Improving PSYOP (and CA as a tangent)

[Voodoun]

RTK,

I appreciate your advice, but I'd like to point out that the contrarianism didn't start with me. I made a point, one that has been made repeatedly and is well accepted both professionally and academically, and has been since 2001, and was our standard procedure during the 20th c., and you told me I was wrong.

What I do as a tactical asset is absolutely unrelated to my ability (or the requirement to do just this as a grad student) to scrutinze and assess policy.

We are losing the War of Ideas. If you think a disparate and disorganized approach is the best way to recover ground on this front that was lost long before 9/11, I'd like to see that position defended. Again, I'm talking about the strategic level - you keep making reference to the tactical. You could be right. I think a lot of people would be interested in seeing a defense of that contention.

Who is going to coordinate Influence Ops between State and DoD?

DoD decided that a unified organization was important enough that after the OSI was shut down it created a Joint PSYOP support element to coordinate DoD efforts.

What about the Justice Dept?

How will the strategic corporal replicate the activities of the USIA? What can the strategic corporal do in Lebanon, or Syria, where he's not operating? How can he make al Hurra and Radio Sawa effective?

I am not *just* an E4 getting ready for deployment, I am also an academic specifically working on policy in this arena.

[RTK]

Again, I'm talking about the strategic level - you keep making reference to the tactical. You could be right. I think a lot of people would be interested in seeing a defense of that contention.

I talk tactical because that the only common ground you and I have right now. I'm a tactical level combat leader. You're a member of a TPT/D. OUr job is to fight and win. Strategy be damned, we're the ones that have to do it. How do WE make it better. You have yet to even address (or ask) what it is you need to do to be successful. You're shooting at the 500 meter target when you're getting tattooed by the 10 meter pop-up. Let me re-vector you to your inital question:

Here's a thought I've had for a long time - doctrinally when a TPT goes out on a PSYOP mission, the 3-4 man team is effectively relegated to one or two men while the other two are left behind with the Humvee. Some discussion on that matter from people who have been down range a few times is that TPTs will often recruit a couple soldiers from their security element (say, the Infantry element they are supporting) to hold down that job, while the PSYOP trained soldiers are freed up to throw more PSYOP at the situation.

Is this a regular practice? Does it work? Should it work? If it does work, and there are no downsides, should it become doctrine?

Whether you see it or not, I'm trying to get you to think of the things you're going to need to answer to before you meet the first commander you'll be supporting. He isn't going to care about your theories of strategy. If you come in with that he'll probably kick you out of his TOC.

You're out of acadamia and theory. You're in the realm of execution now. Get used to it. Embrace it. And don't forget that your action or inaction will impact the Soldiers around you.


Edited to add after you addition of your last line:

Regardless of what you're doing in your research, which is admirable and vital, you probably need to focus down. I have never referenced any Soldier as "just" and E4 or any other demeaning descriptor such as "just" or "only." My track record with the Soldiers I have worked with and lead indicate the same. Do NOT infer that I did it here.

[Voodoun]

Yup, we were clearly talking around eachother.

Tactically I'm not disagreeing with anything you're saying. I most certainly did ask what I needed to be successful tactically, as you pointed out, in my original question.

As you have said, I can affect my AO, I can assist my supported unit in accomplishing its mission, and certainly those are things I'm focusing on in getting ready for deployment. Well, I'm focusing on helping my unit get ready for that. Clearly we need to improve the sophistication of our ground soldiers, and as kville79, who is in my unit, can attest, I try to facilitate that every chance I get. Nothing chaps me more than hearing a PSYOPer talk about ragheads and about how we've been fighting them for thousands of years. I get it.

What I still don't get it how my comment, which is *widely* accepted, and drew fire from you, made me contrarian. Patronize me all you want about tactical concerns, I'm hear to learn about that stuff from you guys, and I only know what I've been taught.

But when we're discussing the War of Ideas, which is way bigger than my supported unit or my rank, and a matter largely outside of the Army's realm of responsiblity, I don't see my defense of a position unrelated to either your experience as a commander or mine as Jr. Enlisted as contrarian.

When I'm in uniform I'm perfectly capable of shutting up and being wrong, in that military way that has nothing to do with correct or incorrect, so I don't intend to be pissing off any commanders.

[reed11b]

Something about this and the SOF support thread has bugged me for a few days now. When the subject of CA and PSYOP soldiers was first raised by Voodoun, the immediate response was "those dirty undisciplined SF wannabe's". Yet when we learned that they are trained to use the equipment and methods that were listed as the reasons for them being "dirty undisciplined SF wannabe's" not one senior member of this council went "ah-ha, perhaps my perceptions were flawed and I need to make an effort to understand these assets better". Not a single one. I'll admit my initial perceptions of CA and PSYOPS mirrored yours, but hearing that some of what we thought was rather silly was trained, and done by the individual, makes me think "why do the soldiers trust the training even if it gets them negative attention from us ground pounder types?" Combined with some of the black and white tactical advice "Never ever ever cuff your sleeves because there is a slight chance of getting a really bad burn from hot brass" this shows a real narrow view on operational concepts (operational is the wrong word, just can't think of the right one at the moment), and we, as the front line on both thinking and discussion of fighting concepts and as professional soldiers can do better. We need to do better. This is were fallacious arguments like HIC vs COIN come from. The world is not black and white, it is grey. Voodoun, the members are very knowledgeable and always give there advice serious consideration, but you don't need to take it as gospel, trust your training and your own gut too.
Reed
I'll now go take my meds and find some good cover and concealment.

[Voodoun]

Something about this and the SOF support thread has bugged me for a few days now. When the subject of CA and PSYOP soldiers was first raised by Voodoun, the immediate response was "those dirty undisciplined SF wannabe's". Yet when we learned that they are trained to use the equipment and methods that were listed as the reasons for them being "dirty undisciplined SF wannabe's" not one senior member of this council went "ah-ha, perhaps my perceptions were flawed and I need to make an effort to understand these assets better". Not a single one. I'll admit my initial perceptions of CA and PSYOPS mirrored yours, but hearing that some of what we thought was rather silly was trained, and done by the individual, makes me think "why do the soldiers trust the training even if it gets them negative attention from us ground pounder types?" Combined with some of the black and white tactical advice "Never ever ever cuff your sleeves because there is a slight chance of getting a really bad burn from hot brass" this shows a real narrow view on operational concepts (operational is the wrong word, just can't think of the right one at the moment), and we, as the front line on both thinking and discussion of fighting concepts and as professional soldiers can do better. We need to do better. This is were fallacious arguments like HIC vs COIN come from. The world is not black and white, it is grey. Voodoun, the members are very knowledgeable and always give there advice serious consideration, but you don't need to take it as gospel, trust your training and your own gut too.
Reed
I'll now go take my meds and find some good cover and concealment.

Reed, thanks, its good to see that sort of thoughtful response.

I actually brought up the cuffed sleeve thing with rather experienced NCO who has mutiple deployments since the mid 1990's with both other SOF and conventional forces. He laughed and said he could see the argument either way, but to consider that PSYOP soldiers are asked to make cerebral judgements that cannot be reflexive in nature the way that an infantryman can rely on his training to carry him through a dynamic firefight. Our brains don't work as well when we're over heated. He'd rather take a brass burn to the wrist than not be at 100% cognitively.

But I'd like to think we can move past the cuffed sleeve/uniform thing and talk about more mission-oriented ideas.

[Ken White]

...consider that PSYOP soldiers are asked to make cerebral judgements that cannot be reflexive in nature the way that an infantryman can rely on his training to carry him through a dynamic firefight. Our brains don't work as well when we're over heated. He'd rather take a brass burn to the wrist than not be at 100% cognitively.

That's essentially correct but it's also not really helpful because it tries to put a cerebral slant on a practical problem. In addition to the hot brass problem (which many of us in an earlier war had while wearing T-shirts as an outer garment... ) there is the senior Officer seeing someone 'out of unigram' problem. That's practical...

What's also practical is that the SOF and in particular the PsyOps communities are filled with smart and educated folks. What many in those communities often seem to forget is that there are some equally if not more smart and just as well or better educated guys wandering about in Rifle companies. That brings up two issues. There are more of them (smart 11Bs, not just all 11Bs) than there are of you and they really, really hate condescension form other communities. So I'd suggest that your experienced SOF NCO made a mildly condescending statement and you repeated it which brings totally cognitively approaching an issue into question. Is that really a good PsyOp-like effort...

But I'd like to think we can move past the cuffed sleeve/uniform thing and talk about more mission-oriented ideas.

Shouldn't be a problem. If I could make a suggestion, don't let your previous (and possibly future) academic persona get too intermingled with your current about to deploy persona. By all means keep your values and your knowledge, state your opinions and question everything but usually, there's little to be gained by arguing the number of angels on that pin (even if it is fun on occasion ).

Which gets to your valid point that we need a national approach to IO. I agree. I also think that will not happen for many reasons. We are a big diverse country with many points of view. Our politics reflect this and our political system mitigates against any coherent long range plan. The US Information Agency essentially did a good job while it was in existence. It was brought down by two things; the desire of the State Department to have total control over our 'message' and the fact that the left leaning among hated anything that tried to put the US in a good light. That same combination of bureaucratic turf battles (which you alluded to much earlier...) and ideology will short circuit the goal in the future (never say never but it is unlikely).

You also said:

"I don't see how we can ideologically confront Salafi jihadis through their media, social services, and educational networks simply by utlizing Army PSYOP (because essentially thats really the only place is resides in the military), the strategic corporal, and a rather small CIA office."

Question. Do we really want to confront Salafi jihadis (or more properly in the PsyOps mode; persons engaged in hiraba) on an ideological basis? I'm not at all sure we want to confront them on that basis and my perception is that if we did we'd lose, big time.

The simple solution to the IO problem is to bring back and empower USIA. Not going to happen, I'm afraid. We'll muddle along -- it's the American way...

[Voodoun]

That's probably a very accurate appraisal of base rates - given that there are around 1500 Tactical PSYOP and probably 10% of our enlisted ranks have post-graduate educations, the odds are high that there's more enlisted 11b's with MA's, MBAs, and PhDs, than PSYOP. But take for intance the E4 I know in PSYOP with an MBA - I don't think he'd argue that his job is going to require him utilize that education in his job. I don't jack squat about being an infantryman - but Reed does - Reed, would you argue that when the #### hits the fan in *your* tactical arena (bullets flying all around) your frontal cortex is fully engaged? I know mine shuts off when dealing with novel fight or flight stimuli.

I think the dynamic situation that was being described to me was not one in which people were being shot at, but one in which the PSYOPer was caught in a delicate social situation that required him to use cognitive function in a manner that the average infantryman (we all assume, and maybe wrongfully so) doesnt generally.

<the fact that the left leaning among hated anything that tried to put the US in a good light. That same combination of bureaucratic turf battles (which you alluded to much earlier...) and ideology will short circuit the goal in the future (never say never but it is unlikely).>

Bingo. Is this acceptable? We have the power to ratchet past the turf wars, but we seem to lack the political will to confront this 'everything America does is bad' mentality.

an updated USIA would be a good start, that's for sure.

As far as do we want to confront the Salafi ideology? Well, that has certainly been the goal of policymakers at this point. Making judgements about whether thats the right or wrong thing to do is beyond my comfort zone.

[Surferbeetle]

You have to listen closely with much more than just your intellect in order to understand what some of the wise people are saying both here at SWJ and downrange. You will need to apply that ability to listen in Iraq for yourself, your team, and your supported unit.

Wilmington has a beach at Ft. Fischer which has helped me, in the past, to still the whir of my intellectual gears and to really listen to what's around me. That beach helped me to prepare for and later to integrate my downrange experience with my civilian and academic experience.

Failing that there is always beer and women to help you with developing your listening skills...

[Voodoun]

<I have never referenced any Soldier as "just" and E4 or any other demeaning descriptor such as "just" or "only." My track record with the Soldiers I have worked with and lead indicate the same. Do NOT infer that I did it here.>

RTK, sorry, didn't mean to imply that you were doing that - *I* am calling myself just an E4 - I don't make any pretension to soldiering expertise. hell, E4 implies a level of competence I can certainly display, but is far beyond my comfort zone. I know that when I deploy I'm going to be growing INTO my rank, not out of it.

No need to pull any punches or anything, we're all grown ups. I know where my weaknesses are.

But RTK, I'd still like to know how I came across as contrarian, when I was just defending a point I made. I felt you were being contrarian, actually. Either way, I'm still interested in your opinion that is contrary to Bill Donovan's ;-)

[RTK]

<I have never referenced any Soldier as "just" and E4 or any other demeaning descriptor such as "just" or "only." My track record with the Soldiers I have worked with and lead indicate the same. Do NOT infer that I did it here.>

RTK, sorry, didn't mean to imply that you were doing that - *I* am calling myself just an E4 - I don't make any pretension to soldiering expertise. hell, E4 implies a level of competence I can certainly display, but is far beyond my comfort zone. I know that when I deploy I'm going to be growing INTO my rank, not out of it.

No need to pull any punches or anything, we're all grown ups. I know where my weaknesses are.

But RTK, I'd still like to know how I came across as contrarian, when I was just defending a point I made. I felt you were being contrarian, actually. Either way, I'm still interested in your opinion that is contrary to Bill Donovan's ;-)

You appeared to argue for the sake of argument, regardless of what was presented to you. Judging from the tone and appearance, take a look at Surferbeetle and JKM. It appears they agreed.

I question reviving a system and agency that was brought down due to media backlash. If the coordinating agency for PSYOPs can be brought down by a media frenzy, and their purpose is to identify themes and messages to further strategic interests, doesn't it negate the purpose?

[Voodoun]

Thanks for taking the time to express that - argumentative and contrarian have different connotations, but to each his own. I was critiquing the validity of the material presented because it did not logically provide a contra-indication to my point, not arguing for the sake of arguing.

To address your point, that's a valid concern, but if the DoD shut down simply because its was being denigrated in the media, where would be? CIA, School of the Americas, NSA, all sorts of government agencies get bad press.

The media hasnt picked up on the Joint PSYOP SE in Fl.

It was the Public Affairs office at the Pentagon that launched a turf war against the OSI

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/ar...25roots.b1.htm

that resulted in its media-driven closure.

I'm not resistant or closed to new ideas or attacks on my paradigm, I know I have new things to learn.

The assumption that a centralized organization would hinder adaptability on the ground doesn't hold water for me. Diplomats are expected to adapt to their unique situations, yet our diplomatic operations are centrally regulated. Same thing with kinetic and intelligence operations.

These examples all benefit from the sort of organization that we saw fit to employ throughout the 20th c. for Strategic Influence ops.

I don't see how we can ideologically confront Salafi jihadis through their media, social services, and educational networks simply by utlizing Army PSYOP (because essentially thats really the only place is resides in the military), the strategic corporal, and a rather small CIA office.

[reed11b]

The assumption that a centralized organization would hinder adaptability on the ground doesn't hold water for me. Diplomats are expected to adapt to their unique situations, yet our diplomatic operations are centrally regulated. Same thing with kinetic and intelligence operations.

These examples all benefit from the sort of organization that we saw fit to employ throughout the 20th c. for Strategic Influence ops.

I don't see how we can ideologically confront Salafi jihadis through their media, social services, and educational networks simply by utlizing Army PSYOP (because essentially thats really the only place is resides in the military), the strategic corporal, and a rather small CIA office.

I think the key argument against the centralized organization is twofold, at least in my mind.
1) Familiar with the term, too many chiefs, not enough Indians? What exactly is the centralized PSYOP office going to control? They are not going to countermand the BCT's, PA is already separate, and what about parallel but non-DOD efforts like the CIA?
2) I think that "ideologically confront Salafi jihadis through their media, social services, and educational networks " is not a primary DOD mission, it is a State and DNI mission. DOD provides support.

There is another thread here that you should probably check out, would like to see your opinion on it. LINK
For the record, I am a big believer that the "strategic corporal" and that proper training and unit structure in this arena would pay bigger dividends over any PSYOP restructure.
Reed

[Voodoun]

Reed, I think we're discussing two different things. I am not suggesting that *Army* PSYOP be tasked to some centralized national level organization - Army PSYOP is focused primarily on short term compliance operations, and should continue on that.

The spectrum of PSYOP continues far beyond that though.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/...op-jp-3-53.pdf

I'm not in a position to have an opinion on who should control this organization, DoD, NSC, State, because that's organizational policy, a realm in which I avoid completely.

When I talk about a coordinating national level office I mean one that guides Strategic Influence for the nation, bringing coherence and focus to our Public Diplomacy, Aid, Information, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations.

US Army PSYOP would remain mostly untouched, at most be given specific tasking and doctrinal guidance.

If I somehow communicated that I was advocating that the Army get involved in all of this, I was most certainly not.