The Army We Need

[wm]

In my early years we had limited money, . . . , but it "seemed" that we trained more, and in many ways trained more effectively. We had training distractions then, but not to the extent that we do now. The training was less structured then, so there was more "time" for mentoring, which is when the real learning takes place. That also meant that leaders were being more effectively developed.

In my LT days, we had both limited time and limited personnel; we also had a huge number of training distractors. I was in a tenant unit in USAREUR's VIIth Corps area where we ran a real world intelligence mission 24/7 with an organization at about 60% strength (on a good day). We did our jobs and were still able to do all the training the Army, USAREUR, my MACOM, and VII Corps required of us as well as all the valuable (and silly) stuff my troops needed to learn to be able to pass their MOS tests (and later their SQTs). How did we do it? Bill has the answer partly right.

Commanders need to observe more training, and spend less time in briefs. Talk to the troops, they'll tell you if they're confident.

All "leaders" need to observe more training. Real leaders will observe day-to-day performance first, recognize what training their subordinates need, and then develop and conduct the appropriate training to fix those performance shortfalls.

The wild card is wartime OPTEMPO. It means that the available time to train has to be scrutinized better. There is certainly risk associated with it, but there may be some training models out there we could look at for MTO&E units which would reduce the amount of friction we have.

Wartime OPTEMPO is an excuse for not doing the right thing. Rob is correct about making sure to use the right kind of training to get the desired results though--that is what training management is really all about.
Caution war story follows:
I was a platoon leader and the Bn training officer (as an additional duty) when Skill Qualification Tests (SQT) were coming into existence. My Bn Cdr's pucker factor was getting huge because he knew his OER would be affected by the performance of the Bn's soldiers on their SQTs. He tasked me to develop a training program for the SQT. In my plan, I proposed what my NCOs and I were already doing in my platoon: a great amount of on-the-job training, executed by the NCOs and me during normal duty following "pre-testing"--an assessment by the NCO of soldiers' job proficiency. (As noted above, my unit was maybe 60% strength and we were doing real world Cold War intel Indications & Warning work, not some garrison training, annual live fire at a range on Graf, and maneuver wargames as part of a REFORGER--but we supported those and Autumn Forge exercises too.) When I briefed the plan, the Bn Cdr's concern was with the lack of classroom training and any ability to verify that the training had occurred. He wanted sign-in sheets and post tests after the classroom instruction--the check the box mentality mentioned by Bill Moore predates PowerPoint and Harvard Graphics (2 tools that I have grown to loath over the years, but they still are better than the old hand drawn charts we had to use in the "brown shoe Army" of the Carter years and earlier.) Being more concerned with doing the right thing than with presenting the right appearance, I used some well placed expletives about his proposed approach to training and convinced the commander to forego that kind of nonsense. The troops did great on the first round of SQT (and subsequent ones too, so I was told). At the same time, my platoon increased its Bn-leading mission productivity. Other platoons actually got better at their missions because of the additional scrutiny given to their soldiers them by their NCOs and LTs. And, overall Bn morale improved (as indicated by a drop in drinking related incidents and other MP blotter reports involving my Bn's troops).
End of war story

[reed11b]

oops, got one long thread mixed up w/ another one..however this post from COIN comes Home truly belongs here...so here it is.
Reed

One of the big problems in the US Armed forces is that inclination to 'proactivity' -- do something even if it's wrong. That attitude insures that quite often, it will be wrong...

My point is still that my questions MUST be asked and honestly answered before any implementation of your model is begun.

That and the fact that in our last three reasonably large sized wars, the principle of FID, propping up a failing state and defeating an insurgency were not the issues that caused us to enter the nations involved.

It also points to a need for a better structured process for (get ready now) STABO. (yes I know, the word is as despised as OOTW, but I am a product of the '90s) Violence and wars in particular leave a vacuum in there wake, and simply leaving that vacuum to fill itself up can lead to larger conflicts or repeats of conflicts (WWI and WWII or DS/DS and OIF are examples so is OIF I and OIF II-whatever OIF we are on now). So there is a need to train and plan for "waging the peace" (sorry again) but I wonder if the DOD is the best organization to orchestrate that planning. I still like the idea of DoS military liaisons and some sort of post conflict expeditionary (I am going to heck after this post) unit, heavy on CA, Medical and MP support. Trying to shoehorn those assets into the BCT's only dilutes the BCT's fighting ability and dilutes the effectiveness of the non-combat assets.
In response to Nagle's original article, saying that the need is there, does not mean that wedging that ability into the existing structure is the best bet. Some wider range thinking outside of the DoD is needed.
Reed

[RTK]

I re-read some old posts tonight and I came to three burning questions:

Are current force modernization efforts based upon the fights in which we are currently engaged resultant of failed foreign policy strategies or are they based upon a coherent concept of future threats to the nation?

Is it possible that future wars will include both conventional and unconventional aspects where both COIN/CT focused units and heavier conventional units will be required?

Are we shooting spiders off our shoes with a 12 gauge?

Discuss....

[slapout9]

Are current force modernization efforts based upon the fights in which we are currently engaged resultant of failed foreign policy strategies.

Yes to this and it is a big one. If we had some type of rational energy policy we wouldn't even be envolved in half the countries that are on the enemy/threat list.

[Ski]

As someone who worked in the 50A field until 2006 (when I left that arena to join the 59A squad of looters), I can tell you that your first assessment is dead on.

Force development (how units are formed) and force modernization (how they are equipped) has been totally driven by our foreign policy since the 1990's. If you want to get into brushfire wars with multiple enemies fighting each other, and then you once you inject yourself into the system, then you don't need mechanized and armored forces. The USMC knew this in the 80's when they began development of the LAV force. They needed wheeled vehicle to traverse the usually terrible road networks when conducting NEO's, and just a little bit of armor to protect the joes. Throw a 25mm cannon and maybe a TOW system and you have enough firepower and protection for most third world scenarios.

The MRAP is the illogical conclusion of all of this nonsense. It is still not on any TOE or MTOE within the Army - perhaps a few specialized Engineer units are the exception.

You have to understand that there is no such thing as threat based modernization strategies any longer. That horse road out the barn in the 90's. Everything is capabilities driven - you can thank the Network Centric warfare guys for starting this road to perdition.

As to your second question, yes. All wars are a blend of both. It all depends on the senior commanders, their intelligence, mental flexibilty and willingness to innovate.

As to your final statement, of course.

I re-read some old posts tonight and I came to three burning questions:

Are current force modernization efforts based upon the fights in which we are currently engaged resultant of failed foreign policy strategies or are they based upon a coherent concept of future threats to the nation?

Is it possible that future wars will include both conventional and unconventional aspects where both COIN/CT focused units and heavier conventional units will be required?

Are we shooting spiders off our shoes with a 12 gauge?

Discuss....

[bumperplate]

Been reading this thread with particular attention to our current training methodologies.

I can't at this moment sum it all up in one or two sentences but there are excellent points in this thread about training. As an Army and as a society we are fixated on metrics. Things must be quantitative. I understand this from a scientific and statistical perspective. But, when it is used to assess the performance of organizations that constantly must execute varied, random, and unpredictable tasks, it is counter-productive. Conducting operations in southern Baghdad is not like showing proficiency in writing out the proof of the first fundamental theorem of calculus. Thus, suitability of a unit for conducting such operations cannot be assessed in a likewise manner.

In the Army, we must crack the code on this and get away from these futile exercises in training, looking to follow a recipe, check X% of boxes for the GO, just head for the PowerPoint slide showing "T" or green or whatever.

While I've met many NCOs and officers I wouldn't trust or follow in combat, overall we have some good ones out there that know their craft and can train their subordinates. To date I have not found any manual that can train a group of 19K Privates about the M2 like a seasoned 19K30 can. Nor have I encountered any manual or test that tells me that a Private is ready to man that M2 in combat as well as tough training, mentoring, and assessment from that 19K30.

I think, in the end, our central problem is trust. Our senior leaders don't trust that we can let that 19K30 loose on a bunch of junior Soldiers and train them on that M2.