Open Thread – Which US DoD Dinosaurs Would You Slay?

[John T. Fishel]

that many issues discussed here are major Congressional rice bowls. But, that is precisely the reason I phrased my proposal on merging the reserves (Army & AF) into the NG, not the other way around. There are precisely 100 Senators who have an interest in the NG along with 435 representatives and a bunch of non-voting Delegates. There is no such unanimous constituency for the Reserves. Nor are all reservists supportive of a separate Reserve. So, I really think you could win on this one.

Regarding OPMS: I was still teaching at Leavenworth when OPMS XXI was being developed there. Based on what I saw, I don't believe there was much, if any, Congressional influence on most of the issues and changes made. It seems to me that this was - and is - largely a case of bureaucratic politics internal to the services as institutions. So, here's one where, in the immortal words of Albert the Alligator (of Pogo Possum fame), "We have met the enemy and he is us!"

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

that many issues discussed here are major Congressional rice bowls. But, that is precisely the reason I phrased my proposal on merging the reserves (Army & AF) into the NG, not the other way around... So, I really think you could win on this one.

Based on what you said, I agree. Then we get to the two 250 pound Orangutans -- the active Army and AF. Are they likely to agree to A Reserve component that is quite a bit larger than they are? I think that goes back to why there was ever a Medical Officer Reserve then an ORC that morphed into today's animal. I think it also points, again, to Congress -- if the majority of people (read: Voters) are with the RC, then Congress will favor the RC; the AC Generals know that...

They're also sharp enough to get the Hamiltonians (who want big, all powerful federal guvmint) on their side and those people, in Congress, will undetected if possible short circuit their States to enhance federal power -- or, in this case, support the Federal entity as opposed to the State entity

However, note also that while Congress can do really pretty much whatever it wants, the Constitution says they are empowered:
". . .
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; ..."

Note that they can pass laws about the Militia and can provide for calling them out -- and as you know, they sort of ignored the Constitution and said the NG was the Militia, the Constitution does not -- but as you know they can raise and support Armies (plural -- and thus the U.S. Army and that other organization, the Army of the United States) but must provide and maintain a Navy.

The point is that Congress has been taken to court for ignoring the Constitution or twisting it to their benefit and that could happen if they play with the status quo to a too great extent. Not saying you're wrong or should not push the issue, just reminding you that it's a very complex bucket with a somewhat muddy history and many competing and highly vested interests.

Regarding OPMS:...Based on what I saw, I don't believe there was much, if any, Congressional influence on most of the issues and changes made.

May not have been, not that familiar with OPMS XXI -- I am however very familiar with DOPMA, know the principal author and am pretty sure that that the 'changes made' you mention were those rom DOPMA to OPMS -- and DOPMA was very much a Congressional baby. Further, OPMS was not able to change many of the legislated elements of DOPMA (Though I've been told the Army wanted to do that).

Not trying to rain on your parade, John, really -- but just reminding you that the tentacles of Congress are awfully deep and sometimes hidden.

[John T. Fishel]

we agree more than disagree. While I still think that a concerted effort to merge the Reserve into the NG would succeed, (1) I know that the opposite would fail before it even got off the ground as it has on several past occasions, and (2) that it would be harder to accomplish than I first thought for the reasons you posit.

Of course, DOPMA is the authority for the implementation of any internal system like OPMS. Changing DOPMA would, I think, be harder to do than tampering with the Reserves, except at the margins. But internal implementation policies and regulations - like OPMS - don't usually engage the interest of the Congress. When I discuss OPMS XXI, I talk about the FAO program because I know it and because it is a great case of both positive change and negative unintended consequences. I really did not enjoy having to tell promotible captains who were thinking about FAO that they were risking retiring as Majors. But it was my obligation to do so because it was unfair to them to let them think that their decision would not affect their careers. So, the plus side of OPMS XXI was that it made the career more predictable for the vast majority of FAOs. It even improved their chances for promotion to Colonel. That said, it was negative for the Army because it deprived the institution of the services of some really outstanding talent at the GO level because FAOs were never going to be looked at and had not done anything in their basic branch since they were Captains. (An example of a successful dual tracked FAO/MI officer pre- OPMS XXI was MG John Stewart who became Southcom J2 because of both his FAO and MI qualifications. Today's John Stewarts will retire as Colonels.

Cheers

JohnT

[Xenophon]

I want to second the motion to slay the Future Combat System, and add the people who came up with it as well. (Figuratively, of course)

[William F. Owen]

I want to second the motion to slay the Future Combat System, and add the people who came up with it as well. (Figuratively, of course)

I'd second this if you get rid of the "Land Warrior" thing as well. The whole FCS thing is based on failing to understand the combined arms approach, and letting engineers think "outside the box." The box exists for good reason and often you need a better box, not the the box you are currently in.

Classic example is the Stryker Brigade concept where the US Army ended up with a good answer to a problem, that did not exist so had to be invented to get the SBCT as the answer, which is very far from a good solution, though has some excellent traits.

[patmc]

I agree 100% that all those regs, required training, etc... eat up a lot of time, and are often a pain, but that does not mean you should finger drill them. That is a leadership failure if you are directing or allowing your NCOs and officers to just make up data. If something didn't get done, you need to be honest and tell higher. A false report is a false report. That said, I do suspect a lot of false data is created, but does not make it right.

I was the HHB XO, and the only LT in the Battery, so I was the OIC of every area for a Corps ORA 3 months after we returned from a deployment. I relied on all my NCO's to do their job, and told them to be honest with their areas. If things could not get done because we had no time, they developed a plan to fix them, and we continued mission. We got 90% of the stuff done, and told the commander a plan to fix the 10%, and this was briefed by my battery commander to the battalion commander. My commander was/is a good man, and he wanted an honest assessment. Same deal on the BN CI. I worked with the Commanders and 1SG's to get the inspections and fixes they needed, but I would not fudge the results, and the colonel got an accurate assessment of his battalion.

I agree training days are limited, and that is why commanders assume risk in their plans. If you are going to forgoe an area, you need to be willing to tell higher why, and not cover it up. When we start picking what regs or rules we follow, that is a slippery slope. And I will say, after both of those experiences, a lot of the regs do make sense, in the larger picture. When you see the forest, they do some good. Covering a 4th point of contact may have been the reason originally, but that does not mean it does not serve another purpose.

I will give "Stiffled Innovation" a read this week, sadly it looks accurate from the blurb.

[Bob's World]

Number one thing the army needs to unload is "The Senior Rater Profile"!

A classic "win-lose" system fostering an unhealthy form of competition, that focuses subordinates on making the boss happy over taking care of their soldiers and accomplishing the mission. This system also selects for leaders who are conservative, unimaginative, and self-serving; none of which to me are traits we want to foster in our senior leadership.

Simply adopting an objective system like the current NCOER would be a vast improvement.

I am not optimistic that such a change will ever occur, as every senior leader was by definition, successful under the senior rater profile system. To challenge the system is to challenge their very validity of their own success.

[patmc]

Well, decided to read it now, and though written in 2002, it covered a lot of the issues I experienced 2004-present. That said, I think the overwhelming problem addressed in the monograph is the command climate, not regulations.

The required training does take up many theoretical training days, but from my experience, a lot can be done concurrently to free up training. The BDE/BN Commander, however, set the tone and tempo for training. If a Commander wants Training Meetings/Command and Staff to take up a whole day, they will. If a Commander wants Command Maintenance every Monday, all day, it will be so. If a Commander wants to tell the commanders what to train, he/she will.

Preparing for a deployment, my battery commander was given the freedom to plan training, and execute. We spent weeks out in the field, training on convoys, and still conducted the mandatory training. I was the Battery Training Officer, and had to fit the Battery Commander's training in with the mandatory training, but we did it. The BN CDR told Battery Commanders to train, and actually let them. Teaching senior officers to trust their subordinates is bigger than teaching junior officers to be innovative. If given the freedom, they will be. That monograph is definately worth the read though. Thank you, sir.

[Schmedlap]

As far as processes, my pet peeve as a Company XO was our antiquated ULLS procedures. As recently as 2006, my supply sergeant and I were hand-carrying 3.5" floppy disks and dot-matrix printouts (you know, the ones that you tear the edges of the paper off?) from our ULLS clerks, who typed on what appeared to be circa. 1995 486 computers running MS-DOS 5.0, to place our orders. Unfrickingbelieveable.

[Ken White]

from the World War II model but the Cl IX / ULLS process has not advanced from the Ford Motor Company parts supply to Dealers that McNamara imposed on DoD in 1962. It has never worked well, it has always been a burden -A training personnel and logistic burden) and has not done what it was supposed to do; provide an easy audit trail for the Bean counters. It is particularly bad at handling demand surges due to increased OpTempo; it can take almost a year to react with some items. We were able to afford that dealy in OEF /OIF -- will we be able to in future deployments?

Bad system. Why, then, is it still here? Inertia. Our training has progressed a bit but all of our 'systems' are way out of date and changes are resisted not because they don't make sense -- but because some are worried about erring, some about 'accountability' and others are worried about turf. Dumb.

We've been talking about 'just in time logistics,' cutting out middlemen and some good experiments have taken place -- no big changes though; "change BAD..."

Yeah, I know it costs -- everything does. Costs less if you do it right instead of doing it due to a false sense of saving money...

[Tom Odom]

The Unified Command Plan, which is neither unified nor a plan. It is rather a disconnected interlocking system of territorial and/or mission fiefdoms designed on communications capabilities from WWII.

The only thing more outdated than the UCP is the Department of State's continued adherence to country missions modeled on the days of wax sealed messages dispatched by sailing ships.

Tom

[Ken White]

we agree more than disagree.

...Changing DOPMA would, I think, be harder to do than tampering with the Reserves, except at the margins. But internal implementation policies and regulations - like OPMS - don't usually engage the interest of the Congress.

True, forgot that aspect. The rest of your comment is distressingly true and there a couple of other winners in OPMS needing a 21st Century thought process applied...

[Schmedlap]

Speaking as someone who never served above the battalion level (I don't mean to brag)...

Get rid of all of those ankle-biter company-level programs, like safety officer/NCO; just a waste of time that gets pencil-whipped prior to command inspections and takes leaders away from more important things (like time with their Soldiers) so that they can attend 40-hour courses on whatever additional duty they are "responsible for" and fabricate a 3-ring binder full of paperwork.

Those programs exist and have company-level personnel responsible for them because that is what Army Regulation dictates. Change the regulations. It is a tremendous drain upon companies that forces them into one of two alternatives: 1) obey the regulation and suffer the consequences of leaders being distracted from their work or being absent to attend random 40-hour courses -OR- 2) disobey the regulations in order to sustain actual readiness (versus paper readiness).

[patmc]

I agree they are a drain on manpower, and often an annoyance, but what does not get checked, does not get done. As an XO during a Corps ORA, and then the BN OIC for a BN CI, most of these regs are not followed to the letter, and are too much detail for a BN to track. If company level reps didn't take the courses, do the paperwork, and "enforce" the regs, it definately would not get done. I don't know a better alternative, other than eliminating regs, but like most things in the Army, they probably exist for a good reason. Just because leaders are not enforcing the regs does not mean they don't serve a purpose. I hate the term eat the elephant one bit at a time (due to overuse in my unit), but if leaders actually worked their areas over the course of the year, not just during inspection prep, it would not be overwhelming. Units probably waste/lose more time going into inspection prep where all other training ceases.

Don't know if it is a dinosaur per se, but stop changing uniforms for no good reason. The backlash against the new blue Army uniform continues, but doubt it will change anything.

Speaking as someone who never served above the battalion level (I don't mean to brag)...

Get rid of all of those ankle-biter company-level programs, like safety officer/NCO; just a waste of time that gets pencil-whipped prior to command inspections and takes leaders away from more important things (like time with their Soldiers) so that they can attend 40-hour courses on whatever additional duty they are "responsible for" and fabricate a 3-ring binder full of paperwork.

Those programs exist and have company-level personnel responsible for them because that is what Army Regulation dictates. Change the regulations. It is a tremendous drain upon companies that forces them into one of two alternatives: 1) obey the regulation and suffer the consequences of leaders being distracted from their work or being absent to attend random 40-hour courses -OR- 2) disobey the regulations in order to sustain actual readiness (versus paper readiness).

[reed11b]

I agree they are a drain on manpower, and often an annoyance, but what does not get checked, does not get done. As an XO during a Corps ORA, and then the BN OIC for a BN CI, most of these regs are not followed to the letter, and are too much detail for a BN to track. If company level reps didn't take the courses, do the paperwork, and "enforce" the regs, it definately would not get done. I don't know a better alternative, other than eliminating regs, but like most things in the Army, they probably exist for a good reason. Just because leaders are not enforcing the regs does not mean they don't serve a purpose. I hate the term eat the elephant one bit at a time (due to overuse in my unit), but if leaders actually worked their areas over the course of the year, not just during inspection prep, it would not be overwhelming. Units probably waste/lose more time going into inspection prep where all other training ceases.

Don't know if it is a dinosaur per se, but stop changing uniforms for no good reason. The backlash against the new blue Army uniform continues, but doubt it will change anything.

After some thought, I think I agree with patmc on this one even if though I really like what schmedlap is saying. I think what would really help would be allowing officers to spend more then a year in a position Nowhere in the real world are you mandated to get a new job title every year.
Reed

[Schmedlap]

I agree they are a drain on manpower, and often an annoyance, but what does not get checked, does not get done.

I would further assert that what gets checked also, often, does not get done. It just gets fabricated. I'm not defending it - I'm just pointing it out.

If company level reps didn't take the courses, do the paperwork, and "enforce" the regs, it definately would not get done. I don't know a better alternative, other than eliminating regs, but like most things in the Army, they probably exist for a good reason.

You and I part ways at the word "probably." I think one can see why they exist by reading the article linked in this thread. Someone gets a bright idea and the authority to implement it to its fullest and they get so focused on their specific issue that they start to think it is the most important issue out there. Suddenly you've got someone in the Pentagon dictating the implementation of some administrative nightmare that reaches its tentacles all the way down to the company/battery/troop level.

The COIN/conventional debate seems to assume that we are not able to train on both, due to time constraints and limitations on how many trades jack can be a master of. I think we far exceed those limitations when it comes to administrative programs. Just because we ensure that one NCO and/or officer in each unit is an "SME" on a program, that doesn't mean that the Soldiers in that unit will be any more capable of processing the slew of rules and regulations foisted upon them. It just means that 50 "SMEs" will be bugging them about 50 sets of rules that they cannot possibly remember. I don't see how you can get adequate enforcement of those volumes of regs without taking away from mission-oriented proficiency. I also don't see how we expect Officers to faithfully execute the 8 to 10 additional duties that they are saddled with, without detracting significantly from their other more important work. Realistically speaking, they don't. And I've never seen a commander get upset about it.

"Besides, every time I learn something new, it pushes some old stuff out of my brain. Remember that time I took a home wine making course and forgot how to drive?" - Homer Simpson

[Cavguy]

I agree they are a drain on manpower, and often an annoyance, but what does not get checked, does not get done. As an XO during a Corps ORA, and then the BN OIC for a BN CI, most of these regs are not followed to the letter, and are too much detail for a BN to track. If company level reps didn't take the courses, do the paperwork, and "enforce" the regs, it definately would not get done. I don't know a better alternative, other than eliminating regs, but like most things in the Army, they probably exist for a good reason. Just because leaders are not enforcing the regs does not mean they don't serve a purpose. I hate the term eat the elephant one bit at a time (due to overuse in my unit), but if leaders actually worked their areas over the course of the year, not just during inspection prep, it would not be overwhelming. Units probably waste/lose more time going into inspection prep where all other training ceases.

Don't know if it is a dinosaur per se, but stop changing uniforms for no good reason. The backlash against the new blue Army uniform continues, but doubt it will change anything.

But here is the problem identified by Shmed ...

Dr. Lenny Wong "Stifled Innovation?" Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. A MUST READ if you haven't before.

Of the 365 days in the year, approximately 109 days are unavailable for training due to weekends, federal holidays, payday activities, and the Christmas half-day schedule. This results in a total of about 256 available days for company commanders to plan and execute training.

Requirements for mandatory training at the company level riginate from Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training, policy letters, command training guidance, and other directives. Scrubbing all levels of command down to the Brigade level, to include Department of the Army, Major Army Command (MACOM), Corps, Division, and installation level, for anything that generates a training requirement results in the identification of over 100 distinct training requirements. Table 1 shows a partial listing of the requirements.

... Note that, as expected, most directedmission-related training requirements come from Division-level or below. More importantly, most directed nonmission-related training requirements originate from DA and MACOM levels. This is critical since policy actions may be most effective in reducing the DA and MACOM requirements.

Incorporating the amount of time necessary to execute each directed training requirement (for example, training on “The Benefits of an Honorable Discharge” takes about 60 minutes a year) results in approximately 297 days of directed training.

Of the 297 days, about 85 percent (or 254 training days) is mission-related training and 15 percent (or 43 training days) is nonmission-related training.

The number of days required by all mandatory training directives literally exceeds the number of training days available to company commanders. Company commanders somehow have to fit 297 days of mandatory requirements into 256 available training days.

When you do this, and the chain of command expects it all done, you get integrity problems. I too shared Schmedlap's late 90's experience of personally observing flat out falsification of reports to meet this unattainable standard. It was a big reason for the exodus of CPTs in the 94-97 year groups before 9/11, given in the Army's 2001 study on officer attrition.

Unfortunately, It took a war to get this shoved out the window. (for now)

[Bullmoose Bailey]

True, forgot that aspect. The rest of your comment is distressingly true and there a couple of other winners in OPMS needing a 21st Century thought process applied...

Also the National Guard exists as one of the last vestiges of The Sovereign State, which edifice of history the post Lincolnian, post Dick Act Federal Government remedied by eliminating their officers in 1933. Today all NG Os are actually AR Os assigned to NG units which seems to mean that during peacetime deployments (ref: US Constitution, The "wartime" clause) they have a different Commander-in-chief from the Soldiers they lead.

Don't ask me if that means now, i.e. The Ol' Joint Congressional Resolution as War Declaration Question, I know not.

Probably insignificant.

Very significant however is the fact that every Governor disagrees with every President on who controls the National Guard. Yes; including Clinton & GW Bush disagreeing with themselves on they day they moved from the Governor's Mansion to The White House.

The State Control has been a big issue in OIF, although mostly in smoky back rooms. I assert that the Governor's collectively refusing "combat" assignments for their respective forces led Pres. GW Bush to begin de-escalation & Iraquification here, among other variables.

The name "National Guard" is at once an homage to our French co-liberators of 1783 & a rather deceptive indicator of non-ownership.

Governor v. President arguments usually happen like this:

Governor: Good afternoon Mr. President.

President: Good afternoon John, how are things in your State house.

Gov: Very well; thank you for supporting that bill

Pres: Well you know I'm counting on your guardsmen to help in the war effort.

Gov: Actually I don't think the people of my State want that to happen.

Pres: Well actually, I'm The Commander-in-chief and we're at war.

Gov: Well then if that's how it is why don't you finance them ?

Pres: I'm sorry I'm late for a.......meeting. Say hello to your family for me.


I feel this controversey was at work in the GW Bush administration's odd decision to defrock the US global military zone commander's of the title Commander-in-chief in favor of Combatant Commander which isn't even accurate or logical.

To those who keep saying there's only 1 C-in-c now might I be so bold as to say actually 58 ?

In previous wars (again we could discuss whether we're at "war" per se Tm: Now) the Guardsmen were not federalized, not deployed, not op-conned, not called forth, not called up but "Drafted" into The National Army, WWI, or The Army of The United States, WWII, Korea, Viet-Nam; distinct from the United States Army, or regular Army. The Army of The United States is what AUS stands for.

Seperately, I was highly offended by the statement: "People used to join the Guard for just that reason: to stay out of the regular Army that got shipped overseas and not used to bolster a destroyed dying military the way they are used now in Iraq" at http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Can_people...ard_be_drafted

There are a great many laws involved here (from Wikipedia):

"The United States Congress has enacted various laws which control the National Guard

The Militia Act of 1792
Providing for the authority of the President to call out the Militia, and providing federal standards for the organization of the Militia.
For the 111 years that the Militia Act of 1792 remained in effect, it defined the position of the militia in relation to the federal government. The War of 1812 tested this uniquely American defense establishment. To fight the War of 1812, the republic formed a small regular military and trained it to protect the frontiers and coastlines. Although it performed poorly in the offensive against Canada, the small force of regulars backed by a well-armed militia, accomplished its defensive mission well. Generals like Andrew Jackson proved that, just as they had in the Revolution, regulars and militia could be effective when employed as a team.
The Insurrection Act
The Militia Act of 1862

Providing for the service of persons of African descent in the Militia, and the emancipation of slaves owned by Confederates.
Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385: The Posse Comitatus Act of 18 June 1878
Reaction in Congress against the Reconstruction-era suspensions of Southern states' rights to organize militias led to the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act, restricting any person's use of the U.S. Army and, as later amended, the U.S. Air Force in domestic law enforcement (use of the Navy and Marine Corps, being uniformed services within the Department of Defense, is similarly restricted by statute [16]). The U.S. Coast Guard, in its peacetime role within the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Guard, when not in Federal Service, are specifically not limited by this act.
The States revise the military codes - 1881 to 1892
The Militia Act of 1903
Established the creation of the National Guard of the United States as the primary organized reserve force for the U.S. armed forces.
National Defense Act of 1916
This act abandoned the idea of an expandable Regular Army and firmly established the traditional concept of the citizens' army as the keystone of the United States defense forces. It established the concept of merging the National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Regular Army into the Army of the United States in time of war. The act further expanded the National Guard's role, and guaranteed the State militias' status as the Army's primary reserve force. The law mandated use of the term "National Guard" for that force, and the President was given authority, in case of war or national emergency, to mobilize the National Guard for the duration of the emergency. The number of yearly drills increased from 24 to 48 and annual training from five to 15 days. Drill pay was authorized for the first time.
The National Defense Act Amendments of 1920
This act established that the chief of the Militia Bureau (later the National Guard Bureau) would be a National Guard officer, that National Guard officers would be assigned to the general staff and that the divisions, as used by the Guard in World War I, would be reorganized.
The National Guard Mobilization Act, 1933
Made the National Guard a component of the Army.
The National Defense Act of 1947
Section 207 (f) established the Air National Guard of the United States, under the National Guard Bureau.
The Total Force Policy, 1973
Requires all active and reserve military organizations be treated as a single force.
The Montgomery Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987
provides that a governor cannot withhold consent with regard to active duty outside the United States because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such duty. This law was challenged and upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1990 in Perpich v. Department of Defense.[15])
The John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007 Pub.L. 109-364
Federal law was changed in section 1076 so that the Governor of a state is no longer the sole commander in chief of their state's National Guard during emergencies within the state. The President of the United States will now be able to take total control of a state's National Guard units without the governor's consent.[16] In a letter to Congress all 50 governors opposed the increase in power of the president over the National Guard.[17]
The National Defense Authorization Act 2008 Pub.L. 110-181
Repeals provisions in section 1076 in Pub.L. 109-364 but still enables the President to call up the National Guard of the United States for active federal military service during Congressionally sanctioned national emergency or war. Places the National Guard Bureau directly under the Department of Defense as a joint activity. Promoted the Chief of the National Guard Bureau from a three-star to a four-star general."

The States have lost so much power in the last century; most significantly the power of electing Senators; this is part of what leads to controversies like The Blogojevich Senate Auction & The Kennedy-Schlossberg Campaign for one vote & similar nonsense due to the Constitution being stood on its head in 1917 in order to even further advance Federal Totalitarianism.

So needless to say the Governor's are in no rush to give up their National Guard Units.

FYI : Linkeage for my above legal list

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationa...(United_States)

[Ken White]

First a request -- try to avoid posting lengthy quotes, to avoid copyright issue and to conserve bandwidth, it's better to provide a link if at all possible,

Also the National Guard exists as one of the last vestiges of The Sovereign State, which edifice of history the post Lincolnian, post Dick Act Federal Government remedied by eliminating their officers in 1933. Today all NG Os are actually AR Os assigned to NG units which seems to mean that during peacetime deployments (ref: US Constitution, The "wartime" clause) they have a different Commander-in-chief from the Soldiers they lead.

I'm not sure that's totally correct. As you know, they are Officers of the Army of the United States (AUS); one of the Armies (plural) the Constitution says that Congress may raise and fund. The AUS as opposed to the USA (as in US Army, the regular army that Congress has also raised and funded) consists of the ArNG (for Federal purposes), the USAR and the USA.

The issue of a 'declared' war is IMO a false one. Forces committed to combat operations constitute a war and if the Congress funds it, they have declared it a war; if, as is true for the current fights, Congress has passed a Resolution authorizing force then they effectively declared war. Thus, ArNG troops federalized for deployments have the same CinC as their Officers; the President.

Very significant however is the fact that every Governor disagrees with every President on who controls the National Guard. Yes; including Clinton & GW Bush disagreeing with themselves on they day they moved from the Governor's Mansion to The White House.

It is a fact though we disagree on its significance. The Governors are entitled to their opinions and political preferences but my suspicion is that as long as the US Government pays in excess of 80% of the costs of the ArNG, Congress and the Courts will not be sympathetic. Membership in the ArNG is totally voluntary; anyone who was in the Guard in early 2003 should have been able to see what was going to occur as sholud anyone who joined the Guard since 2003. The Governors have no case -- political pleading, yes; legitimate complaint, no.

That said, it is my opinion that the Guard has been misused to an extent in all this; that many Guardsmen and reservists have suffered due unexpected short notice and lengthy deployments and that the Guard has done a great job.

The State Control has been a big issue in OIF, although mostly in smoky back rooms. I assert that the Governor's collectively refusing "combat" assignments for their respective forces led Pres. GW Bush to begin de-escalation & Iraqification here, among other variables.

I strongly doubt that but do not know.

The name "National Guard" is at once an homage to our French co-liberators of 1783 & a rather deceptive indicator of non-ownership.

Let me remind you that the Constitution requires Congress:

"To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;"

Seems to me that clearly states that Congress is to pay for a Militia -- and that said payment allows them to specify when the Militia may be called up for Federal duties AND that Congress may prescribe the training regimen. I'll remind you that the National Guard wanted to be the "Militia" and lobbied hard for the Dick Act; Dick himself being a MG in the Ohio Guard. That may be an example of "be careful what you want, you may get it."

Governor v. President arguments usually happen like this:
. . .
Gov: Well then if that's how it is why don't you finance them ?

Pres: I'm sorry I'm late for a.......meeting. Say hello to your family for me.

I think you should do a great deal of research into what share of your peacetime support is paid by your State (not counting add-ons like free College and other benefits that the State Guard got through the legislators) and what is paid by the Federal government. That guy at your State Headquarters is, after all, the 'US Property and Fiscal Officer,' not the ____P&FO

I feel this controversey was at work in the GW Bush administration's odd decision to defrock the US global military zone commander's of the title Commander-in-chief in favor of Combatant Commander which isn't even accurate or logical.

That wasn't the Administration, that was the then SecDef; his idea -- I ignored him, I still call them CinCs as did and do a great number of people.

To those who keep saying there's only 1 C-in-c now might I be so bold as to say actually 58 ?

Sarah Palin agrees with you. I agree with you -- until the guard is Federalized; then there's one Cinc at the top and the Joint Command Cincs a little lower.

In previous wars (again we could discuss whether we're at "war" per se Tm: Now) the Guardsmen were not federalized, not deployed, not op-conned, not called forth, not called up but "Drafted" into The National Army, WWI, or The Army of The United States, WWII, Korea, Viet-Nam; distinct from the United States Army, or regular Army. The Army of The United States is what AUS stands for.

Terminology varies widely and can be confusing. Facts matter. Like it or not, the US is involved in a war that the Congress has funded, it is thus deemed legal by most. You and others may not agree but you're a small minority. ArNGg units have been activated, deployed and done well. If you do not agree with that, it would seem your decision might be to leave the ArNG at the earliest legal opportunity. No sense staying in an organization that you believe is being wronged when it is a voluntary organization.

Seperately, I was highly offended by the statement: "People used to join the Guard for just that reason: to stay out of the regular Army that got shipped overseas and not used to bolster a destroyed dying military the way they are used now in Iraq"

I agree, that's offensive to me on several counts.

The States have lost so much power in the last century; most significantly the power of electing Senators; this is part of what leads to controversies like The Blogojevich Senate Auction & The Kennedy-Schlossberg Campaign for one vote & similar nonsense due to the Constitution being stood on its head in 1917 in order to even further advance Federal Totalitarianism.

Possibly true but that wanders off thread, into political territory and this is not a political board. Political aspects pertaining to war fighting are fair game, general politics should be left outside.

So needless to say the Governor's are in no rush to give up their National Guard Units.

I suspect some senior people in the Regular Army would like to see the ArNG absorbed by the USAR. Others would like to see both disappear and the resources they consume devoted to the Army. Neither of those things is likely to occur so I imagine that regular Army agrees with Governors; lets keep our Guard.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

I'm not sure that's totally correct. As you know, they are Officers of the Army of the United States (AUS); one of the Armies (plural) the Constitution says that Congress may raise and fund. The AUS as opposed to the USA (as in US Army, the regular army that Congress has also raised and funded) consists of the ArNG (for Federal purposes), the USAR and the USA.

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Very good commentary, sir. Am in agreement on the "War Declaration", State Control & The C-in-c titular roles.

Also FYI: There has not been an AUS since 1975.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_of_the_United_States