'America's Broken Army' NPR Series. Cavguy makes COL Gentile proud ...

[Eden]

To illustrate a bit the problems staffers face when working on force structure changes, I can relate my own experience as a bit player in designing a Stryker Division - that is, a division element controlling three Stryker Brigades. This never came to fruition, but the boundaries we were given at the beginning of the process were as follows:

1. A manpower cap - I can't remember what it was but somewhere around 12-15,000.
2. Deployability - the whole division had to be deployable by air given so many sorties in a certain amount of time.
3. No post in Alaska or Hawaii could have fewer soldiers on it at the end of the process than they currently had - a politically imposed condition laid on in deference to the powerful senators from those states.
4. USARAK had to maintain its airborne capability.

Cost (in terms of dollars) never really came into it. But these are the kinds of things that cause otherwise intelligent organizations to do stupid stuff.

[Ken White]

Ratzel Said:

"I suppose we can train for both, but this might make us halfway trained for both instead of highly trained for one? Procurement is even more cut and dry. Do we buy the next generation of tanks, or do we use that money in ways that enhances our nation building capabilities?"

Really good point. I think though, that the answer to the first question is that we were not much better than halfway trained for HIC in 2000. That is due to the fact that our obsolescent and really inefficient personnel system causes an annual rotation of 25-35% of all people in a unit -- so a really well trained unit at one point in time will degrade over the course of a year. That is reality.

That is also not as bad as it sounds; it is, in a word, good enough -- not great but good enough. That has almost always been true of all Armies. Long way of getting to the point that halfway trained for the full spectrum of warfare is acceptable. It's a lot better than being 90% trained for one form and then being confronted with another (See Iraq, 2003).

The answer to the second question is that, quite simply, outside of the Leopard 2A6, the M1A2 has no competition, therefor a new tank is not needed, merely continue to do some R and D. Which we are doing. So "that money" is or will be used to enhance our stability operations capability (see below).

Wilf said:

"The USAF has dropped the ball badly in this area, as has the RAF. The cost versus "spectrum of effect" analysis has been totally lacking. Effectiveness has got to be balanced against efficiency, especially in Air warfare. It is far less critical in land and naval domains.

True, though I think from what I read both are finally starting to realize that and are slowly changing; also see below.

Eden said:

"So you can design an army for high-intensity warfare and still be comfortable that you will have at least some capacity for lesser contingencies.

Not so much for the really expensive parts of the armed forces. Yes, carrier battle groups and F-16 squadrons have utility in small wars - but if you are designing a Navy or an Air Force to support wars like Afghanistan or Iraq, and 'accepting risk' like Sec Gates says we are, the weapon systems you buy would look much different from the ones we are currently acquiring. You would want air frames, for example, designed almost solely to accurately deliver ordnance (or bags of food); air superiority would not be a consideration.

Wilf's right, kudos for that. It often gets forgotten.

I agree but would point out that the HIC capability is critical to survival; the LIC capability is nice to have. It appears that many in the policy realm seem to think along that same line.

The cost of effective LIC systems is generally quite low (relatively speaking), so the diversion of only one Carrier Battle Group (for example) to oblivion would and will pay for both a few more spaces and possibly much equipment tailored for LIC. It is my perception that these trade-offs are being discussed and planned for implementation in the post 2014 period. The spending for the interim is already in place and there is no existential need to change it and Congress would likely not change it barring a major push by someone...

Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move.

A terrible truth. Also the driver of many more things than most realize. Congress is at the root of many perceived DoD-related problems...

[reed11b]

I suppose we can train for both, but this might make us halfway trained for both instead of highly trained for one? Procurement is even more cut and dry. Do we buy the next generation of tanks, or do we use that money in ways that enhances our nation building capabilities?

Again, this will depend on what our interests and geopolitical needs are? Some claim that our safety will depend on our ability to nation build, or "shrink the Gap." Others claim that the China's looking big and bad, or that Russia's' on the rise.

Is it possible to have a force that can do it all? Is there a way to train the force that makes them just as good at both? For instance: Could a unit going through NTC spend half its time doing COIN, and half its time doing HIC? Maybe they can do HIC at NTC and COIN at home station?

Ratzel, if you are using your armed forces as your primary tool of "statesmanship", you are using the wrong tool. Nation Building and "shrinking the Gap" is a primary mission of State, not defense. Of course I have long felt that we need to look at the "Foreign Policy" budget to include defense spending and allocate from there based on current and projected needs, but that is a different argument. How we structure the equipment and train to use the equipment we buy affects our COIN abilities more then the actual equipment. See Wilf's posts for more on that. Do we need UAV's, Yep. DO we need them at the BCT level, or should they belong only to the AF or Army? That is less clear. Another fallacious argument seems to based the thought that brigades have to be either "heavy" or "Light" or "Stryker". Why can't infantry units have organic armor support? Why does mech infantry have to be organized to be manpower short and receive less training on how to work minus the Bradley’s? See where I am going here? The DOD and the public and even, from time to time, members of this board, try to compartmentalize everything into black and white terms. The truth is that the world is grey. Train better, organize better, from the get go and this argument returns to the smoke and vapor it came from
Reed

[Entropy]

Land forces are much more flexible and adaptable (and considerably cheaper) than the air or sea services. You can take an armored battalion or an air defense battalion, park the vehicles somewhere, and use the personnel for a variety of purposes; we've been doing just that for years. When I was a tank battalion S-3 we guarded Haitian refugees at Gitmo and fought prairie fires - and this was in 1995. So you can design an army for high-intensity warfare and still be comfortable that you will have at least some capacity for lesser contingencies.

People are always going to be more adaptable than equipment - that much is obvious. So too is the fact that air and naval forces are more dependent on equipment to operate in their domains and so can be considered less flexible. But for "high tech" warfare, the Army is pretty much just as equipment dependent as the Navy and Air Force.

Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move. So the 10,000 or so bodies that we invest in a carrier battle group (a swag from a groundpounder, by the way, so don't quote me) would ideally be reinvested in brown water forces, CBs, special forces, or in the Army.

You're completely correct about the limitations of manpower on force structure, but I think you're completely wrong in the assertion that manpower is cheap. It is not, especially once one considers that some legacy manpower costs are not part of the defense budget. Moreover, the budget for personnel is much less flexible. You can't save money and divert it to other things nearly as easily as you can with procurement and O&M money.

Additionally, moving personnel from one area (carrier battle group) to another (brown water, CB, SF, Army) is neither easy nor cheap. The skills and equipment requirements are quite different and, in a volunteer force at least, one cannot simply order that nuclear reactor tech to become a SEAL or CB or whatever. You can force them out and recruit replacements, or offer incentives to change, but both of those are expensive, and that's not even discussing the recruiting, retraining, decommissioning costs as well as costs to equip the force for the new task. And by "costs" I'm talking both money AND time. Changing force structure is therefore an expensive and slow process.

Not so much for the really expensive parts of the armed forces. Yes, carrier battle groups and F-16 squadrons have utility in small wars - but if you are designing a Navy or an Air Force to support wars like Afghanistan or Iraq, and 'accepting risk' like Sec Gates says we are, the weapon systems you buy would look much different from the ones we are currently acquiring. You would want air frames, for example, designed almost solely to accurately deliver ordnance (or bags of food); air superiority would not be a consideration.

Turn your argument on its head. Suppose we build a specialized force for small wars - what happens when a big war comes around? Then you're stuck with capabilities you can't use and then the argument is turned upside down. Better, I think, to have capabilities that can do both imperfectly than try to bet the farm on what the next war is going to be and create an ideal force for that particular war. This is actually what both the Air Force and Navy have been doing for almost 20 years now - getting rid of "one-trick-pony" capabilities in favor of more flexible capabilities. Does that have costs? Sure, but what is the alternative? Try to reconfigure most of your force with every new conflict? One can certainly do that to some extent (and all the services are), but changing a carrier battle group into something optimized for small wars may not be practical or wise for a whole host of reasons.

[reed11b]

Turn your argument on its head. Suppose we build a specialized force for small wars - what happens when a big war comes around? Then you're stuck with capabilities you can't use and then the argument is turned upside down. Better, I think, to have capabilities that can do both imperfectly than try to bet the farm on what the next war is going to be and create an ideal force for that particular war. This is actually what both the Air Force and Navy have been doing for almost 20 years now - getting rid of "one-trick-pony" capabilities in favor of more flexible capabilities. Does that have costs? Sure, but what is the alternative? Try to reconfigure most of your force with every new conflict? One can certainly do that to some extent (and all the services are), but changing a carrier battle group into something optimized for small wars may not be practical or wise for a whole host of reasons.

Perhaps I am wrong, but I do not hear anyone calling for specialized forces tailored for small wars. I think everyone is pointing out that this is not practical. I hear a lot of shouting past each other. The only real change I hear being advocated for budget wise, is to take some of the focus off of buying new equipment (not buying new equipment desighned for COIN) and re-focus those funds on training and getting and keeping the right personel.
Reed

[Ken White]

You're completely correct about the limitations of manpower on force structure, but I think you're completely wrong in the assertion that manpower is cheap.

He didn't say it was cheap; he said -- fairly correctly I think, that there's plenty of money. See below.

You can't save money and divert it to other things nearly as easily as you can with procurement and O&M money.

That's true but that revolves around Congress' penchant for micromanaging personnel issues simply because Service people can vote (wrongly in my view but that's another thread). More important to Congress, so can their families vote (as they should be able to). All that said, it has been done and can be done.

Additionally, moving personnel from one area (carrier battle group) to another (brown water, CB, SF, Army) is neither easy nor cheap.

He didn't say that either. I'm the one that used the CVBG example and you noted, I hope that I postulated that well in the future -- IOW, yes, it takes time to do that. However, it has been done and can be again. Likely will...

Changing force structure is therefore an expensive and slow process.

I think we all agree on that; today's arguments by those that count, not by us, translate into 2018 or later actions.

...This is actually what both the Air Force and Navy have been doing for almost 20 years now - getting rid of "one-trick-pony" capabilities in favor of more flexible capabilities.

True, they have -- but I'd be remiss if I did not point out that over the last 20 years, both those services (and the Army and Marines) have not been very astute in pursuing that flexibility until someone forced their hand. Alacrity is not a strong point...Nor, regrettably does vision seem to be.

but changing a carrier battle group into something optimized for small wars may not be practical or wise for a whole host of reasons.

It's a trade off and I suspect that decisions already been made. It'll be fought, no matter which way it goes, that's all American.

Your argument might be more appreciated if the Navy had not gone through the Burke / Zumwalt fiasco, had not decided the LCS was not really the ship needed for the job and if the USS GHWB didn't cost about $2B MORE than her class predecessors (and considering that the MPN and OMN annual cost is about 20% of build cost...). Carriers are great, no question. The issue is how many CVBGs are needed...

Oh, I've also heard on pretty good authority that smaller carriers are being relooked -- again...

[Schmedlap]

This is from another thread, but it reminded me of the issues on this thread...

Afghanistan: The New War for Hearts and Minds
Men's Journal
Wed, Jan 21, 2009

While articles like this make me cringe, I have to say that it is more in line with reality than the views espoused by many Colonels, Generals, and think-tank pontificators, regarding how well the military has adapted to COIN. A lot of leaders "get it." Many don't. And most of the Soldiers don't. The reporter in that article didn't just luck out in finding a flamboyant, disgruntled NG Soldier or a disturbingly out-of-touch LT. That's about par for the course. Sadly, many of the people who write about, ponder about, and advise our civilian masters about military affairs have been separated from the line and segregated amongst fellow intellectuals for so long that their vision of reality is shaped more by their theories and published works than by their past experiences and the current situation. That's why I roll my eyes when people think that we're too focused on COIN.

Maybe our doctrine writers are too focused on it. I think that you could make that argument - or at least argue that too many intellectuals focused on military affairs are too enamored of COIN doctrine to the expense of other issues. Our Soldiers and small unit leaders aren't spending much time internalizing the lessons, training, and certainly not the doctrine. I can't count the number of E-4s and even NCOs whom I had to explain to, repeatedly, that our mission was to protect the population, not to just employ mass punishment if one local opted to fire an RPG at us. It was like explaining to them that the Sun revolves around the Earth and the Moon is made of green cheese. And then there were the LTs who wanted to suppress and flank with an entire platoon of brads in response to a 16-year-old who empties a magazine, drops his weapon, and runs. Thank you, school house, for teaching them nothing but 7-8 battle drills (hopefully, at least THAT has changed).

Some say COIN is the graduate level of war. That's nice. But our force is still in 2nd grade of COIN school and repeating its sophomore year of conventional high school. Maybe we need a No Soldier Left Behind act for our lackluster training?

[Bob's World]

A couple of things worth considering:

1. The newly signed and approved Irregular Warfare Directive opens by stating emphatically that "IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare.."

Ok, I can follow orders as well as the next guy, and a directive is an order, so salute and move out. As I do so though, I still offer that it is probably more helpful to consider this more as a change of environment than as a change of warfare.

While concepts like "4th and 5th generation warfare," "global insurgency" and "hybrid warfare" are all the rage among those who are searching to describe the dynamics of conflict in todays globalized world; I prefer to take a more pragmatic approach. Warfare has not changed, but the environment has changed significantly, and the wise warrior always seeks whatever advantage his environment offers; while the warrior burdened by too much doctrine tends to use what worked last time until his opponent forces him to adjust.

I've always said "train as you fight" is a rediculous cliche'. My position is: "You will fight as you have trained, until the enemy trains you to fight differently."


2. America is still blessed with oceans on either flank, a stable ally to the north, and no strong state threats from the south. We have the luxury of time and space. So as we determine how the military needs to train, organize and equip for the future, we must first determine how we will shape our other tools of foreign policy and engagement to facilitate our national interests in this bold new world.

America is a peace loving, warrior nation. Our national leaders forget the first half of that to our peril; and those who would oppose us forget the second half to theirs.

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/c...df/300007p.pdf

[Ken White]

...I've always said "train as you fight" is a ridiculous cliche'. My position is: "You will fight as you have trained, until the enemy trains you to fight differently."

Never heard 'train as you fight." In my day it was ALWAYS "you will fight as you train." Not the same thing at all.

I disagree quite strongly with the thought "You will fight as you have trained, until the enemy trains you to fight differently." That accedes the initiative to him and I don't buy that for a second. I'll set the mood and tempo, thank you very much. I know that can be done because I've done it in my own little corner of a number of fights...

In the last 30 years, a lot of things that were learned the hard way were thrown out by a bunch of smart people -- who should have known better -- and we're now getting to relearn them. We no longer use random names for operations but use catchy titles. That's dumb.

Our training is seriously deficient and the word Warrior is vastly overused. A good soldier should be able to whip a good warrior any day of the week. A warrior is an amateur fighter. He may be experienced but he's an amateur. A soldier by definition is a professional in today's Army and a good pro can whip a gifted amateur any day of the week. Or should be able to. If our performance in today's combat is merely okay and is not superb it is because we have not properly trained...

[Bob's World]

Come on Ken, you're kind of arguing with yourself! Will I, or won't I fight the way I was trained? And if I change, won't it be because I have learned, and therefore evolve to be more successful against the given threat/environment? We're really saying the same thing. Be prepared, but be adaptive.

I think you may be getting too symantic on the "warrior" vs "soldier." America has fielded several armies of ametures armed with a warrior spirit that did just fine against a some top-rate professional armies, from the Revolution through WWI and WWII.

Professional armies in America are a fairly new-fangled Cold War invention, and the jury is still out as to if it is a good idea or not IMHO. I get your point, in that a good boxer is going to take out a great untrained fighter without breaking a sweat. That's why we don't fare so well in "first battles." But when that fighter dusts himself off and gets back on his feet, the wiser for the knock-down; the boxer better be prepared to either start adapting or start sweating thanks to the training he just provided to his opponent.

[Ratzel]

Ratzel, if you are using your armed forces as your primary tool of "statesmanship", you are using the wrong tool. Nation Building and "shrinking the Gap" is a primary mission of State, not defense.

I think you're correct that this mission has traditionally been the responsibility of the State dept, but if nation building becomes part of America's foreign policy goals, then this will have to change. For example, if we had 200,000 foreign service professionals and sent them to Iraq today and pulled the military out; would we be better off? Probably not.

The most fanatical supporters of nation building (Barnett) make it clear that we need something "in between" the military and State, what Barnett calls a "System Administrator force," that appears to be a mix of peacekeeper troops, private contractors, diplomats, the private sector, the peace corps, and the USMC (for muscle). The opportunity cost of building such a force would be the big systems needed for State on State warfare.

[jmm99]

America has fielded several armies of ametures armed with a warrior spirit that did just fine against a some top-rate professional armies, from the Revolution through WWI and WWII.

after they had been trained by a core of pros - and after they had their clocks cleaned in early engagements because they were amateurs.

Having a warrior spirit without adequate training and equipment doesn't do it (e.g., Task Force Smith, 5 Jul 1950 - despite the RA serial numbers).

The Minuteman is a wonderful symbol - it is not a realistic option in a world where a nation needs legions - which is what we have (thankfully, IMO).

PS: certainly a bold signature - worthy of John Hancock

[Ken White]

Come on Ken, you're kind of arguing with yourself!

I'll leave that to all you smart lawyers...

Will I, or won't I fight the way I was trained?

Yes, you're likely to do so as are all of us. The issue, though is not that.

The issue is if your training was good enough to enable you to survive to:

...therefore evolve to be more successful against the given threat/environment? We're really saying the same thing. Be prepared, but be adaptive.

We are saying that; be prepared and be adaptive but I submit the differences I cited are more than just semantic. I don't think you can or should "train as you fight" because you do not know enough going in to know how you will fight, thus I agree with you that is a meaningless cliche. OTOH, the phrase "you will fight as you train" is a message to do it right. Thus my citing it was in agreement with you on that point and to substitute the older version which may also be a cliche but I think is a cautionary...

A cautionary we have forgotten to our detriment.

I also still strongly disagree that "...until the enemy trains you to fight differently." is an accurate statement or even a good statement. I think it is a bad statement and cedes initiative to the opponent. That is not a good idea; being prepared and adaptive is good, letting the other guy train you is bad. As another lawyer once told me, words are important...

I think you may be getting too symantic on the "warrior" vs "soldier." America has fielded several armies of ametures armed with a warrior spirit that did just fine against a some top-rate professional armies, from the Revolution through WWI and WWII.

Yes, they did fine but only after they stopped being amateurs at war -- warriors -- and became soldiers and had learned from getting decimated by those other soldiers early on in each of those wars. Warrior is a bad term IMO, we can disagree on that.

Professional armies in America are a fairly new-fangled Cold War invention, and the jury is still out as to if it is a good idea or not IMHO.

That's incorrect. The US army had been a professional force for all of its 233 years other than 10 years of major war and the 20 years of Draft during the Cold War. I hardly think that 13% of the Army's lifetime as other than a professional force qualifies as 'new fangled.' Nor am I sure that reverting to the normal state of a professional force nearly 40 years ago can be counted as 'new fangled.' Though I'll grant you that for 38 years we have been trying to run a professional Army as if it was full of amateurs...

We can disagree on whether it's a good idea; I think it's great -- and I served in it when it had the Draft and was not very professional for a variety of reasons. Then later got to serve with the professional force as an adjunct civilian employee. It's good but it could be better and better training is the need.

[Bob's World]

That's incorrect. The US army had been a professional force for all of its 233 years other than 10 years of major war and the 20 years of Draft during the Cold War. I hardly think that 13% of the Army's lifetime as other than a professional force qualifies as 'new fangled.' Nor am I sure that reverting to the normal state of a professional force nearly 40 years ago can be counted as 'new fangled.' Though I'll grant you that for 38 years we have been trying to run a professional Army as if it was full of amateurs...

We can disagree on whether it's a good idea; I think it's great -- and I served in it when it had the Draft and was not very professional for a variety of reasons. Then later got to serve with the professional force as an adjunct civilian employee. It's good but it could be better and better training is the need.

Ken,

Totally agree that a full-time, well trained and equipped Army is best for no-notice warfare; but up until the Cold War the American Populace was not willing to fund such a force, and in fact, for the first 100 years or so of the nation did not even trust having such a force.

I think we are over the trust issues, and the Cold War model has gone on for so long that most without a background in history don't realize what an anomaly it is.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:US...penditures.png

This graph on wikipedia tells the story better than I can. The history of America is one that maintains a small professional cadre in times of peace to man garrisons, write doctrine, and provide a nucleus to build upon in time of war. Each war has then been fought by a vast influx of citizen soldiers, who quickly returned to civilian life once the conflict was over. Which brings us to another downside of a professional Army, is that we don't have a lot of vets stepping into key civilian leadership roles after their short stint for the duration.

Absolutely we maintained a professional core of an Army, but that isn't what we fought and won our wars with. Guard, Militia, Volunteers, Draftees; not Regulars.

Today we think it normal that we have this huge army and massive footprint overseas and at home. Maybe we need it. I don't know. We sure have our fingers in a lot of pies around the world these days.

Now that the Cold War is 20 years behind us, the Army is just one of many institutions, policies, relationships and perspectives that were formed for a particular purpose, but that have been around so long we forget the real reason we formed them. High time for a full review and recalibration across the board.

[Entropy]

Our training is seriously deficient and the word Warrior is vastly overused. A good soldier should be able to whip a good warrior any day of the week. A warrior is an amateur fighter. He may be experienced but he's an amateur. A soldier by definition is a professional in today's Army and a good pro can whip a gifted amateur any day of the week. Or should be able to. If our performance in today's combat is merely okay and is not superb it is because we have not properly trained

I'm with you on the "warrior" thing. I don't like it at all. Warriors, in my mind, fight for personal or tribal glory. Professional soldiers do not.

I do agree with Col. Jones, however, that a large, standing professional military can grow to threaten Republicanism.

[Ken White]

but up until the Cold War the American Populace was not willing to fund such a force, and in fact, for the first 100 years or so of the nation did not even trust having such a force.

Not Correct. It was not so much the populace as the Congress and not so much unwilling as unable -- the Federal Government take of total government revenue was only about 12-15% until the Income Tax Amendment was ratified in 1913, then it slowly climbed until Franklin was elected, began a steady and more rapid climb and hit about 60% of all government intake by the end of WW II where it has essentially stayed since. We had a big Army during the Cold War because, for the first time in a period of peace, we could afford it.

I think we are over the trust issues, and the Cold War model has gone on for so long that most without a background in history don't realize what an anomaly it is.

We never had a trust issue except for the 10-15% fringes on both the left and right. That lack of trust is still there, big time -- in fact, for the far left, it's worse than ever. I do agree with you that the Cold War was an anomaly -- an era of phony 'not peace but no war' except for Korea and Viet Nam when, as is true today, the Army and Marines went to war, supported by the Air Force and Navy while DoD and the rest of the nation did NOT go to war. You're also correct in saying that many do not realize what an anomaly the cold war era was -- the world is now back to business as usual. Messy, isn't it?

This graph on wikipedia tells the story better than I can. The history of America is one that maintains a small professional cadre in times of peace to man garrisons, write doctrine, and provide a nucleus to build upon in time of war. Each war has then been fought by a vast influx of citizen soldiers, who quickly returned to civilian life once the conflict was over. Which brings us to another downside of a professional Army, is that we don't have a lot of vets stepping into key civilian leadership roles after their short stint for the duration.

That was partly true, that small Regular Army fought several wars without the Militia. Different world, though. Today's speed of communication and travel make a return to what was the norm before WW II not a sensible proposition; make it a dangerous idea in fact. You are of course correct in the lack of veterans for civilian leadership roles being a negative but I suspect we'll survive.

Absolutely we maintained a professional core of an Army, but that isn't what we fought and won our wars with. Guard, Militia, Volunteers, Draftees; not Regulars.

True and if we have a big war, I suspect we'll do the same thing again.

Today we think it normal that we have this huge army and massive footprint overseas and at home. Maybe we need it. I don't know. We sure have our fingers in a lot of pies around the world these days.

Yep. In 1939 the Army and AAC were at 189K, 50K overseas, the Army and AAC were about .15% of the US population. Today the Army and USAF total about 866K, about 220K overseas, they are about .28% of the population. So we're twice a big on a per capita basis now as then -- mostly because we can afford it -- and we have about five time as many overseas -- that's due to that speed of communication and travel I mentioned...

Still well less than one half of one percent of the nation serving in the active Army and air arm. I don't think we need to worry about being a garrison state for a while.

Now that the Cold War is 20 years behind us, the Army is just one of many institutions, policies, relationships and perspectives that were formed for a particular purpose, but that have been around so long we forget the real reason we formed them. High time for a full review and recalibration across the board.

This is another of your anomalies. The cold war Army ran between 700K and 900K with ~40% overseas. This Army is 500K with less than 35% overseas -- and the big batch of that will return to CONUS over the next couple of years. The Cold War Army had 10 to 19 divisions; we now have 40 plus Bdes. This Army bears very little resemblance to the Army of 20 years ago, one with which I was thoroughly familiar.

The reason we -- Congress -- formed the active Army was to be an instrument of national power where and when force was required. That was true in 1840, true in 1940 -- and it's true today. I don't think anyone has forgotten that reason.

[Ken White]

As the commercial used to say...

I'm with you on the "warrior" thing. I don't like it at all. Warriors, in my mind, fight for personal or tribal glory. Professional soldiers do not.

Does this mean I have to turn in all my ARCOMS???

I do agree with Col. Jones, however, that a large, standing professional military can grow to threaten Republicanism.

I don't disagree with the premise but as I said in the post above, giving actual numbers in that comment and ending with: "Still well less than one half of one percent of the nation serving in the active Army and air arm. I don't think we need to worry about being a garrison state for a while."

IOW, it isn't large. Not by a long shot. Check Bob'sworld's link and graph -- from 1950 until 1990, over a 40 year period we consistently had from 750K to 1M plus in the Army (and the Republic survived...); essentially we're at a half that -- and there's a war on...

I'm sure you also object to a large Air force and Navy as you did say Military and not just Army. I'm equally sure you're aware of the even larger cuts those two services have sustained in the last 20 years.

I'll also point out that the increase of the Army from 475K in 2001 to 546K (or whatever it is this week) while welcomed by AUSA and some in the Army was resisted by others in the Army, objected to by me and will be the first thing to be cut when Afghanistan and Iraq are history -- and they will become that sooner rather than later.

[Entropy]

Ken,

I don't disagree with your last comment at all, just simply pointing out the danger that might come through creeping normalcy and the passage of time, as well as the need for some amount of vigilance.

[Ken White]

Ken,

I don't disagree with your last comment at all, just simply pointing out the danger that might come through creeping normalcy and the passage of time, as well as the need for some amount of vigilance.

Code Pink is vigilant! So is our great media crowd. Representative Waxman. Many others who 'support the troops' but not the war and wouldn't let their sons and daughters near a uniform...

Not a worry to me; we had forty years of a much bigger Army and Jimmy Carter in that time frame; ideal coup conditions and not a glimmer...

And Burt Lancaster has expired...

Seriously, after 45 years of the fabled 24/7 involvement, that is not even a teensy fear to me. I'm firmly convinced that too many in uniform would not stand for any foolishness on the part of one of their own or a politician or group of pols.

[Steve Blair]

Not Correct. It was not so much the populace as the Congress

Actually it was the populace as well. The military never really occupied a position of respect in this country until the 20th century. It was viewed throughout the 1800s as a refuge for drunkards, unemployable dullards, and foreigners looking to learn English. Officers were respected to a degree, but that was usually based on Volunteer service during either the Mexican War or the Civil War and not Regular service. It's easy to get sucked into the fiscal debates, but aside from Thomas Nast there were few actual "soldier-boosters" around during the latter part of the 1800s...and those who were typically wanted to make some green off the boys in blue.

I would also question the long-term impact of citizen-soldiers who step into leadership positions after their term expired. Historically some of the biggest opponents to a standing force, and indeed good training and equipment for that force, were those same volunteers/draftees who later rose to political prominence. And if you think the officer corps is political now, you should look back through some of the stuff they were writing in the 1880s or so.