The issue is what should we be asking that army to do, and is the army trained organized and equipped to do those things well.
I think that is a good question, however its unlikely to get a definable answer that most are comfortable with. It will change over time. However unlikely we might think certain possibilities are, this seems to be one of those counter intuitive outcomes where to consider them impossible makes them more likely.

Having a full suite of tools at your disposal to influence, coerce or compel if need be provides the other participants something to consider. As they work to free themselves from some, they may remain susceptible to others.

Iran is a great example, but there are others. Why do we believe that Iran will never cross the line which requires us to go to war with them? I use Iran as an example not because of the current rhetoric, evidence of their use of proxies in the ME, actions in the Persian Gulf itself, and not to justify a position. I ask the question in earnest, on what grounds do we justify a belief that Iran would not cross a line, or be perceived of having crossed a line that we would feel there was no other option but to go to war?

Next I'd ask what is the foundation of that belief? The same question could be asked many times over, however we'd be wise to consider that our belief should be grounded in the conditions which include our capabilities and theirs to deter or achieve an objective at what can be considered a tolerable cost to either participant. If a given belligerent believes they can now accomplish something in which they could not previously, because whatever the opposition’s capability was is no longer a capability or a capability with sufficient capacity then they have good reason to weigh the risk differently. Based on their desire or attraction to an objective, they may even defy your estimate (based on your beliefs and intelligence) of their odds or actions.

Transparency in capability communicated through statecraft is critical, but if your capability is hollow, of inadequate capacity, or is in fact not an appropriate capability, then transparency becomes an incentive to act, not a deterrence.

The word "well" in itself is one which is subject to conditions. What is the quality of "well"? This is the challenge of those who have the responsibility to provide "well" when the conditions change, and who must contemplate the consequences when "well" was not good enough. It is not an indictment, but it is the truth - policy when it matters most rarely apportions risk in a way that allows you to make infallible choices. Instead, it often corresponds to its nature of being the unlikely candidate because it comes from interactions which were difficult to discern based on how you saw things prior to those interactions.


So I would argue the other side as well, that while you consider this:

it does not help much in the operations that we are currently asked to conduct.
You may also consider that those capabilities have wielded and may yet wield influence beyond the obvious. How has deterrence based on that capability allowed us to protect our interests beyond OIF and OEF, and even to concentrate on our current operations? What lines were not crossed by others because they did not wish to contend with that capability? What opportunities were presented because others thought our capability relevant to their interests? What influence was gained in our diplomacy based on those capabilities?

Even in theater that capability has shaped operations - consider if we had not been able to retake Fallujah, or paid a terrible price for it? Consider the implications of not being able to open and retain a critical ground line of communication for conduct of our CSS? Consider more than just the political actions which facilitated the Al-Anbar – as Bing West has observed, there is indeed political power in being the strongest tribe on a a number of levels. When that strength is coupled with discipline, restraint, judgment and other attractive qualities it is all the more attractive.

I would argue that in fact we may understand our shortfalls with regard to current operations far better than we understand our strengths, and how they have made our current successes possible. We get immediate feedback when we fail, and we are our own worst (or most effective) critic – however, we don’t always get complete or immediate feedback on the things we do right, and we rarely give ourselves credit – its just our nature. This does not mean we don't have work to do in those gaps, but that if you dismiss something without understanding how it served as an enabler, the new capabilities we build will not be made operational in a way that matters as it pertains to providing the right “means” to operationalize the “ways” we’d prefer toward the “ends” we require.


My point is that we really need to sort out what the mission is prior to changing the army to simply do what we are currently asking it to do more effectively.
And while policy may be able to change quickly, the US national security apparatus, with a few minor mods over the years, is based upon the world as it existed emerging from WWII.
The first and second sentences can be viewed in more than one way. It could support John Nagl's argument or COL Gentile's depending on how we qualify "currently".


I'll agree that the values which we profess to guide our actions have been consistent on paper and spoken word, even occasionally in deed - however the implementation of these values is another matter. They create new possibilities and outcomes which sometimes must be (or have been) addressed in ways that are incongruent. This is as much due to domestic policy interaction as FP.

I think we are going to see a very ambitious FP in its reality. I think we must be prepared to both implement that FP in ways that stand the best chance of success, mitigate risk and preserve our options when those FP interactions create outcomes (or opportunities for others) which we did not anticipate, and which must be dealt with. Better than to have an Army that has its eyes wide open to the range of possibilities and can transition and adapt its capabilities with minimal hiccups, and one which is not rooted in one camp or another.

I cannot remember where on SWJ, but someone had remarked that preserving our "war fighting" capabilities in an armored corps, or something of that size would be enough to retain that capability and expand it. I don't think its that simple. While you might get away with it for a year or two, it would not be long before that capability could not be expanded fast enough to provide you options to respond to your policy crisis, or in a way that was seen as a meaningful way by those who were assessing your capabilities. I don't think it would be long before the DOTML(&E)PF reflected this change as well, and any incentive to preserve there would be overcome by the mainstream.

The solution for this problem must begin at the top.
Yes, our duly elected leadership has that responsibility. However, we must inform them of the risks and advantages. We must provide them alternative advice when appropriate. While our political leadership, and as such its priorities may change (more or less) based on their political philosophy and what they consider the appropriate use of military force, our institutions provide some balance. This is good (although some will say it is not so good), because the institution often has unique insights, and a sense of itself that should be considered.

Best Regards, Rob