Open Thread – Which US DoD Dinosaurs Would You Slay?

[reed11b]

First, I second John T. on the OPMS and would further it to include all "up or out" or "zero defect" policies. I could not find the exact orders (Ken??) but many of the orders stating that training, manning and fitness (readiness) are the responsibility and priority of the individual as opposed to the unit's responsibility. How we PTS and man units should be looked at from a clean slate as well. See, I don't ask for much!
Reed

[Ken White]

I came up with several things when I read his fist post in the thread this morning. My problem with all of them is that -- like OPMS and the USAR / ARNG problem (and I very much agree both are major problems) they're things that DoD or the service has had to based on either law or significant Congressional pressure.

I'm not saying that all the inefficiencies can be laid at the feet of Congress; the Services are quite capable of doing some strange things but the really big things that immediately popped to mind are all Congressionally driven. I suspect that will make them difficult to change. I'd guess that, given the right rationale, change to OPMS would be attainable; change to NGB and the USARC are so deeply political I'm not sure they're adjustable.

Difficult, however, is not impossible. Many things need to be changed and Congress can be strange but they also are not totally unreasonable. I think when we proffer a problem, the issue(s) that make(s) it a problem and recommend solution(s), we need to bear in mind that if the item has interest from the Hill, we'll need to give a rationale that they can or will accept and that accords with the legislative cycle.

That is going to be time dependent. For example, many items in OPMS were pushed by Congress in an effort to be very fair to all concerned; to be fair to the point that they accepted degradation of effectiveness and officer competence and capability that resulted; that and the effort to be 'objective' in evaluations as opposed to subjective (as if that were possible...). Point is , a Republican majority just might revisit that 'fairness' angle, a Democratic majority is less likely to do so.

I could cite some things in the Army enlisted promotion system but my spies tell me that is in flux right now. So the status of a system or process -- and very current knowledge of it -- and whether it's embedded or in flux can have an effect on what one recommends...

I mention all that only as a mild caution...

[Entropy]

I'm not saying that all the inefficiencies can be laid at the feet of Congress; the Services are quite capable of doing some strange things but the really big things that immediately popped to mind are all Congressionally driven. I suspect that will make them difficult to change.

A lot of the stuff that immediately popped into my mind falls into that category, so I'm going to spend some time thinking about things that are politically realistic.

[ODB]

That might be because I am, in comparison to what I would like to see disappear: Future Combat System. Sorry but IMO the technology they are looking to, to be the solution in my mind is not the solution. Only after we pump billions upon billions of dollars into it will we still not have the answer. By the time this thing is done it'll make current bail outs look like chump change. Take that money and apply it to the platform that needs it. The soldier train the soldier. No matter how much technology you throw at the soldier if he doesn't know how to properly employ it it will be useless. What do I need an exoskeleton for? Been done for hundreds of years without it. So I can carry more UAVs to see the battlefield from 10,000. The picture up there does not let me know the feeling on the ground. I know I'll need it to carry the amount of batteries it will take for me to keep all my stuff powered up. Replacing individual knowledge and skills with technology will not make us more effective, we will only become more dependent.

In reality this may be just a smaller piece of the overall bigger process for the DOD and acquistions. I look back at all the blunders from the Commanche to the XM8 and the amount of money wasted. Not sure what the right answer is. One thought I have for say the next rifle. Form a committee of actual end users and experts to test and develop what we need not what someone so far removed from the fight thinks we need.

By no means an expert here, just my perspective on one of the largest misuse of funds IMO. Would like to learn from those in the process how we can fix this. I'm sure at this point there is no pancea for it, but maybe we can stop some of the bleeding.

[Surferbeetle]

DOD is filled with information silos that do not like to talk to one another and many, many layers of redundant management and functions.

Being a product of the American military system makes me think in terms of staff functions. Having worked for the Navy (DPW) I also think about the reasons for distinctions between Line (Restricted and Unrestricted) and Staff personnel.

Do we really need all of the different Communications, Personnel, Finance, and Logistics systems (USA, USN, USAF, USMC, USCG, Reserves and Guard)? How about a single Civil Service for all of DOD? Finally, and nearest and dearest to my heart: a standardized communications platform run by a single CTO organization. We need to break down Information Silo’s within DOD.

Imagine the possibilities with regards to unity of command, training, and economies of scale.

I shudder to think of the screams of protest and howls of outrage...

[John T. Fishel]

that many issues discussed here are major Congressional rice bowls. But, that is precisely the reason I phrased my proposal on merging the reserves (Army & AF) into the NG, not the other way around. There are precisely 100 Senators who have an interest in the NG along with 435 representatives and a bunch of non-voting Delegates. There is no such unanimous constituency for the Reserves. Nor are all reservists supportive of a separate Reserve. So, I really think you could win on this one.

Regarding OPMS: I was still teaching at Leavenworth when OPMS XXI was being developed there. Based on what I saw, I don't believe there was much, if any, Congressional influence on most of the issues and changes made. It seems to me that this was - and is - largely a case of bureaucratic politics internal to the services as institutions. So, here's one where, in the immortal words of Albert the Alligator (of Pogo Possum fame), "We have met the enemy and he is us!"

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

that many issues discussed here are major Congressional rice bowls. But, that is precisely the reason I phrased my proposal on merging the reserves (Army & AF) into the NG, not the other way around... So, I really think you could win on this one.

Based on what you said, I agree. Then we get to the two 250 pound Orangutans -- the active Army and AF. Are they likely to agree to A Reserve component that is quite a bit larger than they are? I think that goes back to why there was ever a Medical Officer Reserve then an ORC that morphed into today's animal. I think it also points, again, to Congress -- if the majority of people (read: Voters) are with the RC, then Congress will favor the RC; the AC Generals know that...

They're also sharp enough to get the Hamiltonians (who want big, all powerful federal guvmint) on their side and those people, in Congress, will undetected if possible short circuit their States to enhance federal power -- or, in this case, support the Federal entity as opposed to the State entity

However, note also that while Congress can do really pretty much whatever it wants, the Constitution says they are empowered:
". . .
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; ..."

Note that they can pass laws about the Militia and can provide for calling them out -- and as you know, they sort of ignored the Constitution and said the NG was the Militia, the Constitution does not -- but as you know they can raise and support Armies (plural -- and thus the U.S. Army and that other organization, the Army of the United States) but must provide and maintain a Navy.

The point is that Congress has been taken to court for ignoring the Constitution or twisting it to their benefit and that could happen if they play with the status quo to a too great extent. Not saying you're wrong or should not push the issue, just reminding you that it's a very complex bucket with a somewhat muddy history and many competing and highly vested interests.

Regarding OPMS:...Based on what I saw, I don't believe there was much, if any, Congressional influence on most of the issues and changes made.

May not have been, not that familiar with OPMS XXI -- I am however very familiar with DOPMA, know the principal author and am pretty sure that that the 'changes made' you mention were those rom DOPMA to OPMS -- and DOPMA was very much a Congressional baby. Further, OPMS was not able to change many of the legislated elements of DOPMA (Though I've been told the Army wanted to do that).

Not trying to rain on your parade, John, really -- but just reminding you that the tentacles of Congress are awfully deep and sometimes hidden.

[John T. Fishel]

we agree more than disagree. While I still think that a concerted effort to merge the Reserve into the NG would succeed, (1) I know that the opposite would fail before it even got off the ground as it has on several past occasions, and (2) that it would be harder to accomplish than I first thought for the reasons you posit.

Of course, DOPMA is the authority for the implementation of any internal system like OPMS. Changing DOPMA would, I think, be harder to do than tampering with the Reserves, except at the margins. But internal implementation policies and regulations - like OPMS - don't usually engage the interest of the Congress. When I discuss OPMS XXI, I talk about the FAO program because I know it and because it is a great case of both positive change and negative unintended consequences. I really did not enjoy having to tell promotible captains who were thinking about FAO that they were risking retiring as Majors. But it was my obligation to do so because it was unfair to them to let them think that their decision would not affect their careers. So, the plus side of OPMS XXI was that it made the career more predictable for the vast majority of FAOs. It even improved their chances for promotion to Colonel. That said, it was negative for the Army because it deprived the institution of the services of some really outstanding talent at the GO level because FAOs were never going to be looked at and had not done anything in their basic branch since they were Captains. (An example of a successful dual tracked FAO/MI officer pre- OPMS XXI was MG John Stewart who became Southcom J2 because of both his FAO and MI qualifications. Today's John Stewarts will retire as Colonels.

Cheers

JohnT