Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
But here is the problem identified by Shmed ...

When you do this, and the chain of command expects it all done, you get integrity problems. I too shared Schmedlap's late 90's experience of personally observing flat out falsification of reports to meet this unattainable standard. It was a big reason for the exodus of CPTs in the 94-97 year groups before 9/11, given in the Army's 2001 study on officer attrition.

Unfortunately, It took a war to get this shoved out the window. (for now)
I agree with Schmed & Cavguy (I'm a YG 97 officer, so a near contemporary of Cavguy). Most of these regulatory requirements exist to cover someone's 4th point of contact, not "for a good reason" (Patmc).

I think that most of "good reasons" are better dealt with through good leadership, and if you don't have that leadership, find a leader that does. A simplified example is the "Safetygrams" that come out regularly and are required to be posted on the unit safety bulletin board. Does a piece of paper that troopers don't read on the bulletin board make them less likely to misuse their equipment in ways that get them killed? Or is it more likely properly planned and executed training, supervised by competent NCOs?

This almost goes back to our "green army" and our "tan army" (although this doesn't work so well in the world of ACUs. In CONUS, tactical situations are "canned" and the BN or BCT level, with almost any important decision made there. Down range, we have PLs and PSGs (mostly), sometimes SLs and section SGTs, outside executing, with the full power to do everything up to employing lethal force- heck, most of the time, even that decision is made by either a E1-E4 gunner, or at most, the SGT vehicle commander in charge of the HMMWV. We trust them there, with life and death, but not here, with a whole multitude of things that are relatively less important.