General invite to attend undergraduate COIN course via Skype & in person

[Meh]

Ken, as I suspected, we're actually singing off the same song sheet, here!

I remember taking a class on Vietnam during my second year of War Studies at the University of London. For a whole semester, I squirmed in my seat as my professor pontificated on the war. What was apparently the main effort of the war? What decided the whole thing? Rolling Thunder!!! That was all we seemed to talk about! Talk about academics out of touch. We never once discussed CORDS or even the grunt war.

Not a problem, I wouldn't have mentioned it other than it did not track with most of your other items and comments. Such fear did exist, of course in very small minority, not perpetual but often if contact was likely. Most didn't show much or just stifled it well and got on with the job, a few had no apparent fear of much of anything. I don't recall any real dread on the part of anyone.

Come to think of it, when I wrote the original syllabus description, I think I meant the uncertainty of patrolling the countryside when ambushes are likely. Sort of redundant since urban warfare's the same. I'll make sure I clearly describe the difference between rural and urban at the tactical levels in the class.

Don't worry, if I get things wrong and misrepresent the realities, the guests in attendance will rip out my eyes and sku...you get the picture.

In order; Hackworth was a legend in his own mind, there were many units more successful in fact and not just under a hotshot publicity seeking commander (there were several of those) but for most of their service in country, not just for a brief period under a Showboat.

Hack's one of my original heroes. What I specifically want to use him for is as an example of an excellent killer. I became a fan in my teens after picking up About Face from my father's bookshelf, read Steel My Soldiers' Hearts when it first came out and was impressed by his turnaround of a battalion. But upon further reading a few years later, I realised that Hack was, if anything, excellent at the job that was holding the US back - search and destroy. He never really engaged in hearts and minds while in the conventional role (nor later on, if I recall from About Face). Hack was a red herring. His notion of "out-G-ing the G" worked excellently from a tactical point of view, but operated in a political vacuum. Men like him were needed for certain missions, but "hearts and minds" had to be carried out by someone else. [I'm not in the know to comment on the veracity of his public persona]

You might want to do some research on Tet and why it led to the strategic defeat you say. It is not as cut and dried as most 'historians' would have you believe. The Press and some really flawed reporting are involved; not a conspiracy, just incompetence and ignorance and a refusal to acknowledge errors.

Absolutely agreed. I do subscribe to what I believe is the conventional wisdom on Tet: mangled the VC, seemingly refuted the president's claims and thus equally mangled the war at home.

No tactical improvements could make up for the loss of political and public will that occurred due to Westmoreland and Johnson's visions of the war. We'll be pre-exploring this part in class 12 about "the war at home", although that's not on the syllabus' description. I'll raise it towards the end of the discussion to throw people a fast ball.

Most of 1968 consisted of switching gears, CORDS really got up to speed in 1969 -- and it worked. But nobody cared. The troop quality continued to deteriorate, no question -- but the effort turned around. Those Tankers I mentioned above, most had a lot of European and no Asian experience so they flooded the staffs and tried to fight big battles, a muddy Infantry LTC Bn Cdr is no match for a spiffily starched MACV Staff Colonel who flies in an says do it my way. Rugby and cricket indeed.

That dictum we get taught in training about "a good plan now is better than a perfect plan too late" seems to apply here. We may be heading down that way in Afghanistan. We certainly headed that way in Vietnam. I'm not sure whether we'll discuss CORDS in depth rather than mentioning it in passing. Even with CORDS, the U.S. as a whole got the timing wrong - so, now the COIN effort was going better, but the conventional effort that would have negated the NVA was being wound down. I really don't envy Abrams. Anywho, the main reason we're not discussing Vietnam very much is because of the focus of the class. I tried to include everything last time and the price was paid elsewhere.

The clearest and to me most important parallel between Vietnam and OIF/OEF is the weakness of host governments. You can only pass the baton if there's another hand to grab it.

Another point if I may; any comparison of Viet Nam and Malaya should consider these facts:

In Malaya, Britain WAS the government, in Viet Nam the US had to ask VN permission to do most everything.

In Malaya, British troop units served for three years, in VN, US troop units lost 10% or usually more of their strength every month, Officers were rarely in position for more than six months and the one year tour effectively crippled the entire campaign.

And don't worry, we'll differentiate between Malaya and Vietnam. In fact, the focus of that class' discussion will be on guiding the students towards figuring out the differences.

Anyone who categorically says the US lost in Viet Nam may be stating a fact in some terms -- but one that is far from true in all terms. Such a view is one that likely missed the military and political lessons of Viet Nam while hewing to the media and academic 'lessons' of Viet Nam. Lost or won doesn't mean much, really, nor is there any sense in playing what might have been. What was, was and what is, is...

Not trying to change your mind on anything, just pointing out that all is not as most of the flawed histories purport to report. One thing for sure about VN -- Lot of myths about that war...

Agreed, actually. I think. In the end, whether you lost 10-0 (Peace and Justice Studies view) or 10-9 due to an own goal (revisionist view) doesn't matter if there isn't a rematch. You've lost. That's it. But there certainly are lessons that we'll touch upon.

Alas, I don't have the time to examine Vietnam in depth this semester. What I'm sure we can both agree on - and what seriously pisses me the bloody hell off - is that the students won't learn those lesson from other university courses on Vietnam. And that's a serious shame.

-Toby