Open Thread – Which US DoD Dinosaurs Would You Slay?

[Ken White]

we agree more than disagree.

...Changing DOPMA would, I think, be harder to do than tampering with the Reserves, except at the margins. But internal implementation policies and regulations - like OPMS - don't usually engage the interest of the Congress.

True, forgot that aspect. The rest of your comment is distressingly true and there a couple of other winners in OPMS needing a 21st Century thought process applied...

[Schmedlap]

Speaking as someone who never served above the battalion level (I don't mean to brag)...

Get rid of all of those ankle-biter company-level programs, like safety officer/NCO; just a waste of time that gets pencil-whipped prior to command inspections and takes leaders away from more important things (like time with their Soldiers) so that they can attend 40-hour courses on whatever additional duty they are "responsible for" and fabricate a 3-ring binder full of paperwork.

Those programs exist and have company-level personnel responsible for them because that is what Army Regulation dictates. Change the regulations. It is a tremendous drain upon companies that forces them into one of two alternatives: 1) obey the regulation and suffer the consequences of leaders being distracted from their work or being absent to attend random 40-hour courses -OR- 2) disobey the regulations in order to sustain actual readiness (versus paper readiness).

[patmc]

I agree they are a drain on manpower, and often an annoyance, but what does not get checked, does not get done. As an XO during a Corps ORA, and then the BN OIC for a BN CI, most of these regs are not followed to the letter, and are too much detail for a BN to track. If company level reps didn't take the courses, do the paperwork, and "enforce" the regs, it definately would not get done. I don't know a better alternative, other than eliminating regs, but like most things in the Army, they probably exist for a good reason. Just because leaders are not enforcing the regs does not mean they don't serve a purpose. I hate the term eat the elephant one bit at a time (due to overuse in my unit), but if leaders actually worked their areas over the course of the year, not just during inspection prep, it would not be overwhelming. Units probably waste/lose more time going into inspection prep where all other training ceases.

Don't know if it is a dinosaur per se, but stop changing uniforms for no good reason. The backlash against the new blue Army uniform continues, but doubt it will change anything.

Speaking as someone who never served above the battalion level (I don't mean to brag)...

Get rid of all of those ankle-biter company-level programs, like safety officer/NCO; just a waste of time that gets pencil-whipped prior to command inspections and takes leaders away from more important things (like time with their Soldiers) so that they can attend 40-hour courses on whatever additional duty they are "responsible for" and fabricate a 3-ring binder full of paperwork.

Those programs exist and have company-level personnel responsible for them because that is what Army Regulation dictates. Change the regulations. It is a tremendous drain upon companies that forces them into one of two alternatives: 1) obey the regulation and suffer the consequences of leaders being distracted from their work or being absent to attend random 40-hour courses -OR- 2) disobey the regulations in order to sustain actual readiness (versus paper readiness).

[reed11b]

I agree they are a drain on manpower, and often an annoyance, but what does not get checked, does not get done. As an XO during a Corps ORA, and then the BN OIC for a BN CI, most of these regs are not followed to the letter, and are too much detail for a BN to track. If company level reps didn't take the courses, do the paperwork, and "enforce" the regs, it definately would not get done. I don't know a better alternative, other than eliminating regs, but like most things in the Army, they probably exist for a good reason. Just because leaders are not enforcing the regs does not mean they don't serve a purpose. I hate the term eat the elephant one bit at a time (due to overuse in my unit), but if leaders actually worked their areas over the course of the year, not just during inspection prep, it would not be overwhelming. Units probably waste/lose more time going into inspection prep where all other training ceases.

Don't know if it is a dinosaur per se, but stop changing uniforms for no good reason. The backlash against the new blue Army uniform continues, but doubt it will change anything.

After some thought, I think I agree with patmc on this one even if though I really like what schmedlap is saying. I think what would really help would be allowing officers to spend more then a year in a position Nowhere in the real world are you mandated to get a new job title every year.
Reed

[Schmedlap]

I agree they are a drain on manpower, and often an annoyance, but what does not get checked, does not get done.

I would further assert that what gets checked also, often, does not get done. It just gets fabricated. I'm not defending it - I'm just pointing it out.

If company level reps didn't take the courses, do the paperwork, and "enforce" the regs, it definately would not get done. I don't know a better alternative, other than eliminating regs, but like most things in the Army, they probably exist for a good reason.

You and I part ways at the word "probably." I think one can see why they exist by reading the article linked in this thread. Someone gets a bright idea and the authority to implement it to its fullest and they get so focused on their specific issue that they start to think it is the most important issue out there. Suddenly you've got someone in the Pentagon dictating the implementation of some administrative nightmare that reaches its tentacles all the way down to the company/battery/troop level.

The COIN/conventional debate seems to assume that we are not able to train on both, due to time constraints and limitations on how many trades jack can be a master of. I think we far exceed those limitations when it comes to administrative programs. Just because we ensure that one NCO and/or officer in each unit is an "SME" on a program, that doesn't mean that the Soldiers in that unit will be any more capable of processing the slew of rules and regulations foisted upon them. It just means that 50 "SMEs" will be bugging them about 50 sets of rules that they cannot possibly remember. I don't see how you can get adequate enforcement of those volumes of regs without taking away from mission-oriented proficiency. I also don't see how we expect Officers to faithfully execute the 8 to 10 additional duties that they are saddled with, without detracting significantly from their other more important work. Realistically speaking, they don't. And I've never seen a commander get upset about it.

"Besides, every time I learn something new, it pushes some old stuff out of my brain. Remember that time I took a home wine making course and forgot how to drive?" - Homer Simpson

[Cavguy]

I agree they are a drain on manpower, and often an annoyance, but what does not get checked, does not get done. As an XO during a Corps ORA, and then the BN OIC for a BN CI, most of these regs are not followed to the letter, and are too much detail for a BN to track. If company level reps didn't take the courses, do the paperwork, and "enforce" the regs, it definately would not get done. I don't know a better alternative, other than eliminating regs, but like most things in the Army, they probably exist for a good reason. Just because leaders are not enforcing the regs does not mean they don't serve a purpose. I hate the term eat the elephant one bit at a time (due to overuse in my unit), but if leaders actually worked their areas over the course of the year, not just during inspection prep, it would not be overwhelming. Units probably waste/lose more time going into inspection prep where all other training ceases.

Don't know if it is a dinosaur per se, but stop changing uniforms for no good reason. The backlash against the new blue Army uniform continues, but doubt it will change anything.

But here is the problem identified by Shmed ...

Dr. Lenny Wong "Stifled Innovation?" Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. A MUST READ if you haven't before.

Of the 365 days in the year, approximately 109 days are unavailable for training due to weekends, federal holidays, payday activities, and the Christmas half-day schedule. This results in a total of about 256 available days for company commanders to plan and execute training.

Requirements for mandatory training at the company level riginate from Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training, policy letters, command training guidance, and other directives. Scrubbing all levels of command down to the Brigade level, to include Department of the Army, Major Army Command (MACOM), Corps, Division, and installation level, for anything that generates a training requirement results in the identification of over 100 distinct training requirements. Table 1 shows a partial listing of the requirements.

... Note that, as expected, most directedmission-related training requirements come from Division-level or below. More importantly, most directed nonmission-related training requirements originate from DA and MACOM levels. This is critical since policy actions may be most effective in reducing the DA and MACOM requirements.

Incorporating the amount of time necessary to execute each directed training requirement (for example, training on “The Benefits of an Honorable Discharge” takes about 60 minutes a year) results in approximately 297 days of directed training.

Of the 297 days, about 85 percent (or 254 training days) is mission-related training and 15 percent (or 43 training days) is nonmission-related training.

The number of days required by all mandatory training directives literally exceeds the number of training days available to company commanders. Company commanders somehow have to fit 297 days of mandatory requirements into 256 available training days.

When you do this, and the chain of command expects it all done, you get integrity problems. I too shared Schmedlap's late 90's experience of personally observing flat out falsification of reports to meet this unattainable standard. It was a big reason for the exodus of CPTs in the 94-97 year groups before 9/11, given in the Army's 2001 study on officer attrition.

Unfortunately, It took a war to get this shoved out the window. (for now)

[82redleg]

But here is the problem identified by Shmed ...

When you do this, and the chain of command expects it all done, you get integrity problems. I too shared Schmedlap's late 90's experience of personally observing flat out falsification of reports to meet this unattainable standard. It was a big reason for the exodus of CPTs in the 94-97 year groups before 9/11, given in the Army's 2001 study on officer attrition.

Unfortunately, It took a war to get this shoved out the window. (for now)

I agree with Schmed & Cavguy (I'm a YG 97 officer, so a near contemporary of Cavguy). Most of these regulatory requirements exist to cover someone's 4th point of contact, not "for a good reason" (Patmc).

I think that most of "good reasons" are better dealt with through good leadership, and if you don't have that leadership, find a leader that does. A simplified example is the "Safetygrams" that come out regularly and are required to be posted on the unit safety bulletin board. Does a piece of paper that troopers don't read on the bulletin board make them less likely to misuse their equipment in ways that get them killed? Or is it more likely properly planned and executed training, supervised by competent NCOs?

This almost goes back to our "green army" and our "tan army" (although this doesn't work so well in the world of ACUs. In CONUS, tactical situations are "canned" and the BN or BCT level, with almost any important decision made there. Down range, we have PLs and PSGs (mostly), sometimes SLs and section SGTs, outside executing, with the full power to do everything up to employing lethal force- heck, most of the time, even that decision is made by either a E1-E4 gunner, or at most, the SGT vehicle commander in charge of the HMMWV. We trust them there, with life and death, but not here, with a whole multitude of things that are relatively less important.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

True, forgot that aspect. The rest of your comment is distressingly true and there a couple of other winners in OPMS needing a 21st Century thought process applied...

Also the National Guard exists as one of the last vestiges of The Sovereign State, which edifice of history the post Lincolnian, post Dick Act Federal Government remedied by eliminating their officers in 1933. Today all NG Os are actually AR Os assigned to NG units which seems to mean that during peacetime deployments (ref: US Constitution, The "wartime" clause) they have a different Commander-in-chief from the Soldiers they lead.

Don't ask me if that means now, i.e. The Ol' Joint Congressional Resolution as War Declaration Question, I know not.

Probably insignificant.

Very significant however is the fact that every Governor disagrees with every President on who controls the National Guard. Yes; including Clinton & GW Bush disagreeing with themselves on they day they moved from the Governor's Mansion to The White House.

The State Control has been a big issue in OIF, although mostly in smoky back rooms. I assert that the Governor's collectively refusing "combat" assignments for their respective forces led Pres. GW Bush to begin de-escalation & Iraquification here, among other variables.

The name "National Guard" is at once an homage to our French co-liberators of 1783 & a rather deceptive indicator of non-ownership.

Governor v. President arguments usually happen like this:

Governor: Good afternoon Mr. President.

President: Good afternoon John, how are things in your State house.

Gov: Very well; thank you for supporting that bill

Pres: Well you know I'm counting on your guardsmen to help in the war effort.

Gov: Actually I don't think the people of my State want that to happen.

Pres: Well actually, I'm The Commander-in-chief and we're at war.

Gov: Well then if that's how it is why don't you finance them ?

Pres: I'm sorry I'm late for a.......meeting. Say hello to your family for me.


I feel this controversey was at work in the GW Bush administration's odd decision to defrock the US global military zone commander's of the title Commander-in-chief in favor of Combatant Commander which isn't even accurate or logical.

To those who keep saying there's only 1 C-in-c now might I be so bold as to say actually 58 ?

In previous wars (again we could discuss whether we're at "war" per se Tm: Now) the Guardsmen were not federalized, not deployed, not op-conned, not called forth, not called up but "Drafted" into The National Army, WWI, or The Army of The United States, WWII, Korea, Viet-Nam; distinct from the United States Army, or regular Army. The Army of The United States is what AUS stands for.

Seperately, I was highly offended by the statement: "People used to join the Guard for just that reason: to stay out of the regular Army that got shipped overseas and not used to bolster a destroyed dying military the way they are used now in Iraq" at http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Can_people...ard_be_drafted

There are a great many laws involved here (from Wikipedia):

"The United States Congress has enacted various laws which control the National Guard

The Militia Act of 1792
Providing for the authority of the President to call out the Militia, and providing federal standards for the organization of the Militia.
For the 111 years that the Militia Act of 1792 remained in effect, it defined the position of the militia in relation to the federal government. The War of 1812 tested this uniquely American defense establishment. To fight the War of 1812, the republic formed a small regular military and trained it to protect the frontiers and coastlines. Although it performed poorly in the offensive against Canada, the small force of regulars backed by a well-armed militia, accomplished its defensive mission well. Generals like Andrew Jackson proved that, just as they had in the Revolution, regulars and militia could be effective when employed as a team.
The Insurrection Act
The Militia Act of 1862

Providing for the service of persons of African descent in the Militia, and the emancipation of slaves owned by Confederates.
Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385: The Posse Comitatus Act of 18 June 1878
Reaction in Congress against the Reconstruction-era suspensions of Southern states' rights to organize militias led to the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act, restricting any person's use of the U.S. Army and, as later amended, the U.S. Air Force in domestic law enforcement (use of the Navy and Marine Corps, being uniformed services within the Department of Defense, is similarly restricted by statute [16]). The U.S. Coast Guard, in its peacetime role within the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Guard, when not in Federal Service, are specifically not limited by this act.
The States revise the military codes - 1881 to 1892
The Militia Act of 1903
Established the creation of the National Guard of the United States as the primary organized reserve force for the U.S. armed forces.
National Defense Act of 1916
This act abandoned the idea of an expandable Regular Army and firmly established the traditional concept of the citizens' army as the keystone of the United States defense forces. It established the concept of merging the National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Regular Army into the Army of the United States in time of war. The act further expanded the National Guard's role, and guaranteed the State militias' status as the Army's primary reserve force. The law mandated use of the term "National Guard" for that force, and the President was given authority, in case of war or national emergency, to mobilize the National Guard for the duration of the emergency. The number of yearly drills increased from 24 to 48 and annual training from five to 15 days. Drill pay was authorized for the first time.
The National Defense Act Amendments of 1920
This act established that the chief of the Militia Bureau (later the National Guard Bureau) would be a National Guard officer, that National Guard officers would be assigned to the general staff and that the divisions, as used by the Guard in World War I, would be reorganized.
The National Guard Mobilization Act, 1933
Made the National Guard a component of the Army.
The National Defense Act of 1947
Section 207 (f) established the Air National Guard of the United States, under the National Guard Bureau.
The Total Force Policy, 1973
Requires all active and reserve military organizations be treated as a single force.
The Montgomery Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987
provides that a governor cannot withhold consent with regard to active duty outside the United States because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such duty. This law was challenged and upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1990 in Perpich v. Department of Defense.[15])
The John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007 Pub.L. 109-364
Federal law was changed in section 1076 so that the Governor of a state is no longer the sole commander in chief of their state's National Guard during emergencies within the state. The President of the United States will now be able to take total control of a state's National Guard units without the governor's consent.[16] In a letter to Congress all 50 governors opposed the increase in power of the president over the National Guard.[17]
The National Defense Authorization Act 2008 Pub.L. 110-181
Repeals provisions in section 1076 in Pub.L. 109-364 but still enables the President to call up the National Guard of the United States for active federal military service during Congressionally sanctioned national emergency or war. Places the National Guard Bureau directly under the Department of Defense as a joint activity. Promoted the Chief of the National Guard Bureau from a three-star to a four-star general."

The States have lost so much power in the last century; most significantly the power of electing Senators; this is part of what leads to controversies like The Blogojevich Senate Auction & The Kennedy-Schlossberg Campaign for one vote & similar nonsense due to the Constitution being stood on its head in 1917 in order to even further advance Federal Totalitarianism.

So needless to say the Governor's are in no rush to give up their National Guard Units.

FYI : Linkeage for my above legal list

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationa...(United_States)

[Ken White]

First a request -- try to avoid posting lengthy quotes, to avoid copyright issue and to conserve bandwidth, it's better to provide a link if at all possible,

Also the National Guard exists as one of the last vestiges of The Sovereign State, which edifice of history the post Lincolnian, post Dick Act Federal Government remedied by eliminating their officers in 1933. Today all NG Os are actually AR Os assigned to NG units which seems to mean that during peacetime deployments (ref: US Constitution, The "wartime" clause) they have a different Commander-in-chief from the Soldiers they lead.

I'm not sure that's totally correct. As you know, they are Officers of the Army of the United States (AUS); one of the Armies (plural) the Constitution says that Congress may raise and fund. The AUS as opposed to the USA (as in US Army, the regular army that Congress has also raised and funded) consists of the ArNG (for Federal purposes), the USAR and the USA.

The issue of a 'declared' war is IMO a false one. Forces committed to combat operations constitute a war and if the Congress funds it, they have declared it a war; if, as is true for the current fights, Congress has passed a Resolution authorizing force then they effectively declared war. Thus, ArNG troops federalized for deployments have the same CinC as their Officers; the President.

Very significant however is the fact that every Governor disagrees with every President on who controls the National Guard. Yes; including Clinton & GW Bush disagreeing with themselves on they day they moved from the Governor's Mansion to The White House.

It is a fact though we disagree on its significance. The Governors are entitled to their opinions and political preferences but my suspicion is that as long as the US Government pays in excess of 80% of the costs of the ArNG, Congress and the Courts will not be sympathetic. Membership in the ArNG is totally voluntary; anyone who was in the Guard in early 2003 should have been able to see what was going to occur as sholud anyone who joined the Guard since 2003. The Governors have no case -- political pleading, yes; legitimate complaint, no.

That said, it is my opinion that the Guard has been misused to an extent in all this; that many Guardsmen and reservists have suffered due unexpected short notice and lengthy deployments and that the Guard has done a great job.

The State Control has been a big issue in OIF, although mostly in smoky back rooms. I assert that the Governor's collectively refusing "combat" assignments for their respective forces led Pres. GW Bush to begin de-escalation & Iraqification here, among other variables.

I strongly doubt that but do not know.

The name "National Guard" is at once an homage to our French co-liberators of 1783 & a rather deceptive indicator of non-ownership.

Let me remind you that the Constitution requires Congress:

"To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;"

Seems to me that clearly states that Congress is to pay for a Militia -- and that said payment allows them to specify when the Militia may be called up for Federal duties AND that Congress may prescribe the training regimen. I'll remind you that the National Guard wanted to be the "Militia" and lobbied hard for the Dick Act; Dick himself being a MG in the Ohio Guard. That may be an example of "be careful what you want, you may get it."

Governor v. President arguments usually happen like this:
. . .
Gov: Well then if that's how it is why don't you finance them ?

Pres: I'm sorry I'm late for a.......meeting. Say hello to your family for me.

I think you should do a great deal of research into what share of your peacetime support is paid by your State (not counting add-ons like free College and other benefits that the State Guard got through the legislators) and what is paid by the Federal government. That guy at your State Headquarters is, after all, the 'US Property and Fiscal Officer,' not the ____P&FO

I feel this controversey was at work in the GW Bush administration's odd decision to defrock the US global military zone commander's of the title Commander-in-chief in favor of Combatant Commander which isn't even accurate or logical.

That wasn't the Administration, that was the then SecDef; his idea -- I ignored him, I still call them CinCs as did and do a great number of people.

To those who keep saying there's only 1 C-in-c now might I be so bold as to say actually 58 ?

Sarah Palin agrees with you. I agree with you -- until the guard is Federalized; then there's one Cinc at the top and the Joint Command Cincs a little lower.

In previous wars (again we could discuss whether we're at "war" per se Tm: Now) the Guardsmen were not federalized, not deployed, not op-conned, not called forth, not called up but "Drafted" into The National Army, WWI, or The Army of The United States, WWII, Korea, Viet-Nam; distinct from the United States Army, or regular Army. The Army of The United States is what AUS stands for.

Terminology varies widely and can be confusing. Facts matter. Like it or not, the US is involved in a war that the Congress has funded, it is thus deemed legal by most. You and others may not agree but you're a small minority. ArNGg units have been activated, deployed and done well. If you do not agree with that, it would seem your decision might be to leave the ArNG at the earliest legal opportunity. No sense staying in an organization that you believe is being wronged when it is a voluntary organization.

Seperately, I was highly offended by the statement: "People used to join the Guard for just that reason: to stay out of the regular Army that got shipped overseas and not used to bolster a destroyed dying military the way they are used now in Iraq"

I agree, that's offensive to me on several counts.

The States have lost so much power in the last century; most significantly the power of electing Senators; this is part of what leads to controversies like The Blogojevich Senate Auction & The Kennedy-Schlossberg Campaign for one vote & similar nonsense due to the Constitution being stood on its head in 1917 in order to even further advance Federal Totalitarianism.

Possibly true but that wanders off thread, into political territory and this is not a political board. Political aspects pertaining to war fighting are fair game, general politics should be left outside.

So needless to say the Governor's are in no rush to give up their National Guard Units.

I suspect some senior people in the Regular Army would like to see the ArNG absorbed by the USAR. Others would like to see both disappear and the resources they consume devoted to the Army. Neither of those things is likely to occur so I imagine that regular Army agrees with Governors; lets keep our Guard.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

I'm not sure that's totally correct. As you know, they are Officers of the Army of the United States (AUS); one of the Armies (plural) the Constitution says that Congress may raise and fund. The AUS as opposed to the USA (as in US Army, the regular army that Congress has also raised and funded) consists of the ArNG (for Federal purposes), the USAR and the USA.

.

Very good commentary, sir. Am in agreement on the "War Declaration", State Control & The C-in-c titular roles.

Also FYI: There has not been an AUS since 1975.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_of_the_United_States

[Ken White]

Also FYI: There has not been an AUS since 1975.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_of_the_United_States

Other than those who are still around who retired with AUS behind their name...

Quiescent until the Draft is reinstituted -- thus hopefully, never...