Undergraduate Student, Help w/Counterinsurgency Debate

[FayeValentine]

This may seem trivial compared to what seems to be going on in the rest of these threads, but I'd appreciate any kind of help...

I am an undergraduate International Affairs student at Mercer University. I am enrolled in my first Int. Affairs class this semester. Each student is assigned a debate topic and position and placed against one other student. I am in the first debate this coming Thursday.

My Topic- Rise in Counterinsurgency.
My position (as given to me by my professor): Irregular warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns will define what the U.S. military will do in the future. The counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the use of minimal force, with the intent of winning the hearts and minds of a civilian population. The Army's adoption of counterinsurgency has made it a better more successful force.

My opponent's position: An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The claim that counterinsurgency improves the effectiveness of the Army encourages a more interventionist posture within the Army — a position that will make it easier for the Army to wage war in the future. The Army’s singular focus on counterinsurgency has in fact weakened it ability to wage conventional war.

I knew next to nothing about counterinsurgency before last night, and now have several days to make the best argument possible and to counter my opposition's argument well. My dad's best friend directed me to you guys. I've been researching nonstop. Any points, arguments, sources, opinions, ANYTHING, would be greatly appreciated. I'll treat you to a meal in our cafeteria next time you're in Georgia! Thanks so much.

[RTK]

This may seem trivial compared to what seems to be going on in the rest of these threads, but I'd appreciate any kind of help...

I am an undergraduate International Affairs student at Mercer University. I am enrolled in my first Int. Affairs class this semester. Each student is assigned a debate topic and position and placed against one other student. I am in the first debate this coming Thursday.

My Topic- Rise in Counterinsurgency.
My position (as given to me by my professor): Irregular warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns will define what the U.S. military will do in the future. The counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the use of minimal force, with the intent of winning the hearts and minds of a civilian population. The Army's adoption of counterinsurgency has made it a better more successful force.

My opponent's position: An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The claim that counterinsurgency improves the effectiveness of the Army encourages a more interventionist posture within the Army — a position that will make it easier for the Army to wage war in the future. The Army’s singular focus on counterinsurgency has in fact weakened it ability to wage conventional war.

I knew next to nothing about counterinsurgency before last night, and now have several days to make the best argument possible and to counter my opposition's argument well. My dad's best friend directed me to you guys. I've been researching nonstop. Any points, arguments, sources, opinions, ANYTHING, would be greatly appreciated. I'll treat you to a meal in our cafeteria next time you're in Georgia! Thanks so much.

Use the search button and look for the terms "Nagl" and "Gentile." That should give you the point/counterpoint you're looking for.

[Jedburgh]

There is a tremendous amount of discussion on that precise topic on this board. I recommend you do your own research on the forums and then come back with some more precise questions.

Lazy people don't really learn anything.

[Van]

Faye,
You have come to the right place. Check CavGuy's interview on NPR for the one side. David Kilcullen's newest book, The Accidental Guerrilla, has an interesting spin on the discussion.

[jmcavin]

If you have the time and wish to add a historical perspective to the current situation, review Marine Corps involvement in the pre-WWII "Banana Wars", specifically Nicaragua and Haiti. Many WWII leaders (such as Puller) developed tacitcal skills that were successfully employed against the Japanese Empire, in "conventional" warfare.

[Schmedlap]

My Topic- Rise in Counterinsurgency.
My position (as given to me by my professor): Irregular warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns will define what the U.S. military will do in the future...
My opponent's position: An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles....

Before wading too deep into the discussions here, I would recommend that you read the op-eds by COL Gentile here and here. He lays out the argument of your opponent. Lucky for you, most people at this site build your argument (read the comments in the blog). Your challenge is choosing which points to use, since there are so many of them! There is also a point-counterpoint here and you may want to read today's op-ed in the WSJ by Mackubin Thomas Owens, who argues on your side. I suspect that your class is focusing on big picture issues free of jargon.

Those articles will give you context. Come back to the threads here at SWJ after reading those articles. Many of the participants in the threads here are practitioners, whether past or current, and the discussions may have too much jargon or "inside baseball" talk to be understandable or useful to you. But do read these threads here at SWJ because, while some of it might be hard for you to understand due to unfamiliarity, you'll be hard pressed to find a better place for a free flow of good ideas on the topic, conducted in a civil manner.

[jmm99]

so keep it simple.

Besides the links suggested by Schmedlap, you will want to read John Nagl here, two Gian Gentile articles here & here, Robert Haddick here, Shawn Brimley here, and Andrew Bacevich here. These all are linked from Schmedlap's links.

If you manage to digest and think about all of these by Thursday, you will be doing well.

As to your opponent's position:

My opponent's position: An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The claim that counterinsurgency improves the effectiveness of the Army encourages a more interventionist posture within the Army — a position that will make it easier for the Army to wage war in the future. The Army’s singular focus on counterinsurgency has in fact weakened it ability to wage conventional war.

the underlined phrase seems to me a disconnect from reality.

From early Vietnam on to the present, the Army has been less interventionist than the civilian policy makers. The key decisions to engage in armed conflicts (of whatever nature) have been made by the Executive branch, more or less supported by Congress. The presence of any kind of additional military capacity will allow a more interventionist posture within the circle of civilian policy makers, if that is what they want. Not a big deal, but I thought the concept of an "interventionist" Army a bit odd.

[Bob's World]

My Topic- Rise in Counterinsurgency.
My position (as given to me by my professor): Irregular warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns will define what the U.S. military will do in the future. The counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the use of minimal force, with the intent of winning the hearts and minds of a civilian population. The Army's adoption of counterinsurgency has made it a better more successful force.

My opponent's position: An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The claim that counterinsurgency improves the effectiveness of the Army encourages a more interventionist posture within the Army — a position that will make it easier for the Army to wage war in the future. The Army’s singular focus on counterinsurgency has in fact weakened it ability to wage conventional war.

A couple of points worth considering:

Realizing that a good debate requires a certain polarity of thinking, I would contend that while both of these positions make valid points and raise legitimate issues; neither is "right" as they both are intentionally overstated as absolutes. The truth, as it often does, lies somewhere in between and is often obscured by all of the smoke and noise of those taking polar positions yakking at each other (that only sounds like a reference to congress, the media, etc)

But before you can talk about insurgency, you need to gain some perspective for what it is; and before you can discuss a rise in insurgency, you must understand what has historically triggered such periods of popular political violence.

In general, insurgency occurs when a government "fails" its populace. Failure being not meeting some issue or issues that can fall across the full range of Maslows heirarchy that a significant segment of the populace feels is important enought to fight over, and where legitimate means for addressing the failure are not available. Not the same as effective governance, as government can be effective (British governance of American Colonies) and fail; or it can be ineffective and succeed. The only metric that matters is how he populace feels about its governance.

Insurgency falls into three broad categories: Revolution, to change the governance of the entire state; Separatist, to break some segment of the state off and form a new state; and Resistance. (In Iraq you see all three forms at the same time, and each requires a tailored approach to resolve).

COIN efforts tend to be long, drawnout affairs largely because Governments (politicians) are even worse than most people at taking responsibility for their shortcomings. Far better to blame such failures on others and focus on "fixing them," rather than being introspective and adjusting your own actions as your main effort, and addressing the symptoms of that failure as a supporting effort.

Finally, outbreaks of insurgency tend to occur after any major disruption ends a period of major governmental control that has suppressed the ability of a wide range of populaces to self-determine their own governance. As Spain crumbled as a major power at the turn of the century (led to popular uprisings and also a scramble by other states to take over payments on old colonies), At the end of WWI a major disruption of the European Colonial system occured with similar effect. The end of WWII led to many African and Asian uprisings. Concept of a common ideology for distinct events occurs as many of these populaces turn to an ideology of communism to rally the populace for change. Post Coldwar the areas released from suppression were central europe, the middle east. Russia in large part opted not to resist, so change was relatively bloodless in Central Europe. In the Middle East the US led west is resisting such changes to the political structures the worked so hard to shape and sustain, so there is conflict. Most of thest populaces are majority Muslim, so it makes a convenient ideology to rally the populace for change.

[John T. Fishel]

the theoretical position he noted was stated by Ted Robert Gurr in his 1970 classic, Why Men Rebel. It may be summarized as follows:
1. The absolutely deprived/oppressed do not rebel.
2. Neither do those who are doing well.
3. Rebellion happens after a period of social/political/economic improvement is followed by a sudden and relatively steep downturn causing the government to lose its legitimacy.
Gurr calls this "perceived relative deprivation."
It's still the best theoretical explanation for insurgency out there.

Good luck in your debate. And don't try to bite off too much. Unse the KISS principle - "Keep It Simple Stupid"

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

.
Any points, arguments, sources, opinions, ANYTHING, would be greatly appreciated. I'll treat you to a meal in our cafeteria next time you're in Georgia! Thanks so much.

Well living in Georgia, you've seen one Russian invasion in the last year. State-v-State warfare has not gone away.

[Steve Blair]

Try the state of Georgia...United States, that is.... Last time I checked, the Red Hordes hadn't come pouring across any borders down there.

[reed11b]

Well living in Georgia, you've seen one Russian invasion in the last year. State-v-State warfare has not gone away.

I thought for sure Ft. Benning could have held them off, are they rolling into 'bama next?!?
Sorry Wilf, I could not resist, and I can never tell if you are joking or not
Reed

[William F. Owen]

I thought for sure Ft. Benning could have held them off, are they rolling into 'bama next?!?
Sorry Wilf, I could not resist, and I can never tell if you are joking or not
Reed

Try the state of Georgia...United States, that is.... Last time I checked, the Red Hordes hadn't come pouring across any borders down there.

Ahhhh!!! I figured they must have more than one cafeteria in Tbilisi!

- ah I kill me!!!

[tulanealum]

Faye,

I do hope you'll come back to let everyone here know how the debate turned out...

I do think the key weakness in your opponent's arguement (as pointed out by another poster) is the idea that a focus on COIN is going to somehow lead to a military that desires more intervention...

[FayeValentine]

I wanted to thank you guys, let you know how the debate went, and formally introduce myself. I’m sorry that I didn’t do that to begin with, please forgive me.

My name is Laurel McCormack. Faye Valentine is a femme fatale from a favorite TV series. Anyhow, I came into college thinking I wanted to be a photojournalist but knowing I wanted to do something with international affairs. We’ll see what comes of it.

I won the debate! After hearing first my and then my opponent’s case, the class voted between conventional and counterinsurgency techniques and which they thought the army should be focusing on. The score: 22 people for COIN and 2 for conventional. This is even cooler, because usually the class comes in having already made up their minds from the case study we all have to read, and the case study had more to back up conventional warfare. I’ve outlined my main points for you guys, not because it is an infallible or even great argument, but because I thought you might be interested to see what someone who’s only just got into this stuff pulled out of it.
1) Afghanistan and Iraq became deadly because the U.S. was not prepared to fight insurgents. Conventional war techniques DO NOT work in insurgency warfare, as the large amount of U.S. casualties at the middle of these wars prove, when insurgents began their attacks. Later successes in Iraq were because specific leaders were able to teach their troops counterinsurgency. In Iraq, U.S. troop causalities dropped by two-thirds from 2006 to 2008. There were only a fourth as many Iraqi civilian casualties in 2008 as 2006.
2) COIN makes troops stronger, not weaker. Opponents argue that insurgents are not skilled enemies and will not be hard to fight. They can be far more dangerous than drafted soldiers in a huge state military (using the 7th cavalry’s experience in Baghdad in 2003 as an example). They know their terrain like the back of their hands, they believe wholly in what they’re fighting for, and they do not adhere to the rules and etiquette of conventional warfare, so anything goes. As a result, troops have to become extremely mentally flexible and adaptive out of necessity. As the Counterinsurgency Field Manual states, “In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly usually wins.” You’re going to become more disciplined, accurate, aware, and flexible, not less so. Counterinsurgency used to be regulated only to the Special Forces A-Team. Throughout history, they’ve gotten into big conventional fights and are renowned for how well they do in them. It is easier to switch from COIN warfare to conventional than vice-versa.
3) Of course pulling from Nagl, we must prepare for immediate dangers first. It is guaranteed that we will continue to need counterinsurgency in the next few years, and not at all that sure that we will be fighting on huge fronts again. It is irresponsible to put more emphasis on hypothetical future wars than the wars we are committed to right now. Learning before deployment results in fewer lives lost in combat. According to the COIN field manual, America’s military history is mostly stability operations. Out of hundreds of U.S. military operations since the American Revolution, only 11 were conventional wars. As Lt. Col. Steve Leonard states, the most the most likely threats to America will come from failing states rather than aggressor states, which are “breeding grounds for the threats that we fear the most, criminal networks, international terrorists, ethnic strife, genocide."

My opponent pulled her argument entirely from our textbook’s case study on counterinsurgency. She made three main arguments:
1) Conventional warfare is where we’ve had success in the past, what we’re known for.
2) From Gentile, cited in our textbook, “the Israeli Army that stumbled its way into south Lebanon in 2006 received a sharp response by Hezbollah fighters who operated like-small unit infantry. One of the reasons for the Israeli Army's poor performance… was their heavy focus on counterinsurgency operations in the Palestinian territories for the six preceding years.”
3) What if a nuclear arms race begins with Iran or China? Counterinsurgency will not help then.

In regards to her arguments, I said it is inadequate to cite an Israeli example of this when we do not have much evidence that this is true for U.S. troops. And also that if a true nuclear war begins, arguing between COIN and conventional warfare won’t be particularly important anymore, but if we were going to have to choose, counterinsurgency would still be more effective unless we invoked the Powell Doctrine before they began to fire anything off.

I prepared by pulling all-nighters and reading every article you guys recommended, along with some others that the man who directed me to you guys recommended. I owe each of you a huge thank you for tolerating my elementary questions and being willing to share your knowledge and passion for this topic with me. That being said, I can’t stop reading about it now. I already understand more world news and make connections everywhere, including while reading Plato’s “The Republic” last night when Socrates says, “Surely the same person is a good guardian of an army who is also good at getting to know the enemies’ deliberations and other actions by stealth?” I will definitely continue to read and learn from your discussions.

I’m assuming you guys already know that there is a large article in my afore-mentioned textbook (Global Issues, Selections from the CQ Researcher, 2009 edition), in the counterinsurgency case study chapter called, “Officers Cross Swords in Online Debate,” and it is almost entirely about Small Wars Journal, citing both articles and posts from the following users on this forums: Buck Elton, Gian P. Gentile, Peter Mansoor, “Cavguy,” and Charles J. Dunlap. As I’d already posted my question and read a lot from this site before I read the chapter, I freaked out. I’d be happy to try and photocopy it and link it for you guys.

Once more, thank you so much. Really. I will be around. In fact, I’ve got two more specific questions, though they are just as elementary. What are some specific instances at any point in history where U.S. troops have had success in switching from COIN to conventional warfare? Also, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...rategy-and-th/, Tim Starr said, “If we focus solely upon conventional preparation, our enemies will hit us unconventionally. If we focus solely upon unconventional operations, our enemies will hit us conventionally.” It seems to me that this is true. I’m glad to be able to learn about all of this, but does it not endanger national security to have the COIN field manual online or for news outlets and officers, either retired or active, to so openly express and debate over what kind of techniques and training our army is moving away from and more towards?

That’s all. Whew.

[Cavguy]

Also, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...rategy-and-th/, Tim Starr said, “If we focus solely upon conventional preparation, our enemies will hit us unconventionally. If we focus solely upon unconventional operations, our enemies will hit us conventionally.” It seems to me that this is true. I’m glad to be able to learn about all of this, but does it not endanger national security to have the COIN field manual online or for news outlets and officers, either retired or active, to so openly express and debate over what kind of techniques and training our army is moving away from and more towards?

That’s all. Whew.

First, you have hit the tension that drives this debate. A wise boss of mine said one thing was for sure, that we don't know who our next war will be against and what it will look like. It is very rare countries "saw it coming". First battles are often littered with dead because of failure by one or more sides to prepare for the kind of war they found themselves fighting.

As to your second point, I feel this debate is healthy for the nation - it keeps it honest to be in the public sphere instead of closed. As far as the enemy knowing what our strategy/approach will be, the discussions are far too general/theoretical to really give anyone a tactical advantage. If we were talking about retsricted stuff, like positions, plans, and capabilities, that's a different matter.

Good job on learning about a complex subject quickly. Now the nuance of all of the above is what really make it interesting.

[Van]

CavGuy,
You beat me to the punch on the 'endanger national security' point. Damn ISP...

Lauren,
Re:

What are some specific instances at any point in history where U.S. troops have had success in switching from COIN to conventional warfare?

You could make the case that World War One represented an instance of this transition. Prior to WWI, the U.S. Army was transitioning out of the Indian Wars and frontier policing and engaging in Small Wars along the U.S. Southern Border with Pancho Villa (N.B. this is where Patton won his spurs, and voiced his regret that he couldn't arrange a saber charge). In the space of two years, the Army swelled and retrained entirely to fight in Europe.

How successful the transition was is a matter for heated debate.

Having listened to extensive discussions of Operation Rolling Thunder and Operation Rolling Thunder II (air campaigns over Viet Nam), I'm sure some would argue that this transition occured during Viet Nam. Note that COIN never ended, we just took on a conventional fight in addition to the "Hearts and Minds".

Re:

does it not endanger national security to have ... for news outlets and officers, either retired or active, to so openly express and debate over what kind of techniques and training our army is moving away from and more towards

Two answers -
1) Like cavalry, speed is security. If we are adaptable, if we can make the truth change rapidly so it doesn't matter what the opponent knows about our thinking from last week.
2) Bruce Schneier (a computer security guru), says that a really secure cipher is the one where you can place the encryption algorithm, the message, and the public key in the opponent's hands, and he or she still can't break it. By analogy, if a counter insurgency methodology is so reliant on secrecy in its concept, I would be concerned about how valid a methodology it is. We obviously need to keep operational information secure, but the concepts and principles should be out where they can be subjected to discussion and peer review. Secrecy also breeds a false sense of security ("Oh, there's no way the bad guys know about this").

does it not endanger national security to have the COIN field manual online ...?

I'm afraid you're under the mistaken belief that the U.S. military reads its own doctrine. The classic quotes regarding this:

From a Russian document:
"one of the serious problems in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals nor do they feel any obligations to follow their doctrine."

Quote from a German general officer:
"The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis."

Congratulations on a job well done!

[Ron Humphrey]

Yep their real good at dealing with elementary questions, they've had lots of practice with some of us

OTOH I can't wait to see how Gentile will feel about several of the arguments you raise

[jmm99]

that "McC" advocacy has triumphed again - and by a wide margin. Good job.

Wouldn't worry too much about what you will do when you grow up. I'm still working on that one - as is Ken White (my observational analysis, not an alleged fact).

Now, when COL Gentile enters the debate .....

PS: You also got to the core truth:

Also, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...rategy-and-th/, Tim Starr said, “If we focus solely upon conventional preparation, our enemies will hit us unconventionally. If we focus solely upon unconventional operations, our enemies will hit us conventionally.” It seems to me that this is true.

While this concept requires us to focus on both, the constraints are set by force levels and financing - since both require training and education in large measures. The "debate" in practical terms centers on this problem.

[Ken White]

...In fact, I’ve got two more specific questions, though they are just as elementary. What are some specific instances at any point in history where U.S. troops have had success in switching from COIN to conventional warfare?

I can give you two more recent than Van's example -- sort of. I say sort of because they really show two units of the US Armed forces switching from conventional to COIN and back almost on demand. THE 1st Marine Division in Korea in 1950 went into a conventional fight, did that for several months and then in early 1951 was tasked with other units including the 5th Regimental combat Team of the US Army to clear some North Korean remnants who had been by passed in the US and South Korean attack to the north the previous fall. This was effectively a COIN operation that lasted three months and was successful. The Division reverted to conventional operations afterwards. Relatively short period but the ability to shift methods and techniques was almost instantaneous each way.

Another example may be found in the operations of the two Airborne Brigades in Viet Nam in 1965-66. Both had trained extensively in COIN techniques and for conventional operations on about a 50 : 50 basis overall (there were unit variances) for the previous couple of years both performed that mission. Both also were during that period in infrequent but heavy conventional battles and went from those battles to two days later delivering truckloads of Rice to villagers.

As I said, that's a sort of an answer to your question; not precisely what you asked. I'm sure I can think of an example or two that goes directly to your question but it may take a bit (I'm old...). However, what your question really asks is "can units switch gears to change from COIN to conventional" and I submit those two examples say -- absolutely.

I'm happy you won your debate and your example shows that good preparation can carry one through. Same thing is true with units and combat -- good training (preparation) enables them to excel...

...does it not endanger national security to have the COIN field manual online or for news outlets and officers, either retired or active, to so openly express and debate over what kind of techniques and training our army is moving away from and more towards?

Van answered this well but I will throw in one more thought. It has been said that we can afford to lose COIN efforts but we cannot afford to lose a major war. That's true, I think -- and thus what we need is simply balance, we have to be able to do both and we can do that, not that hard.

Congrats on a good job.

P.S.

Pay no attention to JMM; he's worried about what he's going to do when he grows up -- I've determined to not grow up so I don't have the problem...