The Army We Need

[Gian P Gentile]

Wilf’s post was spot-on. He sensed the essence of Nagl's speech which was--regardless of if he was talking to captains or generals--a call to transform the American army into a nation-building force. It can not be read in any other way.

Those of us who have commanded combat outfits in coin understand Wilf's statement that soldiers are not diplomats. Coin experts may retch when this is said but basically, fundamentally it is a statement of fact. Combat soldiers stand posts, they shoot, they pull security, they do raids, they patrol, they secure infrastructure projects, etc. The notion that they are diplomats is self-serving fiction. It briefs well but beyond that it is pure nonsense.

And what is one of those young infantry or armor captains to do with Nagl's call for them to be diplomats when they are infantry, cavalry, or tank company commanders and it comes to making choices about training time and resources? Does part of it go to diplomacy training?

If Nagl gets his way the increase of 30K soldiers into the Army will essentially be spent on a nation-building advisory corps for Iraq and Afghanistan. Those 30K could have instead gone toward building 5-6 more combat brigades. See potentially the tack that the American Army is on?

Is this really what we want?

gg

[Ken White]

John T. Fishel makes well the point that the US and the UK differ mightily on their employment of 'diplomats' in wartime. The UK does that very well, we are not so fortunate -- that means the US Armed forces have to fill the gap. That works.

The question though is -- is that a good solution?

I suggest the answer is a resounding 'no.'

State and the rest of the US government need to be brought up to adequate capability and the Army, all of DoD, should fight hard to insure that occurs -- it will be to the detriment of the Defense establishment if it does not occur...

Gian comes in with a good post. I frequently agree with him but often chide him and suggest he lower the level of his expressed discontent just a bit. Not this time. He and Wilf are right -- so is Bill Moore -- SF can do the diplomat / teacher / soldier bit and can provide the necessary interface with local populations (if the powers that be will stop sending them to kick in doors...); The Multi Purpose Forces that are the bulk of the US Armed Services are not diplomats and should not train or spend too much thought time on that aspect of their total competency.

They can be adequately mentored and guided by SF elements and by a revamped and empowered Department of State. Shifting from combat to COIN is not that difficult, if it seems to hard, then the training is inadequate because numerous Armies do it, have done it, we have done it -- it just isn't that difficult. So let SF do their job and let the MPF do theirs -- to include assisting SF at a reasonable level of capability as supplementaries, not replacements.

Be careful how we train -- too much training time spent on building other peoples Armies or nations will lead to a US Army that is not competent at its own primary mission. None of the services train new entrants, officer or enlisted well enough today; to fragment their training on COIN / FID as opposed to basic MOSC and military competence will lessen their overall capability. We need to be able to do COIN adequately (as opposed to superbly); we do not need to let it drive the train...

[reed11b]

I agree with Wilf and Ken. There is a military aspect to COIN, or else it would not have reached the stage of armed conflict. Yes, State and NGO’s play an important role in COIN, but that is there role, not the Army's. The military's role is to fight the insurgents armed force and there means of supply and communication. I feel that stating that insurgencies are always about the population is flawed. Some insurgencies derive there strength and supply through the population but some do not.
The big difference in COIN and HIC in my mind is that COIN has an aspect of Law Enforcement to it. I wonder if having some sort of US Gendarme would pay dividends?
On an almost unrelated note: I feel strongly that reducing the DOD trend of micromanagement would pay big dividends in creating thinking, better fighting soldiers in both COIN and HIC. Creating effective and productive infantry is a big part of this as well.

Reed
Sorry for the scattered thoughts, working way too many hours.

[Gian P Gentile]

See Ken, I have paid attention to your patient "chiding."

I especially liked your last paragraph with the lead sentence cautioning as to "how we train."

v/r

gian

[John T. Fishel]

is more than infantry, cavalry, artillery, and armor - the pointy end of the spear. At the point of the "pointy end" are the SF who often have to do it all, usually on a small scale. But out there on the shaft are the aviators, transporters, loggies, MPs, engineers, psyopers, CA, and intel folk. Embedded in the shaft of the spear are the folk who can, should, and must do some of the tasks that full spectrum warfare - including COIN - requires and that the combat arms are less well equipped to do. That said, the most common roles throughout the history of the US military have been those that require the skills of diplomats, teachers, advisors, trainers. This has been true since the days following the American Revolution. The very first task of the US military under the new Federal Constitution was to put down the Whiskey Rebellion in Western Pennsylvania - something that was done by President Washington's designated second in command, MG Alexander Hamilton (Sec of Treas) without firing hardly a shot. Big wars came approximately once a generation punctuating lots of small wars activities but, most Army officers only wanted to train for and fight the big ones. See, for example, Emory Upton's trip report on his mission to observe and report on the Brits in the NW Frontier of India, published as The Armies of Europe and Asia, and concentrating on the German General Staff! So, the lessons of small wars, while recorded, were rarely learned. And we keep having to reinvent the wheel as a result.

Ken is right when he says that State and other govt agencies need to do more but they have to be funded to do so by Congress. The Civilian Response Corps is a step in the right direction but it will take time to build and even more time to deploy. In its (and State's etc) absence, who will do what is required? Soldiers and Marines - as they always have. Again, that is why we have FAOs, SF, CA and other specialties. Finally, I would note that some of our Greatest Captains - Eisenhower, Marshall, and MacArthur, among others spring to mind - were more than just soldiers; they were diplomats as well.

Cheers

JohnT

[Bill Moore]

Those of us who have commanded combat outfits in coin understand Wilf's statement that soldiers are not diplomats. Coin experts may retch when this is said but basically, fundamentally it is a statement of fact. Combat soldiers stand posts, they shoot, they pull security, they do raids, they patrol, they secure infrastructure projects, etc. The notion that they are diplomats is self-serving fiction. It briefs well but beyond that it is pure nonsense.

This attitude contributed greatly to our downward trend in OIF. Fortunately for our nation it was reversed by an officer who understood that engaging in diplomacy with the locals is not a self serving fantasy, it is absolutely essential. Soldiers are more than capable of engaging with the local populace to identify and help resolve their problems, thus helping develop trusting relationships with the locals that also enable Soldiers to garner intelligence based on that relationship.

If Soldiers are only capable of guarding infrastructure and saluting their red coat officers who have no faith in them (I realize this only applies to a small percentage of our officers, but unfortunately a damaging percentage), then we might as well empty our prisons and fill our ranks with category four soldiers, because we don't need well behaved smart kids capable of solving complex problems like we have now, we just need grunts who do not interact with their environment, but can shoot when so ordered.

Shifting from combat to COIN is not that difficult, if it seems too hard, then the training is inadequate because numerous Armies do it, have done it, we have done it -- it just isn't that difficult.

Words of wisdom, as are,

Be careful how we train -- too much training time spent on building other peoples Armies or nations will lead to a US Army that is not competent at its own primary mission.

We need to be able to do COIN adequately (as opposed to superbly); we do not need to let it drive the train...

It isn't that hard, even an officer can figure it out if he has a patient NCO that doesn't mind mentoring him. Nor do we have to be that good at it, but we sure as how have to understand the character of the fight we're in.

[William F. Owen]

This attitude contributed greatly to our downward trend in OIF. Fortunately for our nation it was reversed by an officer who understood that engaging in diplomacy with the locals is not a self serving fantasy, it is absolutely essential. Soldiers are more than capable of engaging with the local populace to identify and help resolve their problems, thus helping develop trusting relationships with the locals that also enable Soldiers to garner intelligence based on that relationship.

Bill, with respect, I think you are missing the point. Talking to the local population is a very normal military activity, at least where I come from. Has the main force US Army always been good at it? Clearly not, but the US Army are incredibly fast learners and have re-learnt from experience.

You talk to the locals to aid a military/security objectives. It should not be to make their life better. Ideally both will coincide, because if there is less violence, then everybody's life improves. The armed social work angle on COIN is pure poison to the soul of an army. Army's should not build schools, or day-care centres. Providing food, water and shelter, should be the limit. If you can employ locals to aid security then great.

IF your army has to pick up the ball for the other branches of government, it's because your government is broken, not your army

The "Advisor Corps"? Brits never needed an advisor Corps, nor the French, or anyone else, and 30,000 is a ludicrous number.

[Bob's World]

Before we can truly address the question of what kind of Army we need, we must first figure out what kind of foreign policy our government intends to implement.

For the past 60+ years it has been a policy based on a Cold War construct, and now that the Soviets are gone, and try as we might, we can't seem to force anyone else to pick up flag and fill that "enemy" role required to make the policy work, we find ourselves in a quandary. For the past 20 years or so much have simply been our efforts to maintain the status quo.

Problem is that things in nature do not remain static. Particularly populaces and doubly particularly populaces who have been suppressed under first colonial, and then Cold War induced policies implemented by foreign powers that have stifled their opportunities for self determination.

Now, with post-Cold War opportunity, and accelerated by the factors of globalization, the region of the world that has been suppressed and controlled the most is rift with local insurgent movements. Add to that mix the stirrings of reformation movements within Islam as those same factors of globalization crack the stranglehold of the Mullahs over their congregations (much as the printing press cracked the stranglehold of the Catholic leadership over European populaces not so long ago...).

So, the question is: What do you want to be when you grow up America?

We have plenty of role models in history to learn from. My position (and I realize it is a lonely one, but I am confident it will grow) is that we must be true to ourselves. And by that I do not mean to selfishly impose our will over others, but to instead be true to the principles upon what this very great, and very unique country were originally built. We are so convinced that "we are the good guys" that populaces will greet us like liberators when we invade their homelands for "noble" purposes. History really doesn't bear this out.

We have a new President, a new opportunity to finally take a strategic pause, catch our breath, and do a top to bottom reassessment of what type of world we want to live in and how we want to participate in that world (ends). Then look at our national strategies. We currently do not possess a grand strategy as a nation, but have an ad hoc collection of national level (and rather vague) strategies. Let’s craft a new strategy to achieve these newly defined ends (ways). Then, and only then, can we relook our national security structure and institutions of foreign engagement and retune them for the new mission at hand (means).

Right now we are struggling over how to do the wrong thing very well. I for one, take the position that it is better to do the right thing poorly; but that we need to strive to do it to the best of our abilities.

We can do this. We must do this.

Right now we are like a bunch of beer bellied losers arguing about the best ways to beat their wives. Many opinions out there to those ends. Others say no, you must control your wife, and only beat her when she really needs it. I say, hell, we're not even talking about our own wife, we are talking about how to help the neighbor (same neighbor who has never done much for us, by the way) control and beat his wife.

Maybe we need to step back and re-evaluate. I realize the analogy above is not perfect, and that it is intended to evoke an emotional response. Hopefully it also causes some to pause and reflect on the problems discussed in this forum in a new light as well.

[Gian P Gentile]

This attitude contributed greatly to our downward trend in OIF. Fortunately for our nation it was reversed by an officer who understood that engaging in diplomacy with the locals is not a self serving fantasy, it is absolutely essential. Soldiers are more than capable of engaging with the local populace to identify and help resolve their problems, thus helping develop trusting relationships with the locals that also enable Soldiers to garner intelligence based on that relationship...we sure as how have to understand the character of the fight we're in.

Bill:

Your response is typical of the reactive nature of Coin experts anytime somebody questions standard thinking and language concerning the oracle of coin.

Your suggestion that "this attitude" caused to use your words a "downward trend" in OIF is not supported by the operational record as shown by early histories of the Iraq War. I have used this quote before but the most recent current history "On Point II" argues that by and large, most army tactical units by the end of 2003 were conducting best practices in counterinsurgency operations. As a BCT XO in 4ID in Tikrit one of the first briefings we gave to our BCT commander was how to go about setting up local governance in our area, how to go about rebuilding infrastructure, and how to go about protecting the populace.

Later I commanded a cav squadron in west Baghdad in 2006. Conventional forces in coin operate differently than ODA teams. Infantrymen, tankers, scouts, etc for the most part do not take part in so-called diplomacy. Their patrol leaders, SSGs, SFCs, LTs, etc are the ones who engage and talk to the population. So the notion that every combat soldier that has done a tour in Iraq or Astan is out talking to the sheik or local leaders as a diplomat is chimera.

Does this mean as your post suggests, that combat soldiers in coin do nothing but kicking down doors and killing people? Of course not, nor does it mean that in pre-deployment training for a specific area that all soldiers should not learn the basics of the cultures they are going into to help them better understand their environment.

The point that Wilf and I and others are making is that the notion as is literally stated that soldiers are diplomats is just simply folly. They are not, they are combat soldiers and as wilf has pointed out they need to be able to do the basic functions and skills of combat soldiers. If they can do that, then they can step into different directions to do coin, stability ops, nation building etc.

The concern I have is that by using terms like Diplomats we are confusing ourselves as to what should be our priorities, and the reality of coin on the ground in places like astan and iraq.

gian

[Ken White]

...who will do what is required? Soldiers and Marines - as they always have. Again, that is why we have FAOs, SF, CA and other specialties.

Yep.

Finally, I would note that some of our Greatest Captains - Eisenhower, Marshall, and MacArthur, among others spring to mind - were more than just soldiers; they were diplomats as well.

Totally true -- and with no special training back in the day but a lot of common sense, more talking than was probably comfortable for all three and sound military judgment applied when required ...

Wilf correctly notes:

My actual point is you need better doctrine that does not make the error of looking at "IW" as something distinct and difficult, when it is the common currency of military operations.
. . .
Concur, and engaging the local population and wining their support is a normal military skill. It is not necessarily unique to COIN and it is not diplomacy! It's bog standard G2 bread and better. Calling it diplomacy is inaccurate, misleading, and unhelpful.

My suspicion is that the three gentlemen John T. named would agree with that description. Then, as Bill Moore points out:

It isn't that hard, even an officer can figure it out if he has a patient NCO that doesn't mind mentoring him. Nor do we have to be that good at it, but we sure as how have to understand the character of the fight we're in.

True and as Gian reinforced, all we gotta do is be careful about

"how we train."