McMaster on war (merged thread)

[Bill Moore]

Policy and Strategy Must Determine Force Development
U.S. force development should be driven by how our forces might be employed to protect vital national interests. Prior to 9/11, “capabilities-based” defense analysis reinforced shallow thinking about war and disconnected war from policy and strategy. The belief that surveillance and information technology could lift the fog of war elevated a desired military capability to the level of strategy. After 9/11, military operations were not clearly subordinated to comprehensive plans that aimed to achieve policy goals and objectives.

I think this excerpt from BG McMaster's article captured the essence of the problem. This article combined with Robert Jone's article in SWJ, "Populace Centric Engagement" help paint a picture that points to one Sun Tzu's cautions, "tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008...engagement.php

We are not struggling in this conflict due to the technological gains resulting of RMA, but rather because we tended to perceive war in a new way, or more simply we tried to model conflict to fit our preconceived technological solutions to it. Quite simply we created a lie. The technological gains have allowed us to be wildly successful at the tactical level, but tactical successes do not always equate to strategic success. BG McMaster's assessment that the capabilities approach to RMA reinforced shallow thinking about war and disconnected it from policy is spot on. RMA methodology has reinforced myths about war, but the question remains is a capabilities approach the wrong approach to drive technological evolution of our military forces? I don't think we know what the future will look like, and developing capabilities to address a wide range of potential threats is prudent, but a capability is not a strategy, it is simply a tool in the tool box. Perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional develop curriculum?

[Ken White]

... I don't think we know what the future will look like, and developing capabilities to address a wide range of potential threats is prudent, but a capability is not a strategy, it is simply a tool in the tool box. Perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional develop curriculum?

Strongly endorse, in fact...

[Bill Moore]

I wanted to read over my post before I hit submit, but house hold six gave me an order to get off the computer so we could make our appointment, what's a guy going to do?

Perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional develop curriculum? Anyway, what I meant to write was, "perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional development curriculum.

On further thought, that professional development revolution needs to be pushed throughout the Whole of Government WOG. Many folks agree that the current system is far from ideal, but they're content to wait for the bureaucracy to change, but based on my experience that is a receipe for the same ole crap. Dynamic leaders push out beyond the culturally defined rules/limitations, then let bureaucracy catch up with reality. The key is to success is to develop these leaders, and then reward them with the right incentives to stay in, not place them in a dead end job because they're making waves. When people see innovative behavior rewarded, we'll once again see our greatest resource (our people) raise to the occassion of today's and tomorrow's challenges.

[Ken White]

...On further thought, that professional development revolution needs to be pushed throughout the Whole of Government WOG...Dynamic leaders push out beyond the culturally defined rules/limitations, then let bureaucracy catch up with reality. The key is to success is to develop these leaders, and then reward them with the right incentives to stay in, not place them in a dead end job because they're making waves. When people see innovative behavior rewarded, we'll once again see our greatest resource (our people) raise to the occassion of today's and tomorrow's challenges.

However, that is going to require Congress to change their ways to an extent and I'm not sure that can be done.

What the Army -- all of DoD -- can do is take your thought and apply it internally at all levels. I'd submit that in addition to a revolution in professional development, we need and can have a revolution in initial entry training, officer and enlisted.

We also need and can have a significant loosening of the systemically imposed stifling and initiative killing cultural norms to achieve real loosening of the de facto, over-cautious restraints on leaders so they not only permitted but actually encouraged to be dynamic leaders and push out beyond the culturally defined rules/limitations, and let the bureaucracy catch up with reality.

That is 'do-able,' Congress really can't stop it and those serving and most Americans will applaud it. Do wonders for the retention of Captains...

[reed11b]

However, that is going to require Congress to change their ways to an extent and I'm not sure that can be done.

What the Army -- all of DoD -- can do is take your thought and apply it internally at all levels. I'd submit that in addition to a revolution in professional development, we need and can have a revolution in initial entry training, officer and enlisted.

We also need and can have a significant loosening of the systemically imposed stifling and initiative killing cultural norms to achieve real loosening of the de facto, over-cautious restraints on leaders so they not only permitted but actually encouraged to be dynamic leaders and push out beyond the culturally defined rules/limitations, and let the bureaucracy catch up with reality.

That is 'do-able,' Congress really can't stop it and those serving and most Americans will applaud it. Do wonders for the retention of Captains...

I would second that having "unit" personel policies, instead of individual ones, would also be extremly important for any signifigant change in the DOD.

[Sabre]

"Conventional "legacy" Army organizations, designed to fight
under uncertain conditions, proved critical in Operation
Anaconda in Afghanistan in March 2002 and in the attack into
Baghdad a year later. But some of those organizations have
since been eliminated or redesigned, based in part on the
assumption that future tactical and operational environments
would be marked by a high degree of certainty. Although the
divisional cavalry squadron of the Third Infantry Division,
a unit designed to fight for information, protect against
surprise, and ease the forward movement of follow-on forces,
was invaluable during the attack toward Baghdad, that
formation and all others like it have since been eliminated
in favor of small, lightly armed reconnaissance squadrons
designed to use mainly aerial and ground sensors to develop
situational awareness out of contact."

It was with sadness that I read the whole article, since I happen to agree with it, and I don't see it, or anything else, changing the mindset of those in position to effect change - they will instead continue to happily eat PowerPoint slide decks. But as in the above quote from McMaster's paper the DivCav squadrons could serve as the "poster child" example of how the latest grand reorganization went wrong (amoung some things that it admittedly got right), and more generally, how any belief in the chimera of RMA has led to some very bad conclusions...

Whatever war is or becomes, it will always end up as a gun fight, and you'd better'd make sure units have enough weapons in the hands of people who realize that it is their job to employ them and know how to do so.
Throwing more personnel and money into, say, military intelligence, certainly doesn't guarantee better intelligence (far from it, from what I have seen). But a grunt, scout, or a sapper with a rifle? I can think of all sorts of things that he can usefully do, even if I end up in a situation totally different from the original mission.

(Heh, and "Deployablity", how far down THAT road have we gone, for no return on investment?)

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Very enlightening post from one of our most treasured General Officers.

True that the RMA mentality repesents a deficit in critical thinking coupled with myopic obsession on a style of warfighting that is the exception not the norm, even if we attept to normalise it.