'America's Broken Army' NPR Series. Cavguy makes COL Gentile proud ...

[Eden]

I agree that we are probably better at some conventional warfighting skills than we were, say, ten years ago, at least at the platoon, battery, and company level. And I know that being in a real shooting war eventually translates to better tactical training back in garrison - more realism, more emphasis on the most valuable skills, less energy expended on needless 'safety' items and other eyewash.

But...I sense a complacency in your last post that I'm afraid many in the service share. There are a set of staff and command muscles that just don't get exercised anymore, at least so far as I can see. When is the last time anyone maneuvered a brigade in the US Army? Prepared a battalion defense? Conducted a brigade level passage of lines? Provided direct fire support for a division as it attacked? Deployed an AD battalion in direct support of a division? Conducted a brigade breach of an obstacle or an assault river crossing? Conducted SEAD in conjunction with an aviation deep strike? Set up a refueling point for a division as it road marched? Conducted a tactical road march consisting of three or four brigades? Coordinated all of the above as a division staff within the space of three or four days?

We used to do that all the time...well, two to three times a year, anyway, and still screwed the pooch almost every time. Now, I suspect, there are armor and infantry and aviation brigade commanders who have never done any of these things. Some of these will become our next set of division commanders. They will lead battalion and brigade commanders who may not even suspect they have missed something.

This is not a value judgment - I also believe that you have to train for the war you are fighting, and there is only so much time to train. But I am not as sanguine as some about how easily we will be able to resurrect our conventional skills when (not if) called upon to do so.

[William F. Owen]

I think there has to be a differentiation between doing some good training, because you are going to war in a place you know well, against folks you have fought before and the body of skills, drill and forms that you need to maintain an army to be ready for anything that it is likely to be asked to do.

I submit that the issue is doctrine. There is a pretty good body of best practice that can fairly easily accessed, by anyone prepared to take the risk of doing so.

Look at any military training problem and you'll usually find some idiotic body of opinion defending some ones empire or skill set.

Look out for people who believe that it is their job to "deliver training" instead of "teaching people how do things." and then testing them to make sure they can.

[Ken White]

Schmedlap and Eden? I place 'truth' in quotes because I fully acknowledge that 'truth' in training is very subjective, subject to interpretation and means different things to different people.

I think Scmedlap's version of unit training broadly tracks with my experience over almost 30 years of doing and another almost 20 of closely observing and 'overseeing.' I think Eden's comments also track with all that.

The important thing to me is to acknowledge that we are now training better at the unit level than we ever did -- but we still are not doing that as well as we can or should...

Eden says:

"When is the last time anyone maneuvered a brigade in the US Army?... (and much else) ... Coordinated all of the above as a division staff within the space of three or four days?

We used to do that all the time...well, two to three times a year, anyway, and still screwed the pooch almost every time..."

I do not dispute that was done nor that it was training but I will point out that it was generally done poorly -- as Eden acknowledges -- and in my observation unrealistically only once or twice a year and with no penalties for failure or error.

That's a long way of getting to the major point -- how you train is a great deal more important than what you train.

It is far better for combat forces to do the basics well than to do the exotic or upper levels poorly...

Added: Wilf said:

"Look out for people who believe that it is their job to "deliver training" instead of "teaching people how do things." and then testing them to make sure they can."

YES!!!

[reed11b]

There are a set of staff and command muscles that just don't get exercised anymore, at least so far as I can see. When is the last time anyone maneuvered a brigade in the US Army? Prepared a battalion defense? Conducted a brigade level passage of lines? Provided direct fire support for a division as it attacked? Deployed an AD battalion in direct support of a division? Conducted a brigade breach of an obstacle or an assault river crossing? Conducted SEAD in conjunction with an aviation deep strike? Set up a refueling point for a division as it road marched? Conducted a tactical road march consisting of three or four brigades? Coordinated all of the above as a division staff within the space of three or four days?

Ummm, what is this "Division" you refer too? Read somthing about them in WWII I believe and since when have staff and command weenies had "muscles"?
Reed

[RTK]

Hey Ken!

Didn't we have the "training management sucks" talk last week?

[Ken White]

I'm in a rut...

[Eden]

Ummm, what is this "Division" you refer too?

My point exactly!

As for staff and command muscles - here is the approved staff weenie workout:

Stretch the truth
Wrap your head around obvious nonsense
Run into brick walls (3 sets)
Jump through hoops
Perform mental gymnastics
Bob and weave at the podium for thirty seconds
Cool down with 12-oz curls (as many as you need)

[Schmedlap]

Could you explain that again in PowerPoint format? I couldn't quite understand it in plain English.

[Tom Odom]

My point exactly!

As for staff and command muscles - here is the approved staff weenie workout:

Stretch the truth
Wrap your head around obvious nonsense
Run into brick walls (3 sets)
Jump through hoops
Perform mental gymnastics
Bob and weave at the podium for thirty seconds
Cool down with 12-oz curls (as many as you need)

Successful completion earns you the Expert PPT Badge

Successful completion in an operational zone gets the Combat PPT Badge

In my day, the equivalent was the coveted Expert Grease Pencil and Combat Grease Pencil badges

Tom

[Entropy]

I've got a few of these, unfortunately:



Don't forget the advice of Patton:

[Ken White]

In my day, the equivalent was the coveted Expert Grease Pencil and Combat Grease Pencil badges

precursor Expert Flint and Clay Tablet badge.

Gotta grandfather these things...

[wm]

My point exactly!

As for staff and command muscles - here is the approved staff weenie workout:

Stretch the truth
Wrap your head around obvious nonsense
Run into brick walls (3 sets)
Jump through hoops
Perform mental gymnastics
Bob and weave at the podium for thirty seconds
Cool down with 12-oz curls (as many as you need)

Don't forget these favorites:
--Misinterpret higher headquarters tasker, thereby doubling required workload
--12 hour run with hair on fire in response to above tasker
--Submit/Resubmit staff coordination/decision packet (at least 5 reps, usually with two reconsiderations of non-concurrence by the same office for failing to change "happy" to "glad"
--distill 50 pages of text into 3 bullet .PPT slide for 30 second podium "bob and weave."

[ODB]

Must lose at least one of the following weekly for the standard badge, two a week gets you an expert badge, and for the master badge three or more weekly must get "lost".

1. Training concept done at the company or lower level.
2. Range request.
3. Ammo request.
4. NCOER.
5. Awards recommendation.
6. Any and all information requirements that "we" the staff asked for and was submitted by lower levels.

[120mm]

An analogy between the US Army, conventional capability and COIN:

The US Army is to COIN, like a fat, out-of-shape individual who explains to folks that they don't go to the gym, because they don't want to become "too muscular". Nevermind that being "too muscular" is not something that will actually accidentally just happen to someone who works out.

You see, the fat guy is that way pretty naturally, and will continue to be that way in perpetuity. Kind of like the US Army's conventional capability. We, as an army love HIC, because we're good at it, and it's relatively easy to do and train for.

Nevermind that even in our "weakened" state, we could still defeat the next 10 opponents put together, and nevermind that the great majority of our military threats are insurgent-based, and 8 years into this current conflict, we still suck at COIN.

We, as an Army, throw out the "but we don't to give up our conventional capability" as an excuse as to why that is so. We STILL have a huge excess of capability for any imaginable present or even near future threat. And we can spool up our ability to kill red hordes just about anytime we want, though maybe not by killing them the way we would've back in the day.

[William F. Owen]

We, as an army love HIC, because we're good at it, and it's relatively easy to do and train for.

Well good being a relative term. You, and we (UK) haven't faced a world class Combined Arms capability since 1945, and some light conventional forces proved challenging in both Korea and Vietnam.

I do not agree that it is easy to train for. Doing a Battle Group running replenishment, prior to performing a passage of lines, in full NBC kit and and with an air threat is extremely demanding. Do you need to be able to do that, is another question. A conventional capability lost, can be recovered, but will it be recovered in time and with the budget required?

Almost every Army in the world can do COIN, given the right training, leadership and small amounts of quite cheap equipment. It's the default setting for most armed forces. There are very few world class combined arms armies.

Nevermind that even in our "weakened" state, we could still defeat the next 10 opponents put together, and nevermind that the great majority of our military threats are insurgent-based, and 8 years into this current conflict, we still suck at COIN.

On one level I concur, but be careful of drawing a line between Insurgents and everyone else - and you don't "suck at COIN" IMO. The lesson of history is that, left to their own devices, the US Army learns fast.

We, as an Army, throw out the "but we don't to give up our conventional capability" as an excuse as to why that is so. We STILL have a huge excess of capability for any imaginable present or even near future threat. And we can spool up our ability to kill red hordes just about anytime we want, though maybe not by killing them the way we would've back in the day.

If you are saying that conventional capability has to adapt to a Geo-political reality, I'd agree. We might not agree on the precise detail of the Geo-political reality.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Don't forget these favorites:
--Misinterpret higher headquarters tasker, thereby doubling required workload
--12 hour run with hair on fire in response to above tasker
--Submit/Resubmit staff coordination/decision packet (at least 5 reps, usually with two reconsiderations of non-concurrence by the same office for failing to change "happy" to "glad"
--distill 50 pages of text into 3 bullet .PPT slide for 30 second podium "bob and weave."

Very good gents.

And my other mandatory events:

-making mountains out of molehills
-running around in circles
-digging yourself in deeper