Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency

[RTK]

After having the great pleasure of spending some time with both David Kilcullen and John Nagl this week, the following question was born out of a few beers. After hearing both of their responses I'm curious to see the perspective of the forum. The question is...

Given David Galula's estimate that defeating an insurgency is 80% political and 20% military and Dave Kilcullen's statement that maintaining the initiative is imperitive in COIN, how should a company commander or below find the balance between kinetic and non-kinetic operations?

[RTK]

Assuming Naylor's account below, and in the following link, is true, these soldiers appear to have really worked COIN well, given their disposition, strength, and resources. The article is very much worth a full and slow read, as their are valuable TTPs embedded. Perhaps the good Captain has read Kilcullen?



http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f...25-2052517.php

I don't know if the A Company commander has read Kilcullen, but both Dave Kilcullen and LTC John Nagl pointed this cat out as a good role model for other aspiring commanders this week at the Armor Captain's Course.

While interviewing LTC Nagl for companycommand.com yesterday he pointed this article out as a sterling example for other commanders to emulate.

There is no better stamp of approval in COIN than LTC John Nagl. More proof, espcially within a cloud of changing doctrine, that example is better than precept.

[jcustis]

Given David Galula's estimate that defeating an insurgency is 80% political and 20% military and Dave Kilcullen's statement that maintaining the initiative is imperitive in COIN, how should a company commander or below find the balance between kinetic and non-kinetic operations?

Althought the enemy often determines the balance, I firmly believe that unless one studies and plans for the range of COIN options available, they are guaranteed to be stuck in a cycle of kinetic options alone. The same holds true for the 80% political adherent who refuses to believe that there are bad guys who simply need to be put six feet under.

Even when a unit goes kinetic, it must follow that with non-kinetic engagement (IO, HA, etc.), or it condemns itself to waiting for, and then reacting to, the next kinetic event. Units that do "just enough to get by and get home," are the most guilty. There are occupational hazards to what we do, and although we can only mitigate the risk but so much, it doesn't mean that we should shy away from an operation or activity because of those hazards. We achieve balance when kinetic and non-kinetic ops are blended seamlessly as part of a campaign plan. An example would be planning for displaced persons, civilian casualties, or compensation payments as part of a cordon and search operation. It takes work, but can be accomplished at the company level.

To truly succeed, I think commanders have to win the hearts and minds of their men, train to as many relevant kinetic and non-kinetic tasks as possible, and clearly define conditions for success, long before deployment begins. If that means they spend extra training time perfecting the battle drill for a snap VCP, in order to reduce the risk to civilians and friendly forces, then so be it. If he invests the time in developing his company's own IO and intel cells, even better.

There are going to be plenty of times, however, when HHQ prevent a commander from achieving a balance, by pushing poorly written FRAGO. I've seen a brigade one that called for continuous, near-deliberate VCPs as part of shaping operations. It was very particular about set locations, and didn't take into account the fact that after a short time in one location, a VCP is likely to be targetted. Then there was the time during a relief-in-place between my TF (coming from far west Al Anbar) and another that had been operating in an AO between Ramadi and Fallujah. I listened to a battalion commander state very clearly "we don't go down in that part of the AO [meaning vehicle patrols], because you're guaranteed to get IED'd." I couldn't believe what I was hearing, because it was apparent that the threat of IEDs against vehicles had shaped operations, and therefore meant no one had been in an area that had the potential to harbor insurgents. Inability to dismount effectively had reduced their options, and the unit wasn't even able to entertain the idea of non-kinetic fires in what eventually turned out to be a zone ready for CA action.

Denying enemy freedom of maneuver doesn't always require constant physical presence, and a commander can employ non-kinetic fires as an economy of force measure. I don't think enough commanders are being imaginative in that regard.

RANT OFF...

How does achieving a balance tie into doctrine, training, and education? I summed it up once in a discussion with a peer about homestation training. I've expanded on the list since the original conversation, but it follows as such...THE IDEAL COMPANY COMMANDER IN COIN:

-He and his subordinate leaders have read the new COIN pubs, and the pages are dog-eared

-In addition to reading his branch's professional journal (e.g. Armor Magazine) he reads open source newsletters from the civil affairs and PSYOP communities

-Kilcullen's 28 articles are posted and reviewed by all in the unit

-He has studied the actions in Tal Afar, and has formed his own conclusions

-He has driven his men to master 50-60 control words in Arabic

-He and his subordinate leaders have read the CALL products on tactical interrogation, and working with translators/interpreters

-He has stayed current on the political and military/paramilitary (IA, IP, etc.) fabric of Iraq.

-He understands the difference between Shi'a and Sunni, and the tribal ties that can cut across religious lines

-He has reached out to local law enforcement to get informal training on how organized crime networks work, and TTPs for breaking them up

-He has sat in on several town council/county government meetings, and watched the dynamics at work, with an eye towards understanding why certain moderators succeed and others fail

-He understand the targeting process/cycle, and has hand-picked individuals to serve in his ad hoc intel and IO cells

-He has set bravado aside and understands that he and his men must respect the enemy, lest they become complacent

-He is disciplined in documenting those things he has done to prepare for the fight. It may be a journal, AAr, etc., but it starts before deployment and serves as a tool to pass on to those that follow

This list could probably go on for a while, but I believe strongly that without a degree of depth in the areas mentioned above, company commanders will be condemned to a cycle of reaction and have very little to show for it at the end.

[Ray]

Maj. Bob Risdon, who designed the exercises for the U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, said U.S. troops could learn from how Indian forces requested homeowners to lead them on searches of their homes. They were less intrusive in searching people's homes and cars, a tactic that could help when troops are trying to earn the trust of the local population, he said.

"You can figure out a lot about people that way, too. You can figure out if they're trying to hide something," Risdon said.

Lt. Col. Matt Kelley, the 1st Battalion commander, said the way Indians ambushed and disarmed two insurgents impressed him. American troops, in the same drill, simply shot and killed the men, he said.

"They've just gained huge intelligence value from that — instead of killing them, they've captured them," Kelley said. "All our guys said whoa — we'd never do that. We could do it."

Singh, the Indian army commander, said he valued the heightened reality of the U.S. designed exercises, which forced troops to react quickly and rely on their reflexes.

http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/ar...609180355.html

[Jedburgh]

...U.S. troops could learn from how Indian forces requested homeowners to lead them on searches of their homes. They were less intrusive in searching people's homes and cars, a tactic that could help when troops are trying to earn the trust of the local population...

An exercise is an exercise; although certainly of value, the lessons learned have to be understood within the narrow context of that exercise. On the other hand, operations in Jammu and Kashmir offer plenty of valuable lessons (mostly negative) that are worth taking the time to study. India would do well to maintain consistency with the tactics they used in this exercise in Hawaii when on their home turf...

India: Impunity Fuels Conflict in Jammu and Kashmir

...Over the years a conflict over Kashmiri identity and independence has slowly but visibly mutated into an even more dangerous fight under the banner of religion, pitting Islam against Hinduism, and drawing religious radicals into its heart. Indian security forces claim they are fighting to protect Kashmiris from militants and Islamist extremists, while militants claim they are fighting for Kashmiri independence and to defend Muslim Kashmiris from a murderous Indian Army. In reality, both sides have committed widespread and numerous human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law (the laws of war), creating among the civilian population a pervasive climate of fear, distrust, and sadness.

In this report we document serious abuses, especially the targeting of civilians, by both government forces and militants in Jammu and Kashmir. Those abuses continue, despite a tentative peace process that includes talks between New Delhi, Islamabad, and some of Kashmir’s separatist leaders, modest confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan, and the 2002 election of a state government with an avowed agenda to improve the human rights situation. Particular attention is given in this report to the problem of impunity from prosecution, whereby those responsible for abuses rarely get investigated, let alone tried and convicted...

Slideshow

...of course, one has to acknowledge that the other party to the conflict in Kashmir treats those under its control even worse:

With Friends Like These...

...Azad Kashmir is a legal anomaly. According to United Nations (U.N.) resolutions dating back to 1948, Azad Kashmir is neither a sovereign state nor a province of Pakistan, but rather a “local authority” with responsibility over the area assigned to it under a 1949 ceasefire agreement with India. It has remained in this state of legal limbo since that time. In practice, the Pakistani government in Islamabad, the Pakistani army and the Pakistani intelligence services (Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI) control all aspects of political life in Azad Kashmir—though “Azad” means “free,” the residents of Azad Kashmir are anything but. Azad Kashmir is a land of strict curbs on political pluralism, freedom of expression, and freedom of association; a muzzled press; banned books;arbitrary arrest and detention and torture at the hands of the Pakistani military and the police; and discrimination against refugees from Jammu and Kashmir state. Singled out are Kashmiri nationalists who do not support the idea of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. Anyone who wants to take part in public life has to sign a pledge of loyalty to Pakistan, while anyone who publicly supports or works for an independent Kashmir is persecuted. For those expressing independent or unpopular political views, there is a pervasive fear of Pakistani military and intelligence services—and of militant organizations acting at their behest or independently...

[Shek]

Lt. Col. Matt Kelley, the 1st Battalion commander, said the way Indians ambushed and disarmed two insurgents impressed him. American troops, in the same drill, simply shot and killed the men, he said.

Sir,
At least we're good marksmen . . .

[RTK]

"They've just gained huge intelligence value from that — instead of killing them, they've captured them," Kelley said.

Training has taken place. Second and Third order effects revealed. I'll be damned....

[Ray]

In so far as Kashmir being disputed, it would be adequate to mention that the Instrument of Accession is a legal document and one could go into the history and legalities in detail, but then this is a military forum discussing military issues.

In so far as human rights and other issues, it would be pertinent to mention that artillery,tanks, ICVs, air force, anti tank weapons are not used in the Counter Insurgency effort.

To understand the rationale behind the an insurgency and counter insurgency scenario, it is essential to understand the mindset that is operative in such a scenario. In so far as the Kashmiri mindset is concerned and without meaning offence, it would be adequate to quote the British expert on Kashmir, Sir Walter Lawrence from this tome, Valley of Kashmir Page 274 where he writes, 'had they (any race) lived through generations of oppression like the Kashmiris, they might have been more cunning and more dishonest". Indeed, Kashmiris have not had a century of rule of peace in their turbulent history. When India got its independence it was decided that India be a multi lingual, multi ethnic and multi religion state. Kashmir became a part of it as many other princely states. However, Kashmir was given a special right under the Indian Constitution wherein non Kashmiris could not and cannot acquire citizenship of the state nor own property or land.

One could also quote a Persian couplet regarding the Kashmiri but then that is very drastic in thought. In short, it would be adequate to state that the Kashmiri mindset and tongue is as quick as quicksilver.

But one cannot blame the Kashmiri psyche since a race's psyche is moulded by history and Kashmiri history is very turbulent.

My experience in Kashmir where I spent three quarters of my service (apart from being there as a child as my father was posted there in the Army), is that they are prone to complain and make a mountain of a molehill and they tend to fabricate issues as a matter of response. They enjoy complaining as a right. An example is that if a duck is run over by a truck, they will extract a huge sum because they will calculate the number of eggs that would have been delivered by that duck in its lifetime and their further generation and so on. This is also borne out by the fact that they take every issue to the Human Rights Court. It is also true that many a uniformed person has seen the wrong end of the law (civil court) while a large majority proved to be fabrications because of shifting evidence be because their imagination runs wild.

To understand the gravity and the number of "atrocities", one should also compare the length of the terrorism in Kashmir to the number of complaints that have been made. It will indicate the restraint under which the Indian Army operates. It must be understood that while the US could not care less about any complaints made against it, India has to tread carefully since it does not have the clout to suppress or modify international hue and cry as western nations can do. India cannot afford to make mistakes since it neither has the clout nor the international stature to ensure that other nations ignore the complaints or be able to trot out the "rationale" behind the same for the rest of the world to lap up and agree.

The clout of the western nations is obvious as is borne out by the fact that it was only after the US' War on Terror that the terrorism in Kashmir been recognised, as also been curbed to some extent. Before that, who cared? And as far as the UK realising what is the gravity that terrorism can pose to a nation's national and social fabric, it is only after the London Bombings did they realise the horrors and ban militant organisations and sympathisers including the Kashmiri terrorist organisation who were having a field day since such rabid organisation was not targeting the UK.

Therefore, the scenario and international cynicism that India has weathered while combating Kashmiri terrorism can well be fathomed. If this terrorism had been of Kashmiris alone, one could understand. But it is not. The terrorists are from all Islamic nations and so it is the ummah that is being fought and it is not solely Kashmiri terrorism. And the finances and weapons of such Islamic terrorists is fathomless. One can well understand the magnitude if one understands the ferocity and ruthlessness of the mujaheddin operating against a world power, the Soviets in Afghanistan. That India has weathered the Kashmiri situation, if compared in the backdrop of the ferocity, ruthlessness and total disregard to any norms of warfare or rules of the muhjahideeds in Afghanistan which enrages to warrant actions like in Fellujah, it will indicate that such gung ho attitude and righteous anger is absent in Kashmir or else there would be many justifiable Fellujahs in Kashmir. Notwithstanding, it also vindicates the Indian attitude in dealing with terrorism as was seen in the exercise in Hawaii and proves to be the correct attitude, at least in the Indian backdrop.

There is another reason why all ranks avoid being gung ho. One can lose his job as a soldier or an officer having been courtmartialled! In India jobs are not in plenty and in India qualifications for a job is important. The uniformed lot are not qualified for jobs in the civil. Hence, one cannot afford to take a cavalier attitude.

It is not for me to comment on the US mode of combating Insurgency since it will not be fair. I can only draw upon published comments. It is for those who have operated with them to comment. British officers and their Generals have given their views. However, to be fair to the US troops, no matter what one may say, the national psyche has to be also taken into consideration before being judgemental.

Lastly, we have seen what the US officer has to say after the exercise in Hawaii about the modus operandi of Indian troops in Counter insurgency scenarios. Obviously, one would like to believe that the US officer is responsible enough to know what he says. All I can say is that that even in an exercise, the drills and the modus operandi cannot be changed drastically.

One may also mention that before Sir Micheal Rose (the British Adjutant General) assumed the command of the NATO forces in the Balkans, he did an extensive tour of Kashmir and the Indian North East to study the way the Indian Army was tackling insurgency. Obviously, if there were no merits, then a colonial power would not send a full General to their once vassal country to study an issue and that too the haughty and imperious British, who have no qualms to rubbish their own allies and equals!

The US Army, which is a professional organisation, would also not have done extensive exercises in India's High Altitude repeatedly nor train in India's Counter Insurgency school if they had nothing to gain from the Indian experience.

It may also interest you to note this news:

Nato calls
SUJAN DUTTA
In the war zone

Brussels, Sept. 22: Nato, the US-led western military alliance, wants Indian troops for its missions in volatile regions like Afghanistan and Kosovo.

Nato officials here at its headquarters said Indian troops would be part of a wider engagement the alliance envisages with non-member states.

The alliance does not expect Indian troops for its missions overnight but as a consequence of a protracted engagement that will drive policy change in New Delhi and reforms within Nato.

Beginnings have been made at two levels. Nato headquarters has briefed Indian diplomats here. Its secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Schaffer has met defence minister Pranab Mukherjee.
http://www.telegraphindia.com/106092...ry_6783200.asp

[Bill Moore]

AB x X(s + r) - 100 = desired percentage of kinetic operations.

There are no clear cut formulas for figuring out the correct percentages of effort, and if you look at it objectively kinetic operations are partly political.

In situations like El Salvador, Algeria, Greece, etc. where there were established governments that required assistance to defeat the insurgency, I concur that the primary effort is political, and that military operations are limited to setting conditions for political success. This is what most of our legacy COIN doctrine makes reference to, but that isn't the fight we're fighting today.

In a situation like Iraq (and to some extent Afghanistan) where the government is rejected by large portions of the population, and where the insurgents are targeting the Iraqi people and the economic infrastructure (which is our primary political line of operation to create legitmacy for the government), we're in a situation where focusing our efforts on the political and softer activities will not achieve the desired effect.

I'm not interested in your schools if I can't provide for my family, or even provide some degree of security for them. I'll start looking for non-state entities that promise something a little more. Hey, I can put in an IED for $200.00, and my family won't be targeted by insurgents. Not a bad deal.

In parts of Iraq we need to be more aggressive, not less. In other parts of Iraq we need to focus on nation building type tasks and to create a graviational pull of the population to the government. Security must come first, you can't open schools when kids can't go to school closely. You can't be legitimate if you can't protect the population. Aggressive doesn't mean burning down cities, but robust presence and security patrols 24/7 denying freedom of movement to the insurgents. Once an area is semi-secured you can attempt to interject government control.

Our officers need to stop looking for formula type answers in doctrine and start thinking on their feet, they need to open their eyes to their reality, because they are the only ones that will know what is happening in their sector. The situation in your AO is different than it was in mine, figure it out listening to your strategic corporals and the locals, then develop your strategy and adjust it as needed. Read Nagel and Galula for context and ideas, not a how to manual.

[SWJED]

24 September - U.S. Army’s Kill-Kill Ethos Under Fire by Sarah Baxter.

The American army should scrap the Warrior Ethos, a martial creed that urges soldiers to demonstrate their fighting spirit by destroying the enemies of the United States at close quarter rather than winning the trust of local populations, according to senior US officers and counter-insurgency experts.
Soldiers are instructed to live by the creed, which evokes the warrior spirit of the modern US army. It begins with the stirring vow, “I am an American soldier”, and goes on to affirm that “I will never accept defeat. I will never quit . . . I stand ready to deploy, engage and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat”.

Admirable though this may be in the heat of battle, the Warrior Ethos’s emphasis on annihilating the enemy is inimical to the type of patient, confidence-building counter-insurgency warfare in which America is engaged in the Middle East, according to Lieutenant-General Gregory Newbold, former director of operations to the joint chiefs of staff at the Pentagon.

“The future crises that relate to Iraq and Afghanistan will be a struggle for hearts and minds,” Newbold said. “We’re in a different environment now and that requires different techniques.”

The Warrior Ethos replaced the Soldier’s Creed drawn up in the post-Vietnam era which stated: “I am an American soldier . . . No matter what situation I am in, I will never do anything for pleasure, profit or personal safety, which will disgrace my uniform. I will use every means I have, even beyond the line of duty, to restrain my army comrades from actions disgraceful to themselves and the uniform.” ...

[RTK]

Our officers need to stop looking for formula type answers in doctrine and start thinking on their feet, they need to open their eyes to their reality, because they are the only ones that will know what is happening in their sector. The situation in your AO is different than it was in mine, figure it out listening to your strategic corporals and the locals, then develop your strategy and adjust it as needed. Read Nagel and Galula for context and ideas, not a how to manual.

no truer a statement have I seen in recent memory.

Here's what LTC Nagl told me in a recent interview I conducted with him for Companycommand.com. It smacks exactly what Bill is talking about.

"80% of the tasks to be accomplished [in COIN] are political and only 20% exclusively military...the vast majority of those 80% political/economic/informational tasks are going to be done by people in uniform because of the security situation... There are times when you have to be kinetic; there are people who have to be shot; there are occasionally cities that have to be cleared block by block. But the paradox of counterinsurgency is that the more force you use in this kind of fight, the less effective you are. We are fighting a battle for the support of the population, and everything we can do to show them that we are more interested in their futures, their security, and their safety than the insurgents are is a step towards winning the war; and every time we show them the opposite of that by an escalation-of-force incident that leads to innocent deaths, by an excessively kinetic approach to raids at 3 o'clock in the morning, we lose support among the population and as a result lose the opportunity to derive the intelligence we need on who the insurgents are in the community and where they are. We have to use as little force as is necessary to accomplish the task... Recalibrating that balance each and every day, hundreds of times a day, is the task of the company commander and platoon leader and corporal on point..."

[jcustis]

Sarah Baxter typifies why some journalists need to simply shut up and only be allowed to write for travel magazines. That article had absolutely no context, and I can't believ her editor let it hit print.

[SWJED]

Sarah Baxter typifies why some journalists need to simply shut up and only be allowed to write for travel magazines. That article had absolutely no context, and I can't believ her editor let it hit print.

I post these articles as FYI on what the mainstream are getting...

[Jedburgh]

Our officers need to stop looking for formula type answers in doctrine and start thinking on their feet, they need to open their eyes to their reality, because they are the only ones that will know what is happening in their sector. The situation in your AO is different than it was in mine, figure it out listening to your strategic corporals and the locals, then develop your strategy and adjust it as needed. Read Nagel and Galula for context and ideas, not a how to manual.

No truer a statement have I seen in recent memory.

I second RTK.

A problem I had with the Kilcullen paper that Bill posted on another thread was that too much of his discussion of "classic" insurgency was overgeneralized and devoid of context. Although it was a good, thought-provoking paper, I felt it lost something by doing this - whether or not it was intentionally watered down by the author to build a support narrative for his premise.

However, as Bill succinctly points out here, too many of those in the Big Army recently plugging in to the new COIN "fad" are possessed of limited imaginations further constricted by doctrinal blinders that drive them to seek formulaic answers. With regard to their reading of "classic" COIN, these characteristics severely handicap their ability to truly learn from the lessons of the past. Perhaps the manner in which the Kilcullen article was written may have been intended to address those with narrower thought processes.

Another statement of Bill's is very important:

In parts of Iraq we need to be more aggressive, not less. In other parts of Iraq we need to focus on nation building type tasks and to create a graviational pull of the population to the government. Security must come first, you can't open schools when kids can't go to school closely. You can't be legitimate if you can't protect the population. Aggressive doesn't mean burning down cities, but robust presence and security patrols 24/7 denying freedom of movement to the insurgents. Once an area is semi-secured you can attempt to interject government control.

We're discussing the Yin and Yang of COIN - the striving to meet the ideal balance between kinetic and non-kinetic efforts that balance in the effort to both defeat the enemy and gain the support/cooperation of the population. At no point can we go entirely one way or the other. There always has to be some element of one to balance the other, in proportions that vary as much as the context of the AO, as we drive towards the larger goal.

RTK's statement about recalibrating the balance is key - because we not only recalibrate from one region to the other, as Bill explains, but we need to recalibrate within the specific context of each incident at the tactical level. The simple questions What just happened? What do we need to achieve? How do we execute? flash through the small unit leader's decision making process in a true illustration of effects based ops at the lowest level. Training, experience, and effective intelligence support (I'm sure some of you have been following the ad hoc implementation of a company level intel cell in many maneuver units in-theater) all feed into the ability to effectively execute across the spectrum in the COIN environment. In my opinion, we are still not doing enough for our soldiers in two out of three.

[jcustis]

RTK's statement about recalibrating the balance is key - because we not only recalibrate from one region to the other, as Bill explains, but we need to recalibrate within the specific context of each incident at the tactical level. The simple questions What just happened? What do we need to achieve? How do we execute? flash through the small unit leader's decision making process in a true illustration of effects based ops at the lowest level. Training, experience, and effective intelligence support (I'm sure some of you have been following the ad hoc implementation of a company level intel cell in many maneuver units in-theater) all feed into the ability to effectively execute across the spectrum in the COIN environment. In my opinion, we are still not doing enough for our soldiers in two out of three.

This is an exceptionally important observation. "What just happened?" sums up the issues that the small unit leader faces. In this uncharted territory, there is no situational or doctrinal template. We cannot lay most insurgent actions out and say with any certainty that a particular enemy course of action can be confirmed or denied. We haven't even pinned down whether Iraqis are fighting simply because we are still there, whether it's a small faction of foreign fighters causing the problems, or even if the country would really be better off partitioned along ethnic lines.

I've slowly decided that until national reconciliation and demobilization are put on the table, training, experience, and intel support can only go so far. Improvements in those three will only allow us to make incremental progress, because the insurgent forces have very little to lose and I've yet to read anything about attempts to show them what they stand to gain. We'd need to hit too many homeruns in information operations to do that, and our opportunities at bat are dwindling.

Al Qaeda has certainly become the modern-day Red scourge in a twisted domino theory. Can we de-couple AQ from the Iraq situation?

[SWJED]

14 December The Australian - Exceptional Strategist is Our Man in Washington by Patrick Walters.

A few weeks ago a highly unusual ceremony took place at the Pentagon.

David Kilcullen, one of Australia's leading counter-terrorism experts, had come to receive a medal awarded by US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

The Defence Department's Medal for Exceptional Public Service cited Dr Kilcullen's "exceptional service" as special adviser for irregular warfare and counter-terrorism during the 2005 Quadrennial Defence Review.

For Kilcullen, 40, one of the Australian army's most brilliant graduates, it was another milestone in a career that has catapulted him into the highest corridors of power in Washington.

Uniquely, for an Australian citizen, Kilcullen has emerged as a key adviser to US President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Rumsfeld in the war on terror. His influence in Washington arguably oustrips that of the only other Australian to reach high office in the US, Martin Indyk, the former US ambassador to Israel.

Over the past year, working out of the US State Department, Kilcullen has flown on secret assignments into the world's terrorist hot-spots from Iraq and Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa, Indonesia and The Philippines.

A primer he wrote on fighting counter-insurgency warfare for junior officers now forms part of the US army's basic war doctrine, and has been translated into Russian, Arabic, Pashtu and Spanish.

"It's unprecedented," Hank Crumpton, the State Department's counter-terrorism chief, told The Australian in reference to Kilcullen's special role in his office.

"I am the adviser to Secretary Rice on counter-terrorism, and David is my principal strategist."

Leading US strategic thinker Eliot A. Cohen, from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies said: "I cannot think of a non-American who has had so much influence in the US national security establishment - and from within, noless."

Working closely with the Pentagon and the CIA, Kilcullen has led counter-insurgency teams in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan, observing at close quarters the US-led efforts to stabilise the two countries and Washington's battle against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates.

He has stalked around the Arabian Gulf and Pakistan's North-west Frontier studying counter-insurgency warfare and learning new insights into the culture of Islamist terror groups.

A fortnight ago, Kilcullen returned to Washington from Kabul, where he helped teach counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism techniques to officers and NCOs of the fledgling Afghan army, as well as soldiers in the NATO-led coalition.

Combining his Australian army experience with a PHD on the political anthropology of the Indonesian post-1945 Islamist insurgent movement, Darul Islam, Kilcullen first took leave from Australia's Defence Department in 2004 to help the Pentagon with the drafting of last year's Quadrennial Defence Review, which determines the US's global defence strategy.

Working inside the Pentagon in 2004, Kilcullen founded and led the US Government's inter-agency Irregular Warfare Working Group....

[SWJED]

16 December The Australian - War on Insurgency by Patrick Walters.

As Washington struggles to find a way out of Iraq, a young Australian ex-army officer is helping the US chart a new course in the global war on Islamist terror.

In his role as chief strategist for the State Department's counter-terrorism chief Hank Crumpton, David Kilcullen has exerted considerable influence on the direction of America's effort in fighting al-Qa'ida and its affiliates around the globe.

"He has made a big difference to us in terms of the intellectual capital he has brought with him and intellectual capital that he has generated, when we look at terrorism and how we conceptualise our strategy," Crumpton tells Inquirer.

Kilcullen, 40, brings an unusual combination of skills to his role as an Australian serving as a senior counter-terrorism adviser inside the US bureaucracy.

A counter-insurgency expert, Kilcullen combines academic expertise in political anthropology (he has a PhD from the University of NSW) with military experience in Indonesia, East Timor and the Middle East, including a stint helping train Indonesia's Kopassus special forces.

Fluent in Indonesian, he wrote his doctorate on Darul Islam, the post-1945 Muslim insurgency movement in Indonesia crushed by the Suharto government.

Living in kampungs in West Java in the early 1990s had a profound effect on the way Kilcullen views the global phenomenon of radical Islam confronting the US and its allies. Now he is leading a team of experts in Washington writing a new counter-insurgency doctrine for the US Government.

During the past year he has travelled to far-flung theatres in the war on terror, from Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa to Indonesia and Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province.

In his recent writings Kilcullen argues the case for a new paradigm to deal with what he terms a "globalised insurgency" encompassing Iraq, Afghanistan and other regional conflicts.

The US and its allies must adapt the best classical counter-insurgency techniques at the local level, combined with a much more sophisticated global information campaign, to defeat al-Qa'ida and its affiliates...

16 December The Australian - Rocky Road to Influence in the U.S. by Patrick Walters.

...Kilcullen's CV makes him seem a bit like a military adventurer of old: a dash of T.E. Lawrence and Wilfred Thesiger.

As well as getting a PhD in political anthropology, he is a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society and an expert on counter-insurgency warfare.

During his 22-year Australian army career he saw service in East Timor, Bougainville and Cyprus, and developed a keen interest in unconventional warfare.

In 2004 he helped write the Australian Government's white paper on terrorism, before being seconded to the Pentagon as a special counter-terrorism adviser for the 2005 quadrennial defence review.

As the chief strategist in the State Department's Office of the Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Kilcullen has travelled the world helping the US Government refine its counter-insurgency doctrine and the fight against al-Qa'ida.

In his year at the State Department, Kilcullen has exercised unusual influence for an Australian.

Lieutenant-General David Petraeus, head of the US army's combined arms training command, who is tipped to take over as the top US commander in Iraq, says Kilcullen has helped "very substantially to raise the level of understanding of counter-insurgency operations in the United States, not only in the US military but ... throughout the US Government".

"He is," Petraeus tells Inquirer, "one of those rare individuals who has both studied and done counter-insurgency for his country, and who then has helped a coalition partner do it as well at a very high level."

[SWJED]

The New Yorker has placed Knowing the Enemy in their free to view section.

In 1993, a young captain in the Australian Army named David Kilcullen was living among villagers in West Java, as part of an immersion program in the Indonesian language. One day, he visited a local military museum that contained a display about Indonesia’s war, during the nineteen-fifties and sixties, against a separatist Muslim insurgency movement called Darul Islam. “I had never heard of this conflict,” Kilcullen told me recently. “It’s hardly known in the West. The Indonesian government won, hands down. And I was fascinated by how it managed to pull off such a successful counterinsurgency campaign.”...

[marct]

The New Yorker has placed Knowing the Enemy in their free to view section.

Excellent article. Now, if we can just get some more Anthropologists into all the Coalition militaries or more of the military into Anthropology.

Marc

[Bill Moore]

Thanks SWJED, this is the best article I have read lately. Very relevant and useful from the tactical to strategic levels.