The Army We Need

[reed11b]

I agree with Wilf and Ken. There is a military aspect to COIN, or else it would not have reached the stage of armed conflict. Yes, State and NGO’s play an important role in COIN, but that is there role, not the Army's. The military's role is to fight the insurgents armed force and there means of supply and communication. I feel that stating that insurgencies are always about the population is flawed. Some insurgencies derive there strength and supply through the population but some do not.
The big difference in COIN and HIC in my mind is that COIN has an aspect of Law Enforcement to it. I wonder if having some sort of US Gendarme would pay dividends?
On an almost unrelated note: I feel strongly that reducing the DOD trend of micromanagement would pay big dividends in creating thinking, better fighting soldiers in both COIN and HIC. Creating effective and productive infantry is a big part of this as well.

Reed
Sorry for the scattered thoughts, working way too many hours.

[Gian P Gentile]

See Ken, I have paid attention to your patient "chiding."

I especially liked your last paragraph with the lead sentence cautioning as to "how we train."

v/r

gian

[John T. Fishel]

is more than infantry, cavalry, artillery, and armor - the pointy end of the spear. At the point of the "pointy end" are the SF who often have to do it all, usually on a small scale. But out there on the shaft are the aviators, transporters, loggies, MPs, engineers, psyopers, CA, and intel folk. Embedded in the shaft of the spear are the folk who can, should, and must do some of the tasks that full spectrum warfare - including COIN - requires and that the combat arms are less well equipped to do. That said, the most common roles throughout the history of the US military have been those that require the skills of diplomats, teachers, advisors, trainers. This has been true since the days following the American Revolution. The very first task of the US military under the new Federal Constitution was to put down the Whiskey Rebellion in Western Pennsylvania - something that was done by President Washington's designated second in command, MG Alexander Hamilton (Sec of Treas) without firing hardly a shot. Big wars came approximately once a generation punctuating lots of small wars activities but, most Army officers only wanted to train for and fight the big ones. See, for example, Emory Upton's trip report on his mission to observe and report on the Brits in the NW Frontier of India, published as The Armies of Europe and Asia, and concentrating on the German General Staff! So, the lessons of small wars, while recorded, were rarely learned. And we keep having to reinvent the wheel as a result.

Ken is right when he says that State and other govt agencies need to do more but they have to be funded to do so by Congress. The Civilian Response Corps is a step in the right direction but it will take time to build and even more time to deploy. In its (and State's etc) absence, who will do what is required? Soldiers and Marines - as they always have. Again, that is why we have FAOs, SF, CA and other specialties. Finally, I would note that some of our Greatest Captains - Eisenhower, Marshall, and MacArthur, among others spring to mind - were more than just soldiers; they were diplomats as well.

Cheers

JohnT

[Bill Moore]

Those of us who have commanded combat outfits in coin understand Wilf's statement that soldiers are not diplomats. Coin experts may retch when this is said but basically, fundamentally it is a statement of fact. Combat soldiers stand posts, they shoot, they pull security, they do raids, they patrol, they secure infrastructure projects, etc. The notion that they are diplomats is self-serving fiction. It briefs well but beyond that it is pure nonsense.

This attitude contributed greatly to our downward trend in OIF. Fortunately for our nation it was reversed by an officer who understood that engaging in diplomacy with the locals is not a self serving fantasy, it is absolutely essential. Soldiers are more than capable of engaging with the local populace to identify and help resolve their problems, thus helping develop trusting relationships with the locals that also enable Soldiers to garner intelligence based on that relationship.

If Soldiers are only capable of guarding infrastructure and saluting their red coat officers who have no faith in them (I realize this only applies to a small percentage of our officers, but unfortunately a damaging percentage), then we might as well empty our prisons and fill our ranks with category four soldiers, because we don't need well behaved smart kids capable of solving complex problems like we have now, we just need grunts who do not interact with their environment, but can shoot when so ordered.

Shifting from combat to COIN is not that difficult, if it seems too hard, then the training is inadequate because numerous Armies do it, have done it, we have done it -- it just isn't that difficult.

Words of wisdom, as are,

Be careful how we train -- too much training time spent on building other peoples Armies or nations will lead to a US Army that is not competent at its own primary mission.

We need to be able to do COIN adequately (as opposed to superbly); we do not need to let it drive the train...

It isn't that hard, even an officer can figure it out if he has a patient NCO that doesn't mind mentoring him. Nor do we have to be that good at it, but we sure as how have to understand the character of the fight we're in.

[William F. Owen]

This attitude contributed greatly to our downward trend in OIF. Fortunately for our nation it was reversed by an officer who understood that engaging in diplomacy with the locals is not a self serving fantasy, it is absolutely essential. Soldiers are more than capable of engaging with the local populace to identify and help resolve their problems, thus helping develop trusting relationships with the locals that also enable Soldiers to garner intelligence based on that relationship.

Bill, with respect, I think you are missing the point. Talking to the local population is a very normal military activity, at least where I come from. Has the main force US Army always been good at it? Clearly not, but the US Army are incredibly fast learners and have re-learnt from experience.

You talk to the locals to aid a military/security objectives. It should not be to make their life better. Ideally both will coincide, because if there is less violence, then everybody's life improves. The armed social work angle on COIN is pure poison to the soul of an army. Army's should not build schools, or day-care centres. Providing food, water and shelter, should be the limit. If you can employ locals to aid security then great.

IF your army has to pick up the ball for the other branches of government, it's because your government is broken, not your army

The "Advisor Corps"? Brits never needed an advisor Corps, nor the French, or anyone else, and 30,000 is a ludicrous number.

[Bob's World]

Before we can truly address the question of what kind of Army we need, we must first figure out what kind of foreign policy our government intends to implement.

For the past 60+ years it has been a policy based on a Cold War construct, and now that the Soviets are gone, and try as we might, we can't seem to force anyone else to pick up flag and fill that "enemy" role required to make the policy work, we find ourselves in a quandary. For the past 20 years or so much have simply been our efforts to maintain the status quo.

Problem is that things in nature do not remain static. Particularly populaces and doubly particularly populaces who have been suppressed under first colonial, and then Cold War induced policies implemented by foreign powers that have stifled their opportunities for self determination.

Now, with post-Cold War opportunity, and accelerated by the factors of globalization, the region of the world that has been suppressed and controlled the most is rift with local insurgent movements. Add to that mix the stirrings of reformation movements within Islam as those same factors of globalization crack the stranglehold of the Mullahs over their congregations (much as the printing press cracked the stranglehold of the Catholic leadership over European populaces not so long ago...).

So, the question is: What do you want to be when you grow up America?

We have plenty of role models in history to learn from. My position (and I realize it is a lonely one, but I am confident it will grow) is that we must be true to ourselves. And by that I do not mean to selfishly impose our will over others, but to instead be true to the principles upon what this very great, and very unique country were originally built. We are so convinced that "we are the good guys" that populaces will greet us like liberators when we invade their homelands for "noble" purposes. History really doesn't bear this out.

We have a new President, a new opportunity to finally take a strategic pause, catch our breath, and do a top to bottom reassessment of what type of world we want to live in and how we want to participate in that world (ends). Then look at our national strategies. We currently do not possess a grand strategy as a nation, but have an ad hoc collection of national level (and rather vague) strategies. Let’s craft a new strategy to achieve these newly defined ends (ways). Then, and only then, can we relook our national security structure and institutions of foreign engagement and retune them for the new mission at hand (means).

Right now we are struggling over how to do the wrong thing very well. I for one, take the position that it is better to do the right thing poorly; but that we need to strive to do it to the best of our abilities.

We can do this. We must do this.

Right now we are like a bunch of beer bellied losers arguing about the best ways to beat their wives. Many opinions out there to those ends. Others say no, you must control your wife, and only beat her when she really needs it. I say, hell, we're not even talking about our own wife, we are talking about how to help the neighbor (same neighbor who has never done much for us, by the way) control and beat his wife.

Maybe we need to step back and re-evaluate. I realize the analogy above is not perfect, and that it is intended to evoke an emotional response. Hopefully it also causes some to pause and reflect on the problems discussed in this forum in a new light as well.

[William F. Owen]

Before we can truly address the question of what kind of Army we need, we must first figure out what kind of foreign policy our government intends to implement.

OK but isn't this inherent to the nature of the military instrument? It's not particularly puzzling as to what you want an army to be able to do is it?

Foreign Policy can change in less than a week. US Government Policy of September 10 2001 was made irrelevant 48 hours later. Armies take years to change.

I don't think the question is what type of army the US and even the UK need. The need is for a good army. What makes a good army is actually pretty well understood. The problem is the people and ideas that stop those things from taking effect.

[Bob's World]

Certainly many share the position that Armies just need to focus on being Armies. We already have a "good army" in America. In fact, we have a great army. From the ingenuity and initiative inherent in each American Soldier, to the very best training, equipment and leadership we can provide. Building a good army is not the issue.

The issue is what should we be asking that army to do, and is the army trained organized and equipped to do those things well. A good army at desert operations is not automatically a good army at jungle operations; or a good army at defense is not necessarily a good army at offense. We all know this. You must tailor your training, organization and training to the mission at hand. The US developed perhaps the most devastating army at fire and maneuver that the world has ever seen, and while that serves a tremendous deterrent effect, it does not help much in the operations that we are currently asked to conduct.

My point is that we really need to sort out what the mission is prior to changing the army to simply do what we are currently asking it to do more effectively. And while policy may be able to change quickly, the US national security apparatus, with a few minor mods over the years, is based upon the world as it existed emerging from WWII.

So, I stand by my position. England has always had a good army, but that and $1.75 will get you a cup of coffee at starbucks, but it won't bring the Empire back. The solution for this problem must begin at the top. Meanwhile we soldiers will keep doing what good soldiers do, and that is our very best; whenever and where ever we are directed to go.

[Rob Thornton]

I'm glad Bill Moore used the word "soldier", it has the best of both functions and qualities, and covers the vast center we mostly operate in between the words "diplomat" and "warrior". Soldiers should not be automatons, but embody I think the territory in between disciplined and fair, courage and honor, professionalism and candor, etc. Maybe that is what John Nagl meant, however, I would prefer we qualify what we are - just my preference.

While I agree with John T that we have certainly been called often to perform those functions (teaching, advising, diplomat), I would say its worth considering the context under which they were performed, and who at what level should be capable of doing what and when. Does a company commander or battalion advisor characterize himself as a diplomat, or as a soldier who may employ some diplomatic skills to support his military purpose? What of LTCs, COLs and GOs? I realize this may seem like semantics, but it is a subtle nuance that may affect his mission. The truth I think is that it depends upon the conditions, and that is another reason why I prefer the term soldier with its inherent flexibility to adapt as opposed to warrior or diplomat.

How is (or should) a FAO or CA perceived first by those with whom they interact? As a diplomat or as a soldier? How do they see themselves? How should they? Does this affect the way in which other around them act? Is this beneficial or detrimental? Is it something that we should attempt to change, or something we should use? If you change the core nature of something without contemplating the full implications, you may wind up with something that only does either "not so well". That was one of the reason I ran the draft of the case study by Ken, I knew he would raise the flag on any extreme recommendation in the DOTML(&E)PF chapter that raised risk instead of mitigating it. We should consider the addition of new skills and traits from the perspective of enhancing our core values, not as being in opposition to them, of improving our chances of achieving the objectives set before us, not fulfilling one at the expense of another. The oath we take is rather unique in its implications, and should be considered as the litmus test for how we see our future selves.

I believe we are capable of doing what we are called on to do with some relatively painless changes once we recognize there is no real threat to our core values, however that requires we not create threats where there should be none.

A soldier's balancing act then is not a 50/50 proposition, but knowing when (and how) to shift the load accordingly, with the understanding and anticipation that said load may have to be shifted again and again, because conditions and policy objectives change over time, and so must we. This is the danger in opinion - it is that we (people) seem naturally predisposed to calcify and protect our positions, and seek out rational to do so. It seems it is just who we are, and guarding against that desire to make things final, or to preserve what we have is a natural tendency we have to fight.

Bob' s World: Sir, I sorry I missed your visit to Leavenworth - perhaps I'll meet you down in Tampa this month in support of the UQ seminar. There is something worth considering in your statement:

a new opportunity to finally take a strategic pause, catch our breath

Realizing I took the piece out of a larger paragraph, that opportunity comes with a price. As the President Elect takes office, there will be a great deal of pressure to employ the power of the United States in various ways ( from both inside the White House and beyond it). Certainly with tensions high between India and Pakistan, with the increased violence in Gaza, and with many others looking to take advantage of opportunities a true strategic pause would be hard to come by I think (if there ever was one). These in conjunction with dynamic situations in OEF and OIF. The GCCs certainly appear up to their eye teeth in hungry alligators. A pause of any type comes with a price tag - it may be worth paying, but its a price none the less. If it is visible, there are those who will advantage themselves of it.

Best, Rob

[Gian P Gentile]

This attitude contributed greatly to our downward trend in OIF. Fortunately for our nation it was reversed by an officer who understood that engaging in diplomacy with the locals is not a self serving fantasy, it is absolutely essential. Soldiers are more than capable of engaging with the local populace to identify and help resolve their problems, thus helping develop trusting relationships with the locals that also enable Soldiers to garner intelligence based on that relationship...we sure as how have to understand the character of the fight we're in.

Bill:

Your response is typical of the reactive nature of Coin experts anytime somebody questions standard thinking and language concerning the oracle of coin.

Your suggestion that "this attitude" caused to use your words a "downward trend" in OIF is not supported by the operational record as shown by early histories of the Iraq War. I have used this quote before but the most recent current history "On Point II" argues that by and large, most army tactical units by the end of 2003 were conducting best practices in counterinsurgency operations. As a BCT XO in 4ID in Tikrit one of the first briefings we gave to our BCT commander was how to go about setting up local governance in our area, how to go about rebuilding infrastructure, and how to go about protecting the populace.

Later I commanded a cav squadron in west Baghdad in 2006. Conventional forces in coin operate differently than ODA teams. Infantrymen, tankers, scouts, etc for the most part do not take part in so-called diplomacy. Their patrol leaders, SSGs, SFCs, LTs, etc are the ones who engage and talk to the population. So the notion that every combat soldier that has done a tour in Iraq or Astan is out talking to the sheik or local leaders as a diplomat is chimera.

Does this mean as your post suggests, that combat soldiers in coin do nothing but kicking down doors and killing people? Of course not, nor does it mean that in pre-deployment training for a specific area that all soldiers should not learn the basics of the cultures they are going into to help them better understand their environment.

The point that Wilf and I and others are making is that the notion as is literally stated that soldiers are diplomats is just simply folly. They are not, they are combat soldiers and as wilf has pointed out they need to be able to do the basic functions and skills of combat soldiers. If they can do that, then they can step into different directions to do coin, stability ops, nation building etc.

The concern I have is that by using terms like Diplomats we are confusing ourselves as to what should be our priorities, and the reality of coin on the ground in places like astan and iraq.

gian

[Ken White]

...who will do what is required? Soldiers and Marines - as they always have. Again, that is why we have FAOs, SF, CA and other specialties.

Yep.

Finally, I would note that some of our Greatest Captains - Eisenhower, Marshall, and MacArthur, among others spring to mind - were more than just soldiers; they were diplomats as well.

Totally true -- and with no special training back in the day but a lot of common sense, more talking than was probably comfortable for all three and sound military judgment applied when required ...

Wilf correctly notes:

My actual point is you need better doctrine that does not make the error of looking at "IW" as something distinct and difficult, when it is the common currency of military operations.
. . .
Concur, and engaging the local population and wining their support is a normal military skill. It is not necessarily unique to COIN and it is not diplomacy! It's bog standard G2 bread and better. Calling it diplomacy is inaccurate, misleading, and unhelpful.

My suspicion is that the three gentlemen John T. named would agree with that description. Then, as Bill Moore points out:

It isn't that hard, even an officer can figure it out if he has a patient NCO that doesn't mind mentoring him. Nor do we have to be that good at it, but we sure as how have to understand the character of the fight we're in.

True and as Gian reinforced, all we gotta do is be careful about

"how we train."