Open Thread – Which US DoD Dinosaurs Would You Slay?

[82redleg]

But here is the problem identified by Shmed ...

When you do this, and the chain of command expects it all done, you get integrity problems. I too shared Schmedlap's late 90's experience of personally observing flat out falsification of reports to meet this unattainable standard. It was a big reason for the exodus of CPTs in the 94-97 year groups before 9/11, given in the Army's 2001 study on officer attrition.

Unfortunately, It took a war to get this shoved out the window. (for now)

I agree with Schmed & Cavguy (I'm a YG 97 officer, so a near contemporary of Cavguy). Most of these regulatory requirements exist to cover someone's 4th point of contact, not "for a good reason" (Patmc).

I think that most of "good reasons" are better dealt with through good leadership, and if you don't have that leadership, find a leader that does. A simplified example is the "Safetygrams" that come out regularly and are required to be posted on the unit safety bulletin board. Does a piece of paper that troopers don't read on the bulletin board make them less likely to misuse their equipment in ways that get them killed? Or is it more likely properly planned and executed training, supervised by competent NCOs?

This almost goes back to our "green army" and our "tan army" (although this doesn't work so well in the world of ACUs. In CONUS, tactical situations are "canned" and the BN or BCT level, with almost any important decision made there. Down range, we have PLs and PSGs (mostly), sometimes SLs and section SGTs, outside executing, with the full power to do everything up to employing lethal force- heck, most of the time, even that decision is made by either a E1-E4 gunner, or at most, the SGT vehicle commander in charge of the HMMWV. We trust them there, with life and death, but not here, with a whole multitude of things that are relatively less important.

[patmc]

I agree 100% that all those regs, required training, etc... eat up a lot of time, and are often a pain, but that does not mean you should finger drill them. That is a leadership failure if you are directing or allowing your NCOs and officers to just make up data. If something didn't get done, you need to be honest and tell higher. A false report is a false report. That said, I do suspect a lot of false data is created, but does not make it right.

I was the HHB XO, and the only LT in the Battery, so I was the OIC of every area for a Corps ORA 3 months after we returned from a deployment. I relied on all my NCO's to do their job, and told them to be honest with their areas. If things could not get done because we had no time, they developed a plan to fix them, and we continued mission. We got 90% of the stuff done, and told the commander a plan to fix the 10%, and this was briefed by my battery commander to the battalion commander. My commander was/is a good man, and he wanted an honest assessment. Same deal on the BN CI. I worked with the Commanders and 1SG's to get the inspections and fixes they needed, but I would not fudge the results, and the colonel got an accurate assessment of his battalion.

I agree training days are limited, and that is why commanders assume risk in their plans. If you are going to forgoe an area, you need to be willing to tell higher why, and not cover it up. When we start picking what regs or rules we follow, that is a slippery slope. And I will say, after both of those experiences, a lot of the regs do make sense, in the larger picture. When you see the forest, they do some good. Covering a 4th point of contact may have been the reason originally, but that does not mean it does not serve another purpose.

I will give "Stiffled Innovation" a read this week, sadly it looks accurate from the blurb.

[Bob's World]

Number one thing the army needs to unload is "The Senior Rater Profile"!

A classic "win-lose" system fostering an unhealthy form of competition, that focuses subordinates on making the boss happy over taking care of their soldiers and accomplishing the mission. This system also selects for leaders who are conservative, unimaginative, and self-serving; none of which to me are traits we want to foster in our senior leadership.

Simply adopting an objective system like the current NCOER would be a vast improvement.

I am not optimistic that such a change will ever occur, as every senior leader was by definition, successful under the senior rater profile system. To challenge the system is to challenge their very validity of their own success.

[patmc]

Well, decided to read it now, and though written in 2002, it covered a lot of the issues I experienced 2004-present. That said, I think the overwhelming problem addressed in the monograph is the command climate, not regulations.

The required training does take up many theoretical training days, but from my experience, a lot can be done concurrently to free up training. The BDE/BN Commander, however, set the tone and tempo for training. If a Commander wants Training Meetings/Command and Staff to take up a whole day, they will. If a Commander wants Command Maintenance every Monday, all day, it will be so. If a Commander wants to tell the commanders what to train, he/she will.

Preparing for a deployment, my battery commander was given the freedom to plan training, and execute. We spent weeks out in the field, training on convoys, and still conducted the mandatory training. I was the Battery Training Officer, and had to fit the Battery Commander's training in with the mandatory training, but we did it. The BN CDR told Battery Commanders to train, and actually let them. Teaching senior officers to trust their subordinates is bigger than teaching junior officers to be innovative. If given the freedom, they will be. That monograph is definately worth the read though. Thank you, sir.

[82redleg]

Pat,

I agree that we shouldn't finger drill or falsely report, and agree it is mostly a function of command.

I also agree that picking and choosing of regulations is a slippery slope.

The problem is that, as every senior leader I've ever worked for acknowledges, we've made so much "stuff" a matter of regulation (some for good reason, some to CYA, some as a matter of "fairness" or "equality" in some form or another- OPMS XXI may be an example of this) that commander's are forced to pick and choose, because it is impossible to do it all. Commanders that are going down range (vs those that just came back) are going to be focused on getting ready for that. Safety councils, POSH training, sensing sessions, etc, etc, etc, that distract from that are going to get over-ridden at some level.

Part of the problem is absolute adherence to policies (not regulations) enforced by people (either staff or senior NCOs) that aren't commanders. When I was a BC, our containers arrived back from deployment. I wanted to execute the inventory on three consecutive days. Since WED is "supposedly" SGT's Time Training, I talked over with my 1SG executing that training on THUR, in order to execute the inventory on M-T-W. When we briefed this in the BN TNG MTG, it was overridden by the S3 and CSM (the CDR was absent that week for whatever reason), because "SGTs Time has to happen on WED". Never mind that we were executing the intent (in fact, the exact same, NCO-led, NCO-planned, section level training), certain leaders can't get past it.

[Ken White]

observation...

Let me piggy back on 82redleg's comment:

"...The problem is that, as every senior leader I've ever worked for acknowledges, we've made so much "stuff" a matter of regulation (some for good reason, some to CYA, some as a matter of "fairness" or "equality" in some form or another- OPMS XXI may be an example of this) that commander's are forced to pick and choose, because it is impossible to do it all.

This was true to an extent back in th 50s and as I stuck around, the level increased every decade. When I retired from the DAC job in 1995 the sheer volume -- not only at Co level but all through the chain had a tremendously adverse impact.

The really sad thing is that in my estimation the ratio of 'good reason : CYA : equality' in 1995 was about 10 : 70 : 20. Working backwards, fairness and equality are great -- war is not fair and it should not be equal if possible...

The CYA category does include some 'lower validity' items that have morphed into CYA status because not enough time is allowed to do more than pay them lip service. The percentage of 'valid' items is in the eye of the beholder but IMO, it is abysmally low by any measure compared to the other two categories.

...it was overridden by the S3 and CSM (the CDR was absent that week for whatever reason), because "SGTs Time has to happen on WED". Never mind that we were executing the intent (in fact, the exact same, NCO-led, NCO-planned, section level training), certain leaders can't get past it.

I'm not surprised; angry, saddened -- but not surprised. The S3 made a bad decision and good commanders will not let their their Staffs intrude in that way; in the absence of the Cdr, someone was the Acting Cdr and the issue should have been resolved by him if a Battery Cdr and the 3 had a disagreement (and the 3, if senior, was the one who had a duty to refer it to the Acting Cdr and to not overrule a subordinate Cdr). The CSM deserved consultation (perhaps...) but he should've kept his nose out of it as long as the NCO element, SGTs Time, was covered. He also IMO, should have told the S3 privately he was exceeding his authority. CSMs don't have much positive power but they do have a whole lot of negative power and they should use it wisely (In my observation most do but the exceptions give the rest of us a bad name ).

What should be and what is, alas, are rarely the same. I have known over the years a number of senior people who were acutely aware of these growing problems (training distractors and staff interference) and have vowed to do something as they advanced . Some tried -- but most were constrained in what they could do by exactly the same impactors as they reached higher command -- too many Alligators and the imperiousness of the always overlarge, overpowerful, underemployed and therefor overly intrusive next higher staff.

These are problems that can only be fixed by the senior leadership of the Army raking some drastic and radical steps because the Alligators will just reproduce...

[patmc]

Sadly, I've seen stuff like that too, and again goes to command climate. I can't remember if the Bragg SGT's Time policy letter states mandated day of week, or just hours per week, but common sense should allow a commander room as long as its given equal or more time that same week. CDR, or S3 in his place, should allow it, but it is their choice to make. Those who did it a certain way back in their day are often hesitant to reinvent the wheel. I was fortunate as a battery LT, and then staff CPT, that more often than not, the Battalion Commander and CSM gave the batteries room to maneuver. Except on MEDPROS stats, but that is a different debate.

Part of the problem is absolute adherence to policies (not regulations) enforced by people (either staff or senior NCOs) that aren't commanders. When I was a BC, our containers arrived back from deployment. I wanted to execute the inventory on three consecutive days. Since WED is "supposedly" SGT's Time Training, I talked over with my 1SG executing that training on THUR, in order to execute the inventory on M-T-W. When we briefed this in the BN TNG MTG, it was overridden by the S3 and CSM (the CDR was absent that week for whatever reason), because "SGTs Time has to happen on WED". Never mind that we were executing the intent (in fact, the exact same, NCO-led, NCO-planned, section level training), certain leaders can't get past it.

[Steve Blair]

I would slay the basic personnel assignment system. It's clearly broken, and has been so for MANY years. Up or out doesn't work, and neither does a system that rotates commanders so frequently that they never really get a chance to become familiar with their troops. It undermines trust, encourages careerism, and generally works to the detriment of the military.

I'd replace it with something that harks back to the original branch system with a healthy dose of regimental identity thrown in. Maybe this is a bit "bigger" than the original intent of the question, but I do feel that the majority of our problems stem from this system.

Barring that, I'd make the Air Force adopt an NCO promotion system more in line with that of the other services. Not meeting a board until you're up for Senior Master Sergeant (they test for all other ranks) just doesn't make sense.

[Ken White]

on a large number of promotion boards at unit and DA level, I'm here to tell you the Board process is far from an all encompassing solution...

Testing for promotion has merit -- as do boards if properly structured but when things occur as they did at one DA Board I was involved with where the President told us what parameters the then-OPM Personnel Actions chief told him HAD to be applied to all potential selectees and the prime criteria was the picture...

However, your point that the current systems are archaic, out of touch, seem to exist to serve the personnel managers rather than the services is well taken.

[marct]

However, your point that the current systems are archaic, out of touch, seem to exist to serve the personnel managers rather than the services is well taken.

Too true, Ken. What bothers me is the ad that's been showing up for me on this thread after your post...

[Entropy]

Actually, the Navy doesn't use boards either until E-7. I've seen some units use a local board at the unit level to screen candidates for E-7 in the Air Force, but that seems pretty rare.

I had a big pretty post all typed up on the topic of this thread and somehow I lost it. Very frustrating. I'll try to get it back together later so I can make a substantive comment to this post.

[reed11b]

Ranger School.
Reed

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

First the only President Appointed, Senate approved individuals in DoD should be the SecDef, DepSecDef, and undersecretaries. All the rest should be hired by the SecDef within criteria set by the Congress and be career SESs.

Second, nearly all Defense Agencies and Field Activities probably could be eliminated or scaled down considerably. The litmus test would be:

What do you do to directly support the warfighter?

What functions/capabilities do you have that are not already resident in the Joint Staff, COCOMs, and Services?

If you scrubbed hard you could eliminate a lot of beauracracy and use the savings realized to plus up the similar functions/capabilities within the Mil Deps. It would be cheaper and more efficient.

[selil]

Please delete "cyber" anything. It is my specialty but like an electric engineer told me no other utility has there own department why does something as ubiquitous as computing have "cyber" agencies?

Another little thing. If you are in the military you fight. Everybody fights. I don't give a freaking flying monkey bungler if you have twelve stars on your shirt and a small boy to sweep before you. If you wear the uniform you fight. You don't sit in a command shed a continent away and "coordinate". Remove impediments to understanding by requiring EVERYBODY to fight. Staff positions are ancillary to fighting.

As a second point even more high flying and involving illicit substances if it isn't done by a soldier it isn't done. Flexible, capable, smart, and prepared are not supported by a contracting staff who quiver and charge un-godly wages of sin and sue for sexual harassment in a war zone. Everybody will say they need their contractor prepared Hagen Daz and Pizza pie.. WTF?

People whining about carrying batteries into combat (subject to explosion upon contact with water), but they want there dots ice cream. In a 130 degree heat.

Building the green zone is the biggest boondoggle in the history of the American military. The cost, the expense, the strange logistical trials of supporting that monstrosity.

Weapons and weapons systems should be serviceable in the field by the war fighter with the tools attached to the system or light enough. Lighter, faster, cleaner, sustainable, capable should be the technology feats. Not more battery, more logistics, more support... Critical, brittle, high-tech are what make contractors rich. Not a military that can fight wars.

I have more but I've likely peeved about EVERYONE off. Now to be told why none of that will happen.

[Schmedlap]

I have more but I've likely peeved about EVERYONE off.

Anyone peeved by what you wrote about the Green Zone should probably have their heads examined. I think the Green Zone should be placed under responsibility of the National Park Service and designated as a national monument... to fraud, waste, and abuse.

[CR6]

Another little thing. If you are in the military you fight. Everybody fights. I don't give a freaking flying monkey bungler if you have twelve stars on your shirt and a small boy to sweep before you. If you wear the uniform you fight. You don't sit in a command shed a continent away and "coordinate". Remove impediments to understanding by requiring EVERYBODY to fight. Staff positions are ancillary to fighting.

As a second point even more high flying and involving illicit substances if it isn't done by a soldier it isn't done.

In no way angered by what you write Sam, but am curious about how to reconcile one and two. I wear a uniform but my current job makes me responsible for the refurbishment of equipment returning from combat to prepare it for the next deployment. When I went to war, I carried a weapon and was prepared to fight. That goes with the job. But now I am a continent away. If, because I am a soldier, I should be fighting who should do my job in CONUS? According to your second point, a soldier, but how can that be done if all the soldiers are fighting? What am I missing?

Ben

[John T. Fishel]

and Senator (and the Pres, while you're at it). DOD political appointees(about 1300 in all) are there because the Congress and the Executive want them. they want to make sure the President's (and Congress') policies are followed and not misinterpreted by the permanent bureaucracy (civilian and uniformed) as happened in DS/DS with the PSRC. One of Pres Obama's best appointments, IMO, is Michelle Flournoy as USD-Policy. But where do you think she got her experience that qualified her for the post? In the Clinton Administration she was a DASD and Principal DASD (political appointments just below the level of Senate confirmation). So, there is reason for the political appointments as they stand, whether we agree or not. (BTW, the Brits do it kind of like you suggest but their career civil service has far more power than ours does.)

Cheers

JohnT

[Bullmoose Bailey]

True, forgot that aspect. The rest of your comment is distressingly true and there a couple of other winners in OPMS needing a 21st Century thought process applied...

Also the National Guard exists as one of the last vestiges of The Sovereign State, which edifice of history the post Lincolnian, post Dick Act Federal Government remedied by eliminating their officers in 1933. Today all NG Os are actually AR Os assigned to NG units which seems to mean that during peacetime deployments (ref: US Constitution, The "wartime" clause) they have a different Commander-in-chief from the Soldiers they lead.

Don't ask me if that means now, i.e. The Ol' Joint Congressional Resolution as War Declaration Question, I know not.

Probably insignificant.

Very significant however is the fact that every Governor disagrees with every President on who controls the National Guard. Yes; including Clinton & GW Bush disagreeing with themselves on they day they moved from the Governor's Mansion to The White House.

The State Control has been a big issue in OIF, although mostly in smoky back rooms. I assert that the Governor's collectively refusing "combat" assignments for their respective forces led Pres. GW Bush to begin de-escalation & Iraquification here, among other variables.

The name "National Guard" is at once an homage to our French co-liberators of 1783 & a rather deceptive indicator of non-ownership.

Governor v. President arguments usually happen like this:

Governor: Good afternoon Mr. President.

President: Good afternoon John, how are things in your State house.

Gov: Very well; thank you for supporting that bill

Pres: Well you know I'm counting on your guardsmen to help in the war effort.

Gov: Actually I don't think the people of my State want that to happen.

Pres: Well actually, I'm The Commander-in-chief and we're at war.

Gov: Well then if that's how it is why don't you finance them ?

Pres: I'm sorry I'm late for a.......meeting. Say hello to your family for me.


I feel this controversey was at work in the GW Bush administration's odd decision to defrock the US global military zone commander's of the title Commander-in-chief in favor of Combatant Commander which isn't even accurate or logical.

To those who keep saying there's only 1 C-in-c now might I be so bold as to say actually 58 ?

In previous wars (again we could discuss whether we're at "war" per se Tm: Now) the Guardsmen were not federalized, not deployed, not op-conned, not called forth, not called up but "Drafted" into The National Army, WWI, or The Army of The United States, WWII, Korea, Viet-Nam; distinct from the United States Army, or regular Army. The Army of The United States is what AUS stands for.

Seperately, I was highly offended by the statement: "People used to join the Guard for just that reason: to stay out of the regular Army that got shipped overseas and not used to bolster a destroyed dying military the way they are used now in Iraq" at http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Can_people...ard_be_drafted

There are a great many laws involved here (from Wikipedia):

"The United States Congress has enacted various laws which control the National Guard

The Militia Act of 1792
Providing for the authority of the President to call out the Militia, and providing federal standards for the organization of the Militia.
For the 111 years that the Militia Act of 1792 remained in effect, it defined the position of the militia in relation to the federal government. The War of 1812 tested this uniquely American defense establishment. To fight the War of 1812, the republic formed a small regular military and trained it to protect the frontiers and coastlines. Although it performed poorly in the offensive against Canada, the small force of regulars backed by a well-armed militia, accomplished its defensive mission well. Generals like Andrew Jackson proved that, just as they had in the Revolution, regulars and militia could be effective when employed as a team.
The Insurrection Act
The Militia Act of 1862

Providing for the service of persons of African descent in the Militia, and the emancipation of slaves owned by Confederates.
Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385: The Posse Comitatus Act of 18 June 1878
Reaction in Congress against the Reconstruction-era suspensions of Southern states' rights to organize militias led to the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act, restricting any person's use of the U.S. Army and, as later amended, the U.S. Air Force in domestic law enforcement (use of the Navy and Marine Corps, being uniformed services within the Department of Defense, is similarly restricted by statute [16]). The U.S. Coast Guard, in its peacetime role within the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Guard, when not in Federal Service, are specifically not limited by this act.
The States revise the military codes - 1881 to 1892
The Militia Act of 1903
Established the creation of the National Guard of the United States as the primary organized reserve force for the U.S. armed forces.
National Defense Act of 1916
This act abandoned the idea of an expandable Regular Army and firmly established the traditional concept of the citizens' army as the keystone of the United States defense forces. It established the concept of merging the National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Regular Army into the Army of the United States in time of war. The act further expanded the National Guard's role, and guaranteed the State militias' status as the Army's primary reserve force. The law mandated use of the term "National Guard" for that force, and the President was given authority, in case of war or national emergency, to mobilize the National Guard for the duration of the emergency. The number of yearly drills increased from 24 to 48 and annual training from five to 15 days. Drill pay was authorized for the first time.
The National Defense Act Amendments of 1920
This act established that the chief of the Militia Bureau (later the National Guard Bureau) would be a National Guard officer, that National Guard officers would be assigned to the general staff and that the divisions, as used by the Guard in World War I, would be reorganized.
The National Guard Mobilization Act, 1933
Made the National Guard a component of the Army.
The National Defense Act of 1947
Section 207 (f) established the Air National Guard of the United States, under the National Guard Bureau.
The Total Force Policy, 1973
Requires all active and reserve military organizations be treated as a single force.
The Montgomery Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987
provides that a governor cannot withhold consent with regard to active duty outside the United States because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such duty. This law was challenged and upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1990 in Perpich v. Department of Defense.[15])
The John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007 Pub.L. 109-364
Federal law was changed in section 1076 so that the Governor of a state is no longer the sole commander in chief of their state's National Guard during emergencies within the state. The President of the United States will now be able to take total control of a state's National Guard units without the governor's consent.[16] In a letter to Congress all 50 governors opposed the increase in power of the president over the National Guard.[17]
The National Defense Authorization Act 2008 Pub.L. 110-181
Repeals provisions in section 1076 in Pub.L. 109-364 but still enables the President to call up the National Guard of the United States for active federal military service during Congressionally sanctioned national emergency or war. Places the National Guard Bureau directly under the Department of Defense as a joint activity. Promoted the Chief of the National Guard Bureau from a three-star to a four-star general."

The States have lost so much power in the last century; most significantly the power of electing Senators; this is part of what leads to controversies like The Blogojevich Senate Auction & The Kennedy-Schlossberg Campaign for one vote & similar nonsense due to the Constitution being stood on its head in 1917 in order to even further advance Federal Totalitarianism.

So needless to say the Governor's are in no rush to give up their National Guard Units.

FYI : Linkeage for my above legal list

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationa...(United_States)

[selil]

In no way angered by what you write Sam, but am curious about how to reconcile one and two. I wear a uniform but my current job makes me responsible for the refurbishment of equipment returning from combat to prepare it for the next deployment. When I went to war, I carried a weapon and was prepared to fight. That goes with the job. But now I am a continent away. If, because I am a soldier, I should be fighting who should do my job in CONUS? According to your second point, a soldier, but how can that be done if all the soldiers are fighting? What am I missing?

Ben

Appologies. I should have constrained the point about fighting to in theater. In CONUS lord help us and the river don't rise we shouldn't be doing to much fighting, but a whole lot of training.

Previously in another thread I posted about "b" billets which is also a good idea for soldiers returning and to take the wear out of the training cycle. What can't be forgotten though is while serving in "b" billets "you" are in the kill chain. Everybody in that chain should be military. I know that is a huge military personnel component but it is also a lot more flexible. Every time we toss a contractor into the chow hall to serve food that is a job/billet that has to be compensated outrageously in the field. When we talk about CONUS every soldier should train. I imagine you do that. You do your job in CONUS but more importantly if you are serving in that capacity in CONUS you take that experience to the conflict zone...

I'm remembering Beirut 1982-3 and Cafeteria carts being delivered to Marines from ship for their hot meal. Another example of a systemic break down. MCAGCC supposedly has all contractor staff. Who feeds Marines in the field and what is the logistical chain to support that effort?

In barracks or in the field the roles should remain. In the Marines, every Marine is a rifleman loses something when there are 200+ contractors on a FOB necessitating protection beyond what a "b" billet Marine would require.

Highly flexible, sustainable, capable, agile, war fighter centric, mission ready, low-drag, cross-trained they all sound great and appear to be missing in the current military.

That said I critique because I take ownership and in my own small way to try to help make things right.

[Bob's World]

National Guard:

I am a huge fan of the National Guard for many reasons, but there is one important inaccuracy in Bullmoose's filabuster. I don't know the exact %, but the Guard is roughly 96% funded with federal dollars due to it's national warfighter mission. This is a tremendous value back to the states that only have to pay for what they actually use in response to a state emergency (pay, wear and tear on equipment, flight hours), and for facilities.

So when Governors try to say "I need the Guard at home in case of emergency" or "We wore out our equipment fighting a war." They really dishonor themselves by not being honest about the nature of the bargain. They get a great resource of highly trained, highly motivated, well equipped men and women that they can use whenever they want at virtually no cost to the state. The payback is that when the President calls, they go. To complain that the trucks provided to them for warfighting got worn out in the process of warfighting is little more than an attempt to PSYOP the state's populace to oppose the war on false pretenses. Not what I expect from a Governor.