Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency

[Bill Moore]

Martin,

I'll attempt a stab at your question to get the debate started within our group. However, I want to take some time to formulate some concepts first.

Tom,

You would do our government a service if you would write a book on your experiences. After being retired a few years I'm sure you have reflected on your experiences and have much to share with us. Stability and stability like operations will remain a key component of our national security strategy. Unfortunately we tend to wait until it is a crisis until we decide to address it, by then it may be too late. You had a unique role where you were created effects [just because you hate the concept :-)] behind the scenes with limited resources.

Ciao, Bill

[Tom Odom]

Bill,

Thank you. The book is written and you can read one chapter here in SWJ magazine, thanks to the SWJ crew, at: http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/docu...om_journey.htm

Best
Tom

[Jones_RE]

I'll take a stab at Martin's question.

You develop a flexible, non-dogmatic officer corps by continually exposing officers of all ranks to realistic simulations against live, reacting enemies in a free play environment. The army already does this for maneuver warfare out in the desert. The essential requirement now is to extend this attitude to other types of missions, cultures and environments. Especially helpful would be joint missions, where third party forces ally with and oppose US units. Failing that, Special Operations forces might supply a realistic alternative. This doesn't always require a full blown simulation - terrain walks or map exercises can invoke the same principles.

When the results of an exercise hang on whether you grok your ally's cultural and military attitudes, officers of all ranks will break out of their molds real quick.

You fight how you train. Right now, the great bulk of the army trains to do one job (firepower intensive maneuver war) and they do it well. This is because we have devised (through decades of effort) realistic ways of simulating a maneuver war against a thinking, freely acting enemy. If we want the army to succeed at other tasks, we must train for them with the same ingenuity and intensity.

[Martin]

I'll take a stab at Martin's question.

You develop a flexible, non-dogmatic officer corps by continually exposing officers of all ranks to realistic simulations against live, reacting enemies in a free play environment.

[...]

This is because we have devised (through decades of effort) realistic ways of simulating a maneuver war against a thinking, freely acting enemy. If we want the army to succeed at other tasks, we must train for them with the same ingenuity and intensity.

What do you think is missing then? According to what you say above, the objective should have been reached. Or do you mean that the training currently performed simply needs to be taken to the other tasks?

Although it doesn't say how you would do it, I think parts of the why's can be found in leadership and command and control. How to do it, however, is a little bit more complex.

Eager for Moore's thinking...

Martin

[Jones_RE]

I think that within the field of maneuver warfare, the current generation of officers is not dogmatic and inflexible. When it comes to a mechanized shootout in a desert somewhere they're quick thinking, creative and downright devious. There is no other way to win those simulations, because if you follow some scripted playbook the "red team" will hand you your head. There's nothing like that for COIN, Stability Operations, Peace Enforcement, etc. So there's room to just settle in and turn off the brain - dogmatism requires a certain degree of complacency in order to thrive. You can't be complacent against a thinking, breathing opponent who wants to win, because that opponent will come up with a way to beat the pants off you. When that starts showing up in your fitness reports it starts impacting careers and that gets noticed.

[Martin]

I think that within the field of maneuver warfare, the current generation of officers is not dogmatic and inflexible. When it comes to a mechanized shootout in a desert somewhere they're quick thinking, creative and downright devious. There is no other way to win those simulations, because if you follow some scripted playbook the "red team" will hand you your head. There's nothing like that for COIN, Stability Operations, Peace Enforcement, etc. So there's room to just settle in and turn off the brain - dogmatism requires a certain degree of complacency in order to thrive. You can't be complacent against a thinking, breathing opponent who wants to win, because that opponent will come up with a way to beat the pants off you. When that starts showing up in your fitness reports it starts impacting careers and that gets noticed.

Interesting point to make... Do conventional forces have a good way of measuring and recording real world progress in COIN? How would you go about doing that?

Martin

[GorTex6]

If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell: this is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population. You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything weaker than you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations. Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people and societal disruption that fuels and perpetuates the insurgency. The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors.

Dumbasses need to realize this is counterinsurgency and not another Tom Clancy computer game You do not get cool points for firing at anything approaching your convoy nor firing .50 indescriminately at a village

8. Rank is nothing, talent is everything...

Talent isn't based on political position within the unit either.

[Tom Odom]

I think that within the field of maneuver warfare, the current generation of officers is not dogmatic and inflexible. When it comes to a mechanized shootout in a desert somewhere they're quick thinking, creative and downright devious. There is no other way to win those simulations, because if you follow some scripted playbook the "red team" will hand you your head. There's nothing like that for COIN, Stability Operations, Peace Enforcement, etc. So there's room to just settle in and turn off the brain - dogmatism requires a certain degree of complacency in order to thrive. You can't be complacent against a thinking, breathing opponent who wants to win, because that opponent will come up with a way to beat the pants off you. When that starts showing up in your fitness reports it starts impacting careers and that gets noticed.

that is exactly the role of the JRTC where COIN, stability ops, and peace enforcement along with CONOPs and other tasks have been and still are trained against a thinking breathing opponent

Tom

[jcustis]

A pity he was never seconded to Abizaid as an adviser. Sort of an Aussie Charles Murphy role

I disagree, as that is not the level where his influence needs to be felt.

I don't buy off on everything he has written, but good on him for organizing his thoughts and common sense in the best fashion I've seen in a long time. I read it and thought, this is like a memory jogger that I could see finding a home next to the AO/sector map in the CO CP!

Perhaps his services could be better employed, say, at the JRTC, or the Marine Corps Mojave Viper program. This is all good stuff, but it's only as good as its implementation. If a battalion commander directs all of his junior officers to read the text, that's a first step. The shortfall is that with a read of the material, one can only gain the knowledge. The desired endstate is "understanding", and that certainly takes more time, effort, and resources.

I've often held subtle disagreement with the training methodologies typically employed in the military. A case in point is the JRTC/NTC/CAX paradigm. Some units treat them as they are designed, as training events, while others use them as a "graduation exercise" of sorts, and "train to deploy and train". Our doctrine/training commands can be cumbersome at times, and with the issues that the LtCol so poignantly addresses, I don't think one (read: company staff/troops) could gain understanding from a day with him in the bleacher seating at a MOUT town, or an extract of his writing stuffed in the appendices of a period of instruction on COIN.

Perhaps we need a new paradigm, where units shift from sending an officer/SNCO to a formal school for 3-4 weeks, and send their best and brightest to week-long (or longer) seminars where they have the opportunity to sit and truly listen, question, and debate. Designed to deliver further training back to the unit, this training needs to follow something like a sensei-to-pupil model, not Billy Banks and Tae-Bo.

[nichols]

The essential requirement now is to extend this attitude to other types of missions, cultures and environments. Especially helpful would be joint missions, where third party forces ally with and oppose US units.

This is because we have devised (through decades of effort) realistic ways of simulating a maneuver war against a thinking, freely acting enemy.

Joining the discussion late...

This is exactly where the Marine Corps is heading with simulations as part of the Deployable Virtual Training Environment. We just started a contract for the next generation TDS. The requirement doc is 138k, to large to attach so here's some highlights:

The VTK shall provide three levels of editor modules:

• Content Management Editor for TECOM and PMTRASYS only.
• Simulation Center Editor
• Scenario Designer Editor

The control of the editors shall be through a Graphical User Interface (GUI), which shall be simplistic in nature utilizing, sliders, scrollbars, numerical values, and toggle radio buttons. Editors will provide the trainer with the tools needed to shape the training scenario by creating individual Marine, OPFOR, Civilian and Animals and placing them in teams, units, mobs and herds. The editors will also be used to create maps and modify existing maps for use in the TDS and to create the conditions of the training scenario The editor shall be selectable to any or the following forces: Bluefor, OpFor, Host Nation or noncombatants.

• Activity Editor: To task simulation generated avatars and objects in the simulation general operating parameters
• Map Selection: Select the map on which the mission will be set.
• Unit Placement: Designate deployment areas and place the units assigned to the mission on the map.
• Trigger Placement: Triggers are a series of conditions and actions that can be assigned to a mission. When a trigger condition is met, then the action is performed. Triggers can help tailor the scenario to a particular storyline. The AI will also use triggers, especially map based triggers, as planning tools. The designer will select from a list of conditions and actions, or effects, to create a trigger.
• Operational Settings : One of the many functions of the mission editor is the ability to specify initial deployment zones, pre-plotted artillery strikes (if any), game time limit, engagement type, and other general option.
• Number of Players: Specify the number of users to be supported in the designed mission.
•Fog of War Specify the following games settings:
Always See the Enemy
Only See Enemy in User’s LOS
Fading Enemy if no longer in LOS (last known position)
See Enemy in Allied LOS
Units Always Obey Orders
• Fire Support: Specify what type of fire support missions and how many of each missions will be available to each user.
• Save Mission: Save the edited or newly created mission with a unique file name.
• Load Mission: Load an existing mission and edit it in the Mission editor.

3.1.3.3.3 Scenario Designer Weapons editor

The Weapons editor shall provide the means for the player to select from a list of ‘like forces’ weapons and arm the team as desired, limiting each team member to one shoulder-fired weapon. In addition a player will be able to select from other tools to include a compass, binos, GPS, thermal sights, and lasing equipment. Refer to Appendix A for a minimum list of available weapons. Enemy players will be able to chose from a list of asymmetric threat weapons to include Vehicle borne IED’s that cause the appropriate damage to structures, vehicles, and personnel. The editor gives the ability to set the basic load for ammunition for each weapon system.

3.1.3.3.4 Scenario Designer Psychological and Physical editors

The Psychological and Physical editors shall be scaleable from 1 to 10 to adjust the team member’s mental and physical health respectively. For example, a team member’s physical attribute may be adjusted from 10 (very alert and rested) to 1 (drifting in and out of sleep) by using an adjustable slider.

3.1.3.3.5 Scenario Designer Artificial Intelligence Editor

Allow the AI to be altered to modify the computer-opponent’s behavior to be more aggressive or less sophisticated in the types of attacks it undertakes, as examples. For instance, Iraqis at the beginning of the war fought as organized armies, using traditional weapons and tactics. Later, they fought as mobs and now fight as skilled guerillas. The AI Editor, shall allow the Scenario Designer to tailor the computer opponent’s behavior for each of these types of warfare.


3.1.3.3.6 Instructor Controller Station

Allows an Instructor (scenario designer) to task simulation generated avatars and objects in the simulation general operating parameters (for instance, loiter in a given area) or (go to a location at a given time and perform a specific act.) In addition, items can be designated and function as IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), VBIEDs (Vehicle-Based IEDs) or as non-threatening. During game play an instructor has the capability to jump into and control various characters in the game. Have the ability to switch between multiple fixed site positions while in free camera mode (I.e., have multiple locations of interest and be able to transition between them using a pick list.)

And my favorite:

Application Program Interface (API) that allows third party AI to be imported by end user.

This is where we place the DIME PMESII segue.

[jcustis]

Assuming Naylor's account below, and in the following link, is true, these soldiers appear to have really worked COIN well, given their disposition, strength, and resources. The article is very much worth a full and slow read, as their are valuable TTPs embedded. Perhaps the good Captain has read Kilcullen?

By Sean Naylor for the Army times

Liberating Anah

How Apache Company freed an Iraqi city from the grip of a terrorist cell


ANAH, Iraq — insurgents had freely waged a two-year reign of terror on this sleepy, affluent Sunni city of 30,000. They blew up the police station and chased out the nascent police force. They murdered the chairman of the city council and cowed the local populace.

members of Jama’at Al Tawid Al Jihad, known as the JTJ or Group of Monotheism and Jihad — a branch of al-Qaida in Iraq — settled in. This city in central Anbar province came to serve as a convenient sanctuary and way station for fighters going southeast to the real action in Ramadi, Fallujah and Baghdad.

But about 20 kilometers outside Anah, a Stryker squadron commander determined it was time to end the insurgents’ grip on Anah.

Lt. Col. Mark Freitag, commander of the 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, installed a Stryker infantry company in a combat outpost just outside Anah in late March. The grunts of Apache Company, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, attached to Task Force 4-14, took aggressive action against the insurgents, whose leaders made a move to regain the initiative: They dispatched a shadowy commander named Abu Hamza to take charge of the insurgency in Anah.

The stage was set for a showdown here on the south bank of the Euphrates River.

Steep learning curve

The 131 troops of Apache Company assumed responsibility for Anah and the nearby village of Reyanah on Feb. 2 while still based in Rawah. Theirs was to be a steep learning curve. No coalition forces had been stationed in Anah since the 2003 invasion, and the JTJ was used to having the run of the town.

A few weeks before Apache took over, Freitag himself had detained Sheikh Qatada Sa’ad Tehsin, the city council chairman, for his support of the JTJ. On Feb. 17, the JTJ struck back, gunning down Qatada’s replacement, Sheikh Noori Abdul Fatah Askar, on his way to prayers. Noori was also the senior Anah representative of the Islamic Party, a bitter enemy of the JTJ, and the JTJ blamed him for Qatada’s demise.

Soon thereafter, the city council stopped meeting with Apache troops. “Intimidation was a huge factor in their decision to step away from the table,” said Capt. Matthew Albertus, Apache Company’s commander.

It soon became clear that if Albertus was to have any chance of reversing trends in Anah, he needed to position forces closer to the action. Freitag ordered the establishment of Combat Outpost Anah beside a major intersection just north of the city.

From there, Apache could monitor the main road to Rawah, a favorite insurgent location for roadside bombs. Albertus’ 2nd Platoon and a company-sized Iraqi army element moved in March 25. Albertus also re-established contact with the council, seeking out the members individually.

On April 10, in conjunction with the police training team from TF 4-14, a Stryker unit based in Rawah, Apache held a one-day recruiting drive for local police.Police are the first line of defense in any counterinsurgency campaign, and JTJ’s defeat of the previous attempt to establish a police presence had allowed the insurgents free reign in Anah.

http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f...25-2052517.php

[slapout9]

Jcustis, great post. I love success stories which are far to few. I love network diagrams too. There is another way to do this which I was taught years ago. It was called the 3F's. Every suspect is connected in 3 ways. Family,Friends, and Finances. Who is related to who, who is friends with who and who pays who.

When I started in LE we didn't have laptops to print out diagrams so we did them by hand. 3x5 cards with photo's or drew them with traffic accident templates. Any time we had contact with anyone we tried to fit them into the overall crime (family) organization. The hidden enemy became visible. Also strange individual actions began to make sense when looked at in the context of protecting the group, gang or crime family. The bigger the network the better your chance of finding informants or exploiting an arrest situation to create an informant.

We also added an unofficial 4th F. Who is F****** who. If I ever found an x-girlfriend or wife it was a gold mine of information because of the revenge motive. I don't know if this would work in Iraq but it was very useful in the US.

[Ray]

Slapout,

That is some education for me. The "F" stuff of yours.

With your permission I will pass it off to my friends.

They maybe practising it, but it is not formalised.

Though the last "F" I had put into action once , when they had ambushed a patrol as also blew up the tyres of a Caspir and it worked.

[RTK]

Assuming Naylor's account below, and in the following link, is true, these soldiers appear to have really worked COIN well, given their disposition, strength, and resources. The article is very much worth a full and slow read, as their are valuable TTPs embedded. Perhaps the good Captain has read Kilcullen?



http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f...25-2052517.php

I don't know if the A Company commander has read Kilcullen, but both Dave Kilcullen and LTC John Nagl pointed this cat out as a good role model for other aspiring commanders this week at the Armor Captain's Course.

While interviewing LTC Nagl for companycommand.com yesterday he pointed this article out as a sterling example for other commanders to emulate.

There is no better stamp of approval in COIN than LTC John Nagl. More proof, espcially within a cloud of changing doctrine, that example is better than precept.

[jcustis]

Given David Galula's estimate that defeating an insurgency is 80% political and 20% military and Dave Kilcullen's statement that maintaining the initiative is imperitive in COIN, how should a company commander or below find the balance between kinetic and non-kinetic operations?

Althought the enemy often determines the balance, I firmly believe that unless one studies and plans for the range of COIN options available, they are guaranteed to be stuck in a cycle of kinetic options alone. The same holds true for the 80% political adherent who refuses to believe that there are bad guys who simply need to be put six feet under.

Even when a unit goes kinetic, it must follow that with non-kinetic engagement (IO, HA, etc.), or it condemns itself to waiting for, and then reacting to, the next kinetic event. Units that do "just enough to get by and get home," are the most guilty. There are occupational hazards to what we do, and although we can only mitigate the risk but so much, it doesn't mean that we should shy away from an operation or activity because of those hazards. We achieve balance when kinetic and non-kinetic ops are blended seamlessly as part of a campaign plan. An example would be planning for displaced persons, civilian casualties, or compensation payments as part of a cordon and search operation. It takes work, but can be accomplished at the company level.

To truly succeed, I think commanders have to win the hearts and minds of their men, train to as many relevant kinetic and non-kinetic tasks as possible, and clearly define conditions for success, long before deployment begins. If that means they spend extra training time perfecting the battle drill for a snap VCP, in order to reduce the risk to civilians and friendly forces, then so be it. If he invests the time in developing his company's own IO and intel cells, even better.

There are going to be plenty of times, however, when HHQ prevent a commander from achieving a balance, by pushing poorly written FRAGO. I've seen a brigade one that called for continuous, near-deliberate VCPs as part of shaping operations. It was very particular about set locations, and didn't take into account the fact that after a short time in one location, a VCP is likely to be targetted. Then there was the time during a relief-in-place between my TF (coming from far west Al Anbar) and another that had been operating in an AO between Ramadi and Fallujah. I listened to a battalion commander state very clearly "we don't go down in that part of the AO [meaning vehicle patrols], because you're guaranteed to get IED'd." I couldn't believe what I was hearing, because it was apparent that the threat of IEDs against vehicles had shaped operations, and therefore meant no one had been in an area that had the potential to harbor insurgents. Inability to dismount effectively had reduced their options, and the unit wasn't even able to entertain the idea of non-kinetic fires in what eventually turned out to be a zone ready for CA action.

Denying enemy freedom of maneuver doesn't always require constant physical presence, and a commander can employ non-kinetic fires as an economy of force measure. I don't think enough commanders are being imaginative in that regard.

RANT OFF...

How does achieving a balance tie into doctrine, training, and education? I summed it up once in a discussion with a peer about homestation training. I've expanded on the list since the original conversation, but it follows as such...THE IDEAL COMPANY COMMANDER IN COIN:

-He and his subordinate leaders have read the new COIN pubs, and the pages are dog-eared

-In addition to reading his branch's professional journal (e.g. Armor Magazine) he reads open source newsletters from the civil affairs and PSYOP communities

-Kilcullen's 28 articles are posted and reviewed by all in the unit

-He has studied the actions in Tal Afar, and has formed his own conclusions

-He has driven his men to master 50-60 control words in Arabic

-He and his subordinate leaders have read the CALL products on tactical interrogation, and working with translators/interpreters

-He has stayed current on the political and military/paramilitary (IA, IP, etc.) fabric of Iraq.

-He understands the difference between Shi'a and Sunni, and the tribal ties that can cut across religious lines

-He has reached out to local law enforcement to get informal training on how organized crime networks work, and TTPs for breaking them up

-He has sat in on several town council/county government meetings, and watched the dynamics at work, with an eye towards understanding why certain moderators succeed and others fail

-He understand the targeting process/cycle, and has hand-picked individuals to serve in his ad hoc intel and IO cells

-He has set bravado aside and understands that he and his men must respect the enemy, lest they become complacent

-He is disciplined in documenting those things he has done to prepare for the fight. It may be a journal, AAr, etc., but it starts before deployment and serves as a tool to pass on to those that follow

This list could probably go on for a while, but I believe strongly that without a degree of depth in the areas mentioned above, company commanders will be condemned to a cycle of reaction and have very little to show for it at the end.

[NDD]

Posts numbers 3 and 5 in this thread are two of the best comments on the subject I have ever seen on the internet.