The Human Element: When Gadgetry Becomes Strategy

[Ken White]

about a little military skill and a lot of just plain hard work that we continually reject for pat solutions that don't work.

Problem is the wrong people will probably be the ones who think about it...

[Bob's World]

Too many senior commanders love metrics to measure their success. All the better if they come with some sort of unilateral "easy button" program that replaces actually having to do the work to understand the nature of the environment, the problem at hand, and then craft and implement a tailored holistic solution set in support of the host nation to address.

If you are standing in the middle of an isurgency, you don't need a slide rule to know it.

[Surferbeetle]

Bob,

Ok you made me laugh with this one; touche'.

If you are standing in the middle of an isurgency, you don't need a slide rule to know it.

Ken,

...pat solutions that don't work.

Always a popular choice, dead on analysis.

So did you guys catch this opinion piece by Dr. Paul Kennedy at today's WSJ? He has a semi-recent podcast in this same theme, taken at the London School of Economics, and posted for free at Apple iTunes.

In this focus upon chronic fiscal deficits and military overstretch, certain positive measures of American strength tend to get pushed into the shadows (and perhaps should be given more light at another time). This country possesses tremendous advantages compared to other great powers in its demographics, its land-to-people ratio, its raw materials, its research universities and laboratories, its flexible work force, etc. These strengths have been overshadowed during a near-decade of political irresponsibility in Washington, rampant greed on Wall Street and its outliers, and excessive military ventures abroad.

Do metrics apply for what he describes, and what are the significant differences to the 'metrics approach' used that you see with COL McMaster's thesis? How else do we measure things?

I too understand what's going when I am in the thick of things on the ground, but other than having people in my chain of command who know and trust me how does one share one's understanding with the resource providers?

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

Kennedy's analysis is okay but he does very badly miss one point:

"...These strengths have been overshadowed during a near-decade of political irresponsibility in Washington, rampant greed on Wall Street and its outliers, and excessive military ventures abroad."

I'd say by any measure the irresponsibility and greed run back a lot farther than a near decade -- about 48 years in my book and I think at least 30 by anyone's reckoning. A whole lot nearer a half century than ten years. He must have slept through the 70s, 80s and 90s.

I'd apply the same measure to 'military adventures' as well but I suspect the good Professor and I would differ radically on what constituted 'adventure' and on which were excessive, which were necessary and which were not...

Surferbeetle asks:

"Do metrics apply for what he describes, and what are the significant differences to the 'metrics approach' used that you see with COL McMaster's thesis? How else do we measure things?"

I don't think they apply across the board; I do not understand the second question; and what is being measured?

I too understand what's going when I am in the thick of things on the ground, but other than having people in my chain of command who know and trust me how does one share one's understanding with the resource providers?

If you're in the thick of things on the ground, I'd bet there's no problem having your chain of command trust you...

That second phrase is where we've gone wrong. You should not have to share your understanding with the resource providers; it is not their job to second guess you to death (literally) it is their job to support you with the resources you require. It is your chain of command's job to insure you ask for what is needed and to fire you if you ask for excess; since we know you'd never do that, you should get what you ask for. It is also their job to fight any resource battles. I've seen exceptions of course but mostly that used to work, at least prior to my retirement in 1995 -- surely you guys haven't let things go downhill that much in 13 years???

That's what should happen; sometimes it does not, most always due to a number of well intentioned laws and regulations designed to protect the taxpayers money that effectively tie the hands of all. We tolerate that and I don't know why we do -- I do know why some in positions of power tolerate, even encourage, it. Because it enhances their own power.

The Bean counters have taken over the institution and everyone is okay with that? Weird.

Which doesn't answer your question. I don't have an answer. I've never had that problem, seriously. I cannot think of a time when I asked for resources I needed that I did not get them, almost invariably with no metrics involved. I'll acknowledge occasional use of the "Ask for ten, expect five...' rule and that I sometimes would only "...get three." However, that three always worked out. That applies to uniformed and civilian service, peace and war.

I do remember that when the Army, briefly, was going to "Manage Civilians to Budget" that I proposed to eliminate five civilian positions and regrade three others only to be told that I could eliminate just two because there was a Congressionally mandated floor for civilian employees and two was my salami slice. so much for a good idea and a good program that foundered on a metric.

A metric designed to protect jobs, union members and votes -- not the taxpayer's dollars.

Like I said, I don't know why we put up with that stuff...

[Entropy]

I think it's important not to forget the primacy of the human element in warfare, but at the same time we shouldn't overly denigrate technology. As I see it, our technological forces and technological approach performed extremely well in the primary missions we were given: The overthrow of the Saddam and Taliban regimes. The problem was that those successful methods did not work when confronted with two completely unplanned, post-MCO conflicts. Some of that is undoubtedly because gadgetry doesn't work nearly as well against the enemies we faced (as well as our technology mindset), but in my mind, the biggest problem was a complete failure to appreciate, analyze and plan for "phase IV" ops. It was more a failure of research and imagination than technology. We (and our policymakers) didn't understand the societies we had invaded, nor the history, nor any number of other factors, factors that ultimately led to poor decisionmaking. This isn't to say that had we properly understood what we were getting into from the beginning that a technology-based approach would ultimately work - it wouldn't - but we would have been much better off.

[Ken White]

McMaster piece that is in opposition to what you say. In fact, seems to me he said what you said...

However, my purpose in this comment is to highlight one thing you said:

"We (and our policymakers) didn't understand the societies we had invaded, nor the history, nor any number of other factors, factors that ultimately led to poor decisionmaking."

and point out that in every war mentioned, the ideas and advice of people who were very familiar with the societies and their history was not only available to the policy makers -- but was actually provided them.

The policy makers elected to ignore the advice and ideas.

You may recall the Millenium Challenge exercise prior to the invasion of Iraq where retired Marine LTG Paul Van Riper tanked the DoD grand plan; MCMasters mentions the Sigma Exercises prior to Viet Nam which showed a preview of what occurred and mentions that Bundy thought the conclusion 'too harsh.' I happen to know several FAOs who were involved in briefings at the Pentagon before all those wars -- and to also know their advice was not taken...

McMasters is accurately pointing out that there is a human dimension in war and that it is all powerful; that those who look for technology to overcome that are almost invariably going to be disappointed; technology can assist, it cannot 'do.' He is also condemning the American politicians ubiquitous quest for cheap, quick fixes -- and pointing out there aren't any in war.

He's also criticizing those who allow western thinking to determine what eastern opponents will do; he cites this "...one of the deans of systems analysis, Thomas Schelling, wrote in 1964. The precise, rational application of force would culminate in the United States and its adversary reaching “simultaneously a judgment about what is the most reasonable choice for us to make and what is a reasonable choice for him to be making.” That is pathetic; to believe the other guy thinks as you do is to invite defeat. Most Corporals know that...

McMasters isn't picking on "gadgetry" or technology -- he's pointing out the terrible fallibility of massive egos combined with political kowtowing in policy positions.

Rightly so.

[Fuchs]

The problem is that the relevant persons (officers, writers, politicians) have extremely varying degrees of interest in and knowledge about warfare.

You are no easy prey of seemingly 'easy' solutions if you learned very much about warfare (and had the ability to stomach the info properly).

Technology & destruction are simple to understand - it takes very little time and interest to grasp these aspects of warfare. I for one had an unhealthy emphasis on hardware about ten years ago, for example - and learned 95% of what I know about warfare in the meantime.

I see no easy way how the problem could be solved - you simply have to hope that the relevant persons understand all or most facets.


The military morale/combat psychology problem was systematically inflated by "no surrender" OPFOR in exercises, a lack of real fear in training and avoidance of really difficult combat situations since Tet (difficult as 'a battalion is about to be overrun').

We got a prime example for the importance of morale and psychology in warfare in the South Ossetian War; the material and personnel in action was quite even, but the human element failed on the Georgian side (I suspect due to radio comm-disrupting EW and a lack of psychological readiness to fight the extremely superior bigger neighbor).
The Georgians could have had FCS equipment and would likely still have folded.
This example should serve well, especially for politicians and writers.

[Ken White]

The problem is that the relevant persons (officers, writers, politicians) have extremely varying degrees of interest in and knowledge about warfare.

While that's true, the officers should have a great deal of knowledge and, one would hope, interest. Writers one cannot expect too much from and most Politicians in any democratic society are going to have minimal knowledge and interest. The greater problem is said Politicians should take their warfare cues from the Officers but instead take them from the writers and the Officers, subordinate to the Politicians do not always give them straightforward advice -- that's one larger problem...

You are no easy prey of seemingly 'easy' solutions if you learned very much about warfare (and had the ability to stomach the info properly).

No you aren't -- if...

That's the problem, most political policy makers do not learn much and aren't interested in doing so.

Technology & destruction are simple to understand - it takes very little time and interest to grasp these aspects of warfare. I for one had an unhealthy emphasis on hardware about ten years ago, for example - and learned 95% of what I know about warfare in the meantime.

That's why the technology element can be a trap if one isn't careful.

I see no easy way how the problem could be solved - you simply have to hope that the relevant persons understand all or most facets.

You may be correct but IMO that's not good enough; we're talking a lot of lives here and my sensing is that most Politicians tend to take their cues from popular sources as opposed to from the most knowldgable sources. We need to be able to tune down egos but we cannot...

The military morale/combat psychology problem was systematically inflated by "no surrender" OPFOR in exercises, a lack of real fear in training and avoidance of really difficult combat situations since Tet (difficult as 'a battalion is about to be overrun').

I have no idea what that statement means???

We got a prime example for the importance of morale and psychology in warfare in the South Ossetian War...This example should serve well, especially for politicians and writers.

Should but probably won't...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

I'm so gonna use this:

If you are standing in the middle of an insurgency, you don't need a slide rule to know it.