'America's Broken Army' NPR Series. Cavguy makes COL Gentile proud ...

[Ratzel]

but I think it is a mistake to assume that conventional capabilities only have use against conventional forces.

Yes, but in the future we will face trade offs as far as procurement, and are currently facing trade offs in terms of training. So when it comes between the F-22 and more COIN capabilities, or between a COIN rotation at NTC or a HIC conflict rotation, some decision making will have to be done?

I suppose we can train for both, but this might make us halfway trained for both instead of highly trained for one? Procurement is even more cut and dry. Do we buy the next generation of tanks, or do we use that money in ways that enhances our nation building capabilities?

Again, this will depend on what our interests and geopolitical needs are? Some claim that our safety will depend on our ability to nation build, or "shrink the Gap." Others claim that the China's looking big and bad, or that Russia's' on the rise.

Is it possible to have a force that can do it all? Is there a way to train the force that makes them just as good at both? For instance: Could a unit going through NTC spend half its time doing COIN, and half its time doing HIC? Maybe they can do HIC at NTC and COIN at home station?

[William F. Owen]

Yes, but in the future we will face trade offs as far as procurement, and are currently facing trade offs in terms of training. So when it comes between the F-22 and more COIN capabilities, or between a COIN rotation at NTC or a HIC conflict rotation, some decision making will have to be done?

History is a pretty good guide here. Very few armies ever come up with equipment that is so context specific, it can't be used for other things. Nukes being the obvious exception, but MRAPs are useful in high end warfighting, in that there are roles you can usefully apply them to.

...but you are absolutely correct.
The USAF has dropped the ball badly in this area, as has the RAF. The cost versus "spectrum of effect" analysis has been totally lacking. Effectiveness has got to be balanced against efficiency, especially in Air warfare. It is far less critical in land and naval domains.

[Schmedlap]

I suspect that I am inadvertently cherry-picking or that I am missing your point, but I'll throw it out there just in case it's relevent...

I've found the Air Force to be surprisingly relevant to current operations. Almost every operation on my last deployment had multiple Air Force (and possibly Navy) assets on station in the event that we needed them (and we often did), whether it was Spectre, F-16 (or maybe F-14 - in any case, it was carrying 500lb bombs), or something else. Also, isn't it the Air Force that is the lead proponent/agency for UAV's? We used UAV's on a daily basis for a myriad of purposes, often saving us significant manpower, time, and accomplishing the task more effectively.

[Eden]

I suspect that because most of us who haunt the forum are or were Army or Marines we miss the big point about designing forces for the next war. Land forces are much more flexible and adaptable (and considerably cheaper) than the air or sea services. You can take an armored battalion or an air defense battalion, park the vehicles somewhere, and use the personnel for a variety of purposes; we've been doing just that for years. When I was a tank battalion S-3 we guarded Haitian refugees at Gitmo and fought prairie fires - and this was in 1995. So you can design an army for high-intensity warfare and still be comfortable that you will have at least some capacity for lesser contingencies.

Not so much for the really expensive parts of the armed forces. Yes, carrier battle groups and F-16 squadrons have utility in small wars - but if you are designing a Navy or an Air Force to support wars like Afghanistan or Iraq, and 'accepting risk' like Sec Gates says we are, the weapon systems you buy would look much different from the ones we are currently acquiring. You would want air frames, for example, designed almost solely to accurately deliver ordnance (or bags of food); air superiority would not be a consideration.

Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move. So the 10,000 or so bodies that we invest in a carrier battle group (a swag from a groundpounder, by the way, so don't quote me) would ideally be reinvested in brown water forces, CBs, special forces, or in the Army.

[William F. Owen]

Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move.

DING Ding! - Exactly. That has been the central argument of my force development work for the last 7 years! - Kudos Eden. Didn't know the US had the same problem. Many thanks.

[Eden]

To illustrate a bit the problems staffers face when working on force structure changes, I can relate my own experience as a bit player in designing a Stryker Division - that is, a division element controlling three Stryker Brigades. This never came to fruition, but the boundaries we were given at the beginning of the process were as follows:

1. A manpower cap - I can't remember what it was but somewhere around 12-15,000.
2. Deployability - the whole division had to be deployable by air given so many sorties in a certain amount of time.
3. No post in Alaska or Hawaii could have fewer soldiers on it at the end of the process than they currently had - a politically imposed condition laid on in deference to the powerful senators from those states.
4. USARAK had to maintain its airborne capability.

Cost (in terms of dollars) never really came into it. But these are the kinds of things that cause otherwise intelligent organizations to do stupid stuff.

[Ken White]

Ratzel Said:

"I suppose we can train for both, but this might make us halfway trained for both instead of highly trained for one? Procurement is even more cut and dry. Do we buy the next generation of tanks, or do we use that money in ways that enhances our nation building capabilities?"

Really good point. I think though, that the answer to the first question is that we were not much better than halfway trained for HIC in 2000. That is due to the fact that our obsolescent and really inefficient personnel system causes an annual rotation of 25-35% of all people in a unit -- so a really well trained unit at one point in time will degrade over the course of a year. That is reality.

That is also not as bad as it sounds; it is, in a word, good enough -- not great but good enough. That has almost always been true of all Armies. Long way of getting to the point that halfway trained for the full spectrum of warfare is acceptable. It's a lot better than being 90% trained for one form and then being confronted with another (See Iraq, 2003).

The answer to the second question is that, quite simply, outside of the Leopard 2A6, the M1A2 has no competition, therefor a new tank is not needed, merely continue to do some R and D. Which we are doing. So "that money" is or will be used to enhance our stability operations capability (see below).

Wilf said:

"The USAF has dropped the ball badly in this area, as has the RAF. The cost versus "spectrum of effect" analysis has been totally lacking. Effectiveness has got to be balanced against efficiency, especially in Air warfare. It is far less critical in land and naval domains.

True, though I think from what I read both are finally starting to realize that and are slowly changing; also see below.

Eden said:

"So you can design an army for high-intensity warfare and still be comfortable that you will have at least some capacity for lesser contingencies.

Not so much for the really expensive parts of the armed forces. Yes, carrier battle groups and F-16 squadrons have utility in small wars - but if you are designing a Navy or an Air Force to support wars like Afghanistan or Iraq, and 'accepting risk' like Sec Gates says we are, the weapon systems you buy would look much different from the ones we are currently acquiring. You would want air frames, for example, designed almost solely to accurately deliver ordnance (or bags of food); air superiority would not be a consideration.

Wilf's right, kudos for that. It often gets forgotten.

I agree but would point out that the HIC capability is critical to survival; the LIC capability is nice to have. It appears that many in the policy realm seem to think along that same line.

The cost of effective LIC systems is generally quite low (relatively speaking), so the diversion of only one Carrier Battle Group (for example) to oblivion would and will pay for both a few more spaces and possibly much equipment tailored for LIC. It is my perception that these trade-offs are being discussed and planned for implementation in the post 2014 period. The spending for the interim is already in place and there is no existential need to change it and Congress would likely not change it barring a major push by someone...

Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move.

A terrible truth. Also the driver of many more things than most realize. Congress is at the root of many perceived DoD-related problems...

[William F. Owen]

I've found the Air Force to be surprisingly relevant to current operations. Almost every operation on my last deployment had multiple Air Force (and possibly Navy) assets on station in the event that we needed them (and we often did), whether it was Spectre, F-16 (or maybe F-14 - in any case, it was carrying 500lb bombs), or something else.

I'll clarify. The US Air Force is not just relevant, they are Essential. - and as you say, 500lb bombs. It don't matter if they come from an F-16, F-14, B-52 or P-3. It doesn't matter if you get air from the Air Force or Navy - both only exist to support ground operations, and their support is critical.

Also, isn't it the Air Force that is the lead proponent/agency for UAV's? We used UAV's on a daily basis for a myriad of purposes, often saving us significant manpower, time, and accomplishing the task more effectively.

There are vast range of assumptions about UAV operations, which once subjected to rigour, do not paint a clear choice between manned and un-manned aircraft, especially when it comes to COIN operations, and especially when it comes to cost. When it comes to UAV's "Lies, dam Lies and Statistics" are to the fore! It is very context and mission specific.

[reed11b]

I suppose we can train for both, but this might make us halfway trained for both instead of highly trained for one? Procurement is even more cut and dry. Do we buy the next generation of tanks, or do we use that money in ways that enhances our nation building capabilities?

Again, this will depend on what our interests and geopolitical needs are? Some claim that our safety will depend on our ability to nation build, or "shrink the Gap." Others claim that the China's looking big and bad, or that Russia's' on the rise.

Is it possible to have a force that can do it all? Is there a way to train the force that makes them just as good at both? For instance: Could a unit going through NTC spend half its time doing COIN, and half its time doing HIC? Maybe they can do HIC at NTC and COIN at home station?

Ratzel, if you are using your armed forces as your primary tool of "statesmanship", you are using the wrong tool. Nation Building and "shrinking the Gap" is a primary mission of State, not defense. Of course I have long felt that we need to look at the "Foreign Policy" budget to include defense spending and allocate from there based on current and projected needs, but that is a different argument. How we structure the equipment and train to use the equipment we buy affects our COIN abilities more then the actual equipment. See Wilf's posts for more on that. Do we need UAV's, Yep. DO we need them at the BCT level, or should they belong only to the AF or Army? That is less clear. Another fallacious argument seems to based the thought that brigades have to be either "heavy" or "Light" or "Stryker". Why can't infantry units have organic armor support? Why does mech infantry have to be organized to be manpower short and receive less training on how to work minus the Bradley’s? See where I am going here? The DOD and the public and even, from time to time, members of this board, try to compartmentalize everything into black and white terms. The truth is that the world is grey. Train better, organize better, from the get go and this argument returns to the smoke and vapor it came from
Reed

[Entropy]

Land forces are much more flexible and adaptable (and considerably cheaper) than the air or sea services. You can take an armored battalion or an air defense battalion, park the vehicles somewhere, and use the personnel for a variety of purposes; we've been doing just that for years. When I was a tank battalion S-3 we guarded Haitian refugees at Gitmo and fought prairie fires - and this was in 1995. So you can design an army for high-intensity warfare and still be comfortable that you will have at least some capacity for lesser contingencies.

People are always going to be more adaptable than equipment - that much is obvious. So too is the fact that air and naval forces are more dependent on equipment to operate in their domains and so can be considered less flexible. But for "high tech" warfare, the Army is pretty much just as equipment dependent as the Navy and Air Force.

Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move. So the 10,000 or so bodies that we invest in a carrier battle group (a swag from a groundpounder, by the way, so don't quote me) would ideally be reinvested in brown water forces, CBs, special forces, or in the Army.

You're completely correct about the limitations of manpower on force structure, but I think you're completely wrong in the assertion that manpower is cheap. It is not, especially once one considers that some legacy manpower costs are not part of the defense budget. Moreover, the budget for personnel is much less flexible. You can't save money and divert it to other things nearly as easily as you can with procurement and O&M money.

Additionally, moving personnel from one area (carrier battle group) to another (brown water, CB, SF, Army) is neither easy nor cheap. The skills and equipment requirements are quite different and, in a volunteer force at least, one cannot simply order that nuclear reactor tech to become a SEAL or CB or whatever. You can force them out and recruit replacements, or offer incentives to change, but both of those are expensive, and that's not even discussing the recruiting, retraining, decommissioning costs as well as costs to equip the force for the new task. And by "costs" I'm talking both money AND time. Changing force structure is therefore an expensive and slow process.

Not so much for the really expensive parts of the armed forces. Yes, carrier battle groups and F-16 squadrons have utility in small wars - but if you are designing a Navy or an Air Force to support wars like Afghanistan or Iraq, and 'accepting risk' like Sec Gates says we are, the weapon systems you buy would look much different from the ones we are currently acquiring. You would want air frames, for example, designed almost solely to accurately deliver ordnance (or bags of food); air superiority would not be a consideration.

Turn your argument on its head. Suppose we build a specialized force for small wars - what happens when a big war comes around? Then you're stuck with capabilities you can't use and then the argument is turned upside down. Better, I think, to have capabilities that can do both imperfectly than try to bet the farm on what the next war is going to be and create an ideal force for that particular war. This is actually what both the Air Force and Navy have been doing for almost 20 years now - getting rid of "one-trick-pony" capabilities in favor of more flexible capabilities. Does that have costs? Sure, but what is the alternative? Try to reconfigure most of your force with every new conflict? One can certainly do that to some extent (and all the services are), but changing a carrier battle group into something optimized for small wars may not be practical or wise for a whole host of reasons.

[reed11b]

Turn your argument on its head. Suppose we build a specialized force for small wars - what happens when a big war comes around? Then you're stuck with capabilities you can't use and then the argument is turned upside down. Better, I think, to have capabilities that can do both imperfectly than try to bet the farm on what the next war is going to be and create an ideal force for that particular war. This is actually what both the Air Force and Navy have been doing for almost 20 years now - getting rid of "one-trick-pony" capabilities in favor of more flexible capabilities. Does that have costs? Sure, but what is the alternative? Try to reconfigure most of your force with every new conflict? One can certainly do that to some extent (and all the services are), but changing a carrier battle group into something optimized for small wars may not be practical or wise for a whole host of reasons.

Perhaps I am wrong, but I do not hear anyone calling for specialized forces tailored for small wars. I think everyone is pointing out that this is not practical. I hear a lot of shouting past each other. The only real change I hear being advocated for budget wise, is to take some of the focus off of buying new equipment (not buying new equipment desighned for COIN) and re-focus those funds on training and getting and keeping the right personel.
Reed

[Ken White]

You're completely correct about the limitations of manpower on force structure, but I think you're completely wrong in the assertion that manpower is cheap.

He didn't say it was cheap; he said -- fairly correctly I think, that there's plenty of money. See below.

You can't save money and divert it to other things nearly as easily as you can with procurement and O&M money.

That's true but that revolves around Congress' penchant for micromanaging personnel issues simply because Service people can vote (wrongly in my view but that's another thread). More important to Congress, so can their families vote (as they should be able to). All that said, it has been done and can be done.

Additionally, moving personnel from one area (carrier battle group) to another (brown water, CB, SF, Army) is neither easy nor cheap.

He didn't say that either. I'm the one that used the CVBG example and you noted, I hope that I postulated that well in the future -- IOW, yes, it takes time to do that. However, it has been done and can be again. Likely will...

Changing force structure is therefore an expensive and slow process.

I think we all agree on that; today's arguments by those that count, not by us, translate into 2018 or later actions.

...This is actually what both the Air Force and Navy have been doing for almost 20 years now - getting rid of "one-trick-pony" capabilities in favor of more flexible capabilities.

True, they have -- but I'd be remiss if I did not point out that over the last 20 years, both those services (and the Army and Marines) have not been very astute in pursuing that flexibility until someone forced their hand. Alacrity is not a strong point...Nor, regrettably does vision seem to be.

but changing a carrier battle group into something optimized for small wars may not be practical or wise for a whole host of reasons.

It's a trade off and I suspect that decisions already been made. It'll be fought, no matter which way it goes, that's all American.

Your argument might be more appreciated if the Navy had not gone through the Burke / Zumwalt fiasco, had not decided the LCS was not really the ship needed for the job and if the USS GHWB didn't cost about $2B MORE than her class predecessors (and considering that the MPN and OMN annual cost is about 20% of build cost...). Carriers are great, no question. The issue is how many CVBGs are needed...

Oh, I've also heard on pretty good authority that smaller carriers are being relooked -- again...

[Schmedlap]

This is from another thread, but it reminded me of the issues on this thread...

Afghanistan: The New War for Hearts and Minds
Men's Journal
Wed, Jan 21, 2009

While articles like this make me cringe, I have to say that it is more in line with reality than the views espoused by many Colonels, Generals, and think-tank pontificators, regarding how well the military has adapted to COIN. A lot of leaders "get it." Many don't. And most of the Soldiers don't. The reporter in that article didn't just luck out in finding a flamboyant, disgruntled NG Soldier or a disturbingly out-of-touch LT. That's about par for the course. Sadly, many of the people who write about, ponder about, and advise our civilian masters about military affairs have been separated from the line and segregated amongst fellow intellectuals for so long that their vision of reality is shaped more by their theories and published works than by their past experiences and the current situation. That's why I roll my eyes when people think that we're too focused on COIN.

Maybe our doctrine writers are too focused on it. I think that you could make that argument - or at least argue that too many intellectuals focused on military affairs are too enamored of COIN doctrine to the expense of other issues. Our Soldiers and small unit leaders aren't spending much time internalizing the lessons, training, and certainly not the doctrine. I can't count the number of E-4s and even NCOs whom I had to explain to, repeatedly, that our mission was to protect the population, not to just employ mass punishment if one local opted to fire an RPG at us. It was like explaining to them that the Sun revolves around the Earth and the Moon is made of green cheese. And then there were the LTs who wanted to suppress and flank with an entire platoon of brads in response to a 16-year-old who empties a magazine, drops his weapon, and runs. Thank you, school house, for teaching them nothing but 7-8 battle drills (hopefully, at least THAT has changed).

Some say COIN is the graduate level of war. That's nice. But our force is still in 2nd grade of COIN school and repeating its sophomore year of conventional high school. Maybe we need a No Soldier Left Behind act for our lackluster training?

[Bob's World]

A couple of things worth considering:

1. The newly signed and approved Irregular Warfare Directive opens by stating emphatically that "IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare.."

Ok, I can follow orders as well as the next guy, and a directive is an order, so salute and move out. As I do so though, I still offer that it is probably more helpful to consider this more as a change of environment than as a change of warfare.

While concepts like "4th and 5th generation warfare," "global insurgency" and "hybrid warfare" are all the rage among those who are searching to describe the dynamics of conflict in todays globalized world; I prefer to take a more pragmatic approach. Warfare has not changed, but the environment has changed significantly, and the wise warrior always seeks whatever advantage his environment offers; while the warrior burdened by too much doctrine tends to use what worked last time until his opponent forces him to adjust.

I've always said "train as you fight" is a rediculous cliche'. My position is: "You will fight as you have trained, until the enemy trains you to fight differently."


2. America is still blessed with oceans on either flank, a stable ally to the north, and no strong state threats from the south. We have the luxury of time and space. So as we determine how the military needs to train, organize and equip for the future, we must first determine how we will shape our other tools of foreign policy and engagement to facilitate our national interests in this bold new world.

America is a peace loving, warrior nation. Our national leaders forget the first half of that to our peril; and those who would oppose us forget the second half to theirs.

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/c...df/300007p.pdf

[Ken White]

...I've always said "train as you fight" is a ridiculous cliche'. My position is: "You will fight as you have trained, until the enemy trains you to fight differently."

Never heard 'train as you fight." In my day it was ALWAYS "you will fight as you train." Not the same thing at all.

I disagree quite strongly with the thought "You will fight as you have trained, until the enemy trains you to fight differently." That accedes the initiative to him and I don't buy that for a second. I'll set the mood and tempo, thank you very much. I know that can be done because I've done it in my own little corner of a number of fights...

In the last 30 years, a lot of things that were learned the hard way were thrown out by a bunch of smart people -- who should have known better -- and we're now getting to relearn them. We no longer use random names for operations but use catchy titles. That's dumb.

Our training is seriously deficient and the word Warrior is vastly overused. A good soldier should be able to whip a good warrior any day of the week. A warrior is an amateur fighter. He may be experienced but he's an amateur. A soldier by definition is a professional in today's Army and a good pro can whip a gifted amateur any day of the week. Or should be able to. If our performance in today's combat is merely okay and is not superb it is because we have not properly trained...

[Ratzel]

Ratzel, if you are using your armed forces as your primary tool of "statesmanship", you are using the wrong tool. Nation Building and "shrinking the Gap" is a primary mission of State, not defense.

I think you're correct that this mission has traditionally been the responsibility of the State dept, but if nation building becomes part of America's foreign policy goals, then this will have to change. For example, if we had 200,000 foreign service professionals and sent them to Iraq today and pulled the military out; would we be better off? Probably not.

The most fanatical supporters of nation building (Barnett) make it clear that we need something "in between" the military and State, what Barnett calls a "System Administrator force," that appears to be a mix of peacekeeper troops, private contractors, diplomats, the private sector, the peace corps, and the USMC (for muscle). The opportunity cost of building such a force would be the big systems needed for State on State warfare.

[jmm99]

America has fielded several armies of ametures armed with a warrior spirit that did just fine against a some top-rate professional armies, from the Revolution through WWI and WWII.

after they had been trained by a core of pros - and after they had their clocks cleaned in early engagements because they were amateurs.

Having a warrior spirit without adequate training and equipment doesn't do it (e.g., Task Force Smith, 5 Jul 1950 - despite the RA serial numbers).

The Minuteman is a wonderful symbol - it is not a realistic option in a world where a nation needs legions - which is what we have (thankfully, IMO).

PS: certainly a bold signature - worthy of John Hancock