The Army We Need

[Rob Thornton]

The issue is what should we be asking that army to do, and is the army trained organized and equipped to do those things well.

I think that is a good question, however its unlikely to get a definable answer that most are comfortable with. It will change over time. However unlikely we might think certain possibilities are, this seems to be one of those counter intuitive outcomes where to consider them impossible makes them more likely.

Having a full suite of tools at your disposal to influence, coerce or compel if need be provides the other participants something to consider. As they work to free themselves from some, they may remain susceptible to others.

Iran is a great example, but there are others. Why do we believe that Iran will never cross the line which requires us to go to war with them? I use Iran as an example not because of the current rhetoric, evidence of their use of proxies in the ME, actions in the Persian Gulf itself, and not to justify a position. I ask the question in earnest, on what grounds do we justify a belief that Iran would not cross a line, or be perceived of having crossed a line that we would feel there was no other option but to go to war?

Next I'd ask what is the foundation of that belief? The same question could be asked many times over, however we'd be wise to consider that our belief should be grounded in the conditions which include our capabilities and theirs to deter or achieve an objective at what can be considered a tolerable cost to either participant. If a given belligerent believes they can now accomplish something in which they could not previously, because whatever the opposition’s capability was is no longer a capability or a capability with sufficient capacity then they have good reason to weigh the risk differently. Based on their desire or attraction to an objective, they may even defy your estimate (based on your beliefs and intelligence) of their odds or actions.

Transparency in capability communicated through statecraft is critical, but if your capability is hollow, of inadequate capacity, or is in fact not an appropriate capability, then transparency becomes an incentive to act, not a deterrence.

The word "well" in itself is one which is subject to conditions. What is the quality of "well"? This is the challenge of those who have the responsibility to provide "well" when the conditions change, and who must contemplate the consequences when "well" was not good enough. It is not an indictment, but it is the truth - policy when it matters most rarely apportions risk in a way that allows you to make infallible choices. Instead, it often corresponds to its nature of being the unlikely candidate because it comes from interactions which were difficult to discern based on how you saw things prior to those interactions.


So I would argue the other side as well, that while you consider this:

it does not help much in the operations that we are currently asked to conduct.

You may also consider that those capabilities have wielded and may yet wield influence beyond the obvious. How has deterrence based on that capability allowed us to protect our interests beyond OIF and OEF, and even to concentrate on our current operations? What lines were not crossed by others because they did not wish to contend with that capability? What opportunities were presented because others thought our capability relevant to their interests? What influence was gained in our diplomacy based on those capabilities?

Even in theater that capability has shaped operations - consider if we had not been able to retake Fallujah, or paid a terrible price for it? Consider the implications of not being able to open and retain a critical ground line of communication for conduct of our CSS? Consider more than just the political actions which facilitated the Al-Anbar – as Bing West has observed, there is indeed political power in being the strongest tribe on a a number of levels. When that strength is coupled with discipline, restraint, judgment and other attractive qualities it is all the more attractive.

I would argue that in fact we may understand our shortfalls with regard to current operations far better than we understand our strengths, and how they have made our current successes possible. We get immediate feedback when we fail, and we are our own worst (or most effective) critic – however, we don’t always get complete or immediate feedback on the things we do right, and we rarely give ourselves credit – its just our nature. This does not mean we don't have work to do in those gaps, but that if you dismiss something without understanding how it served as an enabler, the new capabilities we build will not be made operational in a way that matters as it pertains to providing the right “means” to operationalize the “ways” we’d prefer toward the “ends” we require.

My point is that we really need to sort out what the mission is prior to changing the army to simply do what we are currently asking it to do more effectively.

And while policy may be able to change quickly, the US national security apparatus, with a few minor mods over the years, is based upon the world as it existed emerging from WWII.

The first and second sentences can be viewed in more than one way. It could support John Nagl's argument or COL Gentile's depending on how we qualify "currently".


I'll agree that the values which we profess to guide our actions have been consistent on paper and spoken word, even occasionally in deed - however the implementation of these values is another matter. They create new possibilities and outcomes which sometimes must be (or have been) addressed in ways that are incongruent. This is as much due to domestic policy interaction as FP.

I think we are going to see a very ambitious FP in its reality. I think we must be prepared to both implement that FP in ways that stand the best chance of success, mitigate risk and preserve our options when those FP interactions create outcomes (or opportunities for others) which we did not anticipate, and which must be dealt with. Better than to have an Army that has its eyes wide open to the range of possibilities and can transition and adapt its capabilities with minimal hiccups, and one which is not rooted in one camp or another.

I cannot remember where on SWJ, but someone had remarked that preserving our "war fighting" capabilities in an armored corps, or something of that size would be enough to retain that capability and expand it. I don't think its that simple. While you might get away with it for a year or two, it would not be long before that capability could not be expanded fast enough to provide you options to respond to your policy crisis, or in a way that was seen as a meaningful way by those who were assessing your capabilities. I don't think it would be long before the DOTML(&E)PF reflected this change as well, and any incentive to preserve there would be overcome by the mainstream.

The solution for this problem must begin at the top.

Yes, our duly elected leadership has that responsibility. However, we must inform them of the risks and advantages. We must provide them alternative advice when appropriate. While our political leadership, and as such its priorities may change (more or less) based on their political philosophy and what they consider the appropriate use of military force, our institutions provide some balance. This is good (although some will say it is not so good), because the institution often has unique insights, and a sense of itself that should be considered.

Best Regards, Rob

[Surferbeetle]

From the good Colonel’s post I could probably be forgiven if I gained the mistaken impression that US Army is not a training based institution.

Let us examine the phrase ‘Diplomatic Training’. Is it the Colonels implication that for the US Army to offer ‘Diplomatic Training’ requires that this weeks world-wide training schedule will include a John F. Kennedy School of Government Graduate School Course on Diplomacy for all of our soldiers, the majority of whom have high school educations? Does it mean that we will listen to or watch regularly played AFN Commercials which remind us not to be an ‘Ugly American’? Will we participate in a 40-hour Headstart Language Course, unit Language Training, a SOLT Language Course, or perhaps a DLI Language Course? Perhaps our soldiers will be afforded an opportunity to use Tuition Assistance or the GI Bill on a college course on History or Government or even Diplomacy? Perhaps an offer will be extended to some of our soldiers to study at West Point, which offers some of the same courses? Perhaps CA, PSYOP, or SF training is a possibility for our soldiers? Or perhaps, the US Army should not expend the time, effort, or any other resources on this type of training which would further Diplomacy, defined in my copy of Websters as (1) The conducting of relations between nations. (2) Tact.

The trenches of WWI are homage to the type of thinking that ‘Diplomatic Training’ is not warranted for soldiers.

Instead I offer up the following references, which examine the pros and cons of this debate in far deeper and more eloquent detail than can I, a mere solider who has in fact received Diplomatic Training from the US Army, who knows first hand that there is more than one path to success, and who unequivocally rejects limiting our Nations ability to fully respond in this war or any other.

Strategic Studies Institute ‘The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy by Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman


RAND Publication CF 251 Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence (Lessons Learned and Best Practices)

[Ken White]

From the good Colonel’s post I could probably be forgiven if I gained the mistaken impression that US Army is not a training based institution.

Unfortunately, I also a mere soldier, have no idea what you're trying to say here? Could I ask for a clarification?

I read this link; "Strategic Studies Institute ‘The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy by Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman" but this one
RAND Publication CF 251 Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence yields the same document

I guess the second one is meant to point to this LINK. *

I'm unsure what either really has to do with the statement which Wilf, I and others have made that diplomacy in the conduct of relations between nations sense is not the business of the soldier (while acknowledging that tact is most always required of soldiers) ...


* Which I had read earlier and disagreed with much that is therein said, strongly believing that the entire Balkans episode was a goat rope that was none of our business and that we did ourselves more diplomatic harm then good there...

[Surferbeetle]

Ken,

Thanks for fixing the link, this document is indeed the one I wanted to link to.

I'm unsure what either really has to do with the statement which Wilf, I and others have made that diplomacy in the conduct of relations between nations sense is not the business of the soldier (while acknowledging that tact is most always required of soldiers) ...

During my year in Iraq I was not engaged in combat operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week and I do not believe that the bulk of our forces during this entire war have been so engaged either. This includes during 2006 when the fruits of following a MCO-centric/Diplomacy-light attitude were particularly evident. This war is not about trench warfare with uniformed force locked with uniformed force. Nor is this war about our top diplomat negotiating with their top diplomat for the win. Things are not that black and white and all the wishing in the world will not make them so.

Instead, the reality is that our Commanders work in a world filled with shades of gray and have to be able effectively negotiate with the local civilian power structure in order to be able to reach some sort of an accommodation. Certainly, sometimes words fail and death has to do the talking. Much of the time, however, a Commander can influence the will of the population with other means. This war is focused upon 'the population'. Commanders (and by this I do not limit the word to Officers, but include NCO's and Agency folks) who fail to understand this, fail to understand the power of diplomacy, and in so doing fail to use all techniques available to them in order to win.

Diplomacy works at a tactical level and it's past time to train on, and consistently use all means available to win. Other duties as assigned is not just a catch phrase...

Regards,

Steve

[Ken White]

During my year in Iraq I was not engaged in combat operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week and I do not believe that the bulk of our forces during this entire war have been so engaged either...Things are not that black and white and all the wishing in the world will not make them so.

Those statements are true of all wars as nearly as I can ascertain. Certainly applies to all I've seen on three continents.

...This war is focused upon 'the population'. Commanders (and by this I do not limit the word to Officers, but include NCO's and Agency folks) who fail to understand this, fail to understand the power of diplomacy, and in so doing fail to use all techniques available to them in order to win.

That is typical not only of COIN operations but, again to my knowledge, of all wars to a greater or lesser extent. I certainly agree with what you say is required with the exceptions of the fact that what you describe is not diplomacy and that you omit privates who also must be involved.

Diplomacy works at a tactical level and it's past time to train on, and consistently use all means available to win. Other duties as assigned is not just a catch phrase...

Then I suggest you need to define diplomacy as you are using it a little better than you did before. Seems to me you are now talking somewhere between international discourse and tact. I don't disagree with the fact that frequently in any war and almost constantly in a COIN-like scenario, some effort along that line is needed by all ranks. No disagreement at all.

What I disagree with is twofold -- calling it diplomacy which it absolutely is not; and the implication that 'other duties as assigned' doesn't cover the problem. It does, it is indeed not a catch phrase -- it never has been that...

Other duties as assigned in this context mean that one has to apply experience and judgment in relations with opponents and civilians in a combat zone to achieve a balance of security and freedom of action. Should such capability be included in our training regimen? Certainly. It should have been from 1975 until 2005 but essentially was not for the bulk of the Armed Forces (in COIN or post conventional conflict / occupation / pacification operations). Hopefully that has been or is being rectified -- but that training is not diplomatic training and to use that word sends a bad message to many, not least Congress who might start thinking diplomacy was a military mission.

Such muddy thinking could lead to a map like this: LINK and a situation wherein the GeoCom CinCs actually were the lead agents in US foreign affairs in their AOs. Note that Schmedlap has said he sees that area allocation dichotomy as a good thing; may or may not be -- what is certain is that having Flag Officers serving as de facto Pro-Consuls around the world means that they are exercising diplomacy. While they need to be knowledgeable about all that, I submit it is not their job to actually do that and further believe that such muddying of waters is not good for the US. Diplomacy is the job of politicians and the foreign affairs crowd; military involvement in diplomacy has always had bad results -- ala your earlier comment about the trenches in WW I.

What you suggest as required training is IMO correct -- what it is not is diplomacy. Not in any way.

[Gian P Gentile]

Lots of good discussion and thoughts on important matters in this thread.

Surferbeetle: Ken's subsequent posts after your questions of me clearly state what would be a detailed explanation by me of what this term "diplomacy" means in terms of an army and its soldiers.

I jumped on John Nagl's use of the term in his speech because in a sense he meant it literally; and in a sense he uses the word as a trope to call for signficant transformation of the American Army toward a force built around the principle of nation-building. It was in that sense that I used strident language and prose to attack the word. But in that attack in no way did I mean to suggest that American soldiers in combat--coin or whatever--should not act with tact, respect, and morality.

I really liked RTK's critique of the new FM 7-0. RTK, you should consider sending it to Military Review, perhaps shortened and tightened up a bit (maybe also without the porn reference; too funny!!) as an oped for one of their upcoming editions. I have yet to read 7-0 closely, but your critique of it will guide me through it when I do.

I also agree with much that Rob T said in his post. Balance is important. But what I have argued in many places and I really liked RTK's analogy to the multi-tool that it had many functions but if you used (or trained) on them all at once the thing would be ineffective. In this sense as RTK argues, the Army should build itself around its core functions of fighting; from there it can do other missions required of it. I just dont see it going the other way, that if we build primarily a nation-building army and then expect it to fight an enemy who stands and fights, well it will not be a pretty picture.

gian

[Surferbeetle]

In this sense as RTK argues, the Army should build itself around its core functions of fighting; from there it can do other missions required of it. I just dont see it going the other way, that if we build primarily a nation-building army and then expect it to fight an enemy who stands and fights, well it will not be a pretty picture.

Sir,

I appreciate your comments and would greatly appreciate on references on diplomacy (or other topics) that you are willing to share.

With respect to your above statement, I too believe that we must have a steel core to our Army that excels at MCO, however, that steel core must also be able to consistently apply effective COIN skills as well. Why? It is my experience that we (the Army) bear the brunt of figuring things out and that there is much more to war than 'just' MCO.

As a CA-Bubba, I was privileged to be attached to the 101st ABN DIV during OIF 1, and their ability to mix solid MCO skills with innovative CMO TTP's as needed was most impressive to me. I traveled the country fairly extensively during my tour and did not see this same mix everywhere. I do not mean to say that we were perfect, I humbly note that we are still fighting in Iraq and that things are still not stable.

Today, and many times when I attend CTC's, it seems to me that the emphasis for this war is still on MCO/COIN as opposed to COIN/MCO. Agency and DOD interaction/teamwork is not where it should be IMO and current force structure has much to do with this (DOS, USAID, SOF, and USAF in particular). I do not claim to have the silver bullet to our problems but I truly feel that we must change our approach in order to arrive at better outcomes. As Ken says there is a difference between diplomacy and Diplomacy and I am still working that one out...

Regards,

Steve

[Ken White]

As Ken says there is a difference between diplomacy and Diplomacy and I am still working that one out...

which is difficult since I don't even own a pedant -- but to preclude further confusion I may have inadvertently sown; Ken doesn't say there is a difference between diplomacy and Diplomacy, large or small 'd' -- it is the intercourse between nations and / or the exercise of tact.

There is however, as Webster points out, a difference between diplomacy (or Diplomacy) and being diplomatic. The latter is a euphemism for being tactful...

Words, as they say, are important.

Particularly when dealing with that crew of Lawyers that constitute our Congress...

[jmm99]

seems a logical extension from "exercise of tact" by soldiers, or anyone else.

I recognize the shorthand use of "that crew of Lawyers that constitute our Congress", so long as you keep in mind that "Lawyers" in the congressional context means "persons who happen to have law degrees". There is a notable lack of what I consider "Good Lawyers" in those hallowed halls.

[Ken White]

...There is a notable lack of what I consider "Good Lawyers" in those hallowed halls.

their parsing skills only, I presume the majority have no lawyerly skills or they wouldn't be in Congress. Hmmm, maybe skill is a bad word -- perhaps penchant for paralyzing parsing would be better...

[RTK]

Lots of good discussion and thoughts on important matters in this thread.

Surferbeetle: Ken's subsequent posts after your questions of me clearly state what would be a detailed explanation by me of what this term "diplomacy" means in terms of an army and its soldiers.

I jumped on John Nagl's use of the term in his speech because in a sense he meant it literally; and in a sense he uses the word as a trope to call for signficant transformation of the American Army toward a force built around the principle of nation-building. It was in that sense that I used strident language and prose to attack the word. But in that attack in no way did I mean to suggest that American soldiers in combat--coin or whatever--should not act with tact, respect, and morality.

I really liked RTK's critique of the new FM 7-0. RTK, you should consider sending it to Military Review, perhaps shortened and tightened up a bit (maybe also without the porn reference; too funny!!) as an oped for one of their upcoming editions. I have yet to read 7-0 closely, but your critique of it will guide me through it when I do.

I also agree with much that Rob T said in his post. Balance is important. But what I have argued in many places and I really liked RTK's analogy to the multi-tool that it had many functions but if you used (or trained) on them all at once the thing would be ineffective. In this sense as RTK argues, the Army should build itself around its core functions of fighting; from there it can do other missions required of it. I just dont see it going the other way, that if we build primarily a nation-building army and then expect it to fight an enemy who stands and fights, well it will not be a pretty picture.

gian

Sir,

I'll see what I can put together before I leave for points east.

When I looked through the new 7-0, I had the OCT 02 version next to it and basically went page by page. You can clearly see the same line of thinking from the people who brought us the BfSB (another source of my frustration).

[ODB]

It seems to me that in many aspects over the past 7 years we have blurred many lines. Everyone wants a piece of the pie and not "their" piece of the pie. Those many levels above my "boots on the ground" are jumping on whatever they think will be the next big thing, punching their "ticket". Maybe I'm a bit of an old school crusty bastard but it's kind of like the old stay in your lane and trust those to your left and right. Having done tours on both sides of the fence conventional and SF, I see things from both sides. Right now IMO there is a lot of confusion in the Army today. Seems everyone wants to do everyone elses job. I know everyone has their own experiences good and bad, unfortunately when personality conflicts take priority over mission accomplishment we get where we are today. Maybe I'm naive or too simple minded when I look at things, but to me it is too easy. We have multiple organizations all with specific skill sets and purposes yet we continually forget how or when to use them or do we simply just think "Hey, I got a great idea let's create a new unit that does this, yeah that's what we need.". As I read many of the comments posted there are multiple thoughts and opinions, but I ask this: What gets us to where we need to go to be successful in MCO and COIN? Why is that the step we need to take, what quantifies that as the solution? Is it as simple as properly employing all the assets available to the US gov't. Stop the political infighting for bigger budgets. Stop showing what else it is you think you can do and actually do the job your organization was created to do. IMO we need to somehow figure out how to come together to fight and defeat the common enemy and wish I knew how to make that happen, it is the million dollar solution. Unfortunately we have too many who put their own personal agendas before everything else.

The last thing I want to touch on is Army Training Sir!!!! RTK hits some major points. Many years ago when I was a young SGT and looking starry eyed at my big, bad green beret neighbor he told me something interesting. He said "Do you know what makes us look so high speed when we do things?" He simply stated "We do the basics to perfection, it just looks like we are doing something high speed". Fast forward many years when I made the jump to SF, let's just say I was shell shocked. After years of losing focus and concentrating on DA, we lost track of how to do the basics. Fortunately we had a smart company SGM who saw this and forced us back to them. Nothing like seeing ODAs in the Aug heat conducting react to contact, squad attack, and break contact live fires. We had lost what made us so good. There are more schools out there to teach you new techniques and to enhance your individual skills but it still comes down to the basics shoot, move, and communicate. I remember as a Private when we started our training cycles it was always with individual weapons. On those ranges every soldier in the company would be there. If it was an M60 range every soldier was there conducting concurrent training on that weapon system. We were all taught how to disassemble, assemble, zero day/night, crew drills, range cards, field expeident emplacement. Every single soldier in the company could effectively employ all weapons systems. Only then would we move onto maneuver LFX (Live Fire Exercises). We started with buddy teams, then fire teams, squads, etc... We built up to Battalion sized LFXs. I want to know what happened to individual skills training. Who decided we no longer needed CTT(common tasks training)? If I remember correctly collective tasks are nothing more than individual tasks put together. If every soldier is taught and trained his individual tasks then collective tasks are a breeze. Like I said earlier maybe I'm too simple minded and just an old crusty bastard, but this is how I was taught and it has worked for me for years. Learn it right the first time you spend the rest of your life doing it right, learn it wrong the first time you spend the rest of your life trying to do it right. Lastly, the best thing that could happen to the Army would be to outlaw Outlook, get back to seeing what your men are doing, get out from behind the desk!

[Gian P Gentile]

Sir,

I'll see what I can put together before I leave for points east.

When I looked through the new 7-0, I had the OCT 02 version next to it and basically went page by page. You can clearly see the same line of thinking from the people who brought us the BfSB (another source of my frustration).

RTK: I am showing my ignorance here, or perhaps just a bit too early but what is "BfSB?"

Also, where are heading to? If you dont mind, drop me a line to let me know?

thanks

gg

[RTK]

RTK: I am showing my ignorance here, or perhaps just a bit too early but what is "BfSB?"

Also, where are heading to? If you dont mind, drop me a line to let me know?

thanks

gg

Sir,

E-mail enroute.

[wm]

There is however, as Webster points out, a difference between diplomacy (or Diplomacy) and being diplomatic. The latter is a euphemism for being tactful...

Words, as they say, are important.

I think it is also important to note that not all words are created equal. Adjectives are pretty valuable for achieving clarity about the nouns we use to represent the things we discuss.

At the risk of being viewed as redundant (Is that as bad as being pedantic? ), I provided the following thoughts that I also posted here in the COIN Comes Home Thread.

Seems to me that one can see COIN operations in two different lights: preemptive COIN and reactive COIN.

Preemptive COIN stops an insurgency before it starts (sort of like preventive maintenance). What Bob's World described in his post wrt the Civil Rights Act would fall in this category I think.

Reactive COIN is what happens after the insurgency has broken out and one seeks to return things to a preinsurrection status quo aka peacefulness (restorative maintenance--what your mechanic does after your car breaks down on the highway, if you wish). What Wilf is seeking to describe with his questions above falls into the second category. What the coalition is doing in IZ and AF is reactive COIN as well.

A third consideration applies whether one is engaged in reactive or preemptive COIN. That is what we might call Limitation COIN. Limitation COIN strives to ensure that the actions taken to restore the status quo do not fan the fames and broaden the insurgency instead. It also must ensure that the efforts to forestall/preempt the insurrection do not produce new sources of dissatisfaction that foment more/different dissent in the populace. I suspect that this part of COIN is what Nagl had in mind when he called on us to produce soldier diplomats.

[Bob's World]

"COIN" is an unfortuante term in that it suggests a reaction or response to insurgency. How then, to become more proactive and to either prevent problems altogether, or to minimize the impact if unable to prevent?

I looked to Mao's three phases as a great point of departure for analyzing this problem (and yes, the final, very conventional NVA attack that finally defeated South Vietnam was classic phase III Maoist insurgency). For me, it all makes more sense by adding a phase 0 on the front end of Mao's three phases, and then considering every populace and every governance to be generally within that "peaceful" phase of daily interaction. As governance and popualces drift apart, one moves gradually into Mao's phase I.

Viewed in this light there is clear Civil lead and responsibility for COIN day in and day out. I don't need fancy metrics to know if I am in a community that is in low phase 0, high phase 0, or any other phase. You know it when you see it.

This is why I believe there is some merit at applying our existing MSCA doctrine to the the COIN problem set. It fully recognizes the enduring role of the Civil leadership, and has clear mechanisms for bringing in military support as needed, and peeling it back off as soon as no longer required. I believe this type of mindset would be a major advance in how we execute COIN.

Problem is that we got into this damn GWOT, and now attempt to paint all of our engagement in a wide array of environments as COIN; and it is messy and doesn't square well. Iraq is unique, as we invaded that country, took over the governance, and then facilitated the creation of a new governance. Always tricky business. We went from conventional attack, to occupation, to true US COIN against a resistance insurgency facilitated by UW waged by AQ. Ouch. Then we shifted to FID in support of a fledgling Iraqi government, while still dealing with COIN against a resistance and CT against AQ. We then had mixed in the Iraqi governments own COIN against both revolutionary and separatist insurgent movements and our FID to suupport that. Confused yet?

In Afghanistan we went from UW in support of the Northern Alliance insurgency, to FID in support of the new Afghan government that emerged. We also got into a resistance COIN operation with the Taliban, and CT against AQ who was again waging UW to support the insurgents.

In the Philippines we came in conducting FID and continue to conduct FID, it slips left and right on us every now and then, but we have been able to keep it cleaner as we did not begin with either an invasion or a UW campaign against the existing government.

Bottom line is that this is complex, but by seeking language and definitions that help us better classify the nature of the particular and unique activities, threats, and environment that we are dealing with in any particular case; and by adopting a more holistic concept of the activities that make up insurgency and COIN to allow us be both more proactive and better in our support to Civil leadership, I think we move forward.

Covered a lot of ground in a couple paragraphs, so if I pole vaulted over any key points without making them clear, just let me know and I will address.

[MikeF]

"COIN" is an unfortuante term in that it suggests a reaction or response to insurgency. How then, to become more proactive and to either prevent problems altogether, or to minimize the impact if unable to prevent?

I looked to Mao's three phases as a great point of departure for analyzing this problem (and yes, the final, very conventional NVA attack that finally defeated South Vietnam was classic phase III Maoist insurgency). For me, it all makes more sense by adding a phase 0 on the front end of Mao's three phases, and then considering every populace and every governance to be generally within that "peaceful" phase of daily interaction. As governance and popualces drift apart, one moves gradually into Mao's phase I.

Viewed in this light there is clear Civil lead and responsibility for COIN day in and day out. I don't need fancy metrics to know if I am in a community that is in low phase 0, high phase 0, or any other phase. You know it when you see it.

This is why I believe there is some merit at applying our existing MSCA doctrine to the the COIN problem set. It fully recognizes the enduring role of the Civil leadership, and has clear mechanisms for bringing in military support as needed, and peeling it back off as soon as no longer required. I believe this type of mindset would be a major advance in how we execute COIN.

Problem is that we got into this damn GWOT, and now attempt to paint all of our engagement in a wide array of environments as COIN; and it is messy and doesn't square well. Iraq is unique, as we invaded that country, took over the governance, and then facilitated the creation of a new governance. Always tricky business. We went from conventional attack, to occupation, to true US COIN against a resistance insurgency facilitated by UW waged by AQ. Ouch. Then we shifted to FID in support of a fledgling Iraqi government, while still dealing with COIN against a resistance and CT against AQ. We then had mixed in the Iraqi governments own COIN against both revolutionary and separatist insurgent movements and our FID to suupport that. Confused yet?

In Afghanistan we went from UW in support of the Northern Alliance insurgency, to FID in support of the new Afghan government that emerged. We also got into a resistance COIN operation with the Taliban, and CT against AQ who was again waging UW to support the insurgents.

In the Philippines we came in conducting FID and continue to conduct FID, it slips left and right on us every now and then, but we have been able to keep it cleaner as we did not begin with either an invasion or a UW campaign against the existing government.

Bottom line is that this is complex, but by seeking language and definitions that help us better classify the nature of the particular and unique activities, threats, and environment that we are dealing with in any particular case; and by adopting a more holistic concept of the activities that make up insurgency and COIN to allow us be both more proactive and better in our support to Civil leadership, I think we move forward.

Covered a lot of ground in a couple paragraphs, so if I pole vaulted over any key points without making them clear, just let me know and I will address.

Well said Bob's World. I'm gonna give it some thought before I reply, but your post was poignant and precise.

The only disagreement that I have is on the Iraq definition. IMO, we are still occupation phase but doing it using COIN priniciples. As the Iraqi government takes over, and we shift to truly advising and reconstruction, then I believe we can declare the occupation over and call it COIN.

As far as phase 0 goes, I believe we need to give some major thought on what makes a nation-state a homeostatic norm (peaceful, democratic, capitalsm, etc). As we learned again and again, it's not the US military that transitions a failed/failing state into a United State.

v/r

Mike

[Bob's World]

Just as an interesting aside to the earlier discussion regarding soldier's role as diplomat; I was just reviewing the 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual, and in para 2-2 "The Mission" one finds:

“If there is an organized hostile force opposing the intervention, the primary objective in small wars, as in a major war, is its early destruction. In those cases where armed
opposition is encountered only from irregular forces under the leadership of malcontents or unrecognized officials, the mission is one of diplomacy rather than military.”


Just found it to be an interesting statement, and one timely to the current discussion. I haven't sorted out yet exactly what they meant by that, or how I think about it. Perhaps it serves as bridge between WILF's oft stated position and some of the others.

[William F. Owen]

“If there is an organized hostile force opposing the intervention, the primary objective in small wars, as in a major war, is its early destruction. In those cases where armed
opposition is encountered only from irregular forces under the leadership of malcontents or unrecognized officials, the mission is one of diplomacy rather than military.”

Well what I read from this, is in the event of of you needing to employ some form of diplomacy, you dust off Col Odom or similar skilled individual and deploy him. One unrecognised official, requires one "solider with some diplomatic training."- while it is still a problem is not a military problem.

I would also add that I do not find the 1940 Small Wars manual that useful or insightful. It is good but I don't hold it to be gospel.

[Gian P Gentile]

...I would also add that I do not find the 1940 Small Wars manual that useful or insightful. It is good but I don't hold it to be gospel.

Wilf: as with most things, I am in agreement with you.

Your observation of the Marine Corps SWM is spot-on. In a couple of published pieces I have given the same observation. Aside from a few pages in the beginning about the political nature of small wars, etc. most of the book is made up of how to move donkeys, guns, marines etc over and under the mountains and streams of central america. As a primary text of history it is useful, but as a secondary source that somehow holds the key and secrets to small wars success it is of very limited value.

I have always thought it silly for commanders to place it on so high a level on their reading lists in preparation for deployment. Actually, the SWM is probably one of the last books a LT should read before deploying; unless that is he or she is hopping into Rufus's time machine for the jungles of nic. in the early 1930s and the Sandino hunt.

gg