Existential Question: The Air Force?

[mmx1]

- the USAF doesn't have good own EW/SEAD assets for penetration of enemy airspace since they gave up the F-4G/F-16C combo wild weasels. They relied instead for years on USN assets (Growlers in the near future) and on the use of AGM-88 (and its modifications) by fighter-bombers.

I have never understood the USAF's relative neglect of SEAD in comparison with their focus on air-to-air combat, especially as the threat to aircraft has been increasingly from the ground.

- the USN doesn't have a good midair refueling capacity for long range missions and relies on USAF KC's. The USN is afaik even retiring dedicated refueling aircraft and will depend on KCs and buddy/buddy refueling in the future.

Seems to me the refueling capability is better done by large tankers from shore than from the carrier - you can only launch so much off a carrier and does a dedicated carrier-based tanker really offer much more than buddy stores? Availability of strips is of course a caveat, but it's not like the tankers are short on gas. KC-130's can range 1000nm with a healthy amount to offload; I'm sure the larger tankers can do better.

- the USN doesn't have a good carrier-based ASW/MPA capability any more and will need to co-operate with P-8's for long-range ASW/MPA in a few years.

Insisting on carrier-based fixed-wing ASW seems like a step back to Cold War worst-case scenario of carrier self-sufficiency than a step forward. A land-based ASW/MPA offers so much more in loiter and range. Or were you suggesting these as examples of successful consolidations of particular missions?

- USAF / USN / USMC share the fighter-bomber mission, even when enough land bases are available.

And when they aren't? It seems like you are pining for an American version of the Brits' Joint Force Harrier (single command for their Harriers, deployable from land bases and carriers alike). Unless we shrink to that size, I don't see the cost savings. Conversely, we don't have to train all our fighter-bombers on carrier ops, which the 500 Hornet plan would require.

As for the original question, it's hard to pin down an answer without defining the desired role and function of the AF and what the rest of the force looks like. If the other services retain their current roles and functions, it's hard to argue with each service operating aircraft to support its particular role, and putting forward anything more than incremental changes.

If, as you posit, we can do with 500 Hornets, 100 C-17's, 2 CV's, etc, then you implicitly define the AF as a provider of support functions (CAS, airlift, ISR). What happens to intercontinental strike (conventional and nuclear - avoiding the use of the term strategic)? While this is SmallWJ, this strikes me as heading away from the vision of "balance" that Sec. Gates has laid out.

How about this for a revised thread topic: What is your vision of what the AF should look like and why?

I'd go bigger and tackle the roles of the AF before hashing out structural issues.