Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency

[SWJED]

This article has been making the rounds among the USMC leadership - comes highly recommended!

Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency by David Kilcullen.

Introduction

Your company has just been warned for deployment on counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. You have read David Galula, T.E. Lawrence and Robert Thompson. You have studied FM 3-24 and now understand the history, philosophy and theory of counterinsurgency.

You watched Black Hawk Down and The Battle of Algiers, and you know this will be the most difficult challenge of your life.

But what does all the theory mean, at the company level? How do the principles translate into action - at night, with the GPS down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you don't understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos? How does counterinsurgency actually happen?

There are no universal answers, and insurgents are among the most adaptive opponents you will ever face. Countering them will demand every ounce of your intellect. But be comforted: you are not the first to feel this way. There are tactical fundamentals you can apply, to link the theory with the techniques and procedures you already know.

What is counterinsurgency?

If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell: this is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population. You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything weaker than you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations. Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people and societal disruption that fuels and perpetuates the insurgency. The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. For your side to win, the people do not have to like you but they must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their security. In this battlefield popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more powerful than a hundred tanks.

Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before you learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity - but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.

Preparation

1. Know your turf...

2. Diagnose the problem...

3. Organize for intelligence...

4. Organize for interagency operations...

5. Travel light and harden your CSS...

6. Find a political / cultural adviser...

7. Train the squad leaders - then trust them...

8. Rank is nothing, talent is everything...

9. Have a game plan...

The Golden Hour...

10. Be there...

11. Avoid knee jerk responses to first impressions

12. Prepare for handover from Day One...

13. Build trusted networks...

14. Start easy...

15. Seek early victories...

16. Practice deterrent patrolling...

17. Be prepared for setbacks...

18. Remember the global audience...

19. Engage the women, beware the children...

20. Take stock regularly...

Groundhog Day...

21. Exploit a "single narrative"...

22. Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves...

23. Practice armed civil affairs...

24. Small is beautiful...

25. Fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces...

26. Build your own solution - only attack the enemy when he gets in the way...

Getting Short...

27. Keep your extraction plan secret...

Four "What Ifs"...

Conclusion...

28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative...

Open the link above for the full article and an explanation on each of the 28 articles of company-level COIN.

[Tom Odom]

I saw it too. It is quite a good piece of work.

I especially like

22. Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves...

Best

Tom

[Bill Moore]

Tom,

I focused on this one also, but don't completely buy it hook, line, and sinker. I don't think trying to create symmetry is necessarily the right answer, because that puts us more in a react mode than an offensive (or taking the initiative) mode. Note insurgents do not have to model us to defeat us, they use their strenghts effectively, and we need to do the same. None the less the author's intent is well taken.

Furthermore I have seen many of our FID efforts produce limited results because we heap technology, weapons, and tactics, techniques, and procedures that are relevant to our culture and our military culture, but not the developing nation we're attempting to assist. FM 7-8 works for us (within limits), but not for armies without a NCO corps. Technology without robust maintenance systems or educated forces to employ them will soon be gathering rust, and we simply wasted millions of tax dollars. How many times have you seen our donated weapons, vehicles, etc. in category four condition throughout Africa during your tours?

It would be great if we could develop an officer corp in our military that could adapt to their environment instead of the dogmatic doctrinal officer corp we have now. We're still producing the same officers we produced out of West Point in the Civil War, and unfortunately more Westmorelands.

[Martin]

It would be great if we could develop an officer corp in our military that could adapt to their environment instead of the dogmatic doctrinal officer corp we have now.

Do you know how to do that? Or rather, how would you go about doing that? Serious question, no pun.

Martin

[Tom Odom]

What struck me about this was the necessity to understand the strengths of the forces you are working with and then accentuate them. I have been in too many countries where one of 2 things happens (or sometimes both) in assistance programs (civil and military).

a. we try to build them into a Mini-me look alike. the absolute worst assistance effort I ever saw was not a USAID initiative but was a US Senator directed through USAID program to "give" slightly used Wisconsin dairy cattle (meaning give them the cows but deduct the costs from available monies) to the Egyptians. There were 50 cows and they lasted less than a year (the bill was 6 figure as I recall). The Egyptians were less than pleased; the USAID mission was less than pleased; but the Senator's home state dairy association was overjoyed and wanted to do it again. We do this militarily. We gave the Sudanese 10 M60A3 tanks in the mid80s; the first thing they did was drive one through the wall of their tank shed. A Major whom I respect stopped them from opening all the tool kits, spare parts, etc in the middle of a sandpile only by threatening to cut off future assistance. To this day, I do not understand why we would sell 10 tanks to Sudan; the country had a huge parking lot of Soviet equipment that had been passed down to them from the Egyptians.

b. They want to be a Mini-me; demands for high tech equipment are fueled by a sense of status. The classic for this was Zaire (now DR Congo) and PR Congo(CongoBrazza). The Soviets backed Congo-Brazza and we backed Zaire. The French and the PRC backed both. Billions of dollars went into this effort and produced nothing. I met a Zairian Fighter Jock whose sole claim to fame was that he had pranged 2 fighters and lived though the second crash resulted in some nasty burns. There was an Italian Macchi ground attack bird out at NDjili airfield and one day I noticed it was being pushed from the military side to the civilian side. There it was refueled and then pushed back. I asked my "Maverick" what that was all about. I only knew of one A/C in the Zairian Air Farce that was still flying, a Puma that tended to wag its tail like a dog. He told me not to worry; the jet was inop due to lack of oxygen, charges on the ejection seat, and other faults. The "ground crew" would push it over every few weeks, gas it up, and then push it back so they could then sell the fuel.

c. is of course where we try to clone ourselves and our clones like it. then you can really get into Alice in Wonderland bizarreness.

Our saving grace in the Cold War was that the Soviets did the same damn thing. I would recommend 2 books about this:

Andrew Buckoke, Fishing in Africa, a Guide to War and Corruption and
Mohammed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, the Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East

I guess that is what I found so refreshing about the RPA in Rwanda. They valued training over all else but they wanted to make sure it fit their needs. They were realistic in their approach to technology and they were frugal. One of my SF guys told me one night at the Embassy bar, "Sir they can't do push ups for Sh@#. They can't do situps worth a damn either and they don't like to run. But they can walk up the side of a mountain like it's not even there..."

And therein is the real lesson of Lawrence: use the strengths and the proclivities of the locals to suit your ends...

Then again Lawrence was not very popular until he was both out of the British Army and dead.

Best
Tom

[Bill Moore]

Martin,

I'll attempt a stab at your question to get the debate started within our group. However, I want to take some time to formulate some concepts first.

Tom,

You would do our government a service if you would write a book on your experiences. After being retired a few years I'm sure you have reflected on your experiences and have much to share with us. Stability and stability like operations will remain a key component of our national security strategy. Unfortunately we tend to wait until it is a crisis until we decide to address it, by then it may be too late. You had a unique role where you were created effects [just because you hate the concept :-)] behind the scenes with limited resources.

Ciao, Bill

[Shek]

It would be great if we could develop an officer corp in our military that could adapt to their environment instead of the dogmatic doctrinal officer corp we have now. We're still producing the same officers we produced out of West Point in the Civil War, and unfortunately more Westmorelands.

Bill,
I don't think that this is necessarily the case. Unlike the Cold War where we were fighting a known enemy on the European battlefield, and hence we had a strong institution functional fixedness on this scenario, today's fight in Iraq/Afghanistan isn't seen as a distraction from the "real thing", but rather as the "real thing" and the main effort for years to come. As such, I think the younger generation of officers, my peers, for the most part has taken to this new operating environment as what will be relevant. I'm sure you've seen this SSI monograph that lends some credence to this viewpoint:

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB411.pdf

Furthermore, I would argue that the grassroots creation of companycommander.com and platoonleader.org also demonstrate a strong desire from this generation of officers to adapt to the environment.

Lastly, I would suggest that what the Army is currently doing with the Expanded Graduate School Program is a huge step in the right direction. I believe that a pre-commissioning program can only take you so far. However, the opportunity to take a "break" to attend graduate school and reflect on real experience and study an area of interest will only serve to create an officer corps that has a greater depth of knowledge with exposure to thoughts outside of the institutional Army that they can then integrate back into the Army. Programs such as this will reinforce the need to think and adapt to the environment rather than just react to the stimuli presented in the more rigid task, conditions, standards construct of training that was well suited to the Soviet threat, but not as effective for training for the COIN environment.

[SWJED]

Spot on Shek… We (SWJ/SWC) have permission to reprint Marine Corps Gazette articles... That said, we are very selective as not to abuse that permission.

I was saving this article for Volume V of the Small Wars Journal Magazine where we will be featuring 4-5 original Small Wars-related articles written by students attending this years' Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

I am sure the other services are making similar adjustments to their PME curriculum – I offer this article up as I am most familiar with the Corps’ efforts. Lastly, my day-job allows for interaction with U.S. and Coalition officers working Small Wars and urban operations issues. There is truly a corps of “Iron Majors” (metaphor for “not-so-senior workhorses” – officer and enlisted) that GET IT.

Educating for the Future by Colonel John Toolan (USMC) and Dr. Charles McKenna. Marine Corps Gazette, February 2006.

... During the past 2 years veterans of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have challenged the limited treatment of Irregualr Warfare and were looking for greater understanding regarding interagency operations, cultural intelligence, and improved campaign design techniques. These officers were immersed in both the planning and conduct of very complex operations that confronted our PME programs. The faculty at CSC, urged by Marine Corps leadership, set out to reexamine what we did and why we did it. The results included improving the warfighting portion of the curriculum, especially in the area of planning; increasing emphasis on culture and interagency operations; and teaching Arabic to our students, all without compromising either CSC's JPME or SACS accreditations. And all adjustments were to begin in academic year 2005-06 (AY05-06). CSC formed an operational planning team, energized it with clear guidance, and proceeded to examine the curriculum from top to bottom. The results of that examination, approved by the Marine Corps University Curriculum Board, led to a significantly different CSC curriculum, both in method and content-a curriculum that remained entirely consistent with the university's curriculum linkages of warfighting studies, professional studies, leadership studies, communications studies, and cross-cultural studies...

On Edit: Looking for posts on all U.S. Service and Coalition / multinational partner's efforts concerning Professional Military Education - in-house and civilian... Also, anything our Interagency (U.S. and multinational) partners are doing along these lines...

[Bill Moore]

Shek, we obviously have many talented officers, but I still have bared witness to "several" officers at Bn level and higher that simply don't understand their operational environment. This isn't a manner of professional disagreement with an approach, these are guys who simply want to apply fire power to a problem and have no understanding of using other tools to infuence the population. For lack of a better term they're "simple", and in a complex world simple doesn't cut it. Perhaps dogmatic was too strong a term, and a more accurate describtion would be that they have a cultural bias towards certain approaches to solving the problem, and are not open to more effective approaches. I think the up and coming generation of officers (hopefully many of you will stay in) are our shinning hope for the future, but the challenge is sustaining until we have a generational change in our ranks. One BDE Cdr can lose the war for us, just like one SPC in Abu Grab lost a strategic IO battle for us.

[RTK]

After having the great pleasure of spending some time with both David Kilcullen and John Nagl this week, the following question was born out of a few beers. After hearing both of their responses I'm curious to see the perspective of the forum. The question is...

Given David Galula's estimate that defeating an insurgency is 80% political and 20% military and Dave Kilcullen's statement that maintaining the initiative is imperitive in COIN, how should a company commander or below find the balance between kinetic and non-kinetic operations?

[Ray]

Maj. Bob Risdon, who designed the exercises for the U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, said U.S. troops could learn from how Indian forces requested homeowners to lead them on searches of their homes. They were less intrusive in searching people's homes and cars, a tactic that could help when troops are trying to earn the trust of the local population, he said.

"You can figure out a lot about people that way, too. You can figure out if they're trying to hide something," Risdon said.

Lt. Col. Matt Kelley, the 1st Battalion commander, said the way Indians ambushed and disarmed two insurgents impressed him. American troops, in the same drill, simply shot and killed the men, he said.

"They've just gained huge intelligence value from that — instead of killing them, they've captured them," Kelley said. "All our guys said whoa — we'd never do that. We could do it."

Singh, the Indian army commander, said he valued the heightened reality of the U.S. designed exercises, which forced troops to react quickly and rely on their reflexes.

http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/ar...609180355.html

[Jedburgh]

...U.S. troops could learn from how Indian forces requested homeowners to lead them on searches of their homes. They were less intrusive in searching people's homes and cars, a tactic that could help when troops are trying to earn the trust of the local population...

An exercise is an exercise; although certainly of value, the lessons learned have to be understood within the narrow context of that exercise. On the other hand, operations in Jammu and Kashmir offer plenty of valuable lessons (mostly negative) that are worth taking the time to study. India would do well to maintain consistency with the tactics they used in this exercise in Hawaii when on their home turf...

India: Impunity Fuels Conflict in Jammu and Kashmir

...Over the years a conflict over Kashmiri identity and independence has slowly but visibly mutated into an even more dangerous fight under the banner of religion, pitting Islam against Hinduism, and drawing religious radicals into its heart. Indian security forces claim they are fighting to protect Kashmiris from militants and Islamist extremists, while militants claim they are fighting for Kashmiri independence and to defend Muslim Kashmiris from a murderous Indian Army. In reality, both sides have committed widespread and numerous human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law (the laws of war), creating among the civilian population a pervasive climate of fear, distrust, and sadness.

In this report we document serious abuses, especially the targeting of civilians, by both government forces and militants in Jammu and Kashmir. Those abuses continue, despite a tentative peace process that includes talks between New Delhi, Islamabad, and some of Kashmir’s separatist leaders, modest confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan, and the 2002 election of a state government with an avowed agenda to improve the human rights situation. Particular attention is given in this report to the problem of impunity from prosecution, whereby those responsible for abuses rarely get investigated, let alone tried and convicted...

Slideshow

...of course, one has to acknowledge that the other party to the conflict in Kashmir treats those under its control even worse:

With Friends Like These...

...Azad Kashmir is a legal anomaly. According to United Nations (U.N.) resolutions dating back to 1948, Azad Kashmir is neither a sovereign state nor a province of Pakistan, but rather a “local authority” with responsibility over the area assigned to it under a 1949 ceasefire agreement with India. It has remained in this state of legal limbo since that time. In practice, the Pakistani government in Islamabad, the Pakistani army and the Pakistani intelligence services (Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI) control all aspects of political life in Azad Kashmir—though “Azad” means “free,” the residents of Azad Kashmir are anything but. Azad Kashmir is a land of strict curbs on political pluralism, freedom of expression, and freedom of association; a muzzled press; banned books;arbitrary arrest and detention and torture at the hands of the Pakistani military and the police; and discrimination against refugees from Jammu and Kashmir state. Singled out are Kashmiri nationalists who do not support the idea of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. Anyone who wants to take part in public life has to sign a pledge of loyalty to Pakistan, while anyone who publicly supports or works for an independent Kashmir is persecuted. For those expressing independent or unpopular political views, there is a pervasive fear of Pakistani military and intelligence services—and of militant organizations acting at their behest or independently...

[Shek]

Lt. Col. Matt Kelley, the 1st Battalion commander, said the way Indians ambushed and disarmed two insurgents impressed him. American troops, in the same drill, simply shot and killed the men, he said.

Sir,
At least we're good marksmen . . .

[RTK]

"They've just gained huge intelligence value from that — instead of killing them, they've captured them," Kelley said.

Training has taken place. Second and Third order effects revealed. I'll be damned....

[SWJED]

14 December The Australian - Exceptional Strategist is Our Man in Washington by Patrick Walters.

A few weeks ago a highly unusual ceremony took place at the Pentagon.

David Kilcullen, one of Australia's leading counter-terrorism experts, had come to receive a medal awarded by US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

The Defence Department's Medal for Exceptional Public Service cited Dr Kilcullen's "exceptional service" as special adviser for irregular warfare and counter-terrorism during the 2005 Quadrennial Defence Review.

For Kilcullen, 40, one of the Australian army's most brilliant graduates, it was another milestone in a career that has catapulted him into the highest corridors of power in Washington.

Uniquely, for an Australian citizen, Kilcullen has emerged as a key adviser to US President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Rumsfeld in the war on terror. His influence in Washington arguably oustrips that of the only other Australian to reach high office in the US, Martin Indyk, the former US ambassador to Israel.

Over the past year, working out of the US State Department, Kilcullen has flown on secret assignments into the world's terrorist hot-spots from Iraq and Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa, Indonesia and The Philippines.

A primer he wrote on fighting counter-insurgency warfare for junior officers now forms part of the US army's basic war doctrine, and has been translated into Russian, Arabic, Pashtu and Spanish.

"It's unprecedented," Hank Crumpton, the State Department's counter-terrorism chief, told The Australian in reference to Kilcullen's special role in his office.

"I am the adviser to Secretary Rice on counter-terrorism, and David is my principal strategist."

Leading US strategic thinker Eliot A. Cohen, from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies said: "I cannot think of a non-American who has had so much influence in the US national security establishment - and from within, noless."

Working closely with the Pentagon and the CIA, Kilcullen has led counter-insurgency teams in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan, observing at close quarters the US-led efforts to stabilise the two countries and Washington's battle against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates.

He has stalked around the Arabian Gulf and Pakistan's North-west Frontier studying counter-insurgency warfare and learning new insights into the culture of Islamist terror groups.

A fortnight ago, Kilcullen returned to Washington from Kabul, where he helped teach counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism techniques to officers and NCOs of the fledgling Afghan army, as well as soldiers in the NATO-led coalition.

Combining his Australian army experience with a PHD on the political anthropology of the Indonesian post-1945 Islamist insurgent movement, Darul Islam, Kilcullen first took leave from Australia's Defence Department in 2004 to help the Pentagon with the drafting of last year's Quadrennial Defence Review, which determines the US's global defence strategy.

Working inside the Pentagon in 2004, Kilcullen founded and led the US Government's inter-agency Irregular Warfare Working Group....

[SWJED]

16 December The Australian - War on Insurgency by Patrick Walters.

As Washington struggles to find a way out of Iraq, a young Australian ex-army officer is helping the US chart a new course in the global war on Islamist terror.

In his role as chief strategist for the State Department's counter-terrorism chief Hank Crumpton, David Kilcullen has exerted considerable influence on the direction of America's effort in fighting al-Qa'ida and its affiliates around the globe.

"He has made a big difference to us in terms of the intellectual capital he has brought with him and intellectual capital that he has generated, when we look at terrorism and how we conceptualise our strategy," Crumpton tells Inquirer.

Kilcullen, 40, brings an unusual combination of skills to his role as an Australian serving as a senior counter-terrorism adviser inside the US bureaucracy.

A counter-insurgency expert, Kilcullen combines academic expertise in political anthropology (he has a PhD from the University of NSW) with military experience in Indonesia, East Timor and the Middle East, including a stint helping train Indonesia's Kopassus special forces.

Fluent in Indonesian, he wrote his doctorate on Darul Islam, the post-1945 Muslim insurgency movement in Indonesia crushed by the Suharto government.

Living in kampungs in West Java in the early 1990s had a profound effect on the way Kilcullen views the global phenomenon of radical Islam confronting the US and its allies. Now he is leading a team of experts in Washington writing a new counter-insurgency doctrine for the US Government.

During the past year he has travelled to far-flung theatres in the war on terror, from Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa to Indonesia and Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province.

In his recent writings Kilcullen argues the case for a new paradigm to deal with what he terms a "globalised insurgency" encompassing Iraq, Afghanistan and other regional conflicts.

The US and its allies must adapt the best classical counter-insurgency techniques at the local level, combined with a much more sophisticated global information campaign, to defeat al-Qa'ida and its affiliates...

16 December The Australian - Rocky Road to Influence in the U.S. by Patrick Walters.

...Kilcullen's CV makes him seem a bit like a military adventurer of old: a dash of T.E. Lawrence and Wilfred Thesiger.

As well as getting a PhD in political anthropology, he is a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society and an expert on counter-insurgency warfare.

During his 22-year Australian army career he saw service in East Timor, Bougainville and Cyprus, and developed a keen interest in unconventional warfare.

In 2004 he helped write the Australian Government's white paper on terrorism, before being seconded to the Pentagon as a special counter-terrorism adviser for the 2005 quadrennial defence review.

As the chief strategist in the State Department's Office of the Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Kilcullen has travelled the world helping the US Government refine its counter-insurgency doctrine and the fight against al-Qa'ida.

In his year at the State Department, Kilcullen has exercised unusual influence for an Australian.

Lieutenant-General David Petraeus, head of the US army's combined arms training command, who is tipped to take over as the top US commander in Iraq, says Kilcullen has helped "very substantially to raise the level of understanding of counter-insurgency operations in the United States, not only in the US military but ... throughout the US Government".

"He is," Petraeus tells Inquirer, "one of those rare individuals who has both studied and done counter-insurgency for his country, and who then has helped a coalition partner do it as well at a very high level."

[SWJED]

The New Yorker has placed Knowing the Enemy in their free to view section.

In 1993, a young captain in the Australian Army named David Kilcullen was living among villagers in West Java, as part of an immersion program in the Indonesian language. One day, he visited a local military museum that contained a display about Indonesia’s war, during the nineteen-fifties and sixties, against a separatist Muslim insurgency movement called Darul Islam. “I had never heard of this conflict,” Kilcullen told me recently. “It’s hardly known in the West. The Indonesian government won, hands down. And I was fascinated by how it managed to pull off such a successful counterinsurgency campaign.”...

[marct]

The New Yorker has placed Knowing the Enemy in their free to view section.

Excellent article. Now, if we can just get some more Anthropologists into all the Coalition militaries or more of the military into Anthropology.

Marc

[Bill Moore]

Thanks SWJED, this is the best article I have read lately. Very relevant and useful from the tactical to strategic levels.

[jwrob1]

Jean Larteguy in the '60's wrote "The Centurions" and "The Praetorians" about French paras in Algeria... he wrote there should be two armies (to paraphrase) one for the parade ground... and one who provides the fighters...