The Army We Need

[William F. Owen]

This attitude contributed greatly to our downward trend in OIF. Fortunately for our nation it was reversed by an officer who understood that engaging in diplomacy with the locals is not a self serving fantasy, it is absolutely essential. Soldiers are more than capable of engaging with the local populace to identify and help resolve their problems, thus helping develop trusting relationships with the locals that also enable Soldiers to garner intelligence based on that relationship.

Bill, with respect, I think you are missing the point. Talking to the local population is a very normal military activity, at least where I come from. Has the main force US Army always been good at it? Clearly not, but the US Army are incredibly fast learners and have re-learnt from experience.

You talk to the locals to aid a military/security objectives. It should not be to make their life better. Ideally both will coincide, because if there is less violence, then everybody's life improves. The armed social work angle on COIN is pure poison to the soul of an army. Army's should not build schools, or day-care centres. Providing food, water and shelter, should be the limit. If you can employ locals to aid security then great.

IF your army has to pick up the ball for the other branches of government, it's because your government is broken, not your army

The "Advisor Corps"? Brits never needed an advisor Corps, nor the French, or anyone else, and 30,000 is a ludicrous number.

[Bob's World]

Before we can truly address the question of what kind of Army we need, we must first figure out what kind of foreign policy our government intends to implement.

For the past 60+ years it has been a policy based on a Cold War construct, and now that the Soviets are gone, and try as we might, we can't seem to force anyone else to pick up flag and fill that "enemy" role required to make the policy work, we find ourselves in a quandary. For the past 20 years or so much have simply been our efforts to maintain the status quo.

Problem is that things in nature do not remain static. Particularly populaces and doubly particularly populaces who have been suppressed under first colonial, and then Cold War induced policies implemented by foreign powers that have stifled their opportunities for self determination.

Now, with post-Cold War opportunity, and accelerated by the factors of globalization, the region of the world that has been suppressed and controlled the most is rift with local insurgent movements. Add to that mix the stirrings of reformation movements within Islam as those same factors of globalization crack the stranglehold of the Mullahs over their congregations (much as the printing press cracked the stranglehold of the Catholic leadership over European populaces not so long ago...).

So, the question is: What do you want to be when you grow up America?

We have plenty of role models in history to learn from. My position (and I realize it is a lonely one, but I am confident it will grow) is that we must be true to ourselves. And by that I do not mean to selfishly impose our will over others, but to instead be true to the principles upon what this very great, and very unique country were originally built. We are so convinced that "we are the good guys" that populaces will greet us like liberators when we invade their homelands for "noble" purposes. History really doesn't bear this out.

We have a new President, a new opportunity to finally take a strategic pause, catch our breath, and do a top to bottom reassessment of what type of world we want to live in and how we want to participate in that world (ends). Then look at our national strategies. We currently do not possess a grand strategy as a nation, but have an ad hoc collection of national level (and rather vague) strategies. Let’s craft a new strategy to achieve these newly defined ends (ways). Then, and only then, can we relook our national security structure and institutions of foreign engagement and retune them for the new mission at hand (means).

Right now we are struggling over how to do the wrong thing very well. I for one, take the position that it is better to do the right thing poorly; but that we need to strive to do it to the best of our abilities.

We can do this. We must do this.

Right now we are like a bunch of beer bellied losers arguing about the best ways to beat their wives. Many opinions out there to those ends. Others say no, you must control your wife, and only beat her when she really needs it. I say, hell, we're not even talking about our own wife, we are talking about how to help the neighbor (same neighbor who has never done much for us, by the way) control and beat his wife.

Maybe we need to step back and re-evaluate. I realize the analogy above is not perfect, and that it is intended to evoke an emotional response. Hopefully it also causes some to pause and reflect on the problems discussed in this forum in a new light as well.

[William F. Owen]

Before we can truly address the question of what kind of Army we need, we must first figure out what kind of foreign policy our government intends to implement.

OK but isn't this inherent to the nature of the military instrument? It's not particularly puzzling as to what you want an army to be able to do is it?

Foreign Policy can change in less than a week. US Government Policy of September 10 2001 was made irrelevant 48 hours later. Armies take years to change.

I don't think the question is what type of army the US and even the UK need. The need is for a good army. What makes a good army is actually pretty well understood. The problem is the people and ideas that stop those things from taking effect.

[Bob's World]

Certainly many share the position that Armies just need to focus on being Armies. We already have a "good army" in America. In fact, we have a great army. From the ingenuity and initiative inherent in each American Soldier, to the very best training, equipment and leadership we can provide. Building a good army is not the issue.

The issue is what should we be asking that army to do, and is the army trained organized and equipped to do those things well. A good army at desert operations is not automatically a good army at jungle operations; or a good army at defense is not necessarily a good army at offense. We all know this. You must tailor your training, organization and training to the mission at hand. The US developed perhaps the most devastating army at fire and maneuver that the world has ever seen, and while that serves a tremendous deterrent effect, it does not help much in the operations that we are currently asked to conduct.

My point is that we really need to sort out what the mission is prior to changing the army to simply do what we are currently asking it to do more effectively. And while policy may be able to change quickly, the US national security apparatus, with a few minor mods over the years, is based upon the world as it existed emerging from WWII.

So, I stand by my position. England has always had a good army, but that and $1.75 will get you a cup of coffee at starbucks, but it won't bring the Empire back. The solution for this problem must begin at the top. Meanwhile we soldiers will keep doing what good soldiers do, and that is our very best; whenever and where ever we are directed to go.

[RTK]

I was typing this when Bob's World replied. His second paragraph is another way of looking at my next two paragraphs:

I'd submit that the Army isn't just a hammer, nor is it the top-of-the-line Leatherman pocket tool that has everything from a can opener to magnifying glass.

In this, I'd say that the Army is one of those multi-tools we had when we were growing up that had about 8 functions but did about three of them really well. In the end, you never used about 5 of the functions because you ran the risk of breaking the damned thing. Army units, particularly those at the tactical level, are the same. Cavalrymen being diplomats detracts from their abilities as scouts. Not saying they can't, just saying they won't be as effective. SF Soldiers have some fantastic capablilities and talents - However, I wouldn't want their leadership to determine the best way for 1st Cavalry Division to employ 2 tank companies in the defense. Not saying they aren't capable of providing that leadership, just saying there are other functions their particular piece is better suited to provide.

There has to be a balance struck somewhere. Today's junior combat leader (squad leader, section leader, PL, PSG) should be able to conduct all of their basic battle drills, competently demonstrate proficiency in core METL tasks, actions on contact, and reporting, and basic troop leading procedures.

They also need a familiarity with TTPs in COIN, though these TTPs need to find a baseline in the core competencies mentioned above. It's been said and quoted multiple times in this thread; It depends on how you train. This is the #1 big issue on my mind at this point.

The new Army capstone training manual, FM 7-0, Training For Full Spectrum Operations, should not have been published. Training for METL is training for METL is training for METL. We need to, as an Army, get back to the 8 step training model, training schedules, and methods of training that our Soldiers will understand.

FM 7-0, published early this month, opens up with a giant glass of Kool Aid describing the environments, conditions, and preconditions that wars and battles are to be fought in the future, quite possibly under the flawed premise that they are right. There are plenty of smart people on this board who work at CAC, but can someone tell me where the hell you all hide the Crystal Ball at Leavenworth?

This manual offers no fresh ideas, but rather codifies an incorrect training methodology that pays lip service to the old method and mirrors what we've been forced to do as an Army in the last 7 years due to a mission cycle that finds the Army deploying, deployed, or recovering from operations abroad every 12-18 months. Just because we've been forced to train in this method due to poor planning doesn't mean it's the right way to train.

I'm reminded of an AAR at JRCT in 2002, as my sapper platoon just completed a route reconnaissance where one of our vehicles was destroyed by a mine. The platoon OC, a cantankerous Staff Sergeant who had a 10th Mountain Division combat patch from Somalia, making him one of the only OCs we had with combat experience. This guy was EF Hutton - when he talked, people listened. At the conclusion of this lane, he sat everyone down and told us that he was going to give us a quote to think about but wouldn't tell us who said it until the last day of the exercise. The quote was "Don't let the fact that everyone is doing it wrong prevent you from doing it right." It gave us all pause and resolved the platoon into determining better practices.

Our junior leaders have lost the art of how to train their Soldiers because those of us who have trained properly in the past have not trained them to conduct proper training management in the present. This is OUR failure as an Army and as Leaders. Platoons don't come up with training plans or schedules anymore. The vast majority of what a unit trains on before they leave for theater is directed by FORSCOM Training Guidance crammed down their throats that forces BDE and BN commanders to pick and choose which tasks they're going to blow off in the pre-deployment training cycle.

Training isn't forecasted in terms of long range, short range, and near term anymore. Though tucked into the back fo chapter 4 in the new 7-0 it talks about these three terms, what it should have said is that tactical units at the BDE and below are in reaction mode within the 8 week mark and are so used to jumping through their asses on a week to week basis before deployment that any work done to forecast training out beyond three weeks is futile since it's going to change.

Sure, there are large Easter Eggs that can be thrown on the largest of echelons' schedule (block leave after deployment, gunnery, CTC/MRE rotation, rail-load, block leave before deployment, and LAD), but the day to day operations, "Hey YOU" mission planning cycle, and micromanagement from echelons above BN due to the increased "strength" in BDE and DIV staffs have created environments of hate and discontent of the staff officers and NCOs appointed over the small units; Staffs whose mere existance, in the minds of the tactical units, stifles progress at the tactical level. This has become such an accepted part of Army life that FM 7-0 actually speaks to it in chapter 4:

[Paragraph] 4-12. Modular formations are more agile, expeditionary, and versatile than previous Army organizations. However, modular organizations require a higher degree of training and operational synchronization at the brigade level.

Operational synchronization, for those keeping track at home, is the new joint definition of micromanagement.

Training meetings at the company level used to be able to take what is happening 8 weeks out and walk back to T-1 and T week to lock in and conduct final coordinating instructions. This doesn't happen anymore. Training meetings at the company level are now wargaming sessions that determine the method of crisis management to be emplyed over the next week to ensure the mission gets accomplished despite the changes imposed from on high.

Indeed, it depends on how we train. The question is, does anyone remember how to train properly?

PS - The quote was from that 1976 porn classic, The Opening of Misty Beethoven. You'll have to rent it to find out the context (or PM Stan).

[Ken White]

...In fact, we have a great army. From the ingenuity and initiative inherent in each American Soldier, to the very best training, equipment and leadership we can provide. Building a good army is not the issue.

Define great...

I do not agree -- we do have the potential to be great but that potential is NOT met due to the fact that we don't provide even adequate initial entry training; that our equipment issue is overly influenced by the defense industry, Congress and the media and that our leadership is not the best we can provide -- it is the best that a semi-meritocratic system hobbled by an inefficient and ineffective personnel system which is required to provide an excessively 'fair' shot for all at higher rank and which can only reward competence by promotion in such rank.

As far as our great training goes, that's funny. It is adequate, no question but it overemphasizes cost reduction, metrics and ease of execution (particularly in the institutions) at the cost of true competence. RTK has well addressed many training issues above in his great post.

My point is that we really need to sort out what the mission is prior to changing the army to simply do what we are currently asking it to do more effectively.

That I do agree with -- I also doubt it will ever happen for three reasons; The world is infinitely variable and rapid, unpredictable shifts can and do occur, Politicians object strenuously to being tied into positions and we have developed an elephantine bureaucracy that will bicker about changes until they're too late. Thus we are confronted with the fact that the US Army must be multi-spectrum capable -- and that it is not today due to training inadequacies, a deficient personnel system and an inflexible bureaucracy.

...And while policy may be able to change quickly, the US national security apparatus, with a few minor mods over the years, is based upon the world as it existed emerging from WWII.

Also agree -- and it's past time that needs to be corrected. The Armed Forces cannot change many aspects of that problem but they have also taken too few steps to change much they could change.

...Meanwhile we soldiers will keep doing what good soldiers do, and that is our very best; whenever and where ever we are directed to go.

That is true and some issues are beyond DoD control but it does not excuse the 'system' for not trying to better itself to the extent it is able...

Having said that, as Rob says:

"I believe we are capable of doing what we are called on to do with some relatively painless changes once we recognize there is no real threat to our core values, however that requires we not create threats where there should be none."

[Rob Thornton]

The issue is what should we be asking that army to do, and is the army trained organized and equipped to do those things well.

I think that is a good question, however its unlikely to get a definable answer that most are comfortable with. It will change over time. However unlikely we might think certain possibilities are, this seems to be one of those counter intuitive outcomes where to consider them impossible makes them more likely.

Having a full suite of tools at your disposal to influence, coerce or compel if need be provides the other participants something to consider. As they work to free themselves from some, they may remain susceptible to others.

Iran is a great example, but there are others. Why do we believe that Iran will never cross the line which requires us to go to war with them? I use Iran as an example not because of the current rhetoric, evidence of their use of proxies in the ME, actions in the Persian Gulf itself, and not to justify a position. I ask the question in earnest, on what grounds do we justify a belief that Iran would not cross a line, or be perceived of having crossed a line that we would feel there was no other option but to go to war?

Next I'd ask what is the foundation of that belief? The same question could be asked many times over, however we'd be wise to consider that our belief should be grounded in the conditions which include our capabilities and theirs to deter or achieve an objective at what can be considered a tolerable cost to either participant. If a given belligerent believes they can now accomplish something in which they could not previously, because whatever the opposition’s capability was is no longer a capability or a capability with sufficient capacity then they have good reason to weigh the risk differently. Based on their desire or attraction to an objective, they may even defy your estimate (based on your beliefs and intelligence) of their odds or actions.

Transparency in capability communicated through statecraft is critical, but if your capability is hollow, of inadequate capacity, or is in fact not an appropriate capability, then transparency becomes an incentive to act, not a deterrence.

The word "well" in itself is one which is subject to conditions. What is the quality of "well"? This is the challenge of those who have the responsibility to provide "well" when the conditions change, and who must contemplate the consequences when "well" was not good enough. It is not an indictment, but it is the truth - policy when it matters most rarely apportions risk in a way that allows you to make infallible choices. Instead, it often corresponds to its nature of being the unlikely candidate because it comes from interactions which were difficult to discern based on how you saw things prior to those interactions.


So I would argue the other side as well, that while you consider this:

it does not help much in the operations that we are currently asked to conduct.

You may also consider that those capabilities have wielded and may yet wield influence beyond the obvious. How has deterrence based on that capability allowed us to protect our interests beyond OIF and OEF, and even to concentrate on our current operations? What lines were not crossed by others because they did not wish to contend with that capability? What opportunities were presented because others thought our capability relevant to their interests? What influence was gained in our diplomacy based on those capabilities?

Even in theater that capability has shaped operations - consider if we had not been able to retake Fallujah, or paid a terrible price for it? Consider the implications of not being able to open and retain a critical ground line of communication for conduct of our CSS? Consider more than just the political actions which facilitated the Al-Anbar – as Bing West has observed, there is indeed political power in being the strongest tribe on a a number of levels. When that strength is coupled with discipline, restraint, judgment and other attractive qualities it is all the more attractive.

I would argue that in fact we may understand our shortfalls with regard to current operations far better than we understand our strengths, and how they have made our current successes possible. We get immediate feedback when we fail, and we are our own worst (or most effective) critic – however, we don’t always get complete or immediate feedback on the things we do right, and we rarely give ourselves credit – its just our nature. This does not mean we don't have work to do in those gaps, but that if you dismiss something without understanding how it served as an enabler, the new capabilities we build will not be made operational in a way that matters as it pertains to providing the right “means” to operationalize the “ways” we’d prefer toward the “ends” we require.

My point is that we really need to sort out what the mission is prior to changing the army to simply do what we are currently asking it to do more effectively.

And while policy may be able to change quickly, the US national security apparatus, with a few minor mods over the years, is based upon the world as it existed emerging from WWII.

The first and second sentences can be viewed in more than one way. It could support John Nagl's argument or COL Gentile's depending on how we qualify "currently".


I'll agree that the values which we profess to guide our actions have been consistent on paper and spoken word, even occasionally in deed - however the implementation of these values is another matter. They create new possibilities and outcomes which sometimes must be (or have been) addressed in ways that are incongruent. This is as much due to domestic policy interaction as FP.

I think we are going to see a very ambitious FP in its reality. I think we must be prepared to both implement that FP in ways that stand the best chance of success, mitigate risk and preserve our options when those FP interactions create outcomes (or opportunities for others) which we did not anticipate, and which must be dealt with. Better than to have an Army that has its eyes wide open to the range of possibilities and can transition and adapt its capabilities with minimal hiccups, and one which is not rooted in one camp or another.

I cannot remember where on SWJ, but someone had remarked that preserving our "war fighting" capabilities in an armored corps, or something of that size would be enough to retain that capability and expand it. I don't think its that simple. While you might get away with it for a year or two, it would not be long before that capability could not be expanded fast enough to provide you options to respond to your policy crisis, or in a way that was seen as a meaningful way by those who were assessing your capabilities. I don't think it would be long before the DOTML(&E)PF reflected this change as well, and any incentive to preserve there would be overcome by the mainstream.

The solution for this problem must begin at the top.

Yes, our duly elected leadership has that responsibility. However, we must inform them of the risks and advantages. We must provide them alternative advice when appropriate. While our political leadership, and as such its priorities may change (more or less) based on their political philosophy and what they consider the appropriate use of military force, our institutions provide some balance. This is good (although some will say it is not so good), because the institution often has unique insights, and a sense of itself that should be considered.

Best Regards, Rob

[Surferbeetle]

From the good Colonel’s post I could probably be forgiven if I gained the mistaken impression that US Army is not a training based institution.

Let us examine the phrase ‘Diplomatic Training’. Is it the Colonels implication that for the US Army to offer ‘Diplomatic Training’ requires that this weeks world-wide training schedule will include a John F. Kennedy School of Government Graduate School Course on Diplomacy for all of our soldiers, the majority of whom have high school educations? Does it mean that we will listen to or watch regularly played AFN Commercials which remind us not to be an ‘Ugly American’? Will we participate in a 40-hour Headstart Language Course, unit Language Training, a SOLT Language Course, or perhaps a DLI Language Course? Perhaps our soldiers will be afforded an opportunity to use Tuition Assistance or the GI Bill on a college course on History or Government or even Diplomacy? Perhaps an offer will be extended to some of our soldiers to study at West Point, which offers some of the same courses? Perhaps CA, PSYOP, or SF training is a possibility for our soldiers? Or perhaps, the US Army should not expend the time, effort, or any other resources on this type of training which would further Diplomacy, defined in my copy of Websters as (1) The conducting of relations between nations. (2) Tact.

The trenches of WWI are homage to the type of thinking that ‘Diplomatic Training’ is not warranted for soldiers.

Instead I offer up the following references, which examine the pros and cons of this debate in far deeper and more eloquent detail than can I, a mere solider who has in fact received Diplomatic Training from the US Army, who knows first hand that there is more than one path to success, and who unequivocally rejects limiting our Nations ability to fully respond in this war or any other.

Strategic Studies Institute ‘The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy by Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman


RAND Publication CF 251 Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence (Lessons Learned and Best Practices)

[Ken White]

From the good Colonel’s post I could probably be forgiven if I gained the mistaken impression that US Army is not a training based institution.

Unfortunately, I also a mere soldier, have no idea what you're trying to say here? Could I ask for a clarification?

I read this link; "Strategic Studies Institute ‘The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy by Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman" but this one
RAND Publication CF 251 Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence yields the same document

I guess the second one is meant to point to this LINK. *

I'm unsure what either really has to do with the statement which Wilf, I and others have made that diplomacy in the conduct of relations between nations sense is not the business of the soldier (while acknowledging that tact is most always required of soldiers) ...


* Which I had read earlier and disagreed with much that is therein said, strongly believing that the entire Balkans episode was a goat rope that was none of our business and that we did ourselves more diplomatic harm then good there...

[Rob Thornton]

I'm glad Bill Moore used the word "soldier", it has the best of both functions and qualities, and covers the vast center we mostly operate in between the words "diplomat" and "warrior". Soldiers should not be automatons, but embody I think the territory in between disciplined and fair, courage and honor, professionalism and candor, etc. Maybe that is what John Nagl meant, however, I would prefer we qualify what we are - just my preference.

While I agree with John T that we have certainly been called often to perform those functions (teaching, advising, diplomat), I would say its worth considering the context under which they were performed, and who at what level should be capable of doing what and when. Does a company commander or battalion advisor characterize himself as a diplomat, or as a soldier who may employ some diplomatic skills to support his military purpose? What of LTCs, COLs and GOs? I realize this may seem like semantics, but it is a subtle nuance that may affect his mission. The truth I think is that it depends upon the conditions, and that is another reason why I prefer the term soldier with its inherent flexibility to adapt as opposed to warrior or diplomat.

How is (or should) a FAO or CA perceived first by those with whom they interact? As a diplomat or as a soldier? How do they see themselves? How should they? Does this affect the way in which other around them act? Is this beneficial or detrimental? Is it something that we should attempt to change, or something we should use? If you change the core nature of something without contemplating the full implications, you may wind up with something that only does either "not so well". That was one of the reason I ran the draft of the case study by Ken, I knew he would raise the flag on any extreme recommendation in the DOTML(&E)PF chapter that raised risk instead of mitigating it. We should consider the addition of new skills and traits from the perspective of enhancing our core values, not as being in opposition to them, of improving our chances of achieving the objectives set before us, not fulfilling one at the expense of another. The oath we take is rather unique in its implications, and should be considered as the litmus test for how we see our future selves.

I believe we are capable of doing what we are called on to do with some relatively painless changes once we recognize there is no real threat to our core values, however that requires we not create threats where there should be none.

A soldier's balancing act then is not a 50/50 proposition, but knowing when (and how) to shift the load accordingly, with the understanding and anticipation that said load may have to be shifted again and again, because conditions and policy objectives change over time, and so must we. This is the danger in opinion - it is that we (people) seem naturally predisposed to calcify and protect our positions, and seek out rational to do so. It seems it is just who we are, and guarding against that desire to make things final, or to preserve what we have is a natural tendency we have to fight.

Bob' s World: Sir, I sorry I missed your visit to Leavenworth - perhaps I'll meet you down in Tampa this month in support of the UQ seminar. There is something worth considering in your statement:

a new opportunity to finally take a strategic pause, catch our breath

Realizing I took the piece out of a larger paragraph, that opportunity comes with a price. As the President Elect takes office, there will be a great deal of pressure to employ the power of the United States in various ways ( from both inside the White House and beyond it). Certainly with tensions high between India and Pakistan, with the increased violence in Gaza, and with many others looking to take advantage of opportunities a true strategic pause would be hard to come by I think (if there ever was one). These in conjunction with dynamic situations in OEF and OIF. The GCCs certainly appear up to their eye teeth in hungry alligators. A pause of any type comes with a price tag - it may be worth paying, but its a price none the less. If it is visible, there are those who will advantage themselves of it.

Best, Rob