General invite to attend undergraduate COIN course via Skype & in person

[Ken White]

Good points. I must admit that, in polishing off the syllabus, I focused more on finding the best readings than finding better wordings for the class descriptions. That "fear and uncertainty" part is definitely piffle and I apologise. That shouldn't have survived into the final version. The actual goal is to take apart the civilian notion that soldiers are somehow victims, so the wording runs pretty much in the opposite direction of the actual things discussed. Definitely mea culpa.

Not a problem, I wouldn't have mentioned it other than it did not track with most of your other items and comments. Such fear did exist, of course in very small minority, not perpetual but often if contact was likely. Most didn't show much or just stifled it well and got on with the job, a few had no apparent fear of much of anything. I don't recall any real dread on the part of anyone. Reporters do miss a lot.

The "lost the battles" part will question whether we focused on the right battles - "hearts and minds" versus conventional search and destroy. I understand the pride felt by those who ravaged communist forces in Vietnam but, to be blunt, there's something odd about in claiming victory in a rugby match when your opponent was playing cricket.

No question about that. My comment was aimed at several things but, since you mention rugby and cricket, I 'll do them in 60s chronology. There is no question the US Army blew it in Viet Nam. GEN Paul Harkins (formerly Patton's Third Army G3 in WW II...) and his replacement Westmoreland tried to fight a campaign in northwest Europe in the paddies of southeast Asia. Not a good plan. Abysmally stupid in fact. That ran from 62 until Westmoreland left in 68. Almost seven wasted years.

Wesmoreland's last deputy was Bruce Palmer, a Cavalryman with Pacific as opposed to European experience (and that made a huge difference, just as Templer's Italian and SOE vs. NW Europe experience made a difference) who advised the new Commander, Creighton Abrams (another NW Europe alumnus but a smart one) to radically change what was being done. Unlike Westmoreland, Abrams listened -- and acted. Also unlike Westmoreland, he reined in the MACV Staff which was dangerously out of touch (and filled with Tankers -- Infantry war, Tankers had to go somewhere. This is important, see below), CORDS was the result and the whole character of the Viet Nam war changed. No sense discussing that, Google should have tons.

We will discuss those US forces which were quite successful in their AO (from Hackworth to CAP), but will also do this with reference to the U.S.' inability to come up with the sort of overarching doctrinal change that FM 3-24 represents.

That's what I suspected and that's what's wrong. In order; Hackworth was a legend in his own mind, there were many units more successful in fact and not just under a hotshot publicity seeking commander (there were several of those) but for most of their service in country, not just for a brief period under a Showboat. What many miss and what the well meaning but woefully ignorant reporters missed at the time is that the US Army units that went to VN in in 1965-66 were pretty professional, were competent and had been training for COIN for several years; most officers and NCOS had a working knowledge of Fall and Galula and the units were good. For a year. They were extremely successful even as the MACV staff tried to push "Search and Destroy" -- many units, including both Airborne Brigades just ignored them and did the COIN thing. Then everyone rotated out.

In late 1966 the second string arrived. Literally. Brand new partly and poorly trained Privates, NCOs from the training base and Reserve unit advisors, some who hadn't been involved in any active army training for years. Officers scraped out of headquarters here and there to include many out of units in Europe -- who had never trained in COIN and couldn't spell Fall, much less Galula. Things predictably got rapidly worse instead of better. In late 1967, another changeover, to the 3rd string. Including NCOs with six months in the Army and who were graduates of a NCO Candidate course of 90 days. Officers from the DA staff. Even things that could not get worse did so...

PS: My last class had a more extensive evaluation of Tet - military victory versus strategic defeat back home and the shape of a pathetically weak South Vietnamese government. Think along those lines for what I mean by "lost the battles".

Oh, I did. You might want to do some research on Tet and why it led to the strategic defeat you say. It is not as cut and dried as most 'historians' would have you believe. The Press and some really flawed reporting are involved; not a conspiracy, just incompetence and ignorance and a refusal to acknowledge errors.

A current day counterpart is the response to Hurricane Katrina which was not that bad -- but the media said it was, so bad it will stay..

But my narrative was up to Tet. Look deeper at that. Far more importantly, you might want to read this: LINK. It discusses the war after Tet -- more importantly but similarly, after the media lost interest in it.

I first went to VN in early 66 and watched us pretty quickly and effectively start cleaning things up and by the time my year was up, things were on an upswing. Went back to VN right after Tet. I was flat horrified to see how much damage had been done in about a year. Friend of mine attributed to new commanders doing what the MACV Staff said do -- search and destroy. So you've got that right but it needs to be taken in context.

Most of 1968 consisted of switching gears, CORDS really got up to speed in 1969 -- and it worked. But by then nobody cared. The troop quality continued to deteriorate, no question -- but the effort turned around. Those Tankers I mentioned above, most had a lot of European and no Asian experience so they flooded the staffs and tried to fight big battles, a muddy Infantry LTC Bn Cdr is no match for a spiffily starched MACV Staff Colonel who flies in an says do it my way. Rugby and cricket indeed.

Another point if I may; any comparison of Viet Nam and Malaya should consider these facts:

In Malaya, Britain WAS the government, in Viet Nam the US had to ask VN permission to do most everything.

In Malaya, British troop units served for three years, in VN, US troop units lost 10% or usually more of their strength every month, Officers were rarely in position for more than six months and the one year tour effectively crippled the entire campaign.

In Malaya, the British were aided by an effective civil service and well trained and efficient Police These had been in place for many years. In VN, neither of those things existed and the poor substitutes that did were not under US control.

In Malaya there was only a short easily interdicted land border and the neighboring nation was essentially friendly. In VN, the border was long, complex abutted three nations and the neighbors were not friendly.

I could go on with a dozen more differences but you get the picture -- anyone who attempts to make comparisons betwen Malaya and Viet Nam is not thinking clearly.

Anyone who categorically says the US lost in Viet Nam may be stating a fact in some terms -- but one that is far from true in all terms. Such a view is one that likely missed the military and political lessons of Viet Nam while hewing to the media and academic 'lessons' of Viet Nam. Lost or won doesn't mean much, really, nor is there any sense in playing what might have been. What was, was and what is, is...

Not trying to change your mind on anything, just pointing out that all is not as most of the flawed histories purport to report. One thing for sure about VN -- Lot of myths about that war...