed in sufficient force and in the right combination to establish security and overwhelm the enemy in their area of operations."
    While I agree on one level, I think McMasters might be looking down the wrong end of the telescope. If you continually ask the wrong question, at no time do you get the right answer.

    Forces should be capability based. What is always missing is a clear doctrinal understanding of why the capabilities should be limited. The US problem has always been to assume that military power comes from maximising capabilities. Obviously it does not! Sorry to state the obvious, but it needs to be stated.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  11. #11
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Partly agree. I think McMasters realizes

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    ...
    Forces should be capability based. What is always missing is a clear doctrinal understanding of why the capabilities should be limited. The US problem has always been to assume that military power comes from maximising capabilities. Obviously it does not! Sorry to state the obvious, but it needs to be stated.
    that military power does not come from maximizing capabilities. Seems to me he's saying that they should be doctrinally based on needed capabilities, not the same thing as our current technique, thus his use of the words "so-called."

    He's also aware of our (and most everyone's) problem of political dithering and meddling in the force design process.

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Default

    I find these concluding lines of the piece to be the most compelling.
    no matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to predict precisely the character of future conflict. The key is to come close enough to be able to adjust as new challenges to security emerge. (Mcmaster, H. R. (2008) 'On War: Lessons to be Learned', Survival, 50:1, 28)
    The point made here is the need to be flexible. And flexibility applies as much to one's thinking as to one's force structure. Until reform of the "personnel manglement" systems inculcates a selection bias towards flexibility and innovation as character traits, I suspect we will continue to see material solutions and organizational structures that are as agile as 200 car freight train negotiating the Tehachapi Loop.

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    Default Apples and Oranges?

    It seems to me that this is comparing apples and oranges. I think somewhere between McMasters and Dunlap is the right place...

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    that military power does not come from maximizing capabilities. Seems to me he's saying that they should be doctrinally based on needed capabilities, not the same thing as our current technique, thus his use of the words "so-called."

    He's also aware of our (and most everyone's) problem of political dithering and meddling in the force design process.
    You need to have a spectrum of capabilities. The effects or capabilities based doctrine is supposed to mean that you don't use a jackhammer when a chisel is required or vice-versa - IE, you look at the strategic objectives (ends), determine the effects required to achieve them (ways), then determine what forces can best achieve those effects (means). I am sure most people here agree with that. You can't predict what future war will be like, so you must organize/train/equip a spectrum of capabilities as a hedge against your vision of future war being wrong.

    I don't see OIF as a renunciation of the effects based doctrine. I see it as an example of the wrong effects being used... due to not understanding the actual effects required to achieve our objectives. As far as defeating Saddam's fielded forces and removing him from power, we did pretty well... quick victory and fairly low casualties - hardly a failure. The following ops were just the opposite - we didn't understand the effects required.

    It should not be a zero sum game... IE, having the ability to dominate at the high end with "transformational forces" should not exclude having the capability to do a manpower-intensive lower end COIN war... we need to maintain a spectrum of capabilities. If the nation can't afford both, then maybe we should avoid COIN ops/nation building-if you're not willing to do it right/spend the money to do it right, then you shouldn't do it at all. Clearly we must be able to protect our survival and vital interests, which typically won't involve COIN but more high intensity conflict. So if we are funds limited, you have to make choices, and maybe the low end, nice to have capabilities fall out. I personally think that we can afford to maintain a reasonable high end force (380 F-22s, new bombers, B-2 replacement for the AF, 300 ships for the Navy, FCS for Army) and still afford the low end (COIN aircraft, increase size of SOF forces, maintain robust light infantry forces). It seems that rejecting the RMA is just as invalid as thinking that the RMA's transformational charachteristics will apply to all wars. If we failed in Iraq by thinking that it would follow the OEF model, won't we potentially fail in the next war by thinking that it will follow the 2005-2008 OIF model?

    I agree wholeheartedly for the need to reform the interagency process. I'll be very curious to see if the next president does this... a new Goldwater Nichols for the interagency?

    Not having been there I can't be certain, but folks who were involved in Anaconda at both the strategic/operational level (in the CAOC) as well as the tactical level (some of the first A-10s on scene) all have said that the Army and AF were NOT well coordinated prior to Anaconda. While Col McMasters' statements about UAV surveillance may be true, I don't think the AF was ready at all for Anaconda. It seems that both services are at fault- the Army for not making sure the AF was ready to support/wanting the support, and the AF for not making sure they knew what the Army had planned and lining up the proper support. Not our joint forces finest hour...

    Anyway definitely a well thought article!

    V/R,

    Cliff

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    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Default Brigadier General Selections for 2008

    Most had heard before, but I got the official memo today. This is a publically available announcement.

    I know two of them personally - COL MacFarland and COL Shields. COL McMaster is also on the list.



    Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced that the President nominated the Army Competitive Category colonels listed below for promotion to the rank of brigadier general.

    Name (Branch)
    Current Assignment

    Colonel Heidi V. Brown (AD)
    Effects Coordinator
    I Corps and Fort Lewis
    Fort Lewis, Washington 98433

    Colonel John A. Davis (30)
    En route to: Deputy Commander
    Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations Defense Information Systems Agency

    Colonel Edward P. Donnelly, Jr. (50)
    Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Army United States Army

    Colonel Karen E. Dyson (FI)
    Deputy Director for Army Budget
    Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management &
    Comptroller)

    Colonel Robert S. Ferrell (SC)
    En route to: Director
    Future Combat System Strategic Communications Army Capabilities Integration Center-Forward

    Colonel Stephen G. Fogarty (MI)
    Director of Intelligence, J-2
    United States Central Command


    Colonel Michael X. Garrett (IN)
    Enroute to: Senior Military Fellow
    Center for a New American Security (CNAS)

    Colonel Thomas A. Harvey (TC)
    Assistant Chief of Staff, C-4/J-4
    United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/ United States Forces Korea/ Deputy Commander (Support), Eighth United States Army/ Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea (Advanced Element)

    Colonel Thomas A. Horlander (45)
    En route to: Director, Resource Management Installation Management Command


    Colonel Paul J. Lacamera (IN)
    United States Joint Special Operations Command Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

    Colonel Sean B. MacFarland (AR)
    Commander
    Joint Task Force North
    United States Northern Command


    Colonel Kevin W. Mangum (AV)
    Senior Commander, Fort Drum
    10th Mountain Division (Light) and Fort Drum

    Colonel Robert M. McCaleb (49)
    Deputy Director
    Program Analysis and Evaluation
    Officer of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8

    Colonel Colleen L. McGuire (MP)
    Director, Senior Leader Development
    Office of the Chief of Staff, Army


    Colonel Herbert R. McMaster, Jr. (AR)
    En route to: Director
    Concepts Development and Experimentation Army Capabilities Integration Center Unites States Army Training and Doctrine Command Fort Monroe, Virginia

    Colonel Austin S. Miller (IN)
    Deputy Director for Special Operations
    J-37, The Joint Staff


    Colonel John M. Murray (IN)
    Deputy Commander


    Colonel Richard P. Mustion (AG)
    Commander


    Colonel Camille M. Nichols (AC)
    Commander
    United States Army Expeditionary Contracting Command

    Colonel John R. O Connor (TC)
    Deputy Commander/Director of Operations Military Surface Deployment and Distribution

    Colonel Lawarren V. Patterson (SC)
    Chief
    Joint/Current Operations Division
    Office of the Army Chief Information Officer/G-6 Taylor Building

    Colonel Gustave F. Perna (OD)
    Commander
    Defense Supply Center Philadelphia

    Colonel Warren E. Phipps, Jr. (AV)
    Deputy Commander/Assistant Commandant
    United States Army Aviation Center

    Colonel Gregg C. Potter (MI)
    United States Army Intelligence and Security Command Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060

    Colonel Nancy L. Price (AC)
    Deputy Program Manager
    Future Combat System Brigade Combat Team Program Integration (Network/Complementary Programs) Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

    Colonel Edward M. Reeder, Jr. (SF)
    Executive Officer to the Commander
    United States Special Operations Command
    MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

    Colonel Ross E. Ridge (FA)
    Chief of Staff, Strategic Effects
    Multi-National Forces- Iraq
    OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq

    Colonel Jess A. Scarbrough (AC)
    Assistant Deputy for Acquistion and Systems Management Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)

    Colonel Michael H. Shields (IN)
    Assistant Deputy Director
    Politico-Military (Europe and Africa Affairs), J-5 The Joint Staff

    Colonel Jefforey A. Smith (IN)
    Assistant Division Commander (Support)
    10th Mountain Division (Light)/
    Multi-National Division - Center

    Colonel Leslie C. Smith (CM)
    Commandant
    United States Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear School/ Deputy Commander, Material and Technology United States Army Maneuver Support Center

    Colonel Jeffrey J. Snow (IN)
    Commander
    20th Support Command (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive)


    Colonel Kurt S. Story (40)
    Deputy Commander (Operations)
    United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command/ United States Army Forces Strategic Command

    Colonel Kenneth E. Tovo (SF)
    Deputy Commander
    Special Operations Command Europe
    United States European Command


    Colonel Stephen J. Townsend (IN)
    Executive Officer to the Commander
    United States Central Command


    Colonel John Uberti (FA)
    Commander
    Installation Management Command
    Korea Region


    Colonel Thomas S. Vandal (FA)
    Deputy Commander (Maneuver)
    3d Infantry Division (Mechanized)
    Fort Stewart, Georgia

    Colonel Bryan G. Watson (EN)
    Chief of Staff
    1st Armored Division

    Colonel John F. Wharton (QM)
    Deputy Commander
    United States Army Field Support Command with duty as Commander, Army Materiel Command Forward-Southwest Asia/G-4, United States Army Central

    Colonel Mark W. Yenter (EN)
    Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 United States Army

    *********************************************

    Last edited by Cavguy; 07-15-2008 at 06:54 PM.
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    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Default Part 2

    The board composition and stats:

    The Selection Board consisted of the following general officers (all grades and assignments shown are as of the convening date of the board):


    General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq

    General Charles C. Campbell, Commanding General, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia

    Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC

    Lieutenant General Ann E. Dunwoody, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, United States Army, Washington, DC

    Lieutenant General Benjamin C. Freakley, Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command/Deputy Commanding General for Initial Military Training United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia

    Lieutenant General John F. Kimmons, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army, Washington, DC

    Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander, Joint Special Operations Command/ Commander, Joint Special Operations Command Forward, United States Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

    Lieutenant General Stephen M. Speakes, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army, Washington, DC

    Lieutenant General David P. Valcourt, Commanding General, Eighth United States Army/Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea

    Lieutenant General Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr., Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, DC

    Major General Sean J. Byrne, Commanding General, United States Army Human Resources Command, Alexandria, Virginia

    Major General Randal R. Castro, Deputy Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

    Major General Bernard S. Champoux, Deputy Commander, Security International Security Assistance Force, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan

    Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III, Chief of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington, DC

    Major General Robert P. Lennox, Commanding General, United States Army Air Defense Artillery Center and Fort Bliss, Fort Bliss, Texas

    Major General John F. Mulholland, Jr., Commander, Special Operations Command Central, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

    Major General Roger A. Nadeau, Commanding General, United States Army Test and Evaluation Command, Alexandria, Virginia

    Major General Virgil L. Packett II, Commanding General, United States Army Aviation Warfighting Center and Fort Rucker, Fort Rucker, Alabama

    Major General Edgar E. Stanton III, Director for Army Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management & Comptroller), Washington, DC

    Major General Peter M. Vangjel, Commanding General ,United States Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

    Major General Dennis L. Via, Commanding General, United States Army Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command and Fort Monmouth, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey

    The following statistical data applies to the nominees as of the day of
    selection:

    AGE AT SELECTION
    YOUNGEST: 44 YEARS, 2 MONTHS
    AVERAGE: 48 YEARS, 1 MONTH
    OLDEST: 54 YEARS, 3 MONTHS

    TIME IN GRADE
    LEAST: 1 YEAR, 11 MONTHS
    AVERAGE: 4 YEARS, 0 MONTHS
    MOST: 6 YEARS, 2 MONTHS

    YEARS OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE
    LEAST: 21 YEARS, 9 MONTHS
    AVERAGE: 25 YEARS, 5 MONTHS
    MOST: 29 YEARS, 4 MONTH

    YEAR GROUP
    MOST RECENT: 1986
    PREDOMINANT: 1982
    EARLIEST: 1978
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  16. #16
    Council Member jkm_101_fso's Avatar
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    Default Who made BG after 21 years?

    Glad to see COLs McMaster and McFarland on the list; certainly well deserved.

    Does anyone know the answer to my title question?
    Sir, what the hell are we doing?

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    Council Member Team Infidel's Avatar
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    Default

    Great to see COL (P) Davis on there. IO Warrior..

  18. #18
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
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    Default MacFarland and McMaster to Get First Star

    Heroes of Ramadi, Tal Afar to Get First Star by Jeff Schogol, Stars and Stripes.

    Army Cols. Sean B. MacFarland and H.R. McMaster Jr. have been selected for brigadier general pending Senate confirmation, officials said.

    MacFarland was commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division in May 2006 when the unit was sent to Ramadi, then one of the worst places in Iraq for US troops.

    During his tenure in Ramadi, MacFarland’s troops worked with local tribes and established combat outposts to take the initiative away from the insurgents...

    McMaster, then commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, ordered his troops to treat detainees humanely, reached out to local Sunni Arabs to separate them from the insurgents, and he established patrol bases throughout the city, The Washington Post reported in 2006.

    In late 2005, he launched Operation Restore Rights to take back the city from insurgents.

    By the time the unit left in early 2006, the mayor of Tal Afar wrote a letter to the commander of US troops in Iraq praising the regiment...
    Last edited by SWJED; 07-15-2008 at 10:14 PM.

  19. #19
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Thumbs up Very glad to hear it

    Quote Originally Posted by SWJED View Post
    It would seem they deserve it
    Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours

    Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur

  20. #20
    Council Member Wildcat's Avatar
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    Thumbs up

    Sweet. I remember first reading about McMaster in Tom Clancy's account of the Battle of 73 Easting, when he was a troop commander. Fast forward several years later when I'm reading George Packer's "The Lesson of Tal Afar" during my COIN research, and I see the same name pop up along with nothing but accolades for his leadership and initiative. I can't say I've read "Dereliction of Duty" yet, though. Still, it's encouraging to see officers of his calibre staying in the Army for the long haul.

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