Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency

[jcustis]

That Amazon.com listing is the book. It can sometimes be found on Ebay in paperback. It was published in 1982, and written by Peter Stiff as told to him by LtCol Reid-Daly. Pamwe Chete: The Legend of the Selous Scouts was published in 1999 and appears to have been written solely by Reid-Daly. I have not read that book, but it appears I need to pick it up.

My copy is with someone else as well, who is enjoying the tales of audacity demonstrated by that band of warrios.

EDITED TO ADD: There is a text within the SWJ Reference Library that I just pulled up, concerning pseudo operations. I'm halfway through it and the issues for consideration are on point, making it a required read for anyone exploring the possibilities of pseudo ops to "mirror" insurgents/terrorists, or just gain other TTPs in dealing with detained/captured individuals.

http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cline.pdf

[Tom Odom]

Wow. I never cease to wonder at how small our world is. Cline as indicated in his bio was CENTCOM and J2 branch, JCS while I was in Army G2. And we are both NPS and UNTSO alumni.


The paper is quite good and to the point. There were other pseudo ops; Yugoslavia in WWII, in naval warfare it is almost a tradition, I believe post WWII Greece also saw some play, I also believe the French did some in Indochina with mixed results (that may account for their avoiding such ops in Algeria). In any case, pseudo ops really seem like a military counterpart to informant ops on the police side, albeit with a more direct action mission. What I really like about this paper is it makes key points on negative effects (yep, I used the "e" word ).

Once again hats off to Dave and Bill for the SWJ library.

Tom

[Larry Dunbar]

Mirroring one's enemy happened in a way during the Rhodesian conflict. A read of the texts describing pseudo-operations, conducted by the Selous Scouts, describes the path the Rhodesian Security Forces took to "turn" terrorists for the purpose of gaining tactical intelligence about the enemy. In several cases, "turned" terrorists were integrated into the Scouts' formations and employed in the field to allow them to get within hands-reach of the small terrorist gangs.

"Mirroring", if not employed in accordance with the precepts of the Law of War, poses significant risks. Could the Iraqi Security Forces become the death squads of the M.E.? Would their actions put a stink on the coalition forces that trained and outfitted them?

Just my $.02

When you hear the words "Death squads" it is a safe bet that "mirroring' is not the strategy being deployed. Death squads are an attempt to reorient your enemy into your way of thinking.

While mirroring is called a destructive strategy (ultimately what you want to do is become kinetic with your enemy) trust is the most important factor. Once you know your enemy, you have to trust your enemy to act exactly how you think they will. Because the enemy is fighting you, you also have to give your enemy complete trust. If the enemy knows you as a death squad dealing S.O.B. then you have to act like one. If the enemy knows you as a fair and moral person, you have to maintain that also.

To break out of a mirroring strategy, trust has to be broken. I think part of Sherman's march through the South was an attempt (I think successful) to break an army who was mirroring his. Leaving a scorched earth was not an American implicit rule that we would normally follow. It was effective, but we did, and, it might be said, we still are paying a price for it.

[SWJED]

I haven't had the time to go through this site (hasn't been updated since 2003) - I offer it up FYI - The Selous Scouts.

[Larry Dunbar]

Quote: "The two major models of pseudo-operations are as intelligence collectors or as operators for direct action missions”.

Cline, like myself, didn’t fully understand the major models of pseudo-operations. I believe he didn’t divide the mission of pseudo-operations correctly. Cline’s two models are mostly one and the same. When pseudo-operations perform intelligence collecting, they are mostly using that information to carry out kinetic strikes against the enemy either directly as operators or indirectly as information gatherers for the military. Therefore I prefer to divide their functions into three major areas. They perform as re-orientation units, as intelligence collectors, and as operators for direct action missions.

Maybe the military doesn’t recognize these units as having this function of re-orientation or they don’t understand re-orientation, but their success rate for converting the insurgents to the government’s side seems extraordinary. While 4 or 5 converts don’t sound like very many, their conversion represents what is needed for a successful PISRR movement. PISRR is an acronym for Penetrate, Isolate, Subvert, Reorient, and Reharmonize. This is a natural constructive process as described by Col. Boyd.

When operating as intelligence collectors, pseudo-operators are mainly collecting information to get inside the orientation and decision making loop of the insurgency. Once inside they can mirror the insurgency and destroy them. This is the same loop that Col. Boyd also described as an Observation, Orientation, Decision-making, and Acting loop (OODA). The loop runs from the high potential and low kinetic energy of observation to the low potential and high kinetic energy of Act. The Act phase is usually carried out by latter military action. Death squads are not really part of an OODA loop, but are part of the Reorientation phase inside a PISRR loop.

As a Reorientation unit, the pseudo-operator’s goal is to bring the insurgency or the general public into the government’s way of thinking, or at least away from the insurgency’s. As the article showed, this can be done directly to the insurgents (converts) or to the general population that the insurgents operate in. This is part of Boyd’s PISRR loop or movement. The movement starts from the high kinetic and low potential energy that Penetrate represents, and moves to the low kinetic and high potential energy of Reharmonize. When the society is Reharmonized, to the will of the government, there is a strong political structure holding it together. While it does take a physical structure to hold a society together, it is really the ideas (implicit laws) of the society that keep it working. I call these ideas (because they have no mass) potential energy.

This reorientation movement, as it relates to pseudo-operations, either “turns” the insurgents and bringing them into the pseudo-operations directly, or the pseudo-operators can bring terror and uncertainty into the general populace, bending the general populace to the government’s will or at least bending it against the insurgency. Because the insurgency needs the general population to survive, bending the general population to the government’s will (Subverting and Isolating) has a direct effect on the insurgency. Of course, as been noted, when used with pseudo-operations the effect may not be the desired one.

While Col. Boyd described OODA and its mirror image PISRR as loops, I describe them as movements. To me they represent a movement of energy per second. But energy is divided into two types: potential and kinetic. We are a combination of both, our legs move us but our brains tell us when to move, where to move, and how much to move. While in military terms kinetic energy usually means bombs or bullets, in physics terms it can mean the movement of any mass, which includes soldiers. Potential energy is the enabler of all movement. Politics is basically potential energy. Depending on what you are trying to accomplish, either destruction or constructive, it generally takes one of these two loops.

If you are nation building, you destroy your opponent’s forces, then try to Reharmonize the society into a form that you are able to live with (I believe this takes lots of troops, because you have to reorient the parts of the society that enables it to physicallyfunction. After Isolating Saddam, We should have reorient the civilian leadership not let it go). This is what the PISRR movement tries to accomplish.

An OODA movement starts when an adversary confronts you. Once you observe your enemy, the collecting of the information that is needed to destroy him begins. Then you orient yourself to the best position, either politically or physically, to destroy your enemy. The decision is made as to your course of action and you act. This generally doesn’t take that many troops because accuracy counts and it is usually easier to break something than repair it.

Because I have no knowledge of how the US military actually works, I can only speak in general terms. Generally speaking, I believe we used a PISRR movement in the Philippines with the use of US trained Philippine troops. North Vietnam used an OODA loop against us. The release of kinetic energy, or Act, happened as the tanks of the North Vietnam army rolled into the streets of the South Vietnam capitol and our guys hung on to helicopters leaving our embassy.

Like someone else said, this is just my .02 cents, thanks.

[jcustis]

Those are very thought provoking words Mr. Dunbar. I would love to be a fly on the wall if coalition forces are at all going throught the process of turning terrorists and employing them side-by-side with our formations.

[NDD]

Posts numbers 3 and 5 in this thread are two of the best comments on the subject I have ever seen on the internet.

[Shek]

It would be great if we could develop an officer corp in our military that could adapt to their environment instead of the dogmatic doctrinal officer corp we have now. We're still producing the same officers we produced out of West Point in the Civil War, and unfortunately more Westmorelands.

Bill,
I don't think that this is necessarily the case. Unlike the Cold War where we were fighting a known enemy on the European battlefield, and hence we had a strong institution functional fixedness on this scenario, today's fight in Iraq/Afghanistan isn't seen as a distraction from the "real thing", but rather as the "real thing" and the main effort for years to come. As such, I think the younger generation of officers, my peers, for the most part has taken to this new operating environment as what will be relevant. I'm sure you've seen this SSI monograph that lends some credence to this viewpoint:

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB411.pdf

Furthermore, I would argue that the grassroots creation of companycommander.com and platoonleader.org also demonstrate a strong desire from this generation of officers to adapt to the environment.

Lastly, I would suggest that what the Army is currently doing with the Expanded Graduate School Program is a huge step in the right direction. I believe that a pre-commissioning program can only take you so far. However, the opportunity to take a "break" to attend graduate school and reflect on real experience and study an area of interest will only serve to create an officer corps that has a greater depth of knowledge with exposure to thoughts outside of the institutional Army that they can then integrate back into the Army. Programs such as this will reinforce the need to think and adapt to the environment rather than just react to the stimuli presented in the more rigid task, conditions, standards construct of training that was well suited to the Soviet threat, but not as effective for training for the COIN environment.

[SWJED]

Spot on Shek… We (SWJ/SWC) have permission to reprint Marine Corps Gazette articles... That said, we are very selective as not to abuse that permission.

I was saving this article for Volume V of the Small Wars Journal Magazine where we will be featuring 4-5 original Small Wars-related articles written by students attending this years' Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

I am sure the other services are making similar adjustments to their PME curriculum – I offer this article up as I am most familiar with the Corps’ efforts. Lastly, my day-job allows for interaction with U.S. and Coalition officers working Small Wars and urban operations issues. There is truly a corps of “Iron Majors” (metaphor for “not-so-senior workhorses” – officer and enlisted) that GET IT.

Educating for the Future by Colonel John Toolan (USMC) and Dr. Charles McKenna. Marine Corps Gazette, February 2006.

... During the past 2 years veterans of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have challenged the limited treatment of Irregualr Warfare and were looking for greater understanding regarding interagency operations, cultural intelligence, and improved campaign design techniques. These officers were immersed in both the planning and conduct of very complex operations that confronted our PME programs. The faculty at CSC, urged by Marine Corps leadership, set out to reexamine what we did and why we did it. The results included improving the warfighting portion of the curriculum, especially in the area of planning; increasing emphasis on culture and interagency operations; and teaching Arabic to our students, all without compromising either CSC's JPME or SACS accreditations. And all adjustments were to begin in academic year 2005-06 (AY05-06). CSC formed an operational planning team, energized it with clear guidance, and proceeded to examine the curriculum from top to bottom. The results of that examination, approved by the Marine Corps University Curriculum Board, led to a significantly different CSC curriculum, both in method and content-a curriculum that remained entirely consistent with the university's curriculum linkages of warfighting studies, professional studies, leadership studies, communications studies, and cross-cultural studies...

On Edit: Looking for posts on all U.S. Service and Coalition / multinational partner's efforts concerning Professional Military Education - in-house and civilian... Also, anything our Interagency (U.S. and multinational) partners are doing along these lines...

[Bill Moore]

Shek, we obviously have many talented officers, but I still have bared witness to "several" officers at Bn level and higher that simply don't understand their operational environment. This isn't a manner of professional disagreement with an approach, these are guys who simply want to apply fire power to a problem and have no understanding of using other tools to infuence the population. For lack of a better term they're "simple", and in a complex world simple doesn't cut it. Perhaps dogmatic was too strong a term, and a more accurate describtion would be that they have a cultural bias towards certain approaches to solving the problem, and are not open to more effective approaches. I think the up and coming generation of officers (hopefully many of you will stay in) are our shinning hope for the future, but the challenge is sustaining until we have a generational change in our ranks. One BDE Cdr can lose the war for us, just like one SPC in Abu Grab lost a strategic IO battle for us.

[Shek]

Shek, we obviously have many talented officers, but I still have bared witness to "several" officers at Bn level and higher that simply don't understand their operational environment. This isn't a manner of professional disagreement with an approach, these are guys who simply want to apply fire power to a problem and have no understanding of using other tools to infuence the population. For lack of a better term they're "simple", and in a complex world simple doesn't cut it. Perhaps dogmatic was too strong a term, and a more accurate describtion would be that they have a cultural bias towards certain approaches to solving the problem, and are not open to more effective approaches. I think the up and coming generation of officers (hopefully many of you will stay in) are our shinning hope for the future, but the challenge is sustaining until we have a generational change in our ranks. One BDE Cdr can lose the war for us, just like one SPC in Abu Grab lost a strategic IO battle for us.

Bill,
I'm tracking now and agree with you that this is an issue, having seen the same firsthand (it was a world of difference working with 4ID vs 101ABNDIV in Iraq). I don't think that there's a quick fix since we were/are fighting with officers who have been promoted for the most part based on their success in fighting a conventional enemy at NTC/JRTC/CMTC with maybe some LIC exposure.

To try and counteract this cultural bias will require the likes of Pertraeus and Chiarelli to be repeated, i.e. rewarding and promoting officers who have shown a competence for the environment and have thus been thrust into prominent command positions (command of CAC and MNC-I) and offered as role models. By putting the right leaders into the right positions, you will have more specified guidance on conduct in the COIN environment (e.g. look at the series of articles about the subtle yet significant changes in the ROE being made by LTG Chiarelli), thereby limiting the ability of those commanders that you refer to that eschew any semblance of "hearts and minds" from pursuing strictly "kinetic" solutions.

I think this is one of those lessons that hopefully we've learned from Vietnam - we need to reward the right officers, to include those that are training the ISF and have shown a knack for COIN, and in doing so, will persuade those who don't buy into the intellectual arguments for COIN principles through the need to adapt in order survive within the new command climate to get promoted.

[jcustis]

http://www.galago.co.za/orders.htm

Galago Press seems to have finally gotten it's website offerings squared away, and softcover editions are available for $30.00 US, including surface mail shipping.

I highly recommend snatching up a volume if you can. From a TTP perspective, the lessons are invaluable, even though the AO was very different from where the US currently operates.

[TROUFION]

The similiarity to the maneuver vs attrition arguments of the 80's and 90's is striking. As with the old argument the answer lies in the grey middle somewhere. You cannot exploit maneuver without attrition and vice versa, exclusion of one for the other doesn't work. Same with the symmetries. A dogmatic answer in favor of either is wrongheaded. In COIN there are times when the SOF 'symmetrical' team can make great utiliy out of the asymmetric Rifle Company, M1A2 Platoon or JDAM CAS. The trick is finding the proper balance through an 'empathetic' understanding of the battlefield.

This article is on the right track seeking the nuanced approach bottom up.

[Neilg]

Sorry folks tried to write about the Britsh build - up Aden Ireland etc but I had to cut it.


Belfast in 1971 to 72 a small city by comparison, ;;;;;;



As terrorists the IRA were in a class of their own and they were to become the grand masters of urban guerrilla warfare.
Operating on the streets there was the constant apprehension, was your cover being exposed, then a phobia of passing a potential bomb or booby trap, hidden explosives in cycle frames, rubbish bins, prams, drain pipes, and under pavements waiting for you to pass then the remote was depressed. The car bomb was said to be initiated in the province by the then Belfast Brigade commander; Seamus Toomey a devastating terror tactic that also killed many civilians as well as soldiers. Other terror tactics evolved, nails imbedded in lumps of gelignite, pipe bombs, blast bombs and the petrol bomb, all made regular appearances.
Then there was the prospect of getting shot, from a rifle or submachine gun, from close range from a pistol as you walked down the street with the mussel less than an inch away from the back of the head. Shootings were never straightforward never a high noon shoot out, and no quick draw with double taps at multiple targets; it was ambush and counter ambush. One form of IRA urban attack in built-up streets would be the ‘cowboy’ attack where a lookout would signal the right moment and a gunman would stick his machinegun around a corner and blaze away and hope for a hit without even having to expose his own body. At other times snipers would shoot through several sets of windows in adjacent houses just as the target passed the furthest away window bearing a small marking cross made of tape at head height. The sniper would get a signal as the soldier passed the marker and fire. A guy you knew, worked and trained with would go down with half his head missing. Sometimes a gunman would loose off a magazine at a target, and then a back up would snatch the weapon and move it away sometimes even hidden in a baby’s pram. The back-ups were kids, wives, mother, and all terrorists. Sometimes a gunman would drop the weapon and make his escape by dashing to an open ‘friend's’ house and sit down to a ‘prepared’ half eaten meal. It looked like he had been there for hour, a ready made alibi.
Then you had the traps; most of these were set for the infantry; the foot patrols. Walking around at night the grunts got bored one trick they used to snare the patrol was to find a house with a good ambush site then get a young good-looking girl to make believe she lived there and to undress in a well-lit window with the knowledge she would attract the attention of the patrol. The word would get around then eventually at one of her acts a burst of machine gun fire or a bomb aimed at the patrol would cut short the performance.
But you had to learn; you learnt to spot the signs between the traps and the tricks, the real and the hoax bombs that ran in a ratio of 20 hoax’s to every real bomb. You knew the signs that meant a shooting was about to happen and you learn when you could be the target. You had to learn the tricks and you had to learn quickly, you learnt that when they let of an explosive devise in an empty street if you did the obvious then you headed straight into an ambush. If you didn’t recognise the signs you died. . But most of all you learnt that in places like Belfast you never become complacent, complacency was not recommended as an operational technique for this type of warfare.

Riots became a twin problem; you could handle the bricks, rock or the bottles, but mainly you listen for the audio signal that would tell the crowd to dispel instantly. This was the time you took cover and looked for the sniper who was about to fire. You had times when the mob suddenly close in on a security patrol as they entered a street, the mob would bang dustbin lids and made a noise loud enough to cause confusion; it broke command and disorientated the six man uniformed patrol; the mob would hide the gunman then help him escape.

At times you found the bodies, the kidnap victims who had been tortured, the unlucky ones that died a horrifying death and ended up stuffed in a car boot along with a booby trap. The news the next day simple said “a body of a man was found dead in central Belfast police are treating it as murder” the politicians preferred it that way. The lucky ones got away with kneecapping a term to describe punishment shootings, a bullet though each kneecap it allowed them to live but to limp about for the rest of their lives. For us it was another learning phase it taught don’t get caught, no surrender.
These tactics weren’t described in British Army training manuals, we learnt the hard way and this meant some people dying.
Another thing you notice, Soldiers who have tried to stop there friends from bleeding to death will never again fall asleep during first aid lectures.
When the shooting start you know you have been continually trained for what is happening but for some people it is hard for them to accept, a street that looks like any other street in England, the people are dressed the same and speak the same language but they are people acting with a psychopathic insanity. You have two options when it happens and the first thing you may see is one of your guys blown apart; you either freeze or try to believe it’s not happening and you die or your training clicks in and natural reactions follow and you engage; if it is a single sniper you do a fast follow up to get close enough to retaliate you never stand still. If it is an ambush you consolidate find better cover even if it means kicking the door or a house in and throwing the occupant out. You radio for a quick reaction force. If you hear the banging of garbage can lids. You know that this is what calls the ghetto occupants onto the streets a riot made to order designed to stop help getting to you. If you’re in Uniform you may have a chance with the rifle to keep them away, undercover you have to shoot civilians, women and teenage kids to get out. There is no hands up, no surrender, no prisoners of war if you are caught you are murdered. Since the seventies we have came to Belfast and went operation after operation, the IRA has changed from terrorists to ‘freedom fighters’, and we conveniently overlook their record of the past 32 years with 1,700 people murdered, including 600 innocent people who just happened to be in the way! For the security forces 720 deaths have been sustained with many thousands injured, many of who will never recover fully! Belfast was the place where you learnt the rules.

[Ray]

An interesting thread on Counter Insurgency (CI).

I will confess that I have not been able to read the 28 articles and therefore, these are but some thoughts that I proffer since I have experience in CI as also have spoken to officers and men who were at the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJW School) of the Indian Army (IA) when some US troops had gone there to train and understand CI as is being practiced in the Indian Army.

Obviously, it does not mean that the thoughts that I am penning can be applicable in other circumstance around the world, including the fact that the national psychology and training of different armies differ. With that rider, one should view my thoughts. Merely professionally.

From the posts, one is led to surmise that the aim of CI is to "kill" the insurgent. Indeed it is so i.e. kill the insurgent/ terrorist. But if I may say, it should not appear as if done with "vengeance" and "anger" (for the want of a better words) that is evident. Even in the CIJW School, it was felt that the US troops adopted a "shoot first and then question" attitude when put through some simulated practical scenarios.

There was a good reason for the "shoot first and then ask questions" format. Unlike the IA which undertakes CI on its own soil and hence cannot afford civilian casualties or collateral damage, the US troops fights on foreign soil and thus their priority is to save American lives i.e. their soldiers at all cost and then worry about civilians/ terrorists. However, either way the Human Rights and the world press can havoc any CI action and make a mountain of a mole hill. Again, here the US is at an advantage because being a superpower as also being a benefactor to many a nation, the outrage, if any, is muted. But, nonetheless, embarrassing. India for reasons that need not be elaborated being obvious is not so endowed.

Yet, professionally speaking, there is no doubt that one has to win the "hearts and minds", even if it has been reduced to the level of a cliche alone! Therefore, any CI action must not appear to be that of vengeance and instead amd eto appears as a mere law and order issue and not even a military one. It must appear mundane as it would be in normal life. No brouhaha and no glorification of the event, either locally or in the media through the official spokesman. The desire to publicise the "victory" will only alienate the people as if an occupation army has come to subjugate the locals. Shooting indiscriminately and causing collateral damage and civilian casualties also only achieves to alienates the people. All efforts must be made to keep it to the minimum.

Another issue that must be borne in mind is that all civilians are not terrorists or terrorist sympathiser. They actually have no option. The terrorists will kill them if they do not cooperate, but the govt forces are not indiscriminate and believe in the legal aspects and hence do not kill wantonly. Further, human rights organisations will gun for the govt troops while they leave the terrorists alone and this add to the bad image which is exploited by the terrorists and the media for propaganda.

Another issue that is forgotten is that genuine civic action should be done instead of cosmetic stuff. It is important that it appears not something to be seen, but that the action is actually to alleviate a local problem. Indian Army's Operation Sadbhavan has proved to be roaring success.

Even civic action that is being done should not look as if it is a "dole" or a "gift". It is condescending (at least in the Oriental mindset). What one should do is give the civilians the stuff and make them do it themselves with technical advice and engineering stores and plant thrown in. Since they construct the stuff, they will protect their Love's labour and feel proud of the same. It will go a long way in accepting the presence of the Army and will also win their confidence wherein they would be more cooperative with the Army.

The idea of having insurgents who surrender as counter insurgents has been successfully practiced in India. We call them "Ikhwanis". However, since they live within the community, they have to be protected. If they are not well paid, they turn extortionists and then the whole exercise is ruined.

Lastly, where all goes wrong (including as experienced in India) is that we don't bone up on the culture and traditions of the locals where there is the insurgency. This is very essential so as to not offend their sensibilities. Likewise, knowing the local language is absolutely essential. Interpreters need not interpret correctly for a variety of reasons.

Just a few thoughts.

[nichols]

The essential requirement now is to extend this attitude to other types of missions, cultures and environments. Especially helpful would be joint missions, where third party forces ally with and oppose US units.

This is because we have devised (through decades of effort) realistic ways of simulating a maneuver war against a thinking, freely acting enemy.

Joining the discussion late...

This is exactly where the Marine Corps is heading with simulations as part of the Deployable Virtual Training Environment. We just started a contract for the next generation TDS. The requirement doc is 138k, to large to attach so here's some highlights:

The VTK shall provide three levels of editor modules:

• Content Management Editor for TECOM and PMTRASYS only.
• Simulation Center Editor
• Scenario Designer Editor

The control of the editors shall be through a Graphical User Interface (GUI), which shall be simplistic in nature utilizing, sliders, scrollbars, numerical values, and toggle radio buttons. Editors will provide the trainer with the tools needed to shape the training scenario by creating individual Marine, OPFOR, Civilian and Animals and placing them in teams, units, mobs and herds. The editors will also be used to create maps and modify existing maps for use in the TDS and to create the conditions of the training scenario The editor shall be selectable to any or the following forces: Bluefor, OpFor, Host Nation or noncombatants.

• Activity Editor: To task simulation generated avatars and objects in the simulation general operating parameters
• Map Selection: Select the map on which the mission will be set.
• Unit Placement: Designate deployment areas and place the units assigned to the mission on the map.
• Trigger Placement: Triggers are a series of conditions and actions that can be assigned to a mission. When a trigger condition is met, then the action is performed. Triggers can help tailor the scenario to a particular storyline. The AI will also use triggers, especially map based triggers, as planning tools. The designer will select from a list of conditions and actions, or effects, to create a trigger.
• Operational Settings : One of the many functions of the mission editor is the ability to specify initial deployment zones, pre-plotted artillery strikes (if any), game time limit, engagement type, and other general option.
• Number of Players: Specify the number of users to be supported in the designed mission.
•Fog of War Specify the following games settings:
Always See the Enemy
Only See Enemy in User’s LOS
Fading Enemy if no longer in LOS (last known position)
See Enemy in Allied LOS
Units Always Obey Orders
• Fire Support: Specify what type of fire support missions and how many of each missions will be available to each user.
• Save Mission: Save the edited or newly created mission with a unique file name.
• Load Mission: Load an existing mission and edit it in the Mission editor.

3.1.3.3.3 Scenario Designer Weapons editor

The Weapons editor shall provide the means for the player to select from a list of ‘like forces’ weapons and arm the team as desired, limiting each team member to one shoulder-fired weapon. In addition a player will be able to select from other tools to include a compass, binos, GPS, thermal sights, and lasing equipment. Refer to Appendix A for a minimum list of available weapons. Enemy players will be able to chose from a list of asymmetric threat weapons to include Vehicle borne IED’s that cause the appropriate damage to structures, vehicles, and personnel. The editor gives the ability to set the basic load for ammunition for each weapon system.

3.1.3.3.4 Scenario Designer Psychological and Physical editors

The Psychological and Physical editors shall be scaleable from 1 to 10 to adjust the team member’s mental and physical health respectively. For example, a team member’s physical attribute may be adjusted from 10 (very alert and rested) to 1 (drifting in and out of sleep) by using an adjustable slider.

3.1.3.3.5 Scenario Designer Artificial Intelligence Editor

Allow the AI to be altered to modify the computer-opponent’s behavior to be more aggressive or less sophisticated in the types of attacks it undertakes, as examples. For instance, Iraqis at the beginning of the war fought as organized armies, using traditional weapons and tactics. Later, they fought as mobs and now fight as skilled guerillas. The AI Editor, shall allow the Scenario Designer to tailor the computer opponent’s behavior for each of these types of warfare.


3.1.3.3.6 Instructor Controller Station

Allows an Instructor (scenario designer) to task simulation generated avatars and objects in the simulation general operating parameters (for instance, loiter in a given area) or (go to a location at a given time and perform a specific act.) In addition, items can be designated and function as IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), VBIEDs (Vehicle-Based IEDs) or as non-threatening. During game play an instructor has the capability to jump into and control various characters in the game. Have the ability to switch between multiple fixed site positions while in free camera mode (I.e., have multiple locations of interest and be able to transition between them using a pick list.)

And my favorite:

Application Program Interface (API) that allows third party AI to be imported by end user.

This is where we place the DIME PMESII segue.

[jcustis]

Assuming Naylor's account below, and in the following link, is true, these soldiers appear to have really worked COIN well, given their disposition, strength, and resources. The article is very much worth a full and slow read, as their are valuable TTPs embedded. Perhaps the good Captain has read Kilcullen?

By Sean Naylor for the Army times

Liberating Anah

How Apache Company freed an Iraqi city from the grip of a terrorist cell


ANAH, Iraq — insurgents had freely waged a two-year reign of terror on this sleepy, affluent Sunni city of 30,000. They blew up the police station and chased out the nascent police force. They murdered the chairman of the city council and cowed the local populace.

members of Jama’at Al Tawid Al Jihad, known as the JTJ or Group of Monotheism and Jihad — a branch of al-Qaida in Iraq — settled in. This city in central Anbar province came to serve as a convenient sanctuary and way station for fighters going southeast to the real action in Ramadi, Fallujah and Baghdad.

But about 20 kilometers outside Anah, a Stryker squadron commander determined it was time to end the insurgents’ grip on Anah.

Lt. Col. Mark Freitag, commander of the 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, installed a Stryker infantry company in a combat outpost just outside Anah in late March. The grunts of Apache Company, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, attached to Task Force 4-14, took aggressive action against the insurgents, whose leaders made a move to regain the initiative: They dispatched a shadowy commander named Abu Hamza to take charge of the insurgency in Anah.

The stage was set for a showdown here on the south bank of the Euphrates River.

Steep learning curve

The 131 troops of Apache Company assumed responsibility for Anah and the nearby village of Reyanah on Feb. 2 while still based in Rawah. Theirs was to be a steep learning curve. No coalition forces had been stationed in Anah since the 2003 invasion, and the JTJ was used to having the run of the town.

A few weeks before Apache took over, Freitag himself had detained Sheikh Qatada Sa’ad Tehsin, the city council chairman, for his support of the JTJ. On Feb. 17, the JTJ struck back, gunning down Qatada’s replacement, Sheikh Noori Abdul Fatah Askar, on his way to prayers. Noori was also the senior Anah representative of the Islamic Party, a bitter enemy of the JTJ, and the JTJ blamed him for Qatada’s demise.

Soon thereafter, the city council stopped meeting with Apache troops. “Intimidation was a huge factor in their decision to step away from the table,” said Capt. Matthew Albertus, Apache Company’s commander.

It soon became clear that if Albertus was to have any chance of reversing trends in Anah, he needed to position forces closer to the action. Freitag ordered the establishment of Combat Outpost Anah beside a major intersection just north of the city.

From there, Apache could monitor the main road to Rawah, a favorite insurgent location for roadside bombs. Albertus’ 2nd Platoon and a company-sized Iraqi army element moved in March 25. Albertus also re-established contact with the council, seeking out the members individually.

On April 10, in conjunction with the police training team from TF 4-14, a Stryker unit based in Rawah, Apache held a one-day recruiting drive for local police.Police are the first line of defense in any counterinsurgency campaign, and JTJ’s defeat of the previous attempt to establish a police presence had allowed the insurgents free reign in Anah.

http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f...25-2052517.php

[slapout9]

Jcustis, great post. I love success stories which are far to few. I love network diagrams too. There is another way to do this which I was taught years ago. It was called the 3F's. Every suspect is connected in 3 ways. Family,Friends, and Finances. Who is related to who, who is friends with who and who pays who.

When I started in LE we didn't have laptops to print out diagrams so we did them by hand. 3x5 cards with photo's or drew them with traffic accident templates. Any time we had contact with anyone we tried to fit them into the overall crime (family) organization. The hidden enemy became visible. Also strange individual actions began to make sense when looked at in the context of protecting the group, gang or crime family. The bigger the network the better your chance of finding informants or exploiting an arrest situation to create an informant.

We also added an unofficial 4th F. Who is F****** who. If I ever found an x-girlfriend or wife it was a gold mine of information because of the revenge motive. I don't know if this would work in Iraq but it was very useful in the US.

[Ray]

Slapout,

That is some education for me. The "F" stuff of yours.

With your permission I will pass it off to my friends.

They maybe practising it, but it is not formalised.

Though the last "F" I had put into action once , when they had ambushed a patrol as also blew up the tyres of a Caspir and it worked.

[slapout9]

Go ahead Ray, if it helps you give it a try.