McMaster on war (merged thread)

[Tom Odom]

McMaster in Tom Clancy's account of the Battle of 73 Easting,

See also Certain Victory

By late afternoon on February 26, Captain H. R. McMaster had been at war for 72 hours. His tank, Eagle 66, led a nine-tank formation as it moved across the featureless Iraqi plain like a squadron of miniature warships gliding through a glass-calm sea. Inside the steel body of Eagle 66, three other soldiers peered intently into a swirling sandstorm searching for the lead tanks of the Iraqi Tawakalna Division.

Isolated in the driver's compartment in front, Specialist Christopher "Skog" Hedenskog lay supine on his "lazy boy" couch. Skog's greatest fear was that his tank, the one that carried the troop commander, might stumble over a mine and miss the war. As he peered intently ahead, he nudged his T-bar left and right to steer smoothly around every piece of suspicious metal or slight imperfection in the ground ahead.

Staff Sergeant Craig Koch, the gunner, sat in the right of the turret, wedged between the gently moving gyro-stabilized gun and a densely packed jumble of white boxes and black telescopes illuminated periodically by blinking red, white, yellow, and green computer lights. The sandstorm, which limited visibility to 900 meters, made Koch very tense. He knew that in a tank battle, victory goes to the gunner who sees the other guy first.

Koch pressed his head tightly against the vinyl rest of his thermal-imaging sight, his right hand gently turning the " Cadillac" handgrips left and right to maintain a constant, rhythmic slewing motion of the turret. His left hand nervously flipped the toggle that changed his sight picture from 3 to 10 power and back and forth between a "black hot" and "white hot" thermal image. He strained to discern from the desert horizon any telltale point of light that would be his first indication of Iraqi armor.

...The shooting war began for Eagle 66 at 1618 hours and lasted exactly seven seconds. As he crested a slight rise, Koch spotted not one, but eight thermal hot spots. He could only make out a series of thin lines through his sight because an earthen berm masked the image of each Iraqi tank. Eagle 66 was loaded with a high-explosive antitank round, or HEAT, not the optimum choice for taking on the Soviet-made T-72 tanks. Should Koch's first shot hit the berm, the HEAT round would explode harmlessly. Koch screamed, "Tanks, direct front." McMaster spotted the tanks. "Fire, fire sabot," he yelled as he kicked up the metal seat and dropped inside to look through his own thermal imager. McMaster's clipped command was a code that automatically launched his three crew mates into a well-rehearsed sequence of individual actions. To Jeff Taylor,"Fire, fire sabot" meant that once the loaded HEAT round was gone, he must reload sabot, known to tankers in the desert as the "silver bullet."

[Kreker]

Still, it's encouraging to see officers of his calibre staying in the Army for the long haul.

...as he is enroute to be the Director, Concept Development & Experimentation, ARCIC, and his perchant for 'net-centric warfare'.

See his CSL paper:
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/...ons/S03-03.pdf

Kreker

[h2harris]

LEARNING FROM CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS

TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE WAR

by H. R. McMaster

War is the final auditor of military institutions.
Contemporary conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq
create an urgent need for feedback based on actual
experience. Analysis of the present combined with an
understanding of history should help us improve dramatically
the quality of our thinking about war. Understanding the
continuities as well as changes in the character of armed
conflict will help us make wise decisions about force
structure, develop relevant joint force capabilities, and
refine officer education and the organization, training, and
the equipping of our forces.

Rest of the essay - http://www.west-point.org/publicatio...rFutureWar.txt

[Rob Thornton]

Some of the ideas (among quite a few) worth bringing out to the SWC and discussing are:

In Dunlap's construct, war could once again be made simple, fast, inexpensive, and efficient by divorcing military operations from policy or limiting the application of military force to targets capable of "projecting power."

Divorced from its political context, the problem of future war could be solved by America's "asymmetric advantages."[2] The argument has appeal, in part, because it defines war as we might prefer it to be.

Promising simplicity overtly, or tacitly by omission in order to serve parochial interests castrates the Civ/Mil discussion when it matters most - that is when the object of policy seems most irresistible and the uniformed leaders must articulate risk in the face of appetite. If there is the false promise of simplicity and efficiency and low risk, then there is little good argument as to why the use of military force to achieve the objective might produce undesirable or unintended risk and consequence.

As such, those who might try and argue caution or upset the status quo for more resources, or a change in approach will have a hard time communicating their reason. Basically the discussion was shaped by our actions and promises, and any voice in the institution which challenges those assumptions by laying out unattractive options (scope of commitment) will have an uphill battle if the institution has compromised its integrity at the expense of its responsibilities. To paint a picture of the nature of war as other then it is may be the worst of betrayals.

Moreover, efficiency in war means barely winning, and in war, barely winning is an ugly proposition.

The complexity and uncertainty of war require decentralization and a certain degree of redundancy, concepts that cut against business's emphasis on control and efficiency.

Forces ought to be designed explicitly to fight under conditions of uncertainty and to achieve effectiveness rather than efficiency. This will entail tolerating a higher degree of redundancy.

Kind of brings out the iron calculus doesn't it? Means + Will = Resistance. There was also a point made that where possible resources should not drive strategy, but the reverse. I think there are at least three sides to this observation - first, do you have the resources available (or can they be made available) to make your preferred strategy feasible; second is the policy of such import that rather then piecemeal resources, you make them available up front thereby making your strategy both more effective, and creating the conditions to where the objective is realized sooner, and as such becomes more efficient in the long run; third - have you created an intellectual and political climate where the the first two points can be brought to light -i.e. if you create and breed a climate of apathy, that is likely what you will get.

Best, Rob

[Entropy]

Interesting read and I agree with a lot, but I also have a few problems:

First, "balanced joint forces" used three times in the piece:

Post-9/11 experience highlights the enduring uncertainty of combat and the need for balanced air, ground, and maritime forces that can both project power from a distance and conduct operations on the ground to defeat the enemy and
secure critical terrain.

and

In doing this, we must avoid viewing force design as a zero-sum game among the services. Precision strike, information, and surveillance technologies cannot substitute for balanced
joint forces, but they are nonetheless vitally important.

and

The above factors militate for the development of balanced joint forces capable of operating against determined enemies that will attempt to evade and attack our technological advantages.

What does "balanced" mean in real terms? He doesn't really explain. And similarly, in his conclusion:

Forces ought to be designed explicitly to fight under conditions of uncertainty and to achieve effectiveness rather than efficiency.

Fighting under conditions of uncertainty seems more like a mindset problem than a force structure problem to me, provided one has a full-spectrum force. His comments on uncertainty seems to argue for a full-spectrum force (something I support) - is that what he's calling for? I couldn't really tell.

I also think his comments on RMA and transformation are a bit too critical and it seems he might want to throw the baby out with the bathwater in that regard:

Our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the 2006 Lebanon war, provide strong warnings that we should abandon the orthodoxy
of defense transformation and make appropriate adjustments to force structure and development.

Although I agree the concepts of RMA and transformation were oversold as a grand-unified-theory of warfare, they should not be simply abandoned because they still have utility in certain kinds of conflict. RMA and transformation concepts should be kept in those areas where they work and discarded in those areas where they don't.

That is why the U.S. Joint
Force must expand its ability to deter, coerce, or defeat nations that either threaten U.S. vital interests or attack those vital interests through proxies.

Personally, I see this more as a political problem than a force structure problem. Differences in force structure are not going to matter much in terms of deterring or coercing states that utilize proxies - it's ultimately political will to hold a state accountable for what proxies do that matters. History seems to show that such political will rarely exists which is why proxies are so effective.

However, recent conventional combat experience also suggests that we should reject the notion that lightness, ease of deployment, and reduced logistical infrastructure are virtues in and of themselves. What a force is expected to achieve once it is deployed is far more important than how quickly it can be moved and how easily it can be sustained. As we endeavor to improve ground force capability, we must
therefore increase airlift and sealift capabilities.

I do think rapid deployability is a virtue which is why I agree with his call for more airlift and sealift capabilities. Regarding the second sentence, if a force can't be moved quickly enough to intervene in a timely manner then it won't be able to achieve anything at all - nor will it be able to achieve much without sustainment. And this contradicts what was earlier said regarding Tora Bora:

At Tora Bora, for example, surveillance of the difficult terrain could not compensate for a lack of ground forces to cover exfiltration routes.

He's right about surveillance, but the reason there was a lack of ground forces was the inability to rapidly deploy and sustain a more adequate force quickly. These limitations were what drove planners toward using locals as a proxy ground force. The recent combat experience of Afghanistan would therefore seem to argue for the opposite of what he suggests. Additionally, logistics continues to be a limiting factor for Afghan operations, so ISTM forces with reduced logistical infrastructure requirements are a virtue in that theater.

Finally, I strongly agree with Ron's comments regarding the relationship between strategy and resources.

[Ken White]

...Fighting under conditions of uncertainty seems more like a mindset problem than a force structure problem to me, provided one has a full-spectrum force. His comments on uncertainty seems to argue for a full-spectrum force (something I support) - is that what he's calling for? I couldn't really tell.

Can't answer for him but that's the way I took it.

I also think his comments on RMA and transformation are a bit too critical and it seems he might want to throw the baby out with the bathwater in that regard...

Although I agree the concepts of RMA and transformation were oversold as a grand-unified-theory of warfare, they should not be simply abandoned because they still have utility in certain kinds of conflict. RMA and transformation concepts should be kept in those areas where they work and discarded in those areas where they don't.

I'm inclined to throw out the whole caboodle. I'm also curious. Where do you think they might work?

Personally, I see this more as a political problem than a force structure problem. Differences in force structure are not going to matter much in terms of deterring or coercing states that utilize proxies - it's ultimately political will to hold a state accountable for what proxies do that matters. History seems to show that such political will rarely exists which is why proxies are so effective.

True but force structure has a significant effect on what your forces can be successfully committed to do.

He's right about surveillance, but the reason there was a lack of ground forces was the inability to rapidly deploy and sustain a more adequate force quickly. These limitations were what drove planners toward using locals as a proxy ground force.

I think there's much more to it. Planning failures and command disconnects (regrettably to include some parochialism...) were also involved.

Finally, I strongly agree with Ron's comments regarding the relationship between strategy and resources.

True -- and that's why force structure has significant impact and that's why we must have full spectrum forces.

[Entropy]

I'm also curious. Where do you think they might work?

They seemed to work pretty well in phases I-III of OIF and even Col. McMaster concedes the point to some extent several times in his essay. One example:

The major offensive operation that quickly toppled the Hussein regime in Iraq clearly demonstrated the possibilities associated with new technology, as well as the effects that improved speed, knowledge, and precision can have in the context of a large-scale offensive operation.
However, the initial phases of the operation also revealed important continuities in warfare that lie beyond the reach of technology. Unconventional forces will continue to evade detection from even the most advanced surveillance capabilities. Moreover, what commanders most needed to know about enemy forces, such as their degree of competence and motivation, lay completely outside the reach of technology.

I don't disagree at all with the above. However, in the end, Saddam's attempts at an unconventional strategy and use of unconventional forces to defend Iraq and his regime failed spectacularly. Col. McMaster is completely correct about the limits of surveillance and technology against unconventional forces, but they proved very useful against his conventional forces.

True but force structure has a significant effect on what your forces can be successfully committed to do.

Sure, but the case he points out was Iran - what force structure will help us coerce, deter them? One more focused on LIC/COIN or one more focused on HIC? Ironically, it was after what appeared to be the complete success of OIF in mid-2003 that Iran put forward a tentative offer for a grand rapprochement with the US.

I think there's much more to it. Planning failures and command disconnects (regrettably to include some parochialism...) were also involved.

Oh I agree - there is always more to the story and I agree with your points, but the fundamental problem of putting forces into and sustaining them in a landlocked country with no infrastructure remained. And of course there was the political pressure to act sooner which, IMO, also helped push the plan toward using locals.

[wm]

Forces ought to be designed explicitly to fight under conditions of uncertainty and to achieve effectiveness rather than efficiency. This will entail tolerating a higher degree of redundancy.

I suspect that the above provides the meat of McMaster's article.
I see his "conditions of uncertainty" as another way of describing risk. The level of risk is a factor of the degree of damage caused times the probability of occurence. Risk can be mitigated but it cannot be eliminated. Force design is (or ought to be) a function of trying to mitigate risk in the attainment of assigned missions. One way to mitigate risk is to overdesign for contingencies. This is what McMaster seems to espouse with his desire "to achieve effectiveness rather than efficiency." However, force developers must also recognize that not every mission has an equal probability of being assigned. So, the force structure must be such as to be able to handle the missions whose risk (consequences of failure times probability of occurence) is highest, within availalble resource constraints.

The real issue is whether those who drive the budget process are willing to appropriate the funds needed to allow the military to mitigate a larger portion of the perceived risk. Dollars drive the procurement actions (to include military personnel and their training) that produce a balanced (or out of balance) joint force.

In order to change the attitudes of those who approve budgets, the military needs to do a better job of identifying the spectrum of risk that various funding levels engender. As McMaster points out, the business notion of waste (as found in LEAN thinking) does not apply as directly to the military. A larger, balanced force structure inventory than immediately necessary (one that is able to handle more than just the short term, quick and dirty deployment, but not so large as to win WWIII within a week, a month, or perhaps even a year) is really a cost avoidance strategy, not waste. This is what needs to be made apparent to those who apportion Federal funding.

[SWJED]

Brigadier General H.R. McMaster on Setting Conditions and The Army Capstone Concept

Certainty vs. Uncertainty / Theory vs. Recent and Ongoing Conflicts (Then and Now)

• Knowledge centric vs. fighting and politics centric.
  
• Planning process vs. design and education.
  
• Synchronization vs. initiative.
  
• Centralization vs. decentralization.
  
• Risk avoidance vs. risk mitigation.
  
• Efficiency vs. effectiveness.
  
• Fires vs. combined arms fire and maneuver.
  
• See / quality of firsts vs. find and understand.
  
• Rapid, Decisive Operations vs. sustained campaigns.
  
• ISR vs. recon and security.
  
• Command from the FOB vs. command from the front.
  
• Systems approach (EBO) vs. complexity (design).
  
• Dominance vs. strategy and continuous interaction.
  
• MCO focus vs. spectrum of conflict.
  
• Capabilities Based Assessment vs. Threat Based Assessment.
  
• Vagueness vs. transparency.
  
• Linear progression (leap ahead) vs. interaction with adversaries - continuous innovation.

Implications for the Army Capstone Concept

• Conducting operations under the condition of transparency.
  
• Conducting operations with partners and amongst diverse populations.
  
• Overcoming anti-access in the context of a joint operation.
  
• Conducting and sustaining operations from and across extended distances.
  
• Fighting for information (physical reconnaissance and human intelligence).
  
• Employing the manpower, mobility, firepower, and protection to close with the enemy.
  
• Conducting area security operations over large areas (including population security; precision fires to limit collateral damage).
  
• Developing partner capabilities (e.g. Security Force Assistance).
  
• Protecting the network and routinely fighting in degraded mode.
  
• Overcoming hybrid threats / complex terrain and overcoming enemy count-mobility efforts.
  
• Reshaping logistics and the demand side of sustainment to ensure operations without pause and freedom of movement in non-contiguous area of operations.

[SWJED]

Conference comment - What we lost in the 90's was the understanding that land warfare is fundamentally different from aerospace and maritime warfare because of the presence of a population and the complexity of geography. We have to capture that again...

[SWJED]

Conference comment - In consideration of the Capstone Concept and the implications and solutions it suggests we have to be careful that we do not overcorrect...

[SWJED]

Conference comment - The 2009 Army Capstone Concept fits nicely with US Joint Forces Command's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations.

[Mark O'Neill]

lack context in the 'vs' , Can you elaborate?

Thanks

Mark

[Brasidas]

A quick point. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff document of his vision on how joint forces would operate 2016-28 in the face of assorted challenges. CCJO incorporates USJFCOM's work in the document: Joint Operating Environment, threats and trends that could face the future force. The JOE is a companion document to CCJO.

[SWJED]

Capstone Concept will change Army doctrine
By Robert Haddick

At last week’s TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference, I heard BG H.R. McMaster deliver a presentation on the U.S. Army’s forthcoming Capstone Concept. Here is a news article from TRADOC and the U.S. Army that describes what the Army’s Capstone Concept is and what it will mean to the Army in the years ahead. A few excerpts from the article:

The new Capstone Concept, McMaster said, examines how the Army operates under conditions of complexity and uncertainty in an era of persistent conflict. The concept's purpose is to put into operational terms Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey's vision of balancing the Army to win today's wars while describing how the future Army will fight the wars of tomorrow...

The primary purpose of the capstone concept is to lead force development and employment by establishing a common framework to think about future Army operations; place modernization decisions in a broader context of future armed conflict; establish a conceptual foundation for subordinate concepts; guide experimentation in Army operations and capabilities; and guide capability development.

"We looked at how the Army intends to operate and face the challenges in the future operating environment against what we're calling hybrid threats," said McMaster. "By looking at the current operating environment and the hybrid threats we face and could face in the future, this helps the Army make a grounded projection into the near future and understand what challenges our Army will face as part of a Joint, interdepartmental and multinational force, and then develop the capability our Army will need to fight the future battle."

BG McMaster is leading a team that will complete work on the Capstone Concept by the end of this year. The new Capstone Concept is then supposed to guide the development of subordinate Army doctrine. The Capstone Concept effort thus represents important guidance for Army training, leader development, and combat unit organization.

During his presentation last week, BG McMaster emphasized the differences between the doctrine his team is completing and the doctrine the Army operated under a decade ago. Small Wars Journal hopes to provide further discussion of the Army Capstone Concept as it nears completion. For now, I recommend reading the article linked to above.

[marct]

I'll admit that this jumped out at me:

In the new edition of the Army Capstone Concept, understanding the situation will be better defined and what the Army learns about the ethnic and cultural aspects of a situation will be factored into whatever threat the Army will face in the future.
{emphasis added}

I've been concerned for some time now about how "culture", broadly speaking, is understood and operationalized in US Army doctrine. There are serious implications for both policy, strategy and operations regardless of how the concept is constructed, but they vary by the construction. I'll be interested to see what final form they take.

[davidbfpo]

'HR' spoke yesterday at IISS, London to a nearly full conference room on the project, with a small number of slides; in a nice touch he had to operate the PPT control himself and sometimes forgot. Very clever delivery and some wicked humour: UK Ministry of Defence (Strategy) questioner poses question and 'HR' responds did I hear you right Tragedy?

A lot to absorb and many points that could be applied to law enforcement.

IISS I think will add a video to their website soon: http://www.iiss.org/ .

Later 'HR' added his praise for the contribution of SWJ / SWC.

More another day.

davidbfpo

[Ron Humphrey]

'HR' spoke yesterday at IISS, London to a nearly full conference room on the project, with a small number of slides; in a nice touch he had to operate the PPT control himself and sometimes forgot. Very clever delivery and some wicked humour: UK Ministry of Defence (Strategy) questioner poses question and 'HR' responds did I hear you right Tragedy?

A lot to absorb and many points that could be applied to law enforcement.

IISS I think will add a video to their website soon: http://www.iiss.org/ .

Later 'HR' added his praise for the contribution of SWJ / SWC.

More another day.

davidbfpo

Not up yet

[Bill Moore]

http://csis.org/event/ground-force-m...-still-matters

MG McMasters is interviewed by Dr. Maren Leed at a CSIS event regarding the role of ground forces in the future security environment.

During the discussion MG McMaster identifies what he calls two scary lessons that some people have apparently learnt from the past decade of conflict:

1. We think we can wars by raiding

2. We think we can outsource our wars and have others fight them

Both of these comments seem to be making a swipe on some of the verbiage coming out USSOCOM, but I don't think anyone senior in USSOCOM thinks we can wars with a raiding approach. Most realize it is a tool in the toolbox that does have numerous applications, but rarely is it decisive.

Regarding lesson number 2, I think this argument is weak because it is based on a series of assumptions that are not credible when you scratch the surface, yet on the other hand assisting others with addressing their security needs when it is appropriate is still a valid strategy. Of course this isn't new, we have been doing this for decades.

At the end of the day the U.S. military is responsible for defending our Constitution and nation, not our partners. Most of the time we have done that with partners, but if someone is proposing a national defense strategy that hinges on outsourcing this responsibility to partners that seems to be irresponsible and dangerous.

Moderator's Note

There is an earlier thread 'McMaster on War': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...read.php?t=647

[Fuchs]

Irresponsible and dangerous?

List the countries which can defend themselves successfully without allies, please.

If you cannot create a long list here with more than a hundred countries around, maybe you should consider whether you became used to a very high level of ambition and then mistook it for a kind of minimum requirement.