Military Staff

[Ken White]

You may have noticed I said that staff ennui was pretty universal -- except for some Germans.

I think that may be due to the fact that the German GS system gives far fewer and lower ranked than US or British norms Staff Officers some or even a lot of actual authority whereas the US and Commonwealth (well, except for the Australians who as always are a bit different...) most of the larger number and higher ranked Staff Officers are precluded from any meaningful exercise of authority, many simple decisions have to be bounced to the commander and distressingly often, up the chain of command.

My limited contact with the French indicates they fall somewhere between the German and Anglosphere traditions. Most Asian armies seem to mirror US / British practice to at least an extent.

Don't know how many nations have LnOs at the Intel School but you may want to talk to those that are there and get their impressions.

[wm]

Another thought on malaise.
I used to say Major was the most dangerous rank in the Army because that was the only rank at which one normally was unable to command (Platoon Leadership is a subst of command, IMHO, USMC has it right with their title of Platoon Commander).

Army officers tend to be Type A folks who want to call the shots or lead. When you are a staff guy, you don't get to lead; you just get to recommend to a leader, who accepts or rejects your recommendations. Maybe 90 days is the window of time that it takes for the "rejection" syndrome (recognition that you are not really calling the shots anymore) to set in.

Drawing on Eden's perspicacious analysis, we might say that in the days of a staff as information gathers, you could still be something of a leader. (This presupposes that leaders are folks who get other folks to do things.) You could go to subordinates and make them do something for you--give you info.
With the explosion of automated reporting of information (digitized terrain, Blue Force Tracking, GPS/SADL, LOGMOD, etc) now, rather than make people do things, staffers satisfy their leadership cravings by making databases do things (by setting up queries and filters).

Also by being the holder of a filtering role, a staffer may get to be something of the grey eminence behind a leader's decisonmaking process--since the staff briefs (provides information to) the commander, it is a decider at one remove. I think that staffers have always had a significant filtering function, but it is more obvious in a world where information gathering requires much less human intervention that previously was the case.

[William F. Owen]

You may want to try and get hold of Col Jim Storr's work, on Staffs. He has written numerous articles for the British Army Review on how staffs are too big and don't work properly.

Type "Jim Storr" and Command into Google and you'll get the phone book.

[Schmedlap]

At first, I thought Ken's point about the 90 day thing was off base because I thought to myself, "that never happened to me." I was the same anal-retentive, overcaffeinated perfectionist that I was when I left my AS3 slot as when I began it. But, then it dawned on me: I was only there for 90 days - and then I PCS'd.

I knew that the slot was temporary and I also knew that I had a lot on my plate for those 90 days. We had just returned from OIF III, my S3 and most of our NCOs in the shop were outprocessing to PCS, leaving me only two E-7's, a transient 1LT, and a cherry 2LT waiting on a platoon for me to sort out over 20 small arms ranges, Brad and Tank gunnery, and a slew of other exercises that would kick off before I PCS'd. Given the short time frame, there was no incentive for me to re-write (or write) the S3 SOP, nor was there any reason for me to go hunting for new bright ideas to implement. My only "pet project" was to make sure that whatever was left on my plate when I PCS'd could be handed off to the incoming S3 and 1LT when I left, without them needing to call me every 30 minutes for the following month.

Looking back, this only reinforces my belief that 1) we have too many staff officers and 2) officers spend too much time in staff positions. If I was able, in my 3 shop that was over 50% understaffed, to do what other battalions were doing (some of which were overstaffed), then that tells me that either I'm superhuman or we have too many staff billets. And while there is something to be said for being in a job long enough to learn its ins and outs and refine processes in place, that sounds more like the job of the NCOs, not an officer with a head full of bright ideas borne of too much idle time.

This personal anecdote is not to say, "look at me, I did it right." I screwed up a lot of stuff. But I didn't make unnecessary work for anyone other than myself. And that, too, is not because I had a gift for staff work - I didn't. It was entirely because I lacked the personnel to dump anything new onto and I lacked the idle time to dream up dumb ideas.

My impression is that, when fully staffed, a unit's staff is where good officers go to have their skills dulled and their talents wasted. Eliminate some of those slots and you will remove the incentives to create PowerPoint eyewashes, remove the idle time for their masters to dream up dumb ideas, and force them to focus on what is important, rather than those nice-to-have things that create red tape and unnecessary delays.

[AmericanPride]

That said, what would be the difference, in your mind, between supporting the "mission" and the "commander"? Why is this currently a problem? Would staff acting to support the "mission" actually cause more problems because it de-syncs the commander's intent?

What got me thinking on this course was reading about how in the Prussian system, if the chief of staff disagreed with a commander's decision he could, in writing, appeal to the higher unit commander for some kind of intervention. I don't imagine that something like this is imaginable in the present US staff system. From what I've seen, the staff is entirely submissive to the commander. I haven't yet explored fully the practical differences between the two, though I would argue that at the very least it would give the staff significantly more autonomy in its work. I'm curious if it would be desirable for someone (the "chief") on the staff to have someone from the next higher unit (CO/XO) as his rater. As for the commander's intent, ideally it should fulfill his commander's mission. I'm sure the majority of the time it does. What partly I'm interested in is whether or not an adversarial staff can develop better intents, COAs, and so on based on the higher unit's tasking. I think this would also lessen the impact of a commander's personality on MDMP. Thoughts?

[Ken White]

...the staff is entirely submissive to the commander.

I lack current experience but for the period 1949-1995 that was far from a universal truth; I've seen many a Staff type bulldoze or cover for a weak Commander and even more go around an overly authoritarian type.

...I'm curious if it would be desirable for someone (the "chief") on the staff to have someone from the next higher unit (CO/XO) as his rater.

Lot of practical problems with implementing that, not least distance and separation in many cases; i.e. it will work in garrison, in peacetime and in some low intensity combat situations but not in all and will not work at all in mid or high intensity combat. The latter may be the exception rather than the rule with regard to time but the latter are the ultimate reason for existence of any staff and thus their requirements have to be the arbiter.

...What partly I'm interested in is whether or not an adversarial staff can develop better intents, COAs, and so on based on the higher unit's tasking. I think this would also lessen the impact of a commander's personality on MDMP. Thoughts?

The intent is or should be the commanders, it is NOT up to the staff to develop that and no good Commander will allow that other than as a training measure; in the actual plan or order, it must be his.

The adversarial approach is much used in many communities, in a military setting it is seldom helpful and is vastly over rated as a method.

The commander's personality is not the only impactor on the MDMP (which is BTW entirely too slow to be used in mid or higher level conflict below Corps level and IMO should be scrapped...), staff personalities and squabbles can also affect it. So, even more so can higher hq -- and subordinate units...

[AmericanPride]

Ken,

Thanks for your input. A few more questions:

The intent is or should be the commanders, it is NOT up to the staff to develop that and no good Commander will allow that other than as a training measure; in the actual plan or order, it must be his.

If a unit's mission is received from higher, why is it necessary that the unit's intent (to achieve that mission) be developed exclusively by the commander? As I previously said -- I have no experience with staff, so I'm probing for underlying purposes, assumptions, etc in how the system functions.

Lot of practical problems with implementing that, not least distance and separation in many cases; i.e. it will work in garrison, in peacetime and in some low intensity combat situations but not in all and will not work at all in mid or high intensity combat. The latter may be the exception rather than the rule with regard to time but the latter are the ultimate reason for existence of any staff and thus their requirements have to be the arbiter.

Do you think technology (for example, electronic OERs) could mitigate the problem of seperation? What other practical problems do you think exist with the idea?

The adversarial approach is much used in many communities, in a military setting it is seldom helpful and is vastly over rated as a method.

Why is an adversarial approach in a military setting seldom helpful and overrated? I understand the concern with 'unity of command'. Does separating a commander from the planning process undermine his ability to execute missions?

which is (MDMP) BTW entirely too slow to be used in mid or higher level conflict below Corps level and IMO should be scrapped...

I haven't seen MDMP at 'combat speed'. Can you give me an idea of what drawbacks you think it has to warrant abandoning it? What do you think is a better alternative? I just finished up another essay (for the same Van Deman program) regarding the differences in instinctual and procedural thinking and decision-making.

Army officers tend to be Type A folks who want to call the shots or lead. When you are a staff guy, you don't get to lead; you just get to recommend to a leader, who accepts or rejects your recommendations.

Do you think that's a consequence of Army culture?

[RTK]

If a unit's mission is received from higher, why is it necessary that the unit's intent (to achieve that mission) be developed exclusively by the commander? As I previously said -- I have no experience with staff, so I'm probing for underlying purposes, assumptions, etc in how the system functions.

Let me answer your question with two counter-questions: What's the point of a commander? Why aren't units lead by committee?

Do you think technology (for example, electronic OERs) could mitigate the problem of seperation?

The problem isn't seperation. What loyalties would the Chief/DCO/XO have to the commander? Again, what's the point of the commander?

Why is an adversarial approach in a military setting seldom helpful and overrated?

For the sake of the team, which is what a good unit functions as, it isn't helpful, productive, or effective to have an adversarial staff. Constant disagreement for the sake of a possibly better product leads to hate and discontent. It also violates the characteristics of a good staff officer, as outlined in appendix C of FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.

• Competence.
• Initiative.
• Creativity.
• Flexibility.
• Confidence.
• Loyalty.
• Team player.
• Effective manager.
• Effective communicator.

This isn't a board room, its a TOC. There is a chain of command and our oaths of office indicate we "follow the orders of the President and the officers appointed over us." I'm also reminded of a couple little winners from GEN Patton on staffs:

1. "A Commander will Command."
2. "Too much if'n, perhaps'n, and maybe'n will never win a battle."
3. "No good decison was ever made in a swivel chair."

I understand the concern with 'unity of command'. Does separating a commander from the planning process undermine his ability to execute missions?

It doesn't undermine it. It prevents him from conducting his duties as a commander. It detaches him from reality. Do the New York Giants set up the game plan this week for their game with Philadelphia without Tom Coughlin? Does Eli Manning get with the rest of the offensive starters and figure out how their going to get the ball around Brian Dawkins and then let Coughlin put on the headset Sunday and let him call plays? Hell no!

It also defeats three of the 16 activities, responsibilities and duties of the staff as outlined in Appendix D of FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.

1. Advising and informing the commander
2. Preparing, updating, and maintaining staff estimates
3. Making recommendations

I haven't seen MDMP at 'combat speed'. Can you give me an idea of what drawbacks you think it has to warrant abandoning it? What do you think is a better alternative?

The Regimental and Squadron MDMP processes I've been a part of as both an engineer and assistant S3 have been abbreviated with a limited amount of COAs or directed COAs that the staff has worked to make better within the confines of the commander's intent, key tasks, and endstate. It's the same way OPORDs are developed at the platoon level on a macro scale with backbriefs to the commander to ensure they synch with his overall scheme of maneuver.

Do you think that's a consequence of Army culture?

That's the way it is. You seem to readily discount the power, necessity, and reality of the fact there's a commander in charge. That's a bit disturbing to be quite honest.

[CR6]

The Regimental and Squadron MDMP processes I've been a part of as both an engineer and assistant S3 have been abbreviated with a limited amount of COAs or directed COAs that the staff has worked to make better within the confines of the commander's intent, key tasks, and endstate. It's the same way OPORDs are developed at the platoon level on a macro scale with backbriefs to the commander to ensure they synch with his overall scheme of maneuver.

Which I imagine were determined in large part by the commander's qualitative assessments based on his judgement, experience and intuition. Ostensibly those characteristics are why a commander was selected to command. Many council members can cite exceptions to this I'm sure, but that's for another thread.

MDMP's biggest problem is that it is an analytical model that doesn't lend itself to time constrained environments, even in an abbreviated format unless analysis is tempered with intuition and judgement to move the process along.

[Ron Humphrey]

I just finished up another essay (for the same Van Deman program) regarding the differences in instinctual and procedural thinking and decision-making.

we could get a look at that paper. Sounds interesting.

[AmericanPride]

RTK,

Thanks for your input. I'll do my best to answer your questions. Your statements are allowing me to see more clearly some of the underlying purposes and assumptions in the Army's command culture.

Let me answer your question with two counter-questions: What's the point of a commander? Why aren't units lead by committee?

Aside for his legal obligations, I believe the "point" of a commander is to lead and to execute. He is to inspire by some way, act, or process his men to perform their duties, and to execute the missions tasked to his unit. In the absence of such tasks, he is to ensure that his unit is able to conduct them, or to the best of his knowledge fulfill the intentions of his boss. Units are not led by committee for a very specific reason; however, I believe that leading and planning are two separate and distinct functions. Notable historical commanders, including American ones, often held war councils with subordinates prior to a battle to determine a COA. Some went so far as to hold votes as to which COA to take. I'm not suggesting a democratic staff system, but I certainly think there is room to make staffs more powerful and more effective. Our present conception of a commander's role is not the first held by the Army, and, IMO, open for improvement. Part of my intent is to identify in other staff systems the relationship (in terms of decision-making, planning, etc) the staff had with the commander and what lessons we can draw from that.

For the sake of the team, which is what a good unit functions as, it isn't helpful, productive, or effective to have an adversarial staff. Constant disagreement for the sake of a possibly better product leads to hate and discontent.

I do not doubt that can be true. However, isn't that a cultural problem not properly addressed by training? This is sidetracking a little, but I think the Army only gives lip-service to character development and can do much more in that regard. I imagine that separating one's feelings from one's own ideas would be a mark of professional decision-making. It's one of the components in "self-actualization" theory. People like to 'own' ideas and I think that's a contributing factor to the problem you cite. Can that desire be mitigated?

What loyalties would the Chief/DCO/XO have to the commander? Again, what's the point of the commander?

The same loyalties you cited in your next set of questions: "follow the orders of the President and the officers appointed over us."

It also violates the characteristics of a good staff officer, as outlined in appendix C of FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.

I will not argue with the desirability of those traits, but I will dispute that adversarial decision-making necessarily undermines loyalty or teamwork. It can and it does undermine, but I do not think that it must necessarily follow from disagreement as you suggest. I also disagree with the connotations of "violate". FMs are not law.

It prevents him from conducting his duties as a commander. It detaches him from reality. Do the New York Giants set up the game plan this week for their game with Philadelphia without Tom Coughlin? Does Eli Manning get with the rest of the offensive starters and figure out how their going to get the ball around Brian Dawkins and then let Coughlin put on the headset Sunday and let him call plays? Hell no!

I disagree with the effectiveness of the analogies and because analogies can quickly spiral beyond control, I'm going to avoid it. I should have clarified my earlier statement: separate was too strong of a word. Perhaps distance would have been better.

It also defeats three of the 16 activities, responsibilities and duties of the staff as outlined in Appendix D of FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.

1. Advising and informing the commander
2. Preparing, updating, and maintaining staff estimates
3. Making recommendations

In the current understanding of commander-staff relationships and functions, yes. Number 1 clearly sets the tone for the position of the staff relative to the commander (I believe I said "submissive" in another post). Part of my intent is to find out (1) whether alternative relationships exist in other staff systems and (2) if such alternatives can produce better results than what we have now.

That's the way it is.

That's not a helpful answer. If personality types have a measurable impact on performance, then I think taking advantage of that is something worth looking into.

You seem to readily discount the power, necessity, and reality of the fact there's a commander in charge.

Not really. I'm probing the extent of that "power, necessity, and reality". I'm very interested in the abstract principles and assumptions that goven commander-staff relationships, and what, if anything, can be modified and improved. Obviously my comments so far indicate an interest in increasing staff powers relative to a commander. That's liable to make the commander types upset.

I think the major contributing factor to our disagreement is the fundamental contradiction in our initial assumptions: I believe your assumption is that an intuitive, direct single decision-maker will make, on average, better (or more relevant?) decisions than a collaberative, deliberate process. I am assuming the opposite. Am I accurate? If so, what do you think are the implications of those opposing assumptions?

MDMP's biggest problem is that it is an analytical model that doesn't lend itself to time constrained environments, even in an abbreviated format unless analysis is tempered with intuition and judgement to move the process along.

Do you think the thoroughness of MDMP is effective? Also, if a staff were semi-autonomous, do you think it would be helpful for it to run continuous MDMP (with the necessary changes) similar to continuous IPB?

[AmericanPride]

Ron,

I can make the paper available to anyone who wants to eye it. I finished it a few days, so it's still a rough draft. PM me and I can e-mail it -- unless you have another preferred method.

[Ken White]

...If a unit's mission is received from higher, why is it necessary that the unit's intent (to achieve that mission) be developed exclusively by the commander? As I previously said -- I have no experience with staff, so I'm probing for underlying purposes, assumptions, etc in how the system functions.

The unit's mission is received; how it executes that mission is determined by the unit (or should be -- it usually is). The Commander is responsible for all his unit does or fails to do -- ergo, the Commander prescribes HIS (or HER) intent. He may let the staff provide him an or some idea(s) or even written intents to assist those staff types in preparing to command at his level -- but in the actual order or plan, the Commander's intent should be just that. Occasionally a weak commander will allow a strong S3 to develop it but that's just wrong. See also RTK above.

Do you think technology (for example, electronic OERs) could mitigate the problem of seperation? What other practical problems do you think exist with the idea?

No, not really -- we could do away with OERs IMO but HRC sort of needs them due to DOPMA. You cannot truly rate someone unless you interface with them frequently and personally. Lacking that, hearsay and rumor start to dictate what is written. Also and again see RTK.

Why is an adversarial approach in a military setting seldom helpful and overrated? I understand the concern with 'unity of command'. Does separating a commander from the planning process undermine his ability to execute missions?

Because it takes up too much time and a staff is not a debating society. Blunt but that's reality. Separating the commander from the planning process isn't going to happen; recall "all the unit does or fails to do..." The commander really is the principal planner at Bn/Sqn level and that makes sense, in theory, he is the most experienced person there. That is also generally true at Bde level.

I haven't seen MDMP at 'combat speed'. Can you give me an idea of what drawbacks you think it has to warrant abandoning it? What do you think is a better alternative? I just finished up another essay (for the same Van Deman program) regarding the differences in instinctual and procedural thinking and decision-making.

The MDMP should be taught at BNCOC and at OBC. It is an orderly way to develop COA and recommendations. I susepct in the process of OBC you'll see the problem. At mid or higher level combat speeds (either of which can occur occasionally or even frequently in LIC), time to go through all the steps just is not usually available. Thus some steps must be omitted. Which steps? Which steps do you omit due to time constraints? The usual answer is to try to omit none because people slavishly do what they've been taught. Guess what happens?

The Division takes time to do all the steps because the big staffs, a two button boss and inertia exist. This means they will be late in getting their order to the Bdes. The Bde will try to accomplish most of the steps but will eliminate some steps (Cdr or S3 dependent; IOW a crap shoot on what doesn't get considered...) and thus will get their order to the Bns/Sqns REALLY late -- those guys will not have time to do most if any of the steps and thus, the trickle down effect robs the old tip of the spear of anywhere near adequate planning and preparation time, the poor Companies or Troops will not even approach adequate time to develop and issue the order. Here's an article I ran across some time ago that makes a good case -- but I believe even their solution takes too much time. LINK. MDMP has its adherents and detractors, it works and is all encompassing -- but even the Army realizes it is a lengthy process and not necessarily always applicable and provides some shortcuts (or used to in 101-5, probably still does in 5.0).

Obviously there are exceptions and I'm overstating to make a point -- but it can often be that bad. Even more fortunately, there are a few truly competent and intuitive Commanders out there who can skip unneeded step and eliminate COAs rapidly to concentrate on what should be done. There aren't enough out there but there are some. The formulaic and the mathematically inclined types are reluctant to eliminate any steps in the MDMP and thus they get out-thought by the instinctive types. Like Ron, I'd be interested in seeing your paper on the differences between instinctual and procedural thinking...

Do you think that's a consequence of Army culture?

Wm can answer but my thought is that it's a function of what personality type is drawn to military service and will stay with it. Most of us, even the non-type As like me, react to challenges (real or perceived... ) and operate on the 'do something even if it's wrong' principle. There's no question the culture reinforces those attitudes thus you get a lot of the condition wm laid out and that, I think, is a big cause of my 90 days into staffitis problem for many.

I do think our staffs are way to large and this exacerbates the problem as more people are poured into the frustrating bucket. Bertrand Russell contended that 20% of the people did 80% of the work in the world. After watching staffs at all levels from Bn to 4-star Hq for a good many years, I'm absolutely certain those figures are about right applied to US military staffs. Colonel / Dr. Jim Storr who Wilf recommend above posits that 40% of the folks on a typical British staff contribute little or nothing -- I'd agree with that also for most US staffs.

ADDED: Saw your response to RTK; several items there I'd like to answer but I'll wait for RTK. I will provide one thing you may wish to consider.

You mention more powerful staffs. Personally, I think that's a bad idea based on experience. If you look at US staffs, you'll discover that pre-WW II, Bn staff officers were LTs; Regt or Bde staff officers were Majors and Div had LTCs -- deliberately done so that a staff officer would not outrank the next subordinate commander. That worked quite well and lasted pretty much through WW II. Post WW II and Korea it changed due to less time in grade required for promotion and thus, inadequate experience for the staff types. CPTs were allotted to Bns. By the time of Viet Nam, only two years service to Captain meant that the S3 was upgraded to MAJ at Bn, LTC at Bde. My belief is that the quality of staffs deteriorated as they garnered more rank and power -- and grew in size (Parkinson's Law applies as do Augustine's Laws V and XXX). I think that's another of those be careful; what you want, you may get it things...

[82redleg]

I read (CRS where) an article that said the MDMP was a process that we developed to help untrained staffs support inexperienced commanders (maybe during WW2?). It seemed to make sense at the time.

I've also read (maybe the same article) that our current staff system was developed in WW1, as a copy of the French copy of the German staff system. The point, if I can condense it, was that the French copied the form of the German staff without the function, and then we copied the form of that, without the rigorous selection and training criteria that was the foundation of the German system.

After experience on BN and BCT staffs, I'd argue that staffs are TOO large and powerful, sort of the point made by Ken at the last post. I think that a BN needs a deputy CDR (a MAJ), a strong CPT to plan operations, and good warrant officer to run sustainment. Everything else can be managed by WOs/senior NCOs- it is (or should be) executing a plan, not making a plan- battle CPT, IPB analysis, maint, budget execution, personnel admin, CHS, etc. At the BCT level, I figure that if you do a single function, you are a CPT (with WO and NCO assistants), if you integrate one of the six warfighting functions, than a field grade officer is required- this would reduce the current 18+ MAJs to 6, with a LTC Chief of Staff and a COL Deputy (the BCT CDR should be a BG, but that's another kettle of fish).

[RTK]

The MDMP should be taught at BNCOC and at OBC.

It doesn't happen often, but I disagree with you here, at least for the OBC part. After 2 years, 19 classes and 1500 lieutenants, there is no way they could comprehend MDMP adequately to even give a familiarization. They have difficulties grasping TLPs, let alone MDMP.

As for American Pride, I'm not going to respond to a great deal of your "points" below. You remind me of a PL who I relieved. You're arguing a better way without knowing what the current way is really all about and, seemingly, for the sake of argument.

I will say this: You've decided in your mind, without experience or operational relevance, that the Army command system and staff climates are inadequate. I would argue that they are very good. However, your biases will not serve you very well in a learning environment and will likely piss of your first series of bosses. You're a thinker, which isn't all bad (also, as indicated by your 156 posts thus far, go back and see how many of them began with the statement "I think" or "I thought." I did. A good deal of them). But you're a new lieutenant, and you aren't going to "fix" the army in your first 6 months.

In all honesty, the subject for your paper is well above your head.

A bit of advice: You haven't been trained nor have you adequately researched the doctrinal backing of the current staff products, principles, or methodology. You have, however, formulated preconceptions, biases, and assumptions in your head. I appreciate your ability to ask questions; I do not admire your flimsy stances based upon no experience or research. If your intelligence analysis at the tactical level in the future is conducted in the same method (ie. preconception without fact) you will get people killed. Given you might turn out to be my BICC or S2 that, to me, is of grave concern.

[wm]

Why is an adversarial approach in a military setting seldom helpful and overrated? I understand the concern with 'unity of command'. Does separating a commander from the planning process undermine his ability to execute missions?

The function of the staff officer is to do his or her damnedest to convince the commander that he/she has the best solution to the problem the commander has been tasked to solve by higher or has identifed him/herself. Once the commander decides on a COA, the staff officers' duty is to do their utmost to ensure that COA is successfully executed. Adversarial relationships among the members of the staff tend to make this second requirement a lot tougher.

I haven't seen MDMP at 'combat speed'. Can you give me an idea of what drawbacks you think it has to warrant abandoning it?

MDMP is really just an involved way of proposing and evaluating various options. The biggest issue with it is that it can become a crutch for folks who are not too good at simultaneous multi-level analysis. For linear thinkers, MDMP is extremely time consuming because each COA gets worked through in series rather than by working all the COA in parallel or multi-threaded processes.

Army officers tend to be Type A folks who want to call the shots or lead. When you are a staff guy, you don't get to lead; you just get to recommend to a leader, who accepts or rejects your recommendations.

Do you think that's a consequence of Army culture?

As Ken pointed out, your response sort of puts the cart before the horse. The perception of Army culture includes draws certain types of folks. They were type A before joining and that may explain why they joined. It also may explain why some of them leave after having had the revelation that they might get to spend less than 30% of their time being the MFWIC (Mo-Fo Who's In Charge)--Schmedlap already alluded to this as the reason for getting off AD in a prior post


Some final thoughts.
--You might wish to consider that the staff function as something like a deputy or 2IC for a unit. (I think that was how Rommel used his OpsO in the desert).
--One could also split the staff into two sections (each with expertise from all of the various staff sections, 1-9 as appropriate to the HQ level involved)--1 section gets to manage the current operation for the commander while the second section plans the follow-on operation. When the follow-on operation kicks off, that staff section now manages it and the first staff section becomes the planning cell for the next step--keep alternating the process. It would keep folks busy and might lessen the likelihood that they get paid too many visits from the "good idea fairy" while ruminating about stuff outside their areas of competence. (This a variation on the multiple command post theory--a fwd CP that fights the current fight; a Main CP that plans the next fight;and a Rear CP that supports both the current and future fights, cleans up the mess from the last figh, and manages rear area protection to boot.

[AmericanPride]

You're arguing a better way without knowing what the current way is really all about and, seemingly, for the sake of argument.

I want to clarify I am not arguing for the sake of argument. I do not know if there is a better way, and if there is, I don't know what it is. That's what I'm probing to find out. IMO, this is the place to do it. I'm not going to approach my CO or BC and say "Hey sir, I'm fresh out of MIOBC and I think this is how you should run the unit." But I'll state what I believe and think here in an open forum; and if I'm wrong, oh well, I'll be corrected and I'll learn something.

I will say this: You've decided in your mind, without experience or operational relevance, that the Army command system and staff climates are inadequate. I would argue that they are very good. However, your biases will not serve you very well in a learning environment and will likely piss of your first series of bosses. You're a thinker, which isn't all bad (also, as indicated by your 156 posts thus far, go back and see how many of them began with the statement "I think" or "I thought." I did. A good deal of them). But you're a new lieutenant, and you aren't going to "fix" the army in your first 6 months.

You're right. I have no illusions about transforming the Army as an O1. Please remember, however, that this is for an academic project, and part of that project requires that I make a claim. I'm not going to say the staff system is worthless or weak; if anything, our continued battlefield successes illustrate the complete opposite. What I want to find out is where the chinks in the armor are, if any, and what can be done to address them. My eventual research may or may not support any extent or component of what I've put forward already. I might conclude just the opposite of the opinions I've expressed. They're just ideas.

In all honesty, the subject for your paper is well above your head.

A bit of advice: You haven't been trained nor have you adequately researched the doctrinal backing of the current staff products, principles, or methodology. You have, however, formulated preconceptions, biases, and assumptions in your head. I appreciate your ability to ask questions; I do not admire your flimsy stances based upon no experience or research. If your intelligence analysis at the tactical level in the future is conducted in the same method (ie. preconception without fact) you will get people killed. Given you might turn out to be my BICC or S2 that, to me, is of grave concern.

I don't think the personal characterization is called for or necessary. But I understand your concern. I have no personal attachment to an idea -- like I stated before, if the research, etc demonstrates my opinion(s) to be wrong here (in a discussion forum), it's an opportunity for me to learn and improve.

[Ken White]

If we agreed all the time, one of us would be unnecessary -- and we both KNOW that ain't true!!!

Even if no one else knows it...

It doesn't happen often, but I disagree with you here, at least for the OBC part. After 2 years, 19 classes and 1500 lieutenants, there is no way they could comprehend MDMP adequately to even give a familiarization. They have difficulties grasping TLPs, let alone MDMP.

Understand -- do recall I say and firmly believe that OBC should be about a year long...

I also think MDMP is way overdone and needs to be greatly simplified. It came about in an effort, as 82 Redleg said

"...that we developed to help untrained staffs support inexperienced commanders (maybe during WW2?). It seemed to make sense at the time.

Though IIRC, it was post Viet Nam and due to DOPMA insuring that we would have too many untrained staffs and inexperienced commanders. ..

[Tom Odom]

If we agreed all the time, one of us would be unnecessary -- and we both KNOW that ain't true!!!

Even if no one else knows it...
Understand -- do recall I say and firmly believe that OBC should be about a year long...

I also think MDMP is way overdone and needs to be greatly simplified. It came about in an effort, as 82 Redleg saidThough IIRC, it was post Viet Nam and due to DOPMA insuring that we would have too many untrained staffs and inexperienced commanders. ..

Don't get me started on MDMP and procedure as a fix for untrained staffs....we add bodies and process to fix what is a training AND experience issue because as soon as one gets competent, they get moved, probably to never repeat the same job but rather to start the learning by doing cycle all over again. Bigger BCT staffs have on exacerbated the issue.

Tom

[RTK]

I don't think the personal characterization is called for or necessary. But I understand your concern. I have no personal attachment to an idea -- like I stated before, if the research, etc demonstrates my opinion(s) to be wrong here (in a discussion forum), it's an opportunity for me to learn and improve.

This is my last post in this thread:

Check it out - It was called for in your first post:

I don't have any hands on experience with staff (yet), so any guidance, especially personal experience, would be welcome. Thanks.

You asked for advice. You then disputed the perspectives given to you. I've evaluated 1500 lieutenants just like you in the last 2 years. I've punted 15% of them. Take that perspective and advice for what it's worth.

Have a very Brave Rifles Day.